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ABSTRACT
The objective of this thesis is the study of the theological
methods and the analysis of the teachings of two Muslim scholars
namely Abu-Mansur Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Mahmud al-Maturidi
• • • •
(d.333/944) and Abu-l-Hasan 'Ali b. Isma'Il al-Ash'arl (260/873 -
324/935), who made a great impact on Islamic thought, played a
major role in the development of Islamic theology and later
became eponyms of two rival or parallel schools of thought, that
is the Maturldite and the Ash'arite schools.
The study is based on the original works of these two scholars
and it aims to clarify the points of agreement and differences
which were assumed to exist between these two scholars or their
respective schools. Thus the thesis has been divided into two
parts, one of which deals with the theological methodology of
al-Maturldi and al-Ash'arl, and the other part deals with their
doctrines and teachings.
In part one which consists of two chapters, an attempt is
made to analyse the methods used by al-Maturldl and al-Ash'arl.
It has been concluded that though these two scholars used similar
methods based on traditional evidences and rational arguments
in their works, it seems that al-Maturidi is more inclined to
the use of reasoning than his fellow contemporary al-Ash'ari.
Part two of the thesis comprises six chapters, from chapter
three to chapter eight. Each two chapters deal with one problem,
where an attempt is made to discuss and elucidate the views of
al-Maturidi and al-Ash'arl regarding the particular problem.
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Thus chapters three and four discuss the views of al-Maturidi
and al-Ash'ari on the problem of God's existence and His attri¬
butes. Chapters five and six deal with their views regarding
the problem of Qadar, while chapters seven and eight treat
their views on the doctrine of Iman. At the end of each two
chapters dealing with a particular problem, the disagreements
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This thesis is concerned with the study of the theological
thought and methodology of two Muslim scholars, namely al-
Maturldl (d.333/944) and al-Ash'ari (260/873 - 324/935).
Al-MaturidI was Abu-Mansur Muhammad b.Muhammad b.Mahmud al-
• • • •
Maturldl as-Samarqandi. He belonged to the Hanafite school of
thought and was called al-Maturidi after his place of birth
Maturld or Maturit, a region or village near Samarqand. There
is no detailed information about al-Maturidi*s life and develop¬
ment of thought available and even the date of his birth is the
subject of guessing work and assumptions.
Al-Ash'ari, Abu-l-Hasan 'Ali b. Isma'Il was born at Basra,
• •
where he was educated in accordance with the Mu'tazilite
teachings. Thus he became a zealous advocate of their doctrines
until the age of forty when he disagreed with them and in
particular with his master and step-father Abu-'AlI al-Jubba'I.
After a period of agony and intellectual crises he deserted the
Mu'tazilites' circle, repudiated their doctrines and disassoc¬
iated himself from them. Then he moved to Baghdad where he
declared his endorsement of the Sunnite dogma in its Hanbalite
form and devoted himself to the rational defence of this
doctrine.
Though these two scholars lived in two districts which were
considerably far apart and definitely had no contact with each
other, their names came to be linked together in the history of
Islamic theology. They were considered eponyms of two parallel
or rival schools of thoughts, namely the Maturldite and the
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Ash'arite schools, and the disagreements and agreements between
their views and doctrines were widely stated. This, however,
was not done on the basis of a genuine and serious study and
analysis of the works of al-Ash'arl and al-Maturidi, thus many
of the views expressed in this respect become open to much doubt
and confusion. It has been felt that a serious study of the
works of these two scholars is necessary in order to evaluate
their role in the development of Islamic theology. Such a study,
however, became possible only recently after the discoveries and
publication of some of the important works of al-Maturldi. It
facilitated to a greater extent the comparison between the
original views of these two scholars. It is hoped that by
analysing these works, the relationship between the thoughts
of al-Maturidi and al-Ash'ari could be established.
Notes about the Sources
This study is based mainly on the works of al-Maturidi and
al-Ash'ari. Therefore, a few words about the authenticity and
chronological order of these works must be said.
The Sources for al-Ash*art's thought: Some of al-Ash'ari's
works have been known for a considerably long period, and have
been the subject of study and critical analysis. However, they
did cause a lot of controversies concerning their authenticity,
their chronology and their place in the development of al-
Ash'ari's thought. It might be sufficient to refer in this
respect to the work of Michel Allard, Le probleme des attribute
divins dans la doctrine d' al-Ash'ari et de ses premiers grands
disciples. where he extensively investigated the authenticity
- 3 -
and chronological order of al-Ash'ari's surviving works.
Allard's conclusions are mainly as follows:
Following R.J. McCarthy, The Theology of al-Ash'arl. pp.xxv-
xxvi, Allard maintained that the Luma' was an authentic work of
al-Ash'arl, and saw no reason for doubting the authenticity of
the Risalat Istihsan al-Khawd fl 'ilm al-Kalam. He also accepted
• •
the Risalat ahl ath-Thaghr to be written by al-Ash'arl. Allard
also admitted the authenticity of the Ibana. but he pointed out
that this work underwent some revisions, which were made by al-
Ash'ari himself, in order to receive the approval of the
Hanbalites in Baghdad. Similarly, Allard asserted the authen-
•
ticity of al-Ash'arl's Kaaalat. To him, it consists of three
works originally distinct: (a) The Maqalat proper, which
intended to give an objective statement of the doctrine of
Islamic sects, and this work comprises the first volume in
Hellmut Ritter's edition. (b) The book entitled "The Fine
Point of Kalam" (kalam an-Nas fi-ad-daqiqj which deals with
points arising from Kalam. but not strictly theological, and
including the views of Christians, philosophers and other non-
Muslims. (c) A book on "The names and the attributes" (kitab
al-asma* wal-sifat). where objective^ statements of views are
followed by brief but trenchant criticisms. Allard regards the
first two parts as initially composed during al-Ash'ari's Mu'ta-
zilites period and later slightly modified after his conversion.
(Allard, pp.48-72. cf. Watt, Formative Period, pp.306-7.)
Allard's findings and conclusions concerning the authenti¬
city of al-Ash'arl's works are sufficiently documented and are
based on interior analysis of the texts along with historical
evaluation, so they must be accepted until new materials become
available. The analysis of al-Ash'ari's views, carried out in
the present thesis, confirms the views of Allard and shows
that although al-Ash'ari's works differ slightly in their emphasi
on certain points, and varied in their methodology, they mainly
agreed on the major principles and the general teachings which
he propagated.
The Sources for al-Maturldi1s thought: Regarding the sources
for al-Maturidi's thought, some works on tafsir. principles of
jurisprudence, theology and the sects, were attributed to al-
Maturldi himself, but only three of these works are believed to
have survived: Kitab al-Maqalat. Kitab at-Tawhid and Ta'wllat
al-Qur'an. It is said that a copy of Kitab al-Maqalat is to be
found in a manuscript in Turkey (Kopriilu, Ms.No. 856). Con¬
sultation of this manuscript reveals that this work is not that
of al-Maturidi, rather that it is an elucidation of some of al-
Ash'arl's views made by an unknown Ash'arite writer.
Reference to Kitab at-Tawhid. was made as early as 1953 by
Joseph Schacht, who gave a brief outline of its contents and
made an unfulfilled promise to publish the book from a unique
manuscript in Cambridge University Library. (J. Schacht, "New
Sources for the History of Muhammadan Theology" S.I, vol.1 (1953)
pp.41-42). It was not, however, until a few years ago, 1970,
that the book was published from the above mentioned manuscript,
in an excellent edition by Fathalla Kholeif. Both Schacht, in
his above mentioned article, and Kholeif in his introduction to
the edited text, expressed their viewpoint about the authenticity
of the work and that it was the work of al-Maturldl. So far,
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there is no reason to doubt their statements in this respect.
As for Ta'wilat al-Qur'an or Ta'wilat ahl as-Sunna. it has
survived in numerous Mss. In his article, "Maturidi und sein
Kitab Ta'wilat al-Qur'an", Per Islam, vol.41 (1965) pp.27-70, the
German scholar, von Manfred Gotz surveyed the surviving Mss. of this
work and made an analysis of the theological problems discussed
in this commentary. M. Mustafiz ar-Rahman edited the first two
• •
chapters (suras) of Ta'wilat for his Ph.D. thesis in 1970. The
Supreme Council of Religious Affairs in Cairo is publishing the
Ta'wilat. and the first volume was published in 1971 under the
title Tafsir al-Maturidi al-musamma Ta'wilat ahl as-Sunna.
edited by I. 'Awadain and S. 'Awadain.
Regarding the authenticity of Ta'wilat. many of the
Hanafite biographical sources attributed this work to al-
Maturidi. Ibn-Qutlubugha in his Ta.i at-Tara.iim. p. 59, mentioned
Ta'wilat as being among al-Maturidi's work and so did the author
of al-Jawahir al-Mudi'a. who highly praised the work and con-
sidered it as a unique book with which none of the work of earlier
authors, on this subject, can have any comparison. (Ibn-Abi-1-
Wafa', al-Jawahir. vol.2, p.130). Al-Pazdawi, the Hanafite
scholar, mentioned in his Usui ad-Din that he studied Ta'wilat
al-Qur'an and Kitab at-Tawhid with his father, who studied them
with his grandfather, who received them directly from al-Maturidi
himself. He complained about the abstruseness of Kitab at-
Tawhid and said that the book was difficult in style and
confused in its arrangement, but made no comment about Ta'wilat
(Usui, p.3).
Though none of these scholars doubted or questioned the
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authenticity of Ta'wilat, a statement of a Hanafite scholar
called 'Ala ad-Din Abu Bakr Muhammad b.Ahmad as-Samarqandi
(died 540/1145 ), who is believed to have made a commentary
on al-Maturldi's Ta'wllat. raised a new problem concerning this
work. According to as-Samarqandi, "The Kitab al-Ta'wIlat".
which is ascribed to al-Maturidi, is a very valuable document
and is of immense benefit for the exposition of the Sunnite
school of thought and its relation to Usui ad-din (theology),
and the school of Abu-Hanlfa and his pupils in fiqh and principles
of Jurisprudence, in a way that is compatible with the Qur'an.
This work, however, was not compiled by al-Maturidi himself like
Kitab at-Tawhld. and Kitab al-Maqalat. but it was written down
from his lectures by his distinguished pupils. Due to this fact,
Ta'wilat is simpler and easier in style than those works compiled
by al-Maturldi himself. In spite of this, however, Ta'wilat is
not entirely free from abstruseness in style, confusion and
difficulty of meaning, so much so that it needs a wide knowledge
and established background in theology and principles of juris¬
prudence in order to be properly understood. (Quotation from
as-Samarqandi•s commentary in Ta'wilat. vol.1. Introduction,
pp.18-19).
As-Samarqandi•s statement raised the point that Ta'wilat
was not written by al-Maturldl himself but by his pupils, therefore,
although it might represent al-Maturidi's views, it is quite
possible that it is not in his own words. In other words, al-
Maturldl in Ta'wilat. is not directly presenting his views as
he is doing in Tawhid, but his views are coming to us through
a mediator who may be liable to misrepresent and misinterpret
- 7 -
them. Therefore, any doubt or caution regarding the authenticity
of the Ta'wllat is justified, since those pupils of al-Maturldi
might have introduced their own views or interpolated them
with those of al-Maturidi. Such doubts could be removed or
confirmed if a method could be established which would enable
us to make sure that the views expressed in Ta'wilat are, or
are not, of al-Maturidi.
So fan, it seems that the only possible method we can use
is to compare the contents of this work with al-Maturidi*s
other works, and find out to what extent Ta'wilat agree or
disagree with them. Unfortunately, we have no work other than
Kitab at-Tawhid. whose authenticity has not been questioned so
far, so that it might be taken as a basis by which we can judge
whether Ta'wilat represents al-Maturidi's views or not. It is
true that Kitab at-Tawhid is concerned only with theological
problems, therefore only the theological points in Ta'wllat
should be considered in this respect. If a conclusion is reached
according to the comparison of these theological points, the
same conclusion might logically be applied to the whole work.
In other words, if the comparison between the theological
points in the two works proveS that Ta'wilat is a genuine work
of al-Maturidi, and unless there is stronger evidence to suggest
the contrary, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of
the remainder.
By going through Kitab at-Tawhid and al-Ta'wilat. it can
be found that the following features are held common by the two
works.
1. It is noticeable that there are certain expressions and
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terms which are often used in Kitab at-Tawhid. Al-MaturidI
more often ended his paragraphs and arguments by one of the
expressions: wala hawl wla-ouwwat illa-bil-lah. or wa -billahi
at-tawfiq. or wa Allahu al-muwaffiq. The same expressions are
often used in Ta'wilat. In both works expressions such as:
wa-l-aslu fi hadha. al-aslu 'indana. wa-'ala dhalik al-ma'Ana
• • '
wa-ma'a ma. are prevalent. Also theological terms such as:
ma'iyya (quiddity) histiyya (existence) shay'iyya (nature of
thing) and non-theological words such as qasr (compulsion),
mihna (test) and kulfa (responsibility) are frequently used.
Judging from this similarity of style, it might be assumed that
these two works are produced by one author.
2. Both works contain arguments with various Muslim and non-
Muslim sects and their viewpoints, but the refutation of the
Mu'tazilites• views and doctrines occupies the prominent place
in both the works. This might possibly indicate that the author
of the two works is one person, whose interests were mainly
directed against the Mu'tazilites. And if it is remembered
that many works against the Mu'tazilite sect were ascribed to
al-Maturldl, it is quite possible that he might have written
both Kitab at-Tawhid and the Ta'wilat.
3. It is noticeable that in both works, when al-Maturidi quotes
the Qur'an to support his views or arguments, he never gives the
s
whole verse, he sometimes referred only to its meaning, and
frequently givesonly two or three words of it.
As far as the theological contents of Ta'wilat and Kitab
at-Tawhid are concerned, it can be found that they are not only
free from contradictions, but sometimes the two works are almost
- 9 -
identical; not in arguments and expressions but in words and
construction of sentences. We find, for instance, that those
views concerning the concept of Iman and the problems related to
it, mentioned in Ta'wilat. are similar to those found in Tawhld.
•
The same definitions and arguments for God's attributes in
Tawhld are more or less found in Ta'wilat. The definitions
■
and arguments for the doctrines of God's will, the creation of
man's actions and the concept of free will and predestination
are almost alike in the two works.
This similarity is more evident in al-Maturldl*s exposition
of the doctrine of God's sitting on the throne, where we find
that five pages of Kitab at-Tawhid (pp.70-74) are reproduced
in Ta'wilat (20:5), with only one exception that a Tradition,
of not much importance as far as the exposition of the problem
is concerned, and four lines of poetry, are mentioned in Tawhld
•
and missing in Ta'wilat. and which might possibly be regarded
as interpolation in Tawhld, since al-Maturldl had no tendency
towards quoting poems in either Ta'wilat or in Tawhld. Al-
Maturidl's views on the problem of the vision of God are almost
identical in the two works, the same arguments, the same
vocabulary, the same sentences are used, and both works endeA
with the conclusion that, "The vision of God is possible without
qualification (bi-la-kayf). for quality is proper to what has
form, while He is seen without qualities such as: being standing
or sitting, leaning or hanging, contiguous or detached, advancing
or receding, short or tall, dark or light, moving or still,
touching or not touching, in or out; He ha| no quality which
imagination can grasp, or the intellect comprehend being above
- 10 -
all this, (Tawhid, p.85, 15-19; Ta'wilat. 7:143).
These few examples can be multiplied, and all indicate the
similarity between Ta'wilat and Tawhid. In spite of this agree-
ment, it is noticeable that in places where the two texts are
not identical, the formulation of the doctrines and the arrange¬
ments of arguments in Tawhid, are more systematically arranged
and more precise compared to those of the Ta'wilat. This might
be attributed to the differences between a written work compared
to that which is believed to be dictated, or to the differences
of their subjects, one being mainly on theology so it is
expected to be systematic, and precise, compared to the other
which deals with various topics of the Qur'an. It might also
be assumed that Kitab at-Tawhld was written later than Ta'wilat
so it is more refined and well arranged.
This last assumption has no conclusive evidence to support
it, but it is worth mentioning that while al-Maturidl was
discussing the problem of God's sitting on the throne in
Ta'wilat. he said that he had mentioned before various possibil¬
ities for allegorical interpretation of the terms istiwa' and
'arsh. but that he is now going to introduce a new attitude
towards this problem. His new attitude was simply that this
doctrine cannot possibly be comprehended by reason or conceived
by intellect, so one should rely only on sam* (revelation) and
accept it without any allegorical interpretation (Ta'wilat 32:4)
This attitude, which seems to represent the last development of
al-Maturidl's thought in Ta'wilat. is taken for granted in
Tawhid, where he said, "We must accept this verse, "The
Beneficent One, who is established on the Throne" (20:5) as it
- 11
stands in the Qur'an, and refrain from making a definite
interpretation of it, as it may have another meaning; we believe
in whatever God meant by it. In discussing this and similar
expressions found in the Qur'an, such as those about the vision,
etc., it is also necessary to deny tashbih and to believe in
whatever God meant without attempting to reach any definite
interpretation (Tawhid, p.74,4-10). Though this statement is
not strong evidence for assuming that the Kitab at-Tawhid was
compiled later than the Ta'wilat. it is worthy of consideration.
The Plan of the Thesis
This thesis has been constructed in the following way: it
has been divided into two parts; one of which deals with the
theological methodology of al-Maturidi and al-Ash'ari, and the
other which deals with their doctrines and teachings.
Part One consists of two chapters: one devoted to the
analysis of al-Maturidi's method in his Kitab at-Tawhid and
Ta'wilat al-Qur'an. here a section is concerned with the
investigation of al-Maturidi's conception and theory of know¬
ledge, while another section deals with his method of argument,
and a third with his method of Qur'anic interpretation.
Chapter II deals with al-Ash'ari's theological method. Due to
the noticeable differences in al-Ash*ari's works, this chapter
has to consist of four sections, each one dealing with the
method followed in one of his major four works; his methods in
the Luma*. Risalat Istihsan al-Khawd fi-'llm al-Kalam (referred
• •
to as Risala I); Risalat ahl ath-Thagr (referred to as
Risala II) and the Ibana. In conclusion to this part, the main
- 12 -
differences and agreements between al-Ash'ari and al-Maturidl
are pointed out.
Part Two of the thesis deals with the doctrines of al-
Maturidl and al-Ash'ari. It comprises six chapters from
chapter III to chapter VIII, each two chapters are devoted to
one problem, and the respective views of al-Maturldi and al-
Ash'ari on this particular problem are discussed and elucidated.
Thus chapters III and IV are devoted to the views of al-Maturldl
and al-Ash'ari on the problem of God's existence and His
attributes. Here their views on different aspects of this
problem are explored, and the methods they used in their
arguments are pointed out. Similarly in chapters V and VI
their views on the doctrine of Qadar, and their arguments in
this respect, are treated. Their doctrine of Iman and the
problem related to it occupy chapters VII and VIII. After each
two chapters a conclusion is drawn out where the points of
agreement and disagreement between al-Maturldl and al-Ash'arl
are outlined.
PART ONE
THE THEOLOGICAL METHOD OF AL-MATURIDI AND AL-ASH'ARI
INTRODUCTION
In tackling metaphysical problems the Muslim theologians
formulated their own method which was distinct from the methods
of the sufis and the philosophers. Though the theologians
depended on the Qur'an and Traditions for the formulation of their
doctrines and dogmas, they did not share the Traditionists' atti¬
tude who deplored speculation and opposed rational arguments in
respect of theological matters. Scripture, the theologians said,
is quite satisfactory for those who believe in its doctrines, but
to demonstrate the validity of these doctrines to others and to
refute contrary opinions, reasoning and rational arguments are
needed.
The theologians similarly did not agree with the sufis* method
which is drawn mainly from personal immediate experience and
depends entirely on ecstasy and intuition. They pointed out the
difficulties of such a method, its inadequacy in solving theo¬
logical problems, its liability to deception and confusion and
distortion of facts with no criterion of judgement for right and
(1)
wrong.
Though it might be said, with some reservation, that the
theologians shared the philosophers* views regarding reasoning on
metaphysical problems, the basic approach of the two parties
(1) Tashkiibru Zada, Mi ftah as-Sa'ada vol.1, pp.64-65.
• •
Ghazall, Ihya' vol.3, p.17.
- 14 -
differs considerably. While the philosophers allowed themselves
an absolute freedom in investigating and reaching their own con¬
clusions on physical and metaphysical problems, the theologians
accepted beforehand the revealed doctrines and beliefs concerning
these matters, and confined their role to the justification and
rational formulation of these dogmas. So the philosophers, as
Ibn-Khaldun said, "Study bodies in so far as they move or are
stationary, the theologians, on the other hand, study them in so
far as they serve as an argument for the Maker, in the same way,
the philosophers' study of metaphysics studies existence as such
and what it requires for its essence, the theologians' study of
metaphysics on the other hand is concerned with the existentia,
in so far as they serve as argument for Him who causes existence.
In general, to the theologians, the subject of theology is to
establish how the articles of faith, which the religious law has
laid down as correct, may be proved with the help of logical
arguments, so that heretical innovation may be refuted and doubts
and confusions concerning the articles of faith be removed."^ ^ So
while the main interest of the philosophers was to pursue knowledge
and truth and to accept whatever their logical procedures proved to
be correct, the theologians on the other hand were mainly concerned
with the exposition of the articles of faith and the defence of
the revealed dogmas by rational arguments. As a result of such an
attitude, theology was characteristically distinguished by its
apologetic outlook and the theologians engaged mainly in negative
refutation of their adversaries, rather than in positive deduction
(1) Ibn_Khaldun, Muqaddima. p.391.
and logical formulation of their doctrines. So, though the
theologians, as al-Ghazali said, "Successfully preserved orthodoxy,
defended the creed received from the prophetic source, and
rectified heretical innovations; nevertheless in so doing they
based their arguments on premisses which they took from their
opponents and which they were compelled to admit as axiomatics,
or through the consensus of the community, or bare acceptance of
Qur'an and Traditions. For the most their efforts were devoted
to making explicit the contradictions of their opponents and
criticizing them in respect of the logical consequences of
what they admitted.
Al-Maturldi and al-Ash'arl both made considerable contributions
to the establishment and formulation of the theological movements
and methods. Each of them laid down his own method upon which a
school was founded, and which occupies the following two chapters.
(1) Vein Ess, Josef, "The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology"
in Logic in Classical Islamic Culture. Ed. G.E. von
Grunebaum. pp.24-26.




THE THEOLOGICAL METHOD OP AL-MATURIDI
1. Al-Maturidi1s Theory of Knowledge
In the early formative period of Islamic theology the main
divisions concerning theological methods developed. The
Mu'tazilite theologians dealt with various aspects of human know¬
ledge, its sources and its relation to religious truth. They
acknowledged the importance of sense-organs in attaining sensual
(2)
knowledge, and stated in detail how the senses conceive things;
they emphasized the role of reason as a source of knowledge, its
function in the field of religion, and went to the extent of
maintaining that reflection is incumbent upon man even before the
(3)
coming of revelation. Moreover, many works which deal with
epistemology were attributed to the Mu'tazilites, but since none
of these works is extant we are unable to investigate the methods
used. Al-Maturidi has generally been accepted as the first theo¬
logian to preface a theological work with a discussion of
(4)
epistemological problems, if only because his Kitab at-Tawhid.
which begins with a refutation of taqlid. and a definition of the
sources of knowledge, is the earliest work of this type to survive.
(1) Maqalat. pp.50-53. Where different views on epistemology
were attributed to the Shi'ites and the Mu'tazilites.
(2) Ibid, pp.382-387.
(3) Iqdam. pp.460-6l.
(4) J. Schacht, "New Sources for the History of Muhammadan
Theology" S.I, vol.1 (1953) p.41.
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The Sources of Knowledge
According to al-Maturldl, the means for attaining the know¬
ledge of the realities of things are three: (a) sense-perceptions
('i.yan). (b) reports (akhbar) and (c) reflection or reasoning
(nazar aw istidlal). ^ ^
(a) The sense perception fivan)
Al-Maturldi used the term 'iyan as an equivalent for the
term hawass which is the term generally used by the theologians
and the philosophers. Al-Maturidi maintained that 'iyan are the
cause of all sensual knowledge and all that which comes under the
perception of the organs of the senses. Such a knowledge is the
origin of true knowledge and there should not be any doubt about
its validity. To al-Maturidi, anyone who denies the validity of
such knowledge is obstinate or self-willed and is baser than an
animal, since all animals know through their sense organs what
preserves and destroys them, and what causes them pleasure and
pain, while he denies this. To al-Maturidi, argument with a man
who holds such views is useless, but he may be jokingly asked
(yumazah) "Do you know that you deny?", if he says, "No" his
denial stands cancelled, but if he answers affirmatively, he admits
the reality of his denial and thereby he defeats his own argument.
A more suitable way to deal with such a person is to cause him
some violent pain such as cutting his limbs until he deserts his
( 2)
obstinacy and admits the reality of sensual knowledge.




the later theologians to the Sceptics. Al-Maturldl attributed
to them the absolute denial of the possibility of knowledge.
Though al-Maturidi suggested that the best method to silence a
person holding such an attitude is to be subjected to physical
torture, he nevertheless put forward the objections raised
against the validity of sensual knowledge, and tried to refute
them by theoretical arguments. He accused those who held such
views as being misled by the devil. To him, they denied sensual
knowledge because to them sense-perceptions might sometimes err
as in the case of the squint-eyed who see one to be two, and of
the bilious who finds honey bitter. They also maintained that
it is observable that the object which the sense organs yield
might sometimes give a different account from what one gets by
reflection (ta'ammul), the defective sight conceiveS things
differently, and a man in his dreams sees things which have no
real existence or which are different from the existing things.
Moreover, things seen at distance are different when one sees them
closely. Finally, there are certain things which are so tiny that
(2)
senses do not perceive them. So the appearance of things is
deceptive and therefore sense organs cannot be trusted as a means
for attaining knowledge.
Al-Maturldi refuted the views of the Sceptics by stating that
the very arguments they used are sufficient proofs for the
(1) Baghdad!, Usui, pp.6-7. Taftazani, *Aqa'id. pp.20-21.
RazI, Muhassal, pp.6-13. cf. Watt, "The Theological Basis
• • •
of Early Kalam" I.Q. vol.vi (1961) pp.5-6.
(2) Tawhid, pp.25-26.
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affirmation and validity of the knowledge coming through the
senses, because unless they did have knowledge of the sense-
objects (mahsusat) they would not have been able to distinguish
between them in different circumstances. As for the case of
defective sight, state of sleep, long distance, and the thin¬
ness of things, al-Maturidi maintains that these are obstacles;
it is true that one does not get true knowledge in such cases,
but when these obstacles removed, the true nature of the
thing can be obtained. Thus these afat or defects are temporary
disturbances and should not entail mistrust of the senses them¬
selves, nor the denial of the sense-objects altogether.^^ Al-
Maturldl emphasized this point repeatedly and stated unequivocally
that the knowledge of the things perceived by the senses differs
according to the different states of the senses, in the case of
defects one knows what defect he has and knows that this defect
is an obstacle which might lead to the distortion of the real
knowledge of things, or even to the occlusion of the object
(2)
altogether according to the varying conditions of the senses.
Moreover, when a man perceives an object he does so from a
certain direction (jiha). and to this direction there corresponds
a certain aspect (jiha) of the object perceived. When an obstacle
partly obstructs the sense-organ, or veils it altogether, the
same applies to the object perceived. Thus it cannot be perceived
in the case of complete defects, while in the state of perfect
condition it can be fully perceived, and according to the
(1) Tawhid. p.26, 6-10.
(2) Ibid, p.154, 8-14.
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proportion of defects the perception of it varies. All this is
well known by one's own sensual experiences; so, according to al-
Maturidi, there may be no argument regarding the knowledge
attained through the perception of the senses.
(b) Reports (akhbar)
The second source for the attainment of knowledge is reports
which, according to al-Maturidl, are our means for knowing our
names, genealogies, the names of things, remote countries, past
events, foods, medicines, what is harmful and what is useful,
and all that which our lives do not enable us to witness for our¬
selves. Reports, however, are of two kinds: 1 - general reports,
and 2 - the reports of the prophet. Al-Maturldi argued against
those who denied the validity of the general reports as a source
(2)of knowledge, and accused them of being in no better position
than those who denied the validity of the knowledge via the senses;
similarly they are stubborn and obstinate since they are denying
necessary knowledge. According to al-Maturldl, he who denies
reports is actually refuting his attitude with his own denial,
because his denial is nothing but a report. Furthermore, the
denial of reports renders a man ignorant of his genealogy, his
name, his essence and the names of all things and leads to complete
ignorance and inability to give information about anything
(1) Tawhid, p.155, 3-10.
(2) Ibid, p.7, 14-18. The denial of knowledge depending upon
reports were attributed to the Barahima and the Sumaniyya.
Baghdad!, Usui, p.11. It is also ascribed to the Barahima
the refutation of prophecy altogether. Fazlur-Rahman, art.
"Barahima", E.I.^ vol.i. p.1031.
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witnessed, not to mention the unseen (gha'lb). ^ ^ To al-Maturldl
the argument that reports are liable to fabrication even after
they become widespread does not necessarily entail the invalidity
of all reports, since fabrication is a defect motivated by a
certain weakness on the part of the fabricator; so it must be
considered as a temporary and not a permanent defect and no cause
for the denial of the validity of knowledge attained by reports.
Moreover, there are so many reports whose authenticity has been
established so why should we not consider them as basis for
(2)
argument and ignore the others. Argument with one who holds
the attitude that all reports should be denied, al-Maturldi said,
is useless but he might be jokingly asked when he denies reports,
"what do you say?" If he repeats what he has said, then he ipso
facto affirms reports, if he did not repeat what he has said then
(3)
you have been protected from his stupidity. A more effective
method to deal with such a person is to subject him to physical
pain and if he complains of pain, he should be told that his words
are nothing but reports which cannot convey any real knowledge,
and he should be treated thus until he finally admits the
(4)
validity of reports.
For the other kind of reports, i.e. the Prophets' reports,
al-Maturldi holds that if reason makes it necessary for everyone
to accept the validity of the general reports, then the reports of
(1) Tawhld. p.7, 14-18.
(2) Ibid, pp.26,14-21; 27,1-2.
(3) Ibid, p.8,5-8.
(4) Ibid, pp.8.9-12: 27,3-4.
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the Prophets should necessarily be accepted, since there are no
reports the truth of which is more evident than theirs, because
of the signs they have, which demonstrate their truth, and that
there is no report in which the heart has confidence more
evidently truthful than the report of the Prophets. So whoever
denies this deserves most to be judged obdurate and stubborn.
These reports coming from the Prophet, however, are handed down
through chains of narrators who are liable to lie and to be
mistaken, because they have no proofs showing their absolute
truthfulness and immunity from mistakes. So these reports must be
scrutinized; if their authenticity has been established beyond
doubt, and their transmitters are the sort of people who never
U _
commit fabrication, such reports are called mutwatlr (widely
(2)
transmitted statements). Other kinds of report are of lesser
11 -
degree of authenticity than the mutwatir, and do not reach its
a
standard in necessitating knowledge. This kind of report should
be subjected to scrutiny of its contents and examination of its
narrators, to see whether its transmitters can be trusted or not,
and to what extent its contents are in line with the Scripture
(sam*) i.e. the Qur'an and other authentic Traditions; and it
(3)
necessitates action according to the outcome of this test.
So according to al-Maturldl, reports in general must be
accepted as a source of knowledge, since there is no ground to
reject their validity. The Traditions of the Prophet are worthier
(1) Tawhid, p.14-18.
(2) Ibid, pp.8,18-20; 9,1-8.
(3) Ibid, p.9, 15.
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of acceptance, they, however, fall under two categories:
4 -
mutwatir. whose authenticity is beyond doubt and must be accepted
p-
4 _
and acted upon accordingly; ghayr-mutwatir. which is of a lesser
IV
<x -
degree of authenticity than the mutwatir. and this should be
A.
subject to test of isnad and matn, and accepted or rejected
according to the result of the test.
Al-Maturldl*s defence of worthy transmitted Traditions seems
to have been directed against some of the Mu'tazilites, who were
thought to have denied the value of tawatur as an evidence for
establishing religious doctrines. They said that it is quite
possible that one of these people who transmitted such a Tradition
might be lying, thus it follows that they all might agree to lie.^^
His defence of general reports might have been directed against
those who denied prophecy and refuted the validity of reports as
a method for establishing it. Among those al-Maturidl mentioned
al-Warraq who, on the one hand, considered the reports of the
Prophet as reports of single individual, therefore they are not
valid, while on the other hand he refuted the validity of tawatur.
(2)
by using certain arguments similar to those of the Mu'tazilites.
Having been aware of the consequences of such a criticism, al-
Maturldi introduced the above mentioned arguments. He also pointed
out that the refutation of reports leads to the refutation of
revelation and history, and entails the negation of all knowledge
whether related to this life or to the life to come. He argued
(1) These views were attributed to an-Nazzam and those who
» •
followed him. Baghdad!, Usui. p.20. IJi, Mawaqif. vol.8.p.380.
(2) Tawhid, p.196, 14-17.
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that reports usually spread according to the events they carry.
So if a king died, the news of his death would be known in spite
of the energetic attempts to suppress them. Reports about the
appearance of a prophet are of the same kind, thus it would be
wrong to assume that they are transmitted by a single individual.^^
(c) Reason or Reflection (nazar)
The third means for attaining knowledge in al-Maturldl•s
system is reason. Al-Maturldi used the terms nazar (reflection),
istidlal (deduction) and *aql to convey the meaning of intellectual
activity and rational argument. He gave reason prominent place
in his methodology and set out to establish the validity of reason
as a means of acquiring sound knowledge, and argued against those
who denied its validity. Thus,to establish the importance of
reasoning and reflection, al-Maturldi introduced the following
arguments:
1. He stated that reflection is a requisite as a criterion for
knowledge attained by the senses and for knowledge based on
reports, especially in cases where the senses or the object seen
have some defects or where the reports were liable to fabrication;
in such cases, reason is required to decide where the truth lies.
Reflection is also indispensable for distinguishing between the
(2)
true signs of the messengers of God and pretence of sorcerers.
2. The validity of nazar has also been established by the
Qur'anic texts where man has been commanded to reflect upon God's
signs on the earth and in the sky and in all creatures. Many
(1) Tawhld.pp.197-98.
(2) Ibid, p.9, 16-19.
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Qur'anic verses enjoin man to ponder and consider what is around
him. "We shall show them our signs in the skies and in themselves
until it becomes clear to them that it is the truth"; "What,
do they not consider how camels were created, how heaven was
lifted up, how the mountains were raised, how the earth was out-
(2)
stretched"; "Behold in the creation of the heavens and the
earth, in the alternation of the night and the day ... indeed are
(3)
signs for a people that are wise." In these and other similar
verses, al-Maturidi said, God requires man to consider, He makes
it necessary for him to reflect and commands him to think and
ponder, and tells us that these are the means leading to the
(4)
attainment of truth.
3. Those who repudiate reason must perforce repudiate it
rationally, thus by their very refutation of reason they prove
(5)
the necessity of reasoning.
4. The exercise of reasoning and reflection is necessary for
attaining to the knowledge of the wisdom in the creation of the
world which is a necessary method for establishing knowledge of
God.
5. Mankind has been endowed with a power to control other
creatures and through trial he has to acquire what benefits him,




(4) Tawhid. p.10, \1-6.
(5) Ibid. 7-8.
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by using reason and by reflection upon things.
6. Everyone afflicted by vicissitudes or being confronted by
puzzling situations, seeks refuge in reason and reflection, this
indicates that reason leads to truth and that facts can be attained
by using it. This is similar to the resort to sight in confusion
of colours, and to hearing in the case of confusion of sounds.
7. Reason and reflection are the only means for attaining the
ultimate knowledge of the goodness and evilness of things after
good and evil have been perceived by the senses or known through
reports, and this illustrates the importance of reason in this
+ (Drespect.
8. Mankind has been created with a natural disposition (tab*)
and reason, and what is recommended by reason might not be desired
by natural disposition, and what is disapproved by reason might
not be disliked by disposition, so they might be mostly in conflict,
therefore reflection on and investigation of every individual case
(2)(amr) is necessary in order to know of what nature and kind it is.
Thus it becomes clear that the validity of reason and reflection
is well established by scriptural evidences and rational proofs,
which necessitate the using of reason for attaining the benefits
of this world and salvation in the world to come. Then, al-
Maturldi proceeds to refute the views of those who reject and deny
the validity of reflection. He stated that some people refrain
from using their intellectual power on the presumption that (a)
there is no certainty that reasoning and reflection will lead to
(1) Tawhid. p.10,8-20.
(2) Ibid, pp.10.20; 11,1-3.
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true knowledge; (b) by reasoning one will lay himself open to
the possibility of being blamed for his conclusions if they were
objectionable, because he trusted his reason and carried his own
responsibility, while by refraining from reflection he will avoid
all these risks; (c) the matters related to the sphere of God,
i.e. His prohibitions and commands, and those matters instigated
by the devils are too confused to be distinguished by reason, so
by avoiding reflection one will be safe from indulging in such
matters.^ ^
Al-Maturldi did not ascribe these views to any particular-
group or sect, he, however, set out to refute them by stating
clearly that reflection and reasoning are necessary for attaining
and explaining truth, and that the abandonment of reflection leads
(2)
to the destruction of man ('atabuhu). He pointed out that by
his own inquisitive nature, and through his intellectual capacity
man is bound to reflect and to think. Moreover, if we consider
the position of man in relation to the affairs of this world, we
find that he is naturally made up of longing for survival and fear
of destruction; his intellect holds him from indulging in the
sensual pleasure which leads to his destruction. Therefore, he
must look for what is suitable for him, and acquire what benefits
him and avoid what causes him harm. This might be achieved either
by looking for a trustworthy guide and following his opinions,
which needs the use of reason to know whether the person meant is




things. Both ways necessitate reflection and thinking. If the
psychological composition were examined, it would be found that
man'8 ignorance of the desires which he is naturally disposed to
follow, and that which his own self tempts him to commit, though
it might cause him harm and grave pain, must compel him to think
and reflect upon his own state. He may ask himself such questions
as: how have I come into such a state? have I eternally been
like this? and what are the forces behind my being in that
condition? So man is never free from such ideas which prevent
him from the abandoning of reflection about himself, because he
wishes to know the principles of his composition and the causes of
his construction. Therefore, according to al-Maturidl, man's
position in the world and his psychological composition obliges
him to reflect and to use his intellect in order to attain what
benefits him and to avoid what causes him harm, and to get a better
understanding of himself.
Al-Maturldi believes that what leads to the abandonment of
reasoning and reflection is the devil, in order to turn man away
from the advantages of reasoning and to make man prisoner of his
desires and lusts, which eventually lead to his destruction. To
illustrate this point al-Maturidi uses the following arguments:
He pointed out that reflection and thinking on the nature of things
ai- _
to discover their elements and outcome (mabadi* wal-nihayat) and
to demonstrate their origination and the existence of their
originator, pre-occupies man and distracts him from what would
(2)
destroy him. Moreover, since it is not wise of man to neglect
(1) Tawhid. pp.135,14-21; 136,1-8.
(2) Ibid, p.136,9-13.
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his senses, or hinder them from performing their natural task,
then reason deserves all the more not to be neglected or distracted
from its duty.^^ Furthermore, al-Maturldi said, reasoning and
reflection lead man either: (a) to know that he is created and
that he has a creator who rewards him for performing good deeds,
and punishes him for committing evil acts, in which case he will
avoid what displeases Him and devote himself to what pleases Him,
and thus he will attain to happiness in this world and salvation
in the hereafter; (b) or to an opposite conclusion, therefore
he will enjoy the pleasures of this life and be punished in the
world to come; (c) or to the conclusion that true knowledge of
such matters is incomprehensible, and thus he will be satisfied
and stop worrying and bothering himself about such thoughts and
ideas. So, according to al-Maturidi, a man gains whatever may
(2)
be the outcome of his reflection and thinking.
(d) al-Maturidi ' s rejection of ^taqlid. ilham and ta'lim:
In accordance with his conception of knowledge and its sources
al-Maturidi rejected taqlid (blind imitation), ilham (inspiration)
and taflim (authoritative instruction) as means for attaining
knowledge. He begins his Kitab at-Tawh?d by the statement that,
"we have found that people are of different opinions and of
different sects regarding religion. In spite of these differences,
however, it is found that each one of them holds that what he
believes in is the truth, while what others follow is false; and
(1) Tawhld. p.136, 13-16.
(2) Ibid. 16-22.
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that all of them had predecessors whom they followed unquestionably
(yuaallad). This showed that taqlld provides nothing in which
one should seek refuge to support his views because another
muqallid. may on the same process reach an opposite conclusion.^^
So taqlld is invalid and cannot be rationally accepted because it
is not more than accumulation of blind followers and it produces
no convincing arguments for the correctness of what is followed.
It, however, might be valid if two conditions have been realized:
if the muqallad is one of those who originate teachings and has
a rational argument by which the correctness of what he claims
may be known, and a proof which convinces the judicious that he
has attained the truth. The second condition is that the muqallid
should know the truth of what his authority professes. It seems
that al-Maturldi is referring by the religious authority to the
prophet, who introduces original teachings, along with the proofs
of their correctness, and thereby practically renders other views
futile. To al-Maturidi, such an authority should be followed with
(2)
awareness and understanding on the muqallid's part , and here it
might be asked, if these conditions have been realized, will the
term taqlid be appropriately applicable?
Regarding ilham, al-Maturidi stated that people hold different
views regarding the methods by which right behaviour, truth, good
deeds and their opposites might be known. Some hold that man's
heart is the source of such knowledge and therefore he should
follow and stick to whatever his heart tells him to be true and
right. Others maintain that man is not capable of knowing the
(1) Tawhld, p.3,7-11.
(2) Ibid, pp.3,11-14; 4,1-4.
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causes of things, so he must follow what has been inspired in him
by God who knows better about all the affairs of this world.
The first attitude seems to be identical with that of the
Sceptics who asserted that the realities of things follow from
what one happens to believe, so if one happens to believe a thing
(2)
is right, it is right, but if wrong it is wrong. The other
view is that of the Sufis who maintained that their knowledge is
attained through inspiration from God who casts the truth into
their purified hearts, and thus their knowledge comes through
ilham and not by reflection and reasoning.
Al-Maturldl rejected and criticized the Sceptic's views in
- (4)
his Kitab at-Tawhid , so by mentioning them in connection with
the Sufi's attitude, he is presumably implying that the two
attitudes have something in common. Since both hold that the
?kheart or what one believes, is the source of knowledge; and tfcfet
both introduce no proofs or arguments for what they hold, al-
Maturidi rejected the two views as being sources of knowledge.
According to him, it is unlikely that the two methods could lead
to knowledge because mutual contradiction and contrast among
religions and doctrines is quite evident, and the follower of
every religion assumes that truth is on his side, but it is
inconceivable that all these contradictory views are correct and
are attained on the basis of ilham from God, otherwise such a god
(1) Tawhid, p.6,4-7.
(2) Watt, "The Theological Basis of Early Kalam", pp.5-6.
(3) Ghazali, Ihya'. vol.3, p.16.
(4) Tawhid. pp.153-154.
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could not be trusted since he is presenting truth as false and
vice versa. Moreover, every follower of a doctrine holds his
doctrine on the basis of his own inspiration, and by the same
criterion considers the others' doctrines as wrong, none, however,
has proofs which the others have not. Such a situation and
attitude cannot lead to truth and reconciliation between the
contending groups.
Al-Maturldi also rejected the Batinite view that knowledge
is attainable only from the infallible Imam, who it is said has
charge of the truth and receives instruction from the prophet,
and not acquired by reflection and reasoning. Commenting on
the Qur'anic verse, 36:78, al-Maturidi said this verse refutes
the Batinite claim that knowledge results from the instructions
of the infallible Imam. If such a view were correct, then the
verses, 36:78 and 30:8, which encourage reflection and thinking,
will be rendered meaningless. Contrary to the Batinite view,
these verses show that knowledge of religious matters is
attainable by reflection and reasoning as well as by the reports
from the prophet whose truthfulness has been established; man,
therefore, must abide by what is given by these two sources,
(2)
and not by what he assumed to come from other sources.
2. Reason and Revelation
Though al-Maturidi emphasized the importance of reason and




aware of its shortcomings and defects, and that there are certain
limits beyond which it should not venture. He stated that
rational knowledge is based either on data provided by the senses
or arguments and proofs; such a knowledge, however, is unable to
grasp the essence of things. Its role is limited to distinguishing
between things through the qualities which make them different
or compounds (mukhtalifat wa-mu'talifat). In other words,
through reason, knowledge of the causes of things as well as the
proofs of demonstration can be obtained, but the real essence of
things cannot be comprehended.^^ Its role is similar to that of
a road which leads to different districts of town, but it does
(2)
not give the exact picture of the town itself. With regard
to metaphysical problems, reason falls short of comprehending the
essence of God, which is beyond the reach of human intellect.
Due to this fact, revelation is needed to provide man with such
knowledge.
Al-Maturidi devoted a special section to show on one hand
how unaided reason is unable to fulfil man's desire for knowledge
and, on the other hand, to demonstrate the importance and validity
of revelation. He argued that:
1. To sustain their life people need nourishment and cures for
illness; but there are different kinds of foodstuffs and medicine,
some of which are deadly poisons, hence, reason which has no
valid method of attaining this knowledge, recommends that not




because such a trial might lead to one's destruction; thus
reason shows the need for a man to whom God has revealed this
information.^^
2. Prom the beginning reason has had no methods of knowing
agricultural affairs, medical sciences, different crafts and
professions, trade and business, various languages, and the
methods of procreation and education of children, thus men
depend on each other for the knowledge of such matters. This
proves that the principles of these sciences are known by
instruction and education and not by deduction of reason. Also
people resort to each other in time of difficulties seeking the
help of those who are wiser, they also educate themselves by
studying with learned men, all of which indicates that human
intellect is insufficient for attaining all that man needs, and
(2)
so it is necessary to resort to a reliable advisor (nasih saduq).
• • •
3. Reason acknowledges the necessity of the knowledge of God,
and that man should thank Him for His numerous graces, but it
cannot decide how this task should be accomplished. Also the
physical and mental composition of man indicates that he is
created in order to worship God, but reason has no authority to
tell how this worship should be performed, so revelation is needed
in these two aspects to define and stipulate the methods and ways
(3)of thanks and worship.
4. Disagreements and disputes among people as to who is the
(1) Tawhid. p.179,13-18.
(2) Ibid.. pp.179,19-20; 180,1-22.
(3) Ibid p. 181 .1 -21.
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possessor of the real truth are evident, along with their
unanimous agreement that there is no authority among them to
whom they may resort for deciding with whom the truth might be.
Since reason considers disagreement as the origin of all decay
and an antecedent to destruction, it deems it necessary that
assistance is needed to help reason and guide it to harmony. But
no authority has a better knowledge of the nature of reasons than
God, therefore a messenger from Him is needed for the guidance of
man.
5. Scholars vary in their knowledge regarding what benefits
them in this life and in the hereafter, some possess knowledge
while the others do not. Since God, who is the most knowing,
must possess knowledge which no man possesses, a messenger from
(1)
Him is needed to deliver that knowledge.
6. Sometimes the true nature of human intellect is obscured and
influenced by internal and external factors; such as desires,
motives, habits, environments and associations, and as a result
it even fails to give us true knowledge of things that are within
its own sphere. So revelation is needed to guide human intellect
to the truth.
7. All things, apart from the tangible ones, are perceived
either by (i) their deduction from the tangibles with which they
have some connection such as: the smoke with the fire, light with
the sun, effect with its agent etc., or (ii) by the reports which
tell us about the events and happenings which we do not witness.
(1) Tawhld. p.182,1-12.
(2) Ibid., pp.182.20-21: 183,1-3; 185,7-10.
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Through reports also (and here are the reports of the prophet),
we know God's commands and His prohibitions, His promises and
threats, what is permitted and what is prohibited. Since all
these facts are known only by reports, a prophet is needed to
instruct man in these aspects.^ ^
To establish the importance of revelation, al-Maturldl began
by Bhowing how religion is necessary to man. He clearly stated
that mankind needs religion as a source of unity, and as a source
in which he could seek refuge. Such a fact could be proved by
sam* and reasoning. According to al-Maturidi, the investigation
of man's history discloses the fact that he cannot live without
having some sort of belief. Even those who hold sceptical views,
believe and defend something. Also all kings and rulers have
certain policies and systems according to which they attempt to
rule and unite their subjects. Similarly, messengers and
reformers introduce certain beliefs and methods of life and
conduct to unite people around them. So a close examination of
man's history shows that he has always been in association with
(2)
certain kinds of religions or doctrines.
Reason also supports man's need of religion; it is unwise
to assume that the world is created in vain and for the purpose
of destruction, and therefore it must have been created for the
purpose of the continuation of life for a certain time. The
world, however, consists of different natures and contradictory
elements, and in particular of man who is of various inclinations,
numerous natures and compelling desires. If he is left to
(1) Tawhid, pp.183,13-20, 184,1-2.
(2) Ibid.. p.4,6-13.
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behave according to his natural dispositions, he would be in
constant struggle to attain his personal aims and desires which
would lead to fighting and to the final destruction and corruption
of life. Therefore, there must be someone who can lead man
towards unity and save him from fighting and destruction. More¬
over, it is impossible that God, who is wise and all-knowing,
would leave mankind without providing them with someone to guide
them in this life, and direct them to what benefits them in the
life to come. Such a person, however, must be provided with proofs
and signs to show his selection as a guide for mankind. So
according to al-Maturidi, the evidences of both sam* and reason,
prove that man needs a religion and suggest that there must be
messengers from God to guide mankind.Al-Maturldi assigns
such an important place to the messenger that according to him,
a society cannot be founded without a revealed law (sharl* a) to
(2)
govern its conduct and provide the basis for its life.
These views concerning religion and revelation were challenged
by various groups, some of whom were atheists and others who
believe in the existence of God but saw no necessity for revelation
assuming that human reason is sufficient to determine the know¬
ledge of God and the distinction between good and evil. Thus
they rejected outright the concept of revelation and the role of
the prophet as a mediator between man and God. They argued that
if the prophet's teachings agree with the judgement of reason




messages, however, disagreed with reason, it would be impossible
to believe them and thus there would be no point in sending them.
They maintained that there is an obvious contradiction between
reason and revelation where the prophets allowed and commanded
certain things which reason considers as evil, such as the
slaughter of harmless animals. Since it is impossible that God,
who is wise, would command what is forbidden by reason, it
follows that those so-called prophets were not sent by God.^^
This attitude towards prophecy and revelation was generally
(2)
attributed to the Barahima, and to those who were influenced
by them such as Muhammad b. Zakriyya ar-Razi (d.925 or 932)
• r*
Abu-'lsa al-Warraq, and Ibn-ar-Rawandi.^ Al-MaturidI,
however, made reference only to the Barahima and al-Warraq,
while to him Ibn-ar-Rawandi seems to be the vigorous opponent
(1) Tawhld. pp.200,3-16; 201,1-4.
(2)
(2) E.I. vol.i, art. "Barahima" (Pazlur-Rahman), p.1031.
(3) Badawl, Kin Ta'rikh al-Ilhad fi-l-Islam. pp.201-6.
(4) Abu-'isa al-Warraq (d.247/861) was a Mu'tazilite, then
became heretic and was accused of Manichean sympathies,
(2) -
E.I. , S.M. Stern, art. "Abu-'isa al-Warrak" vol.i, p.130.
(5) Abu-l-Husain Ahmad b.Yahya b.Ishaq born at the beginning of
• • mm
the 3rd century A.H. He was a Mu'tazilite, then became a
ShI'ite and later under the influence of his master al-
Warraq, adopted irreligious views and became zandiq.
(2) -




To refute these arguments, al-Katuridi begins by emphasizing
the point that there is no contradiction between reason and
revelation. To illustrate this point he said that in relation
to their being good or evil, things are of two kinds: some of
which are intrinsically good or ugly irrespective of their change
of circumstances, while others might sometimes be good and
sometimes be evil according to certain situations. This second
kind is not easily recognisable, thus it requires someone with
a comprehensive knowledge of all situations, i.e., a prophet
from God. The slaughtering of harmless animals is of this
second type and thus cannot possibly be intrinsically evil
otherwise it would have never been allowed in certain circum¬
stances. In fact, killing might sometimes be recommended by
reason in cases of self-defence and protection of the community.
(1) According to al-Maturldl, Ibn-ar-Rawandi accused al-Warraq
of following the Magians and of denying the Traditions of the
prophets (Tawhid. p.199,17-20). He also rejected his objections
against the validity of the widely transmitted Traditions
(mutwatir)(Tawhid, pp.196,18-19; 197,1-4), and objected to
his arguments against the validity of the prophet's miracles.
(Ibid. , pp.187,9ff; 200,17ff.) Since it is affirmed that
Ibn-ar-Rawandi himself adopted the same views and arguments
of al-Warraq (P. Kraus, "Beitrage zur Islamischen Ketzergeschichte
Das Kitab az-Zumurrud des Ibn-ar-Rawandi" R.S.O.vol.14 (1934)
pp.97-99), it seems that al-Maturidx is quoting some of Ibn-
ar-Rawandi ' s earlier works, i.e. those compiled before his
falling under the influence of al-Warraq and adopting his views.
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So, according to al-Maturidi, if reason considers a thing to
be intrinsically good it can never be evil, likewise if it
considers something as evil it would never be good. This judge¬
ment of reason is contrary to the judgement of natural disposition
(tab*), where judgement differs according to differences in its
natures and according to what extent it is accustomed to the
act (*ada). Thus, since killing is sometimes allowed, it means
that it is not intrinsically evil, but its evilness is related
to the judgement of natural disposition. This proves that
revelation does not judge something, which reason considers evil,
to be good. It might, however, disagree with tab* and judge some-
thing as good, while tab* considers it as evil.^^
Thus al-Maturidi clearly differentiates between the judgement
of reason and tab* regarding good and evil. To him, what is evil
according to the judgement of reason, becomes more evil whenever
one thinks about it, while what is evil according to nature could
become good when one becomes familiar with it. He gave the example
of wild animals, such as birds and beasts, which by their nature
are untamed and difficult to control, but change by nature when
they are tamed. Thus what was naturally repugnant to the animals
becomes pleasing to them. This proves that the judgement of
natural disposition is liable to change and reverse, but this can
(2)
never happen in the case of the judgement of reason.
•
Due to this essential difference between reason and natural
disposition, God makes reason and not tab* prerequisite for man's
(1) Tawhld, pp.201-4.
(2) Ibid.. pp.218,20-23; 219,1-4. cf. also p.243.
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responsibility. Man shares with other animals in having natural
inclinations and desires, but has been commanded to follow the
judgement of his reason and not that of his tab1. ^ ^
These differences between the judgements of reason and tab*
•
are results of the differences in their essential composition.
Thus while natural dispositions are inclined to immediate pleasures
and invite man to attain them and encourage him to avoid what
causes him pain and harm, reason discloses to man the real nature
of things and whether they are good or evil irrespective of their
immediate pleasure or pain; tab* cannot give such a judgement,
because it is only concerned with the present moment, while reason
is concerned and takes into consideration the present and the
future, thus it is more capable than tab* to disclose the ultimate
result of an action and its result. Good and evil in things
should not be judged according to natural disposition,but by reason
which is more qualified to make right decisions in this respect
because of the essential differences between the two forms of
(2)
judgement.
Thus al-Maturidi sees no contradictions between reason and
revelation regarding good and evil. To him the apparent contra¬
dictions in this respect are the result of our view being derived
not from reason but from tab*. which should not be considered as
judge in such matters because of the instability and relativity
of its decisions.
The fact that reason is superior to tab* as a criterion of
(1) Tawhid, p.224,1-4.
(2) Ibid.. pp.223,10-13; 224,12-15.
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good and evil, does not mean that it is an absolute and a
sufficient judgement in this respect; because, as has already been
mentioned, reason has its shortcomings and limits. It might be
misled by outside influences from conceiving the intrinsic values
of things, and thus revelation is needed. According to al-
Maturidi, if reason were left alone without outside influences,
there would be no need for a messenger to inform people about
what is commendable and what is objectionable, and what is good
and what is evil; but since reason does not intuitively com¬
prehend the value of things, but comprehends by reflection and
pondering, obstacles might interfere and prevent it from per¬
forming its task; because of all these reasons, revelation is
needed in order to help reason and point out what is good and what
is evil.^^ Moreover, al-Maturldi said, though it is true that
reason might reach the same decision of revelation in those matters
which are absolutely forbidden or obligatory, in the cases where
no clear-cut decision can be applied, revelation is the only
judge. According to him, "Conditions of things are such that they
are either forbidden, or obligatory or something in between
(wasit aw mumkin). i.e., which can be forbidden or obligatory.
What reason considers as obligatory or forbidden, revelation
cannot judge differently. Concerning that which is liable to
either of the two possibilities, reason cannot give a true judge¬
ment, therefore revelation or a prophet is required to explain
which alternative is most probable, i.e., whether it is prohibited
(2)




In the course of his defence of revelation al-Maturidi
criticized the views of those who attacked prophecy by denying the
validity of the prophet's miracles. In this context he
mentioned in particular al-Warraq, who is said to have maintained
that the prophets^ miracles cannot be accepted as proofs for
his prophecy, because their miraculous nature w*re tested and
made -t&e4r appeal to certain people only. They in fact might
just be a sort of magic or trick. People were not able to
challenge them, because they had no knowledge about the nature
(2)
of the production of such actions.
To defend prophecy against such attacks, al-Maturidi pointed
out that the perfection of the characters of the prophets made
it impossible for anyone to accuse them of being liars. Moreover,
there is no doubt that people were unable to challenge the
miracles presented by the prophets. If it is assumed that one
could attain the ability to perform miracles on the basis of his
learning and experience, then it may be said that the prophet
performed them without any learning or prior experience. This is
a strong evidence in support of the fact that the miracles were
provided by God in order to support the prophets' claims to
(3) - -
prophethood. Furthermore, al-Maturidi said, the nature of
magic and miracles is completely different, therefore it would
be wrong to make any comparison between them. Miracle is a
reality which remains as long as the message of the prophet





eyes for a while then vanishes. Also magic is a kind of craft
which can be learned and performed by anyone who has acquired
its secrets, while miracles are claimed and performed only by
the prophets. The magicians' main intention is to gain worldly
benefit, while the prophets aim is to purify the human soul from
greed and lust, and prevent it from indulging in worldly affairs.
So the aims of the prophets and magicians are totally different.
Moreover, the prophets undergo suffering and hardship in order
to deliver their message and to provide a good example for
human moral perfection, so it is inconceivable that they are
similar to the magicians.
Al-Warraq attacked particularly the miracles of the prophet
Muhammad and maintained that the miraculous nature of the Qur'an
is untenable. He claimed that the inability of the Arabs to
imitate it is not a proof for its miraculous nature, nor for the
prophethood of Muhammad. He said that the Arabs wereunequal
in their literary attainments, so that it is quite possible that
the Qur'an was the composition of one of the best of them. The
Arabs were not concerned with the intellectual activity and
knowledge. It is also quite possible that their engagement in
war distracted them from challenging the Qur'an. To al-Warraq,
if one excelled others in certain matters, it does not mean that
(2)
he is a prophet.
To refute these views, al-Maturldl said that it cannot be
denied that the Arabs were very intelligent and passionate people;
(1) Tawhld. pp.189-190.
(2) Ibid., pp.191.16-19: 192,1-2.
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there were many distinguished poets and eloquent men of letters
among them. They were challenged to imitate the Qur'an and were
given ample time to do so, but they failed to meet that challenge.
Instead they resorted to fighting which is more difficult and
involved sacrifice of their selves. If they were able to imitate
the Qur'an, they certainly would not have chosen war. So the
inability of the Arabs to meet the challenge to imitate the
Qur'an is a strong proof for the miraculous nature of the Qur'an.
That challenge, however, was not limited to the Arabs, but was
issued to non-Arabs as well as jinn, "Say: verily though mankind
and the jinn should assemble to produce the like of this Qur'an,
they could not produce the like thereof though they were helpers
(1)
one of another. The Qur'an has spread all over the world and
no-one has stepped forward to meet this challenge. As for the
assumption that the excellence of someone in certain matters does
not entail that he is a prophet, al-Maturldl replied that the
excellency of the prophet in certain matters, which is his
miracles, is a kind of support given to him by God to prove his
claim to prophethood. If he were an impostor, God would not give
(2)him such a support.
Then al-Maturldl proceeds to explain the aspects of the
miraculous nature of the Qur'an. From his treatment of this
point, it seems that he considers that the miraculous nature of
the Qur'an lies in its literary perfection and in its prophecy




knowledge. The literary perfection of the Qur'an is evident in
its eloquence, arrangement (nazm). and in the beauty of its style
and diction to such an extent that the Arabs, who exceeded in this
art, failed to match it.^^ Even though it was revealed over a
period of twenty years or more, this did not cause any discrepancy
in its contents or differences in its style, for every part of
(2)
it is consistent with the others. The wondrous nature of the
Qur'an is shown from the fact that it contains an explanation
of all matters which were proclaimed by previous religions,
although the prophet had no access to such materials, nor had he
previously been able to read and write. The Qur'an also contains
prophecies such as the spreading of Islam and the victory of the
Muslims, which were made at a time when all circumstances
appeared to be unfavourable to these happenings. It also
contains all the principles of knowledge and sciences related to
this life and the hereafter, which must prove that it was revealed
by him who has comprehensive knowledge. The contents of the
Qur'an are in agreement with the contents of the previous sacred
books. This implies on one hand the unity in origin of all these
books, and on the other hand that the Qur'an came from the same
(3)
source of revelation. Moreover, although the Qur'an was
revealed during the period of ignorance and dominance of poly¬
theism, it had contained all the proofs and arguments for the
(4)






Al-Maturidi devoted a special section to the establishment
of the validity of prophecy in general and the prophethood of
Muhammad in particular. To him, prophethood is based on three
principles: (1) the character of the prophet, (2) the tangible
and deductive evidences for his prophethood, (3) the suitability
of circumstances for his message.
As for the prophethood of Muhammad, al-Maturidi quoted in
detail many proofs which disclose the physical perfection and
moral integrity of the prophet's character. He also enumerates
(2)
many of the miracles which were performed by him. He con¬
sidered the Qur'an to be the most convincing miracle^ and proof
for his mission. All the circumstances were suitable for the
(3)
appearance of his message. ' The people were at a loss and in
dire need of someone to guide them to belief and moral conduct.
The teachings of the previous religions were corrupted and badly
misinterpreted. God had promised that in such a time He would
send a prophet to guide people in the right direction. (35:24;
23:44).^^ Then al-Maturidi referred to some of the rational
evidences and historical circumstances of the prophet's life,
which disclose . the validity of his mission and the necessity
for it.^^
(1) Tawhid, pp.202,11-21; 203,1-12.





3. Reason and Religious Knowledge
Though one might understand from the above-mentioned account
that al-Maturidi regards revelation as the only method of
conveying religious truth, it is reason, however, which plays
the role of establishing these religious truths by rational
arguments. Thus within the frame of religion, reason has a
considerable role to play. He considers reason to be the pre¬
condition for the imposition of religious responsibility (taklif),
and if one is unable to understand God's orders, in spite of his
efforts and attempts to do so, he is exempted from that order,
because all God's commandments are made to be understood, if one
fails to comprehend them, then he is no longer included among
those to whom they were addressed. Reason also, necessitates
the knowledge of God, and through his intellect alone, man must
come to know God, by reflecting upon His creation and the
phenomenon of creation all over the world which eventually leads
to the establishment of God's existence and His power. According
to al-Maturidi, the knowledge of God and His commands, is only
attained by deduction, Carad la-yudrak ilia bil-istidlal).
Since man has been endowed with means of understanding such as
rational and imaginative faculties, and has been warned by various
methods to reflect upon himself and what surrounds him, he is
necessarily compelled to reflect and come to the knowledge of
God.^^ If he fails to reach such a knowledge, he will be
eternally punished. Even if God did not send a messenger to
instruct man, he has no excuse for not knowing his creator,
(1) Tawhld. p.137,14-19.
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because he has been endowed with the intellect and the power to
think.
But God has clearly stated that He is sending "Apostles who
give good news as well as warning, that mankind after the coming
(2)
of the apostles should have no plea (hu.j.la) against God" , and
that He does not punish a nation before sending a messenger to
warn them and the punishment comes after a clear defiance of
(3)
His commandments. On the basis of these verses, the
Ash'arite theologians maintain that reason alone necessitates
neither belief in God nor the knowledge of Him; man is not
(4)
punished for not achieving such a knowledge.
Al-Maturldl defended his views by saying that it is possible
that the real meaning of plea intended in the above mentioned
verse is that it applies only to religious duties and laws
('ibadat wal-shara'i*) which are known only by revelation and not
by reason, but faith (din) is necessitated by reason, because
they have been endowed with intellects and in the instruction of
every man there are signs which, if seriously considered, will
demonstrate the existence of God, His oneness and His Lordship
_ / c\
(rububiyya). As regards the statement that God promises
that He will not destroy a nation before the sending of a
(1) Shaykh Zada, Nazm al-Fara'id wa-Jam* al-Fawa'id. pp.46-9.
(2) 4:166.
(3) 17:15-16.
(4) Iji, Kawaqif. vol.1, p.271.
(5) Ta'wilat. 4:166.
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messenger, al-Maturldl said that God did not destroy them
because people are of various categories regarding their intell¬
ectual capacity: (1) there are those who can comprehend
things spontaneously (bil-badiha) and of this category are the
scholars and judicious men. (2) There are others who need the
assistance of revelation in order to understand and perceive the
realities of religious truth. (3) The third category are those
who do not understand either by revelation or by reason, so
they need a tangible warning which affects them and their life
in order to understand and realize the reality of God's existence
and His commands. So, in order that no-one of the above
categories may plead against Him, God sends messengers, though
He might punish those who are able to reflect for not pondering
and using their intellect.
4. Al-Maturidi's Method of Argument
According to his theory of knowledge which is based on
sense-perception, reports and reason, al-Maturidi used two kinds
of proofs to support his doctrines and to refute those of his
opponents. One kind of his proof is based on traditional
evidences and the other on rational inferences and deduction.
Traditional Evidences:
Al-Maturidi used the term khabar (report) and sam* to
describe this kind of proof. Sam* literally means what has been
heard of or what has been received by hearsay or what is established
(1) Ta'wllat. 7:94.
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by normal practice, but technically it is used for traditional
evidences. Al-Maturldl used the term to cover both meanings.
Thus to establish the necessity of religion, he stated that this
fact can be established by both sam' and reason, and what sam'
meant to him are the evidences based on historical data or
general observation.^^ Similarly, he used the term report
in establishing the temporality of substances (a'yan), to refer
to both the Qur'anic verses and some evidences based on data
(2)
derived from investigation. In the same manner, he stated
that God's attributes can be established by sam' and reason.
With regard to the evidences of the sam', he simply indicated
that the Qur'an and all the other Scriptures have ascribed
certain attributes to God. The prophets and all other creatures
(3)
applied the same names and attributes to Him. These few
examples are sufficient to show that al-Maturidi used the term
sam' and report in a wider sense to cover all proofs derived from
traditional evidences whether revealed or not. The traditional
evidences quoted by al-Maturidi consist of many Qur'anic verses
and some of the Traditions and in order to establish his point
of view he employed i,jma'.
The Qur'an;
The Qur'an represents to al-Maturidi as well as to all the
Muslim theologians, the unquestionable authority for the estab¬





commentary on the Qur'anic text and a detailed study of the
method he used in this commentary will follow later. In his
Kitab at-Tawhid he widely utilized the Qur'anic verses in order
to prove his theological point of view and to refute those of his
adversaries. However, he not only quoted the verses of the
Qur'an, but also constructed his rational arguments on the basis
of those verses. Thus from the Qur'anic verses 21:22, 17:43,
23:91, 13:16 he developed various rational arguments to demonstrate
the oneness of God.^^ This method of constructing arguments on
Qur'anic texts is more evident in al-Maturidi's section on the
visibility of God, where he depended mainly on Scripture to
(2)
establish his point of view. He followed the same methodology
in his proofs of God's will,^^ His speech, the doctrine of
Qadar^"^, and the problem of Iman.^) Al-Maturidi also interpreted
the Qur'anic verses which were quoted by his opponents in order
to show that they had misinterpreted them and hence that they had
(7)
in no way proved their point of view.
The degree of the usage of Qur'anic verses by al-Maturidi
differs according to the nature and treatment of the subject. But,
on the whole, the arguments based on Qur'anic reasoning appear to





(5) Ibid, pp.225-26, 254-55, 257-58.
(6) Ibid, pp.325-6, 332-4, 373-77.




Traditions have not been widely used by the speculative
theologians and one can hardly trace more than half a dozen
Traditions in al-Maturidi's Kitab at-Tawhid. To establish the
doctrine of intercession, al-Katuridl merely said that the Qur'an
and reports (akhbar) of the prophet support this doctrine, without
quoting any Traditions.^^ Yet he quoted a Tradition as a proof
(2)for his view on God's visibility , and two Traditions on the
(3)
problem of the relation between Iman and Islam. Apart from
these authentic Traditions, al-Maturldl quoted three Traditions
which could not be traced in the sources of hadith. One on the
(4)
concept of ir.ja'. which seems to have a Shi ite origin , another
(5)
on the creation of Iman and the third is the commonly used
Tradition concerning the Qadarites, "The Qadarites are the Magians
of the Muslim's community".^^ All this indicates that al-
Maturidl was not concerned with the material available in the
form of hadith in the course of his theological arguments.
1,1ma' :
In all the instances in which al-Maturldl employs arguments








already exhausted all the arguments based either on Qur'an or
Traditions. Thus i.jma' seems to have been of less significance
to him. It was used for instance as a proof that the grave
sinner is a mu'min; al-Maturidl said the community agreed
(ittafaqat).that, the grave sinner must be called either mushrik,
kafir or a Muslim, one who refuses to apply to him one of the^e
names is thereby acting contrary to what has been unanimously
agreed upon (ma u.jmi'a 'ala-l-qawl bi-h.).^^ Ijma' is also used
to establish that only the outward performance of the mu'min
(2)should be considered. It has also been employed to prove that
(3)the evidences of the prophet's mission were widely transmitted.
It is also used in the sense of the consensus of the theologians
(i.jma* ahl al-Kalam) to repudiate the Mu' tazilites.
His Rational Method:
To formulate his rational arguments, al-Katuridi made use of
the scientific material and logical methods which were advanced
and developed by the early theologians, particularly the
Mu'tazilites. This is quite evident throughout kitab at-Tawhld
where the terminologies and the concepts, as well as the form of
the arguments used, reflect the rational tendency of al-Maturidl,
f
and disclose j his indebtedness to the Mu'tazilites and other
i
theologians of similar attitudes.






is attained either by reports or inference based on observation
of the relationship between things, such as the relationship
between smoke and fire; the sun and its light; things and their
effects; writing and writer; building and builder.^^ This
operation is called istidlal. and it proceeds from an already
stored knowledge about things. So our knowledge about man, fire
or similar things is derived from a deduction based on our
previous knowledge of similar entities. This method leads to
such a knowledge, otherwise one can neither trust nor deal with
(2)
anyone, since he would have no sign to guide him in this respect.
According to this, al-Maturidi used the terms: reasoning (*aql).
speculation (nazar). inference (istidlal). sign (dalala), and
analogy (qiyas) in a sense which implies one form or another
of intellectual activity or speculation leading to a new result.
The arguments he used did not follow exactly the form of the
Aristotelian logic, but benefited, as did all the theological
arguments, from the concepts and rational arguments of that
system. Some of his arguments are particularly identical with
the Aristotelian syllogism in its categorical and hypothetical
forms, while others are merely of a political and dialectical
nature. At the same time, he widely used the method of the
analogy of the present to the absent (qiyas al-gha'.jb *ala-l-
shahid).
1. Syllogism: Of the various forms of syllogism, al-Maturldl




predicate and the judicial relation between them. Thus to
establish the attributes of speech, he argued that the inability
of every knowing and powerful person who does not speak must be
due to some defect such as impotence or some hindrances. Since
God is above all such defects, then He must be able to speak.
Again, to demonstrate that God's actions take place according
to His will, he used a similar argument. "According to the
rule of wisdom, he who does a thing while willing by it another
thing or willing it to be different from what it normally is,
would be either ignorant of the outcome of his actions, or he
is fooling around by his acts. Since these two characteristics
are impossible for God, then His actions must be according to
(2)
His will." Sometimes the arguments do not follow a formal
system but are based on premises and conclusions, as in the
following arguments: power is an accident which does not endure,
(3)
thus it must be concomitant with the action. The general
procedure in these arguments is that the first premise is
considered as valid, and it is sometimes verified, as in the
argument which al-Maturidi used to demonstrate the necessity of
religion to man: it is not wise to assume that the world is
created in vain and for destruction, but it consists of contra¬
dictory elements which lead to destruction, therefore there
must be someone who guides man and saves the world from






As for the hypothetical syllogism, al-Maturldl used this
proposition in its conditional form. This method of argument is
known among the theologians and jurists, as the method of
_ (p)
enumeration and division (as-sabr wal-taqsim) . It is based
on mutual exclusion of two or more contradictory statements. It
implies the division of an object into two or more possibilities,
(3)
then demonstrating the falsity of all of them except one. Al-
Maturldi widely used this method of argument and demonstration.
Thus, to demonstrate the temporality of the world, he said that
the world is either eternal with all its contradictory elements,
or it is originated by a principle which is devoid of these
contradictory elements, or that these contradictory characters
were introduced into it later. Then he demonstrates the falsity
of the first and the last assumptions and thus proves the
(4)
validity of the second proposition. Also, to prove the
existence of God, he argued that if the world were created by
itself, it would either be created after its being existent or
before its coming into existence, both assumptions are impossible,
(5)
this proves that it is not created by itself but by God.
Similar arguments were used to demonstrate the oneness of God^^ ,
(1) Tawhld, pp.4-6.
(2) Ghazali, Mi'yar al-'llm. p.89.





the reality of the attributes of takwin.^ ^ and to refute the
(2)
views of the dualists on the existence of light and darkness,
(3)
and the anthropomorphists on God's locality.
2. Qiyas al-gha'ib 'ala-l-shahid; (Analogy of the hidden to
the present).
This kind of analogy is one of the methods used by the
(4)
theologians of different schools, as well as by the jurists.
As far as the theologians are concerned, it is said that al-
Khayyat, the Mu'tazilite, devoted a whole book to explain qiyas.
and that Abu-'Ali al-Jubba'i and his son Abu-Hashim made a
(5)
considerable contribution to the establishment of this method.
QadI 'Abd-al-Jabbar defines qi.yas as, "The deduction of the hidden
from what is known, if it cannot be known but by inference from
the present. Though the jurists and the theologians used
this method, the former consider that the causal link (jami')
between asl the major premise, and the ffl-r*, the minor premise,
or between the present and the hidden, is 'ilia, ratio legis;
the theologians, however, added: definition (hadd). condition
(shart). and inference or proof (dalil), as other links between
(7)
the present and the hidden. The Ash'arite theologian, al-
Baqillani, considers 'ilia as one of the deductive methods and
(1) Tawhid, p.46,16-18.
(2) Ibid.. pp.35-36; 122-23.
(3) Ibid. . p.70,1-11.
(4) An-Nashshar, Manahi.i al-Bahth 'ind Mufakkiri-l-Islam.p129 ff.
(5) 'Abd-al-Jabbar, al-Muhit bi-l-Taklif. p.186.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Iqdam. p.182 ff. Juwayni, Irshad. p.49.
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explains it by saying: "If a hukm or a quality is attributed
to a certain thing in the present for a certain 'ilia, the same
'ilia should be the cause of attributing the same hukm or quality
• •
to the thing in the hidden." To illustrate this he gives the
example of the body and knowledge in the present and the hidden.
In the present, Baqillani said, body is called body because of
its being compound (mu'allaf), and the *alim is called so because
of his possession of knowledge. So, if one has been described
as 'alim in the hidden, the attribute of knowledge should be
ascribed to him, and if something has been called body in the
hidden, it would necessarily be compound and composed of parts
(mu'allaf wa-murakkab).^ ^
Those who affirm God's attributes depended largely on this
(2)
method to establish their views. The Mu'tazilites used this
method of analogy to establish many of their doctrines especially
(3)
those related to God's justice ('adl). The abuse of this
method, however, led to many errors; the anthropomorphists, for
instance, considered God as a body, because they could not
(4)
perceive any thing in the present without its being a body;
and the Mu'tazilites denied the vision of God because they
compared it with the vision of things in the present world and
applied the same conditions of the latter to the former, and
(5)thus ended by denying the vision of God altogether.
(1) Baqillani, Tamhid, pp.27-8.
(2) Iqdam. p.182.
(3) 'Abd-al-Jabbar, op♦cit.. pp.165-66.
(4) Tawhld. pp.85,7-8; 120,16-17.
(5) Ibid., pp.82-3. Ghazali, Iqtisad. p.30 ff.
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Al-Maturldl as a theologian and a jurist adopted this
method but he pointed out the dangers of its random application.
According to him, there are two views regarding the relationship
between the present and the hidden; some held that the present
indicates a hidden similar to it, and others believed that it
indicates a hidden either similar to it or in contrast to it. The
former view led to the belief that the world is eternal, since
according to them, the world is the origin of the hidden, and
the hidden is similar to it.^^ Al-MaturidI rejected this view
and strongly criticized it and adopted the latter view. He
believed that the indication of contrast between the hidden and
the present is more evident. To him, the very example of the
world proves this; because every thing in the world indicates
its being originated or its being eternal, both of which are
different from the things themselves. They also show that they
iVs
either have a creator or were created by themselves and these are
> A
different from the things of this world. So the present might
indicate something different from the hidden; it does not
necessarily indicate that it is similar, otherwise everyone
witnessing himself might imagine that all the world is similar
(2)
to himself, which is absurd.
So, as far as the relationship between the present and the
hidden is concerned, al-Maturldi differentiates between two
spheres, that of God in which the present indicates a hidden
either similar or in contrast to it, and the other is that of
(1) Tawhid. pp.27,21; 28,1-3.
(2) Ibid.. p.28,6-11.
- 61 -
the world,, sphere in which the present indicates something
similar to it.
According to this conception of analogy, al-Maturidi used
this method to establish the knowledge of God. He emphasized the
point that, there is no way of attaining any knowledge of God
save through proceeding from the present world, since such a
knowledge cannot be attained through the senses or by traditional
ADevidence (shahadat as-sam ). Thus, it is necessary to use the
law which is valid in this world in order to establish the
existence of God, without implying any resemblance or similarity
between God and the world. The nature of analogy itself does
not suggest such a resemblance. To illustrate this point, al-
Maturidi said that writing indicates the existence of a writer,
but it does not reveal the nature of the writer, since he might
be either an angel, or a human being, or a jinn. Similarly, in
the case of God, the world indicates the existence of an
originator, but it does not imply his nature or quiddity (kayfiyya
aw-ma'iyya). Thus to establish the existence of the maker of the
world, analogy has to be used, and one should begin from the
world then proceed to the knowledge of God, but this does not
lead to the knowledge of His nature or His quiddity as stated
(2) - -
above. Al-Katuridi used the same analogy to establish the
attributes of God. He argued that there is nothing in the present
which is powerful and at the same time has no power of action,
and there is none who is able to speak yet who does not possess
(1) Tawhid. p.129,21-3. cf.p.175,14-15.
(2) Ibid.. p.29,4-15.
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the power of speech. Since the present is an indication of the
hidden and since God has the power to act, Ke must also possess
the faculty of speech.^^ Again, this analogy between God and
the world does not imply any resemblance between the attributes
of God and the same concepts used in this world; God is high
above human terminologies and concepts, but because of the
limitations of human intellect, these terms and concepts were
used to describe the absolute reality, in order to bring it
(2)
within the grasp of human intellect. However, the situation
is different regarding the things of the present world, where
the relationship between things is established on the basis of
similarity. So if the qualities of a particular thing were
known, and the same qualities were attributed to an object not
present, it would be realized that the object which is absent
is similar to the present one (mushahad). Thus, if the qualities
of a body or a fire were known to someone, he would recognize
those qualities on their being described to him without actually
(3)
having to see them. So our knowledge of things like a man or
a fire which are matters of the present world are attained by
deduction (istidlal) . based on a previous knowledge of similar
things. To al-Maturldi, the denial of this deductive method
leads to the denial of knowledge itself; since all knowledge is
based on this method. It would also make it difficult for '






his own concepts and expectations.
3. Polemical Arguments
Not all the theological arguments were in the form of
syllogism and analogy. Some of them were of a polemical nature,
such as the arguments which are generally known as ilzam and
mu'arada. and are intended to reduce the adversary's view either
to absurdity or to an untenable position. Such arguments were
much used by the Muslim theologians especially of later generations
and examples of them can be found in al-Maturidi's discussions,
but to lesser degree than in those of other theologians. Thus,
while he was refuting the view of those who denied God's
attributes, al-Katuridi argued that if the people were asked about
God, they would either use some terms and expressions to make the
reality of Him understandable to human intellect, or avoid the
use of human languages and concepts altogether and, in this case,
(3)
they would refute their own views regarding the Divine reality.
Similar arguments were used against the Batinite view that God
(4)
has no essential names and attributes.
Some of the polemical arguments were in the form of a
dialogue consisting of questions and answers between the theo¬
logians and their adversaries, in order to develop a certain
(5) - - -thesis or to prove certain points. Al-Maturidi also used this
(1) Tawhld. p.27, 14-17.
(2) Van Ess, "The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology", pp.23-26
(3) Tawhld. p.25,11-15.
(4) Ibid.. p.95,13-15.
(5) Van Ess, op.cit.. p.23.
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method of argument, and we find in his discussions such phrases
as fa in qal ... yuqal lahu^^ (if somebody says ... we answer);
- (2)
fa in ail ... qila (if it is said ... it would be answered).
Al-MaturidI used many of these arguments in his disputes with
al-Warraq, Ibn-ar-Rawandi ^ and al-Ka'bl.^^
5. Al-yaturidI's Kethod for the Interpretation of the Qur'an
(a) His Conceptions of tafsir and ta'wil
The title of al-Maturidi's commentary on the Qur'an: Ta'wllat
al-Qur'an or Ta'wilat ahl as-Sunna. indicates that he is among
the first commentators to use the term ta'wil instead of tafsir.
for the exposition of the Qur'an, and this has some significance.
Originally, the terms tafsir and ta'wil were used interchangeably
for the exposition of the Qur'an; in the course of time, however,
various differentiations betv/een the two terms were introduced,
and tafsir was mainly used for external philological exegesis,
while ta'wil was used for the exposition of the subject matter
(5) - - -of the Qur'an. Al-Katuridi's definition^ of the two terms is
unique and to some extent discloses his method of interpretation.
(1) Tawhid, p.31•
(2) Ibid.. pp.39-40; 47; 50.
(3) Ibid.. p.186 ff.
(4) Ibid.. p.236.
(5) For the philological definitions of the terms tafsir and
ta'wil see Ibn-Manzur, Lisan al-'Arab. vols.6.p.36l and
13,p.34. For the various definitions of these two terms
see 11qan. vol.4, pp.167-69. Tahanawi, Kashshaf, vol.2,
pp.1116-17.
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To al-Maturldi, tafsir means the giving of a definite meaning
to the verse, and the only people suited to such a task are the
companions of the prophet, because they were contemporaries of
the prophet and witnessed all the events and circumstances in
which the Qur'an was revealed. They also had knowledge of the
prophet's commentary and explanation of the verses and were well
conversant with the occasions of the revelation (asbab an-nuzul).
Those companions, however, did not give their opinions on the
verses of the Qur'an, because tafsir is not subject to various
opinions, but they conveyed what they had witnessed and received
from the prophet. In the light of this concept of tafsir, al-
Maturidi said, the saying of the prophet, "Whoever interprets
the Qur'an according to his personal opinion, will take his place
in the fire", becomes clear.
The meaning of ta'wil. however, is to give all the possible
meanings implied in the verse, therefore it is not limited to
the companions of the prophet as tafsir. but is open to all
qualified scholars. There is no restriction on ta'wil, because
unlike tafsir, ta*wil does not state that God meant a certain
meaning by a certain verse, but it is simply an attempt to
discover the meaning which might possibly be implied in the verse;
its utmost achievement is to point out that the meaning of a
verse might be so or so. To illustrate his views on this point,
al-Iiaturidi said if we take the verse, "Praise be to God". (al-
hamdu lil-lahi), some said that it means that God has praised
(1) See al-Maturidl's Introduction to his Ta'wilat,
- 66 -
himself, and others said that God has ordered us to praise Him.
Both views are based upon Traditions, and whoever holds one of
them is a mufassir. The same verse might be interpreted (tu'awwal)
as that hamd means eulogy to God, that He should be praised and
that man must be thankful to Him. So tafsir is to adopt one of
the meanings based upon authority, while ta'wil is to introduce
several meanings extracted from the verse.
(b) The Sources of His Commentary
1. Of the above mentioned terms, al-Maturldi chose the term
ta'wil and applied it to his commentary, presumably implying that
he is going to give his own opinion and interpretation of the
Qur'an. At the same time, however, al-Maturidi made it clear
that the Qur'an should be interpreted by the Qur'an itself if it
is possible. To him, the Qur'an does not contradict itself and,
to reach an appropriate understanding of its meaning, all the
verses concerning a point of discussion should be considered.
In many instances, we find that a point is briefly referred to
in a verse, and is elucidated in other verses; so by consulting
all the verses related to the point, the exact meaning of the
verse might be attained. Al-Katuridi applied this method throughout
his Ta'wilat al-Qur'an. and widely used it in his k.at-Tawhid.
especially in those sections dealing with man's actions, God's
will, free will and predestination, and Iman. Thus, according to
al-Maturidi, the Qur'an itself is an important source for the
understanding of its meaning.
(1) Al-Maturidi's Introduction to his Ta'wilat.
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2. The second source for the interpretation of the Qur'an is
the Traditions of the prophet. In many works of hadlth,
Traditions and reports which give exposition to the verses of
the Qur'an were attributed to the prophet.Though al-Katuridi
quoted many Traditions throughout his commentary, as evidences
for his interpretation, he was very cautious and critical about
the authenticity of these Traditions; thus he came to accept
those Traditions whose authenticity had been established, and to
reject any reports which seemed to be contrary to the necessity
of reason or what had been rationally established. Commenting
on the verse, "Upon the day We shall say unto Gehenna, Art thou
filled? and it shall say, Are there any more to come?", al-
Katuridl said that some commentators maintained that Gehenna will
be asking for more until the /Merciful put His feet into it so
it will be filled, and there will not be room for a single person.
To support such a view, the commentators quoted a Tradition
(2) - -
believed to be narrated by Abu-Hurayra. Al-Maturidi refuted
this view as being absurd and rejected the Tradition as
unauthentic. To him, such views led to the resemblance of God
to a human being and contradicted God's saying, "I shall assuredly
fill Gehenna with Jinn and men all together" (Q. 11:119), while
in this imaginative view it will not be filled until God put
his foot into it, which is sheer nonsense. The Tradition is
(1) In some works on Traditions, a special section on tafsir is
_ _ - fi
recorded: Bukhari, Muslim and at-Tirmidhi. See Wensick,
A
A Handbook of Early Kuhammadan Tradition. See also As-
Suyuti, Itqan, vol.4, pp.214-259.
• ' ""
(2) See Bukhari, Sahih, vol.3, pp.336-37.
• • •
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contrary to all rational proofs which reject tashblh. and since
any Tradition which contradicts rational proofs should be rejected,
this Tradition should be rejected.
Commenting on the Qur'anic verse, "God commands you to
sacrifice a cow, they said, Do£st thou take us in mockery?", al-
Maturidi said that some commentators inferred from these verses
that God's order was general when it was first addressed to the
Israelites, because God ordered them to sacrifice a cow without
giving specific descriptions, but after their investigation and
questioning, He particularized the cow. The commentators quoted,
as support for their view, the report attributed to the prophet
which says, "If they (i.e. the Israelites) sacrificed any cow
it would have sufficed them, but by their questions they brought
difficulties upon themselves, and thus God made it hard for
(2) - -
them." Al-Maturidi rejected this report and considered the
issue based upon it as completely wrong; because it implies that
something occurred in God's order and made Him change His
decision, a notion no Muslim should hold, not to mention the
(3)
prophet, because it amounts to unbelief.
Thus it becomes obvious that though al-Maturidi depended
on Traditions as a source of interpretation of the Qur'an, he did
not accept all that had been transmitted, he judged them instead
by the Qur'an and reason, and if they contradicted the Qur'an or
(1) Ta'wilat. 50:30.
(2) Zamakhshari, Kashshaf. vol.1, pp.61-62; Razi, Tafsir, vol.1,




if they were unreasonable, he simply rejected them.
3. The third source upon which al-Katurldi depended in his
Ta'wilat is the interpretations given to the Qur'an by previous
commentators. Al-Maturidi quoted names such as: Ibn_'Abbas, al-
Hasan al-Basri, Kuqatil ibn_Sulayman, Abu-Zaid al-Balkhi Abu-'Awsaja,
• ••
al-Kalbi, Abu-Bakr al-Asamm, Ja'far ibn-Harb, and Abu-'AlI al-
• •
Jubba'I; but he did not accept their views without question. Al-
Maturidl subjected the views of those commentators to his critical
opinion, and whenever they seem to him to be contradicting reason
or to be disagreeing with philological usage, he did not hesitate
to reject and refute them. Thus al-Maturidi rejected the idea
attributed to Ibn_'Abbas, that the meaning of the verse, "The
likeness of them is as the likeness of a man who kindled a fire ...
etc.", is concealed and beyond the attainment of human intellect.
To al-Maturidi, such views cannot be accepted because all the
parables mentioned in the Qur'an are meant to be understood, and
to make it easy for the intellect to understand what is difficult;
if IbnAbbas's view is accepted, then the meaning of the verse
will be obscured, which is unlikely.In a more vigorous tone,
al-Maturidi rejected the reasons introduced by the commentators
(2)
as an explanation for the names of 'Arafat and Mina.
Even in matters upon which there is a general agreement,
(1) Ta'wilat. 2:17, vol.1, p.54.
(2) Ta'wilat. 2:129, vol.1, p.304. 'Arafat, a name of a mountain
and adjacent plain located four hours distance east of Mecca,
where the Mecca pilgrims spend the 9th day ofpfoulhijja.
Kina, the valley of Mina near Mecca.
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al-Maturidi did not hestitate to question the views of the
commentators and to point out the weakness of their arguments.
Commenting on the verse, "And when Moses said to his people, 'My
people, you have done wrong against yourselves by your choosing
of the calf (for worship), now turn to your Creator and slay
one another'," al-Maturidi said, if all the commentators did not
agree to interpret the slaying as meaning the real killing of
themselves, it would not have been necessary to explain it in
the real sense, because actual killing is a punishment for the
act of disbelief, and in this verse the Israelites were ordered
to kill themselves after they had repented and submitted to God,
so the slaying here is unlikely to mean the actual killing. It is
possible that they were merely ordered to exert themselves in
worship, and that they should suffer hardships for their negligence
and disobedience to God; qatl. is commonly used in this sense, and
if it is said that so and so kills himself in such and such a
matter, it does not mean that he actually killed himself, but simply
that he exerted himself and exhausted himself by hardship. So, to
al-Maturldl, slaying in this verse should be explained in this
(1 )
sense and not in the sense of the actual killing of themselves.
(1) Ta'wilat, 2:54, vol.1, pp.155-56. Razi, who asserted the
actual killing, refuted al-Maturldi's argument by saying that
punishment differs according to the differences of the revealed
laws (shari<a) so it is possible that in the law of Moses
repentance was conditioned by the killing of one's self.
Tafsir, vol.1, p.356. Qurtubi attributed al-Maturidi's views
to the Sufis (ahl-l-khawatir) who interpret the killing as
humiliating the self by extensive worship and keeping away
from lust and desires. Al-Jami* vol.1, p.401.
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All the commentators maintained that the days referred to in
the verse, "And they say, The fire shall not touch us save a
number of days", are those days in which the Israelites wor-
(1) - - -
shipped the calf. To al-Maturidi this is nonsense for two
reasons: (i) Those Israelites, to whom the verse was addressed,
did not worship the calf, but their fathers did, so it is
nonsense to assume that the days mentioned in the verse are a
reference to the time of their worship of the calf. (ii) Even
if the verse was addressed to the Israelites who worshipped the
calf, it is not possible to explain the days, by the days of
their worship of the calf, because they had already repented
of that wrongdoing and it is meaningless to be punished and
chastised for something they had already repented of. So to
al-Maturidi these days referred to a period in which the
(2)
Israelites disobeyed God and did not repent.
Prom what has been said, it becomes clear that al-Katuridi
depended upon three sources for his interpretation of the
Qur'an; (i) the Qur'an itself, (ii) the Traditions, (iii) the
commentaries of his predecessors. The Qur'an stands unchallenged
and unquestionable; however, al-Maturidi did not accept all of
the other two sources, he distinguished between the authentic
and the false, adopted what can reasonably be justified and
refuted all that contradicted reason and common sense.
(1) See Kashshaf. vol.1, p.64. RazI believes that such
matters should be referred only to sam' and nothing should
be ascertained on opinion. Tafsir. vol.1, pp.390-91.
(2) Ta'wilat. 2:80, vol.1, p.204.
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(c) Al-Maturidi' s attitude towards the Qur'anic Stories
The Qur'an, like the previous Scriptures, is full of stories
referring to events and happenings in the past and telling the
fate of certain ancient nations, in particular of the Israelites
and their prophets. These stories, however, were referred to
briefly in the Qur'an and no details of them were given because
the Qur'an mainly meant them to be a straightforward admonition.
But human curiosity, as Ibn-Khaldun said, incited the early
Muslims, who were mainly Arabs of the desert, to seek more details
of these stories. The only sources available to them at that
time were the Christians and Jews of Arabia who, because of their
nomadic life, were not better equipped to provide authentic
information; but because of their religious status, their inter¬
pretation had been accepted and passed from that time onwards
to the commentary on the Qur'an.Because of the commentators'
attitude towards these stories and their attempts to provide
full details from the ancient Scriptures and legendary sources
for the Qur'anic stories, their commentaries become filled with
(2)
material drawn mainly from these sources.
Unlike most of the commentators, al-Katuridi's attitude
towards these stories was very strict. He rejected all the
details introduced by the commentators and objected to all the
interpretations based upon the ancient Scriptures. To al-
(1) Ibn-Khaldun, Muqaddima. p.368.
(2) It seems that all the commentators joined in this activity
in one way or another. See Ramzi Ka'na'a, Al-Isra'iliyyat
wa-Atharaha fi Kutub at-Tafsir. pp.214-367.
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Maturidi, the only authority for such details is the prophet.
If there is no authentic tradition explaining a story, then the
story must be accepted as it is mentioned, with the addition
of no details to its contents. To him, these stories, apart
from their admonitory purpose, are proof of the validity of the
message of the prophet and conclusive evidence of his prophethood,
since at the time of the prophet, none of the Jews or the Christians
had challenged the authenticity of the version of these stories
stated in the Qur'an and explained by the prophet. This testifies
to the authenticity of these stories and the truthfulness of the
prophet. So, to add unauthorized details to these stories would
jeopardize their authenticity and might lead to their distortion.
Moreover, no benefit is to be expected from knowing the details
of these stories so that no-one should occupy himself with such
(1)
a useless task.
Al-Maturidi applies this attitude to all the stories of the
Qur'an and thus, commenting on the verse, "And question them
concerning the township which was bordering the sea ...", al-
Maturidi mentioned the various names given to the town by the
(2)
commentators and rejected them all saying, "Y/e do not know
what that town is and we do not need to know it, and if there
were to be any benefit resulting from such knowledge God would
(3)have provided us with it." For the verse, "And recite to them
the tiding of whom we gave our signs, but he cast them off", al-
(1) Ta'wllat. 7:73.
(2) See Kashshaf. vol.1, p.356.
(3) Ta'wllat. 7:163.
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Maturidi mentioned the attempts made by the commentators to
discover who was meant by this verse, and ended by stating that
"we do not know to whom the verse refers, but its contents apply
to any one who belies God's signs, and it should not be specific¬
ally limited to a certain person.
By using the same criterion, al-Maturidi rejected all the
details concerning Thamud, their prophet Salih and his mirac
• •
she-camel. To him, what is said about the she-camel: that it
came out of a certain rock, it used to produce such and such an
amount of milk, and that when it was killed the faces of the
killers took different shapes and colours for three days and that
the chastisement came on the fourth day; all this, to al-Maturidi,
is groundless and no-one can affirm or deny it, so that one
- (2)
should stick to what has been stated in the Qur'an. The same
applies to the story of Joseph. Al-Maturidi considers the
commentators' speculation about who said "Do not kill Joseph"
and the price for which he was bought, as useless efforts because
such things are knov/n only by authentic reports and there is
nothing of the sort; their stories about the relation between
Joseph and the governor's wife are nothing but a sort of fairy
tale, and to him such details should not be given without
authority.Similarly, al-Maturidi treated the stories of
Moses and the Israelites, and suspected all the details concerning
(4)
their history and destruction. He also refuted the speculations
(1) Ta'wilat. 7:175.




regarding the Cave and the inscription (ar-raqlm)^ ^ by saying
we do not need to know what the cave and raqim are, or where
they were, because these names are not of our language; besides,
our attention should be concentrated on the men themselves and
not on the cave and raqim. The commentators' reports that these
men of the cave were so and so and their numbers and names were
such and such, and their dog was of such description is groundless;
such things are known only by revelation and authentic Tradition.
The prophet himself has been asked not to ask anyone about them,
(2)
so the commentators have no justification for their speculation.
Al-Maturidi*s attitude and suspicions concerning the details
of these stories, extended to those reports which the commentators
introduced as an explanation of certain events believed to have
occurred at the time of the prophet, such as the legendary
- (3) - - - -
stories concerning the mi'ra.1 and the gharaniq. Al-Maturidi
doubted the whole story of the prophet's ascent to Heaven and
said, "concerning the reports that the prophet had ascended to
heaven, where he met other prophets, we say what Abu-Bakr had
said, 'If he (i.e. the prophet) says so I do believe him*, other¬
wise we should confine ourselves to what the Qur'an stated and
that is that the prophet was carried by night from the holy Mosque
to the further Mosque", and no more should be added because all
the reports concerning this event are transmitted on the authority
of a single individual (fihadith ahad), and such a chain of isnad
• •
(1) See Kashshaf. vol.1, p.56~4; Razi, vol.6, pp.456-57, Tafsir.
(2) Ta'wllat. 18:9-11.
(3) See Tabarl, Tafsir, vol.15, pp.1-13.
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is unreliable in such matters.
Commenting on the verse, "Indeed they were near to seducing
thee from what We revealed to thee, that thou might forge against
Us another, and then they would surely have taken thee as a
friend: and haflt^ We not confirmed thee, surely thou wert near
"(2) - - -
to inclining unto them a very little ... , al-I*aturidi said
that this verse indicates that the unbelievers tried to seduce
and misguide the prophet, but he was protected from all the
temptations they offered him. At the same time, he rejected
those stories introduced by the commentators as occasions for
the revelation of the verse, such as: the story that some
Qurashites tried to make a compromise with the prophet and he
almost submitted to their demands but he was protected from doing
so by God's instructions. To him, those stories are lies and
the production of a vicious imagination (khayal fasid). Al-
Maturldl argued that the last part of this verse, "And had We not
confirmed thee, surely thou mightest almost have inclined unto
them a very little" shows how these commentators are mistaken in
their assumption, because God tells that He had confirmed his
prophet so he did not incline to them, secondly, the inclination
the prophet intended to make has been described as being very
little and what these stories tell is quite serious; thirdly,
the word almost (kada) does not imply that he actually had
(1) Ta'wilat. 17:1. Razi also rejected all the legendary
traditions about mi'raj because they include unacceptable
tales, Tafsir, vol.5, p.366.
(2) Qur'an. 17:73-74.
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inclined to them, so what the commentators claim is wrong and
cannot be accepted.^^
The story of the gharaniq is originally linked with the
verse, "We never sent any messenger or prophet before thee, but
when he framed a desire Satan casts some vanity into his desire,
but God annuls what Satan casts, then God confirms His signs -
(2)
surely God is All-Knowing, All-Wise." It is said that when
the prophet saw that the Meccans gave no heed to his message, he
desired that something to make them accept it would be revealed
to him. At that moment, while he was sitting in the Ka'ba with
numbers of the Meccans, the Sura of an-Najm was revealed to him
and he recited it until he came to the verse, "Have you considered
- - (3)
El-Lat and El-'Uzza, and Manat the third the other." Satan
put upon his tongue, "these are the exalted females (al-gharaniq
al-'ula) whose intercession is to be sought." On hearing this,
the Meccans were delighted and even prostrated themselves with
the prophet, but later Gabriel blamed the prophet for reciting
(4)
this statement, and the above mentioned verses were revealed.
Al-Katuridi doubted the authenticity of this story, and to him if
it were true, which is unlikely, it might be explained as a slip




(4) Tabari, Tafslr, vol.17,pp.119-121. RazI rejects the story of
al-gharaniq as being mere fabrication, and introduces rational
proofs and traditional evidences to show its fallacy. See
RazI, Tafslr. vol.6, pp.165-169.
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and beliefs are well known, might make verbal mistakes contr-
dicting his own convictions, and he will not be blamed for that
because everyone realizes that they do not represent his real
views. It is much more likely that this verse refers to the fact
that when the prophet recited the Qur'an to the unbelievers in
order to convince them, Satan casts into their hearts doubts and
arguments against the Qur'an and the prophet, as is mentioned in
the verse, "The Satans inspire their friends to dispute with
you, if you obey them, you are idolaters." (6:121)^^
Concerning the verse, "And do not say regarding any thing,"
I am going to do that tomorrow," but only, "If God will", it is
said that the prophet was asked by the Jews or the Meccans about
certain things and he told them that he would give his answers
the following day without saying, "If God will." But instead of
giving them the answers, he waited for fifteen days without
receiving revelation, so the prophet got worried, and after that
Gabriel descended with the Sura of the Cave, including this
(2)
verse by which he was admonished for not saying, If God will.
Al-Katuridi rejected the whole story as being nonsense and
produced by the imagination of the commentators. To him, it is
impossible for the prophet to say that he is going to give his
reply the next day without having orders from God; it is also not
possible that for not saying "If God will", God withheld from
him revelation and demonstrated his lie to the unbelievers. To
(1) Ta'wllat. 22:52.
(2) Tabarl, Tafsir, vol.15,pp.140-41; Kashshaf. vol.1,p.568.
RazI, Tafsir, vol.5,p.472. Suyuti, Asbab an-Nuzul. vol.2,
PP.14-15.
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al-Maturidi, God cannot choose and select His messenger and
then forsake and belie him; so what the commentators said is
O)groundless.
Prom what has been said it becomes clear that al-Maturidi
rejected all the legendary tales quoted by the Qur'an commentators
from foreign sources, in order to explain the stories referred
to in the Qur'an. He emphasized the point that regarding these
Qur'anic stories one should stick to what is mentioned in the
Qur'an itself and been explained by authentic Traditions.
(d) Al-Maturidi's attitude towards the ambiguous verses of
the Qur'an:
The ambiguous verses of the Qur'an, (al-mutashabihat). are
one of the problems which caused many discussions and disputations
among the theologians, the commentators, and the philosophers.
The problem originated from the Qur'anic verse:
"It is He who revealed the book to you. It
contains unambiguous verses that are the mother
of the book, and other verses that are ambiguous.
Those who are inclined in their hearts toward
deviation follow that which is ambiguous in the
Qur'an, because they desire trouble, and they
desire to interpret it. But only God knows how
to interpret it. Those who are firmly rooted
in knowledge say, "We believe in it. It is all
(2)






Different readings of this verse led to different attitudes
towards the interpretation of the ambiguous verses; those who
considered the part of the verse, "Those who are firmly rooted
in knowledge say, 'We believe in it, it is from our Lord'," as
forming a new statement, refrained from indulging in ta'wil; so
to them only God knew the interpretation of the ambiguous verses.
While those who advicated ta'wil coupled this statement with the
preceding one and maintained that it means that only God knows
how to interpret them, and so do those who are firmly rooted in
knowledge.^1^ Among those who hold the latter views are the
theologians, the philosophers, and other extremist groups who
saw in ta'wll a means by which the text of the Qur'anic revel-
(2)
ation could be brought into agreement with their own tenets.
Though al-Maturldl advocates the interpretation of the
ambiguous verses, he maintains that these verses are of two
kinds: (i) there are those, the meaning of which could be known
and explained, (ii) and those which are known only to God. The
reason for revealing the first kind is either to denote the merits
of those who possess knowledge, or to indicate the necessity of
reflection as a means for attaining knowledge. The other kind
of verses are revealed as a test for men; they are not to indulge
(3)
in interpreting their meanings.
Allegorical interpretation of the ambiguous verses led to
the rise of sects in Islam, and contributed to the development of
(1) Ghazali, Ihya' vol.1, p.92.
(2) E.I.^ art. "Tafslr", pp.558-9.
(3) Tawhid. p.222, 5-16.
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theological schools with the result that each group or sect
maintained that it alone held the true interpretation and accused
the others of heresy or unbelief. ^ ^ All this confusion, according
to al-Maturidi, resulted from the wrong methods used by these
sects in their ta'wil; these sects used the Qur'an to serve their
own ends and desires and, instead of drawing their doctrines and
concepts from the Qur'an, they used the Qur'an to justify their
(2) - -
preformulated beliefs and concepts. To al-Maturidi, such
sectarian interpretation should not be accepted unless rational
proofs and arguments to justify it are produced.However, this
restriction on ta'wil should not entail the acceptance of the
other extreme view which rejects interpretation altogether and
advocates the acceptance of the verses at face value. To al-
Maturidi, if such views were accepted the Qur'an would be
contradictory because we find in one verse, "Those who believe in
(4)God and the Last Day ask not leave thee" , and in another
A
verse, "Surely those who ask thy leave - those are they that
(5)
believe in God and His messenger." So, judging by the verbal
appearances of these two verses, there is obvious contradiction.
Also, we find that one verse concerning divorce says, "If he
divorces her (finally), she shall not be lawful to him after that,
(1) Ta'wilat. 3:1; Ibn_Rushd, Fasl al-Maqal.. p. 36.
(2) Ghazali attacks both the Batinites and the Sufis for twisting






until she marries another husband,"^^^ and another verse states,
"If he divorces her, then it is not fault in them to return to
each other, if they suppose that they will maintain God's
(2)bounds." In the first verse there is prohibition and in the
other there is permission, and judging by verbal appearances
they contradict each other. So a proper understanding of the
Qur'an is attained not by considering its verbal appearance, but
(3)
by reflecting and pondering upon its contents.
So, to al-Maturidi, negligence of the use of reasoning as
well as the excess of its use, were the main causes behind the
confusion concerning the ambiguous verses. The muhkam becomes
concealed for certain reasons: on one hand there is man's
inclination to what pleases him, his following of what he is
accustomed to, his blind imitation, and the lack of investigation.
On the other hand there is his excessive reliance on his
intellect and his attempts to judge revelation according to the
dictate of his own reason. Kan, to al-Katuridi, is imprisoned by
his natural disposition, and chained by his desires, so he is
inclined to what he is accustomed to, and it is difficult for
him to accept the judgement of reason, or exercise his effort
(4)
to look for truth. On the other hand, his excessive
admiration and reliance on reason prevents man from attaining






modest reasoning is the best method for interpreting the
ambiguous verses; and this is the duty of wise men, scholars and
men of insight (ahl al-basar). and the duty of the others is to
follow them.^1^
(e) Al-Maturidi's Ta'wilat and theological problems:
The Qur'an is the major factor which directed the thought
of the Muslim thinkers, especially the theologians; it was a
source of inspiration for many theological theories and, from
its verses, solutions for theological problems were introduced.
So it is not surprising to find that al-Maturidi*s commentary on
the Qur'an is a mine of information for his theological views,
and that throughout his Ta'wilat. al-Maturidi endeavoured to
formulate his theological doctrines and to produce his arguments
for them.
Prom his commentary on the verse, "There is nothing like
(2) - - -
unto Him" , al-Maturidi formulated his principle of tanzih and
the rule that none of God's acts or attributes should be measured
by man's acts or attributes; accordingly, he argued and refuted
the attitude of the Mushabbiha which is based on some Qur'anic
verses that suggest resemblance between God and man. To al-
Katurldi, the rule for dealing with such verses is, that after the
establishment of tanzih. they should either be applied to God
without interpretation or be allegorically interpreted in a




himself, as will be seen later, inclined towards the second
method, and thus he explained away all the verses which attrib¬
uted to God hands, eyes, face, etc., which is contradictory to
the principle of tanzih. Similarly, al-Maturidi argued from
the verses 16:40 and 41:10 for his views on the attribute of
tawkln and God's act of creation. The verse 1:4 proves to him
the eternity of God's attributes, the attribute of essence and
actions. The verse, "Thee only we serve" proves that Iman is
ft.
affirmative and one should not say, "I am believer if God wills."
A
Also from the verse, "We have divided between them their livelihood
in the present life ...", al-Maturidi produces arguments for the
establishment of God's creation of man's actions, and for the
defence of his theory of acquisition (Kasb). More details of
these doctrines and concepts are to be found later in this thesis;
these few examples, however, show that al-Maturidi, like the
other theologians, used the Qur'an as a basis for the formulation
of his doctrines and the defence of his views.
Apart from this, however, al-Maturidi's Ta'wilat discloses
his vast knowledge and acquaintance with the views of the Muslim
sects as well as other schools of thought; it shows that he was
well conversant with the cultural heritage of his time. Throughout
his Ta'wilat. al-Maturidi argued and disputed the views of
various schools and sects; he discussed and refuted the Karramite
views on Iman;^^ attacked those whom he called the Hashwites,
Mushabbiha, and Ashab al-Hadith, and criticized their views on
• •
(21 - -the attributes of God. Al-Maturidi also discussed and refuted
(1) Ta'wilat. 2:8, vol.1, p.44; 49:14.
(2) Ibid.. 7:86; 50:38; 60:1.
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the Batinites' views on the annihilation of the bodies (fana'
al-a,jsam) and their views on the last day.^^ Al-Maturidi also
rejected the Batinites' interpretation of the Qur'anic verse,
"He is the first, and the last, the outward and the inward, He
has knowledge of everything." The Batinites explained the first
as referring to the first originator, and the last to the
second originator, the outward is the prophet, an-natiq, and the
inward is their infallible Imam, who has the knowledge and
- (2) - -
authority for interpreting the Qur'an. Al-Maturidi also
disputed many of the views of the Jews, Christians, the
Materialists (dahriyya), the dualists, Zoroastrians and the
philosophers. Al-Maturidi devoted most effort towards refuting
the view of the Mu'tazilites. In his Ta'wilat, he took every
opportunity to demonstrate the inconsistency of the Mu'tazilites*
views, and the invalidity of their arguments and the erroneousness
of their doctrines. Among the common expressions in al-Maturidi•s
commentary are, "The Mu'tazilites said so and so ... and its
interpretation to us is so and so ..."; "This verse refutes
the Mu'tazilites' views ..."; "The Mu'tazilites have no arguments
from this verse to support their doctrines" ; and the names of
Ja'far b. Harb, Abu-Bakr al-Asamm, al-Jubba'i, an-Nazzam, and
• • « •
Abu-l-'Abbas an-Nashi', are frequently mentioned.
Prom what has been said it might be concluded that al-
Maturidi was among the first theologians to deal elaborately




theory of knowledge based on sense perceptions, reports and
reason as the only sources for attaining knowledge. As far as
religion is concerned, al-A'aturidi gave priority to revelation
especially in defining religious dogmas, at the same time,
however, he assigned to reason a prominent place and considered
it as a precondition of religious responsibility, and as a means
for establishing and defending on rational grounds these dogmas
and doctrines. Al-Maturidi's commentary on the Qur'an discloses
his emphasis on the role of reason in religion and, though he
depended on the Qur'an and authentic Traditions as sources for
his ta'wil. al-lvlaturidi freely used his personal opinion to
reach his own views and conclusions.
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CHAPTER II
THE THEOLOGICAL METHOD OP AL-ASH'ARI
Introduction
Al-Ash'ari's methodology differs from one work to another
according to the nature and scope of the work. The aim of the
Luma*. for instance, was to elucidate and defend the Sunnite
doctrine against the views of the Mu'tazilites. Therefore, it
lays more emphasis on the major Mu'tazilite tenets, and it also
employs the same method of argument used by the Ku'tazilites,
which is based on rational argument and extensive use of analogy.
Risalat Istihsan al-Khawd fi-'llm al-Kalam (Risala I) is
• •
intended to justify the use of Kalam as a method, in opposition
to the Hanbalites. Thus it agrees with the Luma* in placing more
emphasis on the rational aspects of al-Ash'ari's thoughts.
The Risalat ahl ath-Thaghr (Risala II). however, was meant
to defend the traditional methodology and to refute the excessive
use of rational speculation in theology^ tfjfhile the lbana was
designed mainly to appeal to the sentiment of the Traditionalists
and to win their favour. Thus, it selected the points discussed
by these groups and made use of the type of arguments which were
familiar to them. It agrees with Risala II in that it places
more emphasis on this traditional aspect. In spite of these
differences, however, the general views and the conclusions
expressed in these works were those of al-Ash'ari.
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1. His Methodology in the Luma'
(a) Al-Ash'ari's defence of reasoning:
In his Luma', al-Ash'ari not only used rational arguments
to prove his views, but he openly defended the use of reasoning
and deductive method in theology. He regarded the arguments of
the Qur'an on the possibility of restoration of creatures, as
clear evidences for the justification of reasoning in theology.
In the Qur'anic verses, 36:78-79, God made the first creation
a proof of the possibility of the last creation, because the
same concept is present in both of them. In another verse,
36:80, He made the appearance of fire from the green tree a
proof of the possibility of His creating life in decayed and
crumbling bones and of His power to create its like. So by
using the method of reasoning and analogy, the Qur'an proves the
possibility of the restoration of creatures; and by the same
method theological concepts and problems might be formulated and
solved. According to al-Ash'ari, "God applied the same judgement
to things of similar nature, and compared them in the same way,
because He has said, "God originates creation then brings it
back again." Q.30:11« and said, "And it is He who originates
creation, then brings it back again, and it is very easy for
Him" Q.30:27. Thus He likened the initial creation to the
restoration, and since such a method was used and adopted in
the Qur'an, then there should be no objection to its application
to theological problems.^^
Al-Ash'arl derived another proof of the validity of
(1) Luma'. pp.8-9.
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reasoning and deductive methods from the story of Abraham's
search for God, expressed in the Qur'anic verses. It has been
recorded that when Abraham saw the star he said, "This is my
Lord." But when it set he said, "I love not the setters." When
he saw the moon rising, he said, "This is my Lord", but when it
set he said, "If my Lord does not guide me I shall surely be of
the people gone astray. By observing the star and the moon,
Abraham noticed that both set and inferred that neither of them
could be God, and according to al-Ash'arl, Abraham combined the
moon and the star in issuing his judgement that neither of them
could possibly be God since setting is common to both "and this
is the method of reasoning and inference which some people
(2)
unjustifiably repudiated and eschewed."
(b) His method of argument;
Al-Ash'ari made use of rational arguments and deductive
methods to formulate his views and to refute those of his
opponents. In the processes of his arguments he employed
qiyas in its different forms, introduced polemical arguments
and quoted the Qur'anic verses to support his conclusions and
to justify his point of view.
Qiyas (analogy)
Analogy is one of the methods used by al-Ash'ari to defend
his views and demonstrate the validity of his doctrines. Thus
(3)in the Luma', expressions such as dalil (proof) , min bab
(1) Qur'an. 6:76-77.
(2) Luma'. p.8.
(3) Ibid. . pp.6, 8, 11.
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al-qiyas (from the standpoint of analogy),^^ dalil min al-qiyas
(2)
(analogical proof) , are commonly used. Al-Ash'ari, however,
used qiyas as a general term covering every form of. intellectual
activity and speculation leading to a new result. Thus qiyas,
to him, includes qiyas al-gha'ib 'ala-l-shahid. Aristotelian
syllogism, as well as demonstrative method or rational argumen¬
tation based on general observation and common sense.
Concerning qiyas al-gha'ib 'ala-l-shahid. al-Ash'ari used
this kind of analogy to establish the attributes of God, and to
prove that God is knowing, powerful, and that He is eternally
(3)
hearing and seeing. He also drew comparisons between the
things of the present world and those related to the sphere of
God. So to prove that God has knowledge by which He knows,
al-Ash'ari drew a comparison between man's works and those of
God, and since the former proved that we are knowing and that we
have knowledge, the latter must also prove that God is also
knowing and that also He has a knowledge. According to al-
Ash'ari, "The works of wisdom (as-sana'i' al-hikmiyya) do not
• • •
proceed from one of us unless he possesses knowledge, the
analogy between this and the works of God proves that He also
(4)knows and possesses a knowledge."
In his Luma'. al-Ash'ari systematically formulated his
arguments according to the Aristotelian syllogism, and many of
(1) Luma', p.32.




these arguments can easily be identified with one form or another
of this qiyas. To defend the eternity of God's speech al-Ash'arl
systematically argued, "Had God ever been not-speaking, He would
have been qualified by one of the contraries of speech, that
contrary of speech would have been eternal. And if that contrary
of speech had been eternal, it would have been impossible for it
to cease to exist and for the creator to speakyfor the eternal
cannot cease to exist, just as it cannot begin to exist. So the
creator would have had to be not-speaking, not-commanding, and
not-prohibiting in any way whatever; but it is agreed that this
is false. So if this be false, it is true and certain that the
creator has ever been speaking and saying.
Also arguing for the possibility of the vision of God, al-
Ash'ari introduced the following syllogism: What cannot be
predicated of God and cannot be true of Him is of such a nature
that allowing it would involve the affirmation of His origination
or the origination of a quality in Him or the likening of Him
to creatures, or classing Him under a genus, etc. But the
affirmation of the vision involves none of these which cannot be
(2)
predicated of God. Therefore, the vision is not impossible.
Al-Ash'ari, like al-Maturidi, used the hypothetical form of
syllogism, which normally assumes the form of dividing the answer
into many alternatives, and then demonstrating the falsity of
them all or some of them and thus proving the assumed suggestion.




argued that God's speech must either be eternal or temporal. The
second alternative allows for three suggestions: (i) that God
produces it by Himself, (ii) or it is self-subsistent, (iii) or
that he produces it in another substrate. Then he proved the
impossibility of these three alternatives and concluded that
God's speech must be eternal.The same method is used to
establish the oneness of God, by demonstrating the falsity of
all the suggestions resulting from assuming that more than one
(2)
God exists, he was able to prove His oneness. Similar methods
or argument were used to establish the point that power exists
(3)
simultaneously with the act.
L'any of al-Ash'arl's rational arguments were based on
general observation and common sense, and to prove his point of
view, he often drew examples from the common things as happened
around him. So to defend his views that capacity exists with the
act, al-Ash'ari said the rational proof for the existence of
capacity with the acts is that, if we were to see a man actually
praying, we should not know precisely when his capacity had
begun to exist for him, however, we should know from the act
itself that his capacity was evidently for the act i.e. the
(4)
prayer which he was performing. Arguing also for the creation
of man's act, al-Ash'ari said, "The rational proof of the creation
of man's acts is our experience that unbelief is bad and false
(1) Luma', p.22,5-17.
(2) Ibid., p.8.
(3) Ibid.. pp.54,19-20; 55,1-3.
(4) Ibid.. p.27,13-18.
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whereas faith is good, toilsome and painful. The unbeliever
exerts himself to make unbelief good and right, and the believer
wishes that faith would not be toilsome and painful. Their
wishes, however, do not change the character of belief and un¬
belief. On the other hand, we know that an act does not come
into existence as it really is unless someone produces it as such.
Since the believer and unbeliever wish their convictions to be
otherwise, and still they come contrary to their wishes, then they
cannot be the real producers of their doctrines, and the
intentional producers of them must be God.^^
In addition to these rational arguments, al-Ash'ari used
many polemical arguments. He used the method of ilzam to refute
his opponents. The Mu'tazilites assumed that the fact that God's
will has not been fulfilled does not mean that He is weak, since
He is able to force man to action (i.e. to believe), should He
wish. To refute this assumption, al-Ash'ari referred to the
Mu'tazilites' own view that a forced belief does not merit reward,
so God cannot force men to believe. In another argument, he said
that since the QaHarites believe that man is forced to believe or
not to believe, they are bound to hold that in this case God
would not be able to perform the lutf (grace) through which the
(2)
disbelievers would have inevitably been believers.
(c) The pur*an and the Method of its Interpretation.




of the Lu.ua* , the role of reason is limited to prove and to
demonstrate the validity of the dogmas and doctrines which have
already been laid down by revelation. So, in spite of the
prevalence of rational arguments in the Luma*, the Qur'anic
verses are frequently quoted. The use of the Qur'anic verses,
however, differs slightly from their usage in the Ibana, in
that in Luma*, al-Ash'ari did not simply gather the verses and
let them speak for themselves, which he often did in the Ibana.
The general features of his arguments in the Luma* were that
he introduced rational arguments to establish his views, then he
quoted Qur'anic verses to give strength to his arguments. Some¬
times, however, al-Ash'ari used the verse as basis upon which
he built rational arguments, followed it up with proofs from
analogy and reasoning.
Al-Ash'ari's method for interpreting the Qur'an remained
similar to that of the Ibana. an aspect which will be discussed
in detail later. He emphasized the point that the Qur'an does
not contradict itself, and thus all the verses concerning a
certain point should be taken into account, so that the proper
meaning of each verse might be attained. Commenting on the
Qur'anic verse, "I created Jinn and men only that they might
adore rae"/^ al-Ash'ari said, "By these words God meant some
of the Jinn and men i.e. those of them who do adore Him," for He
said in another verse, "And We have created for hell many Jinn




God must have created many for hell, because of the verse we
have just cited, and he must have created some of them to adore
Him, because of His word, "I have created Jinn and men only so
that they might adore Me". And those whom He has created to
adore Him and those whom He has willed should adore Him, and
who end by adoring Him."^^ So by collecting together all the
verses concerning the point, al-Ash'ari succeeded in rendering
his opponent's arguments, on the above-mentioned verse, futile.
He also pointed out that the literal meaning of the verse
should be preserved unless there is a convincing reason or proof
for the acceptance of another interpretation. Therefore, al-
Ash'ari refuted the Ku'tazilite interpretation of the verse,
"Looking at their Lord" as meaning "Looking at the reward of
their Lord" and said, the reward of God is something distinct
from Him, and one may not turn from the literal to the figurative
(2)
meaning of speech without a convincing reason or proof. And
through his section on the particular and universal (al-'amm
- S
wal-Khas') . al-Ash'ari argued that only positive proofs decide
whether particular or universal meaning is meant by a verse.
Though al-Ash'ari said that these proofs might be the language in
which the Qur'an is revealed, or the reliable authority, yet he
said that if there is any slight indication that language might
convey a meaning different from that held by authority, that of
the authority should be followed, and the grammarians, according
to him, could not be cited as authority in this respect when
(3)





2. Al-Ash'ari's Method in his Risalat Istihsan al-Khawd
• f
fi-'llm al-Kalam (Risala I)
(a) Al-Ash'ari's Vindication of Kalam
Al-Ash'ari's treatise Risalat Istihsan al-Khawd fi-'llm al-
• •
Kalam, is mainly devoted to the justification of speculative
theology, the establishment of the validity of rational arguments,
and at the same time to the refutation of the attitude of the
traditionalists, who raised many objections against the contents
and method of Kalam (rational theology). In this treatise, al-
Ash'ari described his opponents as being ignorant, unable to
rationalise or inquire into religious matters, and more inclined
to taqlld and blind imitation of authority. The same group held
the doctrine of the Uncreatedness of the Qur'an^^ and followed
(2)
Ibn_Hanbal in this respect. Those traditionalists accused the
Mutakallimun of being deviationists and innovators, and raised
the following objections against Kalam:
1. They claimed that engagement in discussion of matters
such as motion and rest, body and accident, accidental
modes and states, the atom and the leap, and the attributes
of God, is innovation and deviation, otherwise if it were
a matter of guidance the prophet and his companions
would have discussed it.
2. Before his death, the prophet had discussed and
clearly explained all needful religious matters; and
since no reports concerning the concepts and terminologies
(1) Risala I. p.87.
(2) Ibid.. p.93.
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of Kalam related to him, it is obvious that Kalam is an
innovation and engagement in it is a deviation.
3. The absence of reports from the prophet and his
companions on Kalam might be explained in two ways:
(a) Either they knew Kalam, but they intentionally
abstained from discussing it. So we might follow their
steps and refrain from plunging into it, since it is not
a part of religion, otherwise the prophet and his
companions would not have been silent about it.
(b) Or they were ignorant of it, and in this case it
is permissible for us to be ignorant of it, for if Kalam
were a part of religion, they would not have been ignorant
of it. So according to both explanations Kalam is an
innovation and plunging into it is a deviation.
Al-Ash'ari's Risala I was an attempt to refute these accus¬
ations and claims. Thus, his main interest was to demonstrate
that: (1) Kalam is not an innovation. (2) That its basic
principles are laid down in the Qur'an and Traditions so it is
not a deviation and (3) That the prophet and his companions were
not ignorant of Kalam.
1. Al-Ash'arl strongly rejected the traditionalists' claims,
that Kalam is an innovation; and by using their own argument al-
Ash'ari said, the prophet had never stated that one should
consider a person as a deviating innovator, merely on the basis
of the fact that he indulges in discussions related to Kalam, so
by asserting such accusations, the traditionalists were constrained
(1) Risala I. p. 88
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to regard themselves as innovators since they had discussed
something which the prophet did not discuss, and accused of
deviation one whom the prophet did not so accuse. This also
applies to the traditionalists' doctrine on the creation of the
Qur'an, their suspension of judgement on it, and their accusation
of unbelief against him who says"the Qur'an is created; because
the prophet had not stated that if this question should arise
after his death, that one should suspend his judgement on it, and
say nothing about it, nor did he say that one should regard a
person as deviating and unbelieving when he affirms that, or
(2)
when he denies that it is created." So by passing any judge¬
ment such as this, the traditionalists were innovators. However,
the traditionalists' logic constrained them to consider Malik,
ath-Thawri, Shafi'i, and Abu-Hanifa as deviating innovators since
they discussed and compiled books on matters neither discussed
nor referred to by the prophet.So what al-Ash'ari was trying
to emphasize was that the mere absence of reports from the
prophet or statement from his companions on a matter, does not
(4)
render its discussion an innovation, and so the traditionalists'
attitude based on such a concept is totally wrong and invalid.
The last argument, however, implies that al-Ash'ari held the
(1) Risala I. p.88
(2) Ibid.. p.95.
(3) Ibid.. p.97
(4) Al-Ash'ari seems to have intentionally overlooked all the
Traditions condemning discussions of theological problems,
See Vi'ensinck, A Handbook of Early Mohammadan Tradition . p.54.
- 99 -
view that discussion on Kalam is of equal legitimacy with argument
on fiqh; he seems to have considered that there is no difference
between fiqh and Kalam as far as validity of subjects is
concerned. Therefore, if discussion and argument of Kalam were
an innovation, then discussion of problems relating to fiqh would
be an innovation as well; a notion which his adversaries would
not accept. ^ ^
2. The second point which al-Ash'ari tried hard to establish
was that, the basic principles of both the object and methods of
Kalam were implicitly contained in the Qur'an and Traditions, so
that they were not excluded from the religious matters as the
traditionalists claimed. He explained how the principles of
motion and rest are implied in the Qur'anic story of Abraham's
search for God. (6:76/77). The theologians' argument for the
oneness of God goes back to the Qur'anic verses, and the detailed
treatment of the questions deriving from the basic dogma of
- (2)
God's oneness and His justice is simply taken from the Qur'an.
The possibility and impossibility of the resurrection are based
upon the Qur'anic arguments, which are designed to confirm, from
the point of reason the possibility of resurrection after
(3)
death. The principle that the series of things which begins
to exist has a beginning, and the refutation of the Materialists'
views that there is no motion which is not preceded by a motion,
and no day which is not preceded by a day, and the rejection of
the views that there is no atom which cannot be halved ad infinitum;
(1) Ibn_Rushd uses the same argument to justify the philo¬
sophical method; Ibn-Rushd, Fasl al-?>"aaal. pp.7-8.
(2) Risila I. p.89.
(3) Ibid.. pp.90-91.
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the basis of all these concepts and arguments, according to al-
Ash'arl, are to be found in the Sunna of the prophet. He quoted
the Tradition concerning the man who when his wife bore a black
child was suspicious of her, but was convinced of the child's
legitimacy by the prophet, who drew to him example from the
camels who often have offspring^ of a different colour from
themselves. Al-Ash'ari pointed out that this method of argument
used by the prophet is of a revealed source, and it is based on
the principle of referring things to their similar kinds and
comparing them to those related to them. He concluded that this
method of proof should be the basis in our judgement regarding
the things which are similar or alike (ash-shabih wal-nazir).^^
The Qur'an and Traditions also contain many of the theo¬
logical methods, and thus the basis of the rational refutation
of the adversary (al-munaqada *ala-l-khasm) is derived from the
• •
way in which the prophet argued with the fat rabbi, and with
those who claimed that God had enjoined upon them, that they should
not believe an apostle until he should come to them with a
(21
sacrifice which fire would consume, (3:183). The basis for
the method of correcting the sophistry of the adversary,
(istidrak mughalatat al-khusum) is also taken from both the
• •
Qur'anic verse, "You and what you worship, apart from God, will
be fuel to Gehenna, you shall go down to it.", and the argument
- (3)
developed upon it between the prophet and 'Abdallah b.al-Ziba'ra.
(1) Risala I. pp.91-92.
(2) Ibid.. p.93.
(3) Ibid.. pp.93-94. See also Suyuti, Asbab an-NuzuI. vol.2,p.20.
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After quoting many verses and Traditions, to support his
assumption that the Qur'an and the Sunna included many of the
subjects and methods of theology, al-Ash'ari concluded by saying,
"All the verses we have mentioned, as well as many which we have
not mentioned, are the basis and argument for us in our
discussion of what we have mentioned in detail. It is true that
no question was particularized in the Qur'an and the Sunna, but
that was because the particularisation of questions involving
rational principles did not take place in the days of the prophet.
However, he and his companions did engage in Kalam of the sort
which is mentioned.^ ^ So, to al-Ash'ari, the Qur'an and
Traditions contained the seeds of theological methods and
problems. The prophet and his companions dealt with them in the
terms and methods suited to the needs and necessities of their
period, and it is legitimate for us to deal with these problems
in the light of the new development of terms and methods.
3. This leads us to the third point which al-Ash'ari discussed
and emphasized; that the prophet was not ignorant of the theo¬
logical concepts and terms such as: body, and accident, motion
and leap etc. It is true that he did not discuss every one of
these points specifically, but this was not because he had no
knowledge of them, but because the need to use them did not
arise in his time in such specific form, so that he may have or
may not have discussed them, even though their basic principles
(2)
were present in the Qur'an and the Sunna. So, if Kalara on
the creation of the Qur'an and on the atom and the leap, in these
precise terms, had originated in the prophet's time, he would have
(1) Risala I. p.94.
(2) Ibid.
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discussed and explained them, just as he explained and discussed
all the specific questions which did originate in his tirae.^"^
(b) Al-Ash'ari's Differentiation between Fioh and Kalam.
Though al-Ash'ari, in his defence of Kalam, used the arguments
used by the jurists in their justification of qiyas in fiqh;
nevertheless he pointed out the differences between fiqh and Kalam
both in method and in contents. The two systems belong to
(2)
religion, but each one of them has its own field and principles.
Al-Ash'ari held that the Qur'an and the prophet have recourse to
reason in settling disputes with their opponents; the Qur'anic
arguments with those who denied resurrection, were designed to
confirm, from the point of view of reason, the possibility of
life after death, and the prophet's disputes with his opponents
(3)
were based on rational arguments. On the other hand, the
companions and the early generation of lawyers discussed many
religious questions related to law, such as the problems of
inheritance, divorce, and punishments, (hudud) and in the absence
of explicit instructions on such matters, they referred and linked
them (radduha wa qasuha) to something which had been determined
explicitly by the Qur'an and Traditions and their own ij tihad.
So there are two systems of thought, fiqh, which is concerned
(1) Risala I. p.95.
(2) Ibid., pp.89-94. Where al-Ash'ari tried to establish that
the problems and methods of Kalam are to be found adumbrated
in the Qur'an and Traditions.
(3) Ibid.. pp.90; 92.
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with furu' and depends mainly on revelation, and Kalam which is
concerned with theological problems and depends on reason.
According to al-Ash'ari, "the fiqh questions, which involved
judgements on unprecedented secondary cases were traced back, by
the jurists, to the rules of the Shari'a, or revealed law, which
consist of particulars and whose rules can be formulated only
with reference to revelation (sam*) and the prophet's teachings.
But as regards those questions concerning universal principles
(usul) i.e., theological problems, every rational Muslim ought
to retrace them to the set of principles which have been
unanimously upheld through reason, sense-experience, and evident
truth etc. This is because the treatment of the questions of
Shari'a, which belong to the sphere of Tradition is to reduce
these to the principles of the Shari'a, which also belong to the
sphere of Traditions; while the treatment of the questions
arising from reason and sense-experience is that these should be
retraced to their own proper sphere (i.e. of reason and sense-
experience). Rational and traditional questions (al- aqliyvat
wal-sam'iyyat) must never be mixed up."^^ So reason, sense-
experience and evident truth are the means of formulating
theological problems, while fiqh questions should be retraced
only to revelation.
(c) Reason and Religious Knowledge
So far we have seen how al-Ash'ari used rational arguments
to formulate and defend his views, and that he exerted his utmost
(1) Risala I, p.95.
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efforts to justify reasoning in theology and to establish the
legitimacy of Kalam. In spite of this, however, he did not allow
reason absolute freedom in all fields of religious knowledge, but
he emphasized the shortcomings of this intellectual faculty, and
the limits beyond which it should not venture. To him, reason
is a means of knowing God, and by his intellect man is able to
attain such knowledge. At the same time, however, he pointed
out that reason alone does not make this knowledge incumbent upon
man, it is only revelation that imposes the knowledge of God.
Thus, as ash-Shahrastani said, "al-Ash'ari distinguished between
the attainment of knowledge of God through reason, and its
necessarily coming that way. All knowledge comes by reason, said
(1 )
he, but revelation makes it incumbent upon men."
Al-Ash'ari emphasized the point that reason is only an
instrument for perception and it does not impose religious duties.
To him, reason proves the origin of the world, the oneness of
its maker, His power and eternal attributes ... etc., but the
imposition of religious duties is only known by revelation (shar*).
If God orders the doing of a thing it becomes duty (wa.jib) , and
if He prohibits a thing it becomes unlawful, (haram), before
(2)
revelation, however, nothing is said to be obligatory or unlawful.
The other point which al-Ash'ari emphasizes is that there is no
reward or punishment for deeds before the sending of a messenger.
Therefore, if one, through his intellect alone, reached a
perfect knowledge of God, he would be a believer though he would
(1) Iqdam. p.371.
(2) Baghdadi, Usui. p.24.
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not deserve any reward; on the other hand if his intellect led
him to atheism he would suffer no punishment; because reward and
punishment are only for obedience and disobedience which are
conceived when there is command, and without revelation there
will be no command.
3. Al-Ash'ari's Method in his Risalat ahl-al-Thaghr (Risala II)
The aim of this treatise is to answer some of the questions
raised by the scholars and jurists of the frontier (thaghr) of
- (2)
Bab al-Abw-ab, concerning the agreed methods and principles
of religion. Al-Ash'ari said that he was going to explain the
doctrines of the fathers (salaf), along with their rational
arguments and proofs, to justify the method which they followed,
i.e., the method of revelation; and to expose the errors of the
(3)
methods of the philosophers (turuq al-falasifa). Accordingly,
• "**
al-Ash'ari divided his treatise into two parts, one dealt with
the methods of the Qur'an and Traditions and contained criticisms
of the other methods followed by the philosophers and similar
groups. The other part dealt with the exposition of the doctrines
upheld by the fathers.
To al-Ash'ari, there were two methods which were diametrically
opposed, the method based on revelation (tariqat ash-shar') and
(1) Baghdadi, Usui, p.25.
_ . {\
(2) Bab al-Abwab is the Arab designate of a pass and fortress at
the Eastern end of the Caucasus in Persian Darband.
O.K. Dunlop, art. "Bab al-Abwab" E.I.^. vol.i, pp.835-36.
(3) Risala II. p.81.
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the method of the philosophers. And while the former method is
based on the Qur'an and Traditions, the latter is based on
rational deduction and some principles which are alien to
revelation. To illustrate the Qur'anic method, al-Ash'ari gave
examples from the Qur'an and the prophet's teachings which deal
with theological problems. The Qur'an contains rational arguments
for the existence of God, His oneness, and the possibility of
resurrection, it also contains rational arguments against the
Arab pagans, those who denied the necessity of prophecy, and the
Jews and Christians who denied the prophethood of Muhammad.^^
The Qur'anic verse, "We created man of an extraction of clay then
Vr'e set him a drop in a receptacle secure, then W'e created of the
drop a clot, then We created of the clot a tissue, then We
created of the tissue bones, then W'e garmented the bones in flesh,
thereafter We produced him another creature, so blessed be God,
(2)
the fairest of Creators." , proves the origination of man, and
the existence of his originator. This Qur'anic argument about
the phenomenon of change in the states of man might be formalized
by the following syllogisms: man changes from one state to
another, changeable things cannot be eternal, but originated,
therefore man is originated, and since originated things need an
originator, man must have an originator who is pov,erful and wise.
In accordance with this verse, al-Ash'ari gave many examples
which reveal the perfection and intention in the creation of man,
(3)
and the wisdom of his creator. The Qur'anic verse, "Surely
(1) Risala II, pp.82-86.
(2) Qur'an, 23:11.
(3) Risala II. pp.82-83.
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in the creation of heaven and earth, and in the alternation of
night and day^ -fhere are signs for men possessed of mind"^\
confirms such concepts, and indicates that many things in this
world, including the alternation of night and day, were meant
(2)for the benefit of man, and to meet his demands.
The main objective of the prophet, was to call to the
attention of people of diverse opinions, the fact of their
origination, the oneness of the originator, and to explain to
them the methods and proofs for knowing God, which are mainly
derived from the signs in His creation. The prophet has clearly
explained all these principles and doctrines as well as the
method for proving them. 3ecause of this fact, the companions
did not indulge in discussions regarding such matters; they simply
accepted what the prophet said without questioning or adding to
it.^^ Thus, to al-Ash'ari, religious doctrines and dogmas were
firmly established by revelation, hence the companions had no
need to discuss or argue about them. Yet, they discussed and
investigated those problems which are related to fiqh, and which
concerned judgement upon unprecedented cases, \7hen such cases
occurred, the companions referred them to the principles laid
down by revelation, and gave their solution in accordance with
these principles. The different methods of ijtihad (personal
effort) were an outcome of this attitude towards fiqh's problems.
Thus, the early Muslim generations did not follow the steps of
(1) Qur'an, 3:190.
(2) Risala II. pp.83-84.
(3) Ibid.
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each other, but they exercised their own opinions since they
had been ordered to think and reflect upon such matters. As for
those matters related to dogmas such as the knowledge of God, His
attributes, justice and wisdom, the companions were well
instructed on them by the prophet so they did not need to
compose arguments about them. Later generations had no excuse
to attempt to find any method other than that transmitted to them,
or to recommence new proofs or arguments other than those stated
by revelation, because it is impossible for anyone to introduce
a method or argument better than that of the prophet, or to
attain knowledge of something unknown to him.^^
Prom what has been said, it seems that al-Ash'ari differ¬
entiated between the method of dealing with questions of fiqh
and treatment of theological problems, and while one is free,
as the companions were, to discuss, infer and dispute law
problems, according to the principles laid down for arguments on
such subjects, one does not need to engage in arguments on
dogmaticp matters, since these matters were well established,
in both method and doctrines, by revelation. But does this mean
that al-Ash'ari imposed restrictions on reasoning and investigation
of theological problems and thereby forsook the notion which he
vigorously defended in his other treatise, the Risala I? Or is
it that he was simply trying to construct his methods and
theological doctrines about revelation? We have already seen
in the Risala I how al-Ash'ari exerted his utmost efforts to
justify speculative theology and to establish the validity of
(1) Risala II. p.88.
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rational arguments, and strongly emphasized that the basic
principles of both objects and method of kalam, were implicitly
contained in the Qur'an and Traditions.^^ In the present
treatise, al-Ash'ari clearly stated that revelation has its own
method in dealing with theological problems, and that no-one
should exceed the bounds which are laid down by the Qur'an and
Traditions in this respect; he also demonstrated how rational
proofs and arguments can be extracted from the Scriptural texts.
So in both treatises, al-Ash'ari was trying to lay down the
bases of theological methods and proofs according to revelation,
but in the Risala I he was arguing with those who opposed any
sort of speculation in theology, so he laid more emphasis on the
importance of reasoning in theology and that the basis for
theological methods and proofs are to be found in Scriptural
sources. In Risalat ahl al-Thag;hr. however, al-Ash'ari was
defending the Qur'anic method against the excesses of the philo¬
sophers and the extremist theologians, who used methods and
arguments, contrary or different in some respects, to that of the
Qur'an, so he laid more emphasis on the importance of following
the method of revelation, and argued against all attempts to
deviate from it.
So, though the points of emphasis differed from one treatise
to the other, the central theme of both treatises remained the
same, i.e., that revelation contained the method and object of
theology. In other words, revelation laid down the framework for
theological method upon which reason might work. Thus, al-Ash'arl
(1) See Supra, pp. 97-102.
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does not reject reasoning or rational proofs in theology, but he
gave revelation priority in establishing method and doctrines of
the faith, so that reasoning and rational arguments for them
might follow. And this is what al-Ash'arl has done in the
second part of his present treatise. In that part of his Risala II.
which deals with the doctrines of the fathers, al-Ash'ari did
not only enumerate the articles of their belief as he did in
his creeds of the Ibana and the Haqalat. but he introduced
arguments and rational proofs for them. Thus, to establish the
doctrine that there is nothing like God, al-Ash'ari quoted the
Qur'anic verses which supported this doctrine, and upon these
verses he built the following arguments: If God were similar
to His creatures, it would be that either He is originated like
them, or that they are eternal, both premises have been proven
to be wrong, so God is not similar to His creatures/^ By
using the same rational method, al-Ash'ari argued for the
eternity of God's attributes and that they do not necessitate a
similarity between Him and His creatures, and that they are
(2)
neither God nor other than He. To explain that the coming
(maji') of God, mentioned in the Qur'anic verses, did not imply
movement, al-Ash'ari said, "The coming means movement, if the
comer is body or substance, but God is neither body nor substance.
(3)
Therefore His coming does not imply movement."








reasoning or rational proofs in theology, but he was simply
trying to establish that the method used by revelation is more
valid than that used by the philosophers. He made-this point
quite clear throughout his present treatise, and according to
him, since, the truthfulness of the prophet has been firmly
established, all his authentic reports must be the only method
for knowing all that we do not perceive by our senses. The
prophet's reports, in this respect, are more convincing, and as
evidences they are clearer than those methods used by the philo¬
sophers; because there are many objections raised against#- the
method of the philosophers, and unless these objections are
answered, this method must not be accepted as a valid method
for solving theological problems.
Al-Ash'ari identified the argument* for the existence of
God based on the concepts of accidents and substance, which were
mainly used by the theologians, as that of the philosophers and
severely criticized it. To him, the very existence of these
accidents needed to be established, and the advocates of this
method had to show the falsity of the objections raised against
their existence. It has also to be proved that these accidents
were different from substances; that they were not self-subsistent;
that they did not endure; that they were of different kinds etc;
and above all that the judgement of their being originated should
be carried over to whatever is inseparable from them. Satis¬
factory answers to these objections were preconditions for the
use of this method; such answers, however, were unlikely because
(1) Risala II. p.89.
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on every point mentioned, there were sects disagreeing with the
philosophers and introducing lengthy arguments refuting their
views.^ Regarding the method of revelation, we find that
there is no need to involve ourselves with such puzzling points
and difficult questions. So compared to the method of the
philosophers, the method of revelation is much easier and more
convincing, while the former is difficult and beyond the reach
(2)
of the comprehension of the masses.
4. Al-Ash'ari's Theological Method in the Ibana.
Introduction.
In his Ibana. al-Ash'ari clearly stated the authority upon
which he formed his theological views. He said, "The belief we
hold and the religion we follow are holding fast to the book of
our Lord, the Sunna of our prophet, and to the Traditions
related on the authority of the companions and the successors,
and the Imams of the hadith. to that we hold firmly, professing
what Abu-'Abd-Allah Ahmad b.Muhammad b.Hanbal professed, and
• • •
avoiding him who dissents from his belief.Again, al-Ash'ari
said, "We accept all the Traditions for which the traditionalists
vouch ... we rely, in that wherein we differ, upon our Lord's
book, and the Sunna of our prophet, and the unanimous consent of
the Muslim community, i.jma' , and what it signifies; and we do








allow, nor do we believe of God what we do not know."^^
Superficial reading of these statements suggests that al-
Ash'ari is one of the traditionalist followers of Ibn_Hanbal
to whom he claimed allegiance, but a close study and scrutiny
of the contents of the lbana might give a somewhat different view
of al-Ash'ari's position and attitude. It is true that the
Ibana, especially that part called the Sunnite creed, almost
represents the views of Ibn_Hanbal. It is also true, that
quotations from the Qur'an and Traditions are widely used in the
Ibana. and that i,ima' is often used to silence opponents; but
the reading of the Ibana shows that there is a considerable
difference between al-Ash'ari and the Hanbalite traditionalists
(2)
in their way of using these sources. From these statements,
it seems that to al-Ash'ari, the valid sources for religious
knowledge are the Qur'an^Traditions and i.jma' .
(3)
(a) The Qur'an and the Method for its Interpretation
Al-Ash'ari considered the Qur'an as the main source for
establishing religious doctrines and the basis for their proofs.
So we find him quoting many Qur'anic verses and sometimes leaving
them to speak for themselves. In spite of this, however, he
often built a very considerable structure of rational arguments
(1) Ibana. pp.11-12.
(2) Watt, Formative Period, p.307.
(3) Al-Ash'ari is said to have written a work on tafsir which
is mainly devoted to the refutation of the views of al-
Jubba'ai and al-Balkhi, Ibn_'Asakir, Tabyyin. pp.136-39.
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upon these verses. So al-Ash'arl did not simply quote verses, but
he showed how these verses, on which he relied, supported his
doctrines and how those quoted by his adversaries did not prove
what they wished them to prove. This point might be better
illustrated by al-Ash'ari's rational arguments for the vision
of God based on the verse, "Paces that day are bright, looking
to their Lord" (75:22-23) and his refutation of the Ku'tazilites*
denial of the vision based on the verse, "The eyes comprehend
Kim not, but He comprehends the eyes" (6:103). While al-Ash'ari
rejected all other interpretations of the first verse, other than
(2)
the seeing of God by the eyes, he strongly contended against
the Ku'tazilites attempt to interpret the second verse in a
(3)
way which curtails the vision of God.
Since the Qur'an was the source which all the contending
theological groups quoted as an authority to validate and
support their views, it has been subjected to different inter¬
pretations, to serve the particular interests of this or that
party. So to avoid this, al-Ash'ari tried to set rules for the
interpretation of the Qur'an; he accused the Mu'tazilites, the
Qadarites and other deviators, of being misled by their straying
desires which inclined them to the blind acceptance of the
principles (taqlid) of their leaders and their departed forebears
so that they interpreted the Qur'an according to their opinions
with an interpretation for which God had neither revealed authority




nor shown proof, and which they had not derived from the prophet
or from the ancients of the past.^^ To al-Ash'arl, many of
the Ku'tazilites'wrong views were the outcome of their attitudes
and their misinterpretation of the Qur'an; so to avoid this al-
Ash'arl introduced the following principles as rules for the
interpretation of the Qur'an:
1. In various parts of the Ibana al-Ash'ari emphasized the
point that the Qur'an does not contradict itself, on the contrary.
(2)
every part of it tallies with every other. And of those
verses which seem to be contradictory, he ingeniously extracted
arguments to support his views and to refute those of his
opponents. To affirm his views on the vision of God, al-Ash'ari
said, "God's book agrees part with part, and so since He says in
one verse, 'On that day shall faces beam with light, looking
towards their Lord' and in another verse, 'Their eyes do not
reach Him', we know that He means only the eyes of the infidels
do not reach Him or that human sight does not attain God in
(3)
this world". The Mu'tazilites argued that God gives guidance
to every one being faithful or infidel, and introduced as support
for this view the verse, "The month of Ramadan in which the
Qur'an was sent down as guidance to men." which implies that the
Qur'an is guidance for all men whether they are infidels or the
faithful. To al-A.sh' ari, this verse had a particular meaning
because God had explained in another verse that He guides those
(1) Ibana . p.7. Ibn—Asakir. Tabyyin. p.138.
(2) Ibana , p . 64.
(3) Ibid, , p.16 .
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who fear Him, and told us that He does not guide the infidels.
Since the Qur'an does not contradict itself, it becomes necessary
that God's words, "Guidance to men" refer only to the faithful
and not to the infidels.^^^ So the only safe method for inter¬
preting the Qur'an and understanding the exact meaning of a
verse is by taking into consideration the other verses which
tally or seem to convey a different meaning. It is only by
employing such methods that the real meaning of a verse might be
(2)
attained.
2. The second principle for interpreting the Qur'an is that it
should be explained in the light of the Arabic language.
According to al-Ash'ari, God addressed the Arabs in their
classical language and so there is no other way but to recourse
to what is found, understood and comprehended in that language,
(3)
and to explain the Qur'an according to it. On the problem of
error and whether God causes the wicked to err, al-Ash'arl argued
with those who held that "error, in regard to God, means that He
called them erring and not that He causes them to err". Al-
Ash'ari rejected this interpretation, and argued from the
linguistic meaning of the term, by saying, 'To those it should
be said, "Does not God address the Arabs in their classical
language, and has He not said therefore, "In the clear Arabic
tongue" (Q.26:195) and "We have not sent any apostle save (to
(1) Ibana, pp.63-64.
(2) See al-Ash'ari's argument with the Mu'tazilites on the
concept of guidance (hidaya). Ibana, pp.64-65.
(3) Ibana, p.15.
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teach) in the language of his own people" (Q.14:4) they will
certainly answer "yes" therefore, it may be said to them, 'then
if God revealed the Qur'an in the Arabic tongue, where do you
find in the classical Arabic language that one may say "So and
so misled so and so" meaning "He called him erring". Al-Ash'ari
concluded that, since it is not correct according to the Arabs to
say "So and so misled so and so, when he calls him erring, their
interpretation is false because it is contrary to the Arabic
tongue. With such arguments and clever use of language, al-
Ash'ari silenced his opponents and was able to build thereon many
(2)of his arguments and to refute the views of his adversaries.
3. The third principle for understanding the Qur'an is that
its literal meaning should be accepted unless there is a strong
proof or a convincing argument suggesting other meaning, then
this should be followed. The revealed book: should not be sub¬
jected to the interpretation of human beings, otherwise such
personal interpretation might lead to the distortion of its real
meanings. According to al-Ash'ari, "the Qur'an is to be under¬
stood literally and it is not for us to understand it in any
(3)
other way except by proof." What al-Ash'ari means by proof
here, is the ijma' or the agreement of the Muslim community to
give a certain meaning to a certain verse or to define whether
the verse is universal in its meaning ('amma) or not; if the use








meaning, and we may not remove it from this meaning without
argument or proof ... we give a particular meaning to the Qur'an
by i.jma' and by proof. ^ ^
Thus, he argued against the Mu'tazilites, who denied that
God has two hands on the pretext that if two hands were ascribed
to Him, then more than two might be ascribed to Him as well,
since God said, "from what our hands have made" (Q.36:71) in
the plural. Al-Ash'ari said, it is unanimously agreed that the
belief of those who hold that God has a number of hands is
false, therefore God must indeed have spoken of a number of hands,
but really have meant to assert the existence of only two hands.
Against the Mu*tazilites' strong argument, al-Ash'ari only finds
i,jma* to refute it; time and again he stressed the point that
the Qur'an is to be interpreted literally, and v<e do not depart
from its literal meaning except by proof and so, in the present
example, we find a proof by which we transferred the reference
to hands from its primary literal meaning to another literal
meaning; and the latter literal meaning must rest on a truth from
(2)
which there is no departure except by proof.
Though al-Ash'ari applied these principles to his treatment
of the Qur'anic verses in the Ibana, and considerably succeeded
in proving the validity of his views and the weakness of those
of his opponents, his enthusiastic efforts to prove his points
of view and his emphasis on the literal interpretation of the




arguments for the uncreatedness of the Qur'an (based on the
premises that God's names are mentioned in the Qur'an; and if
the Qur'an is created, these names will be created.and so God's
knowledge, power and will etc.), disclose the disputatious nature
of some of al-Ash'ari's arguments. Of the same nature is his
attempt to identify God's witness mentioned in the verse, "God
bears witness that there is no God but He ..." (Q.3:18), with a
verbal pronunciation, and his conclusion that God undoubtedly
hears this witness and hears it from Himself, so it is eternal
(2)
and so is God's speech.
Arguing also for the eternity of the speech of God, al-
Ash'ari introduced the argument based upon the verse, "And Ky
curse shall be on thee till the day of judgement." (Q.38:78) and
said if God's speech is created and created things come to end,
then His speech and His curse on Iblis will come to end, and to
hold such views is to forsake the religion of Islam, therefore
(3)
God's speech must be eternal. It is obvious that neither the
contents of the verse nor the premises of the arguments lead to
the conclusion which al-Ash'ari came to. Stating his views on
the utterance of the Qur'an, al-Ash'ari rejected the application
of the term lafz to the Qur'an, on the pretext that the Arabs use
this term for casting off things so it should not be applied to
the Qur'an. According to al-Ash'ari, when an Arab says, "I





fami) his meaning is, "I have cast it forth" and so the word of
God is not said to be uttered, but only to be read, recited,
written and memorized.^^^ The weakness of this argument is
quite obvious, and al-Ash'ari's opponents might well argue on
the same linguistic ground and say that the Arabs use the word
lafz in respect of speech, to mean its pronouncing or saying,
the meaning which al-Ash'ari intentionally suppressed, in the
course of his argument, in order to justify his conclusion.
(b) The Traditions
The second authority upon which al-Ash'ari depended, in
forming his theological views, is the reports and Traditions of
the prophet which he accepted and based arguments upon without
questioning their authenticity. In his Ibana, al-Ash'ari said,
"We accept all the Traditions for which the traditionists vouch:
the descent into the lower heavens, and the Lord's saying 'is
there any who has a request? is there any who ask forgiveness?'
(2)
and the other things they relate and vouch for." To prove
his views, al-Ash'ari simply recorded reports and Traditions and
let them speak for themselves. He quoted many Traditions, to
(3)
support his views on the vision of God, to demonstrate the
- (4)











Al-Ash'ari considered the consensus of the Muslim community,
(ijma*). as one of the sources of religious knowledge; reference
has already been made to the importance of i.jma' in interpreting
(3)
the Qur'an, and for deciding what is the meaning of a verse.
Al-Ash'ari clearly stated that, after the Qur'an and Traditions,
he depended on i.jroa' to establish his theological views; and to
demonstrate the validity of his doctrines. Thus he uses this
authority as an auxiliary or ancillary proof for the establishment
(4) (5)
of God's vision , and to affirm God sitting on the throne.
Al-Ash'ari also used i.jma' to refute the views that God is knowing
but has no knowledge and attacked its holders as being self-
contradicting and deserters of the Muslim community. To al-
Ash'ari, the Muslims unanimously agreed that God had eternal
knowledge and they said that God's knowledge is eternal because
it precedes created things; that he who denies that God has
knowledge dissents from the Muslims and is guilty of a departure












In his Ibana. al-Ash'ari never mentioned reason as a
source for attaining religious knowledge, or as a method for
establishing the validity of the dogma; he even excluded reason
- (3)
from being able to interpret the Qur'an. In spite of this
however, he made use of rational arguments in order to establish
his views and to refute those of his adversaries, and thus we
find proofs based on arguments derived from common sense and
general observation proportionally occupy a prominent place in
the Ibana. On the question of God's vision, for instance, out of
the eight proofs presented, three were based on rational arguments.
According to al-Ash'ari, one of the things that proves the
visibility of God to sight is the fact that nothing exists that
God cannot show us, and it is only the non-existent that He
cannot show us; wherefore, since God certainly exists, it is not ira-
(4)
possible that He should show us Himself. So by using the
principle of existence, al-Ash'ari is rationally arguing to prove
the possibility of God's vision; but it has to be noticed that he
had recourse to these rational proofs after he had introduced






He also made use of the analogy between man and God to
establish the attributes of God against the Ku'tazilite denial
of them. He said that the Ku'tazilites cannot deny that one can
be willing except by a will, therefore the Liu'tazilites had no
justification for denying that the knower knows only by a know¬
ledge, and that God has a knowledge just as He has a will.^^
Many of the Ibana's arguments are of a polemical nature,
which were meant to embarrass the opponents and to demonstrate
the absurdity of their views. Thus to refute the Mu'tazilite
view regarding God's sitting on the throne, al-Ash'ari said
if God's sitting (istiwa') on His throne means He has power over
it (isti'la), then it would have to be said that He is seated on
all created things, including the throne, for instance on gardens,
wastelands and similar things, but no Muslim holds such an
(2 )
absurd belief. He used the same method to refute the Mu'taz-
ilite conception of abandonment (khidhlan). He said if the
Liu'tazilites define 'abandonment' in the sense of leaving men
free to disbelieve, they would equally have to say that God
abandons the believers, leaving them free to disbelieve too, which
(3)
is heresy.
Throughout the Ibana, the proportion between rational and
Scriptural proofs varies, according to the point under discussion;
and thus while al-Ash'ari depended mainly on the Qur'an to





sitting on the throne, and the uncreatedness of the Qur'an, he
rationally argued against the Waqifiyya, who said neither that
the Qur'an was created nor that it was uncreated. He also
refuted the Jahmaites' denial of God's knowledge, power and other
(2)
attributes mainly on rational ground. Out of the twenty-
two proofs which al-Ash'ari introduced to establish God's will,
nineteen of them were based on general observation and derived
from common sense.
So, al-Ash'ari gave reason an important place in his Ibana,
but it never became a rival to the role of revelation. He did
not consider reason as a source of doctrines or dogmas, but he
used it to demonstrate or to prove dogmas which were already
established and derived and verified from the Qur'an and
(4)




(4) Watt, Free Will, p.140. cf. W. Thomson, "Al-Ash'ari and
his Ibana". K.W. vol.32 (1942) p.244.
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CONCLUSION TO PART ONE
In the light of this exposition, we may now cpmpare the
theological methods of al-Maturidi and al-Ash'ari. To begin with
it might be said that it is clear that while al-Katuridi seems to
be systematic and consistent in the way he deals with theological
problems in his two works, the Ta'wilat and Kitab at-Tawhid. al-
Ash'ari*s methodology differs from one work to another according
to the nature and scope of the work. Thus, while the Luma* and
Risala I of al-Ash'ari represent a rational trend similar to
that of the Mu'tazilites in using Xalara (reasoned theology) and
defending its methodology, the Risala II and the Ibana tend
more towards Hanbalite views £that they defend the traditional
method and concepts related to the Hanbalites. It has, however,
been demonstrated that even in these latter works, al-Ash'ari
did not entirely follow the traditionalist method, rather he used
rational arguments and evidences to support his views.
It has also been shown that unlike al-Ash'ari, al-Maturidi
devoted a special section of his Kitab at-Tawhid to deal with
the theory of knowledge. Due to the fact that this is the
earliest extant theological work of its kind to be prefaced with
a treatment of the theory of knowledge and epistemological
problems, al-Katuridi has been recognized as one of the first, if
not the first Muslim to deal with such considerations. In his
treatment of this point, al-Maturidi criticized the views of
opposing groups; those who thought that knowledge is not attain¬
able at all, or that senses cannot supply true knowledge, or
doubted the validity of reason as a means of knowledge as well
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as those who emphasized the importance of reason in this respect
even above revelation. Similarly, he refuted the idea that
individual mind can be the basis of knowledge, and did not accept
inspiration, blind imitation or ta*lim as a means of providing
sound knowledge. In the face of opposition from both sides, al-
Maturidi defended the validity of the knowledge attained by the
sense organs, reports (including revelation) and reason. He
pointed out that though reason is an important means of knowledge
it has its shortcomings and limits, so it cannot give true
knowledge about everything that needs to be known. Thus, it
requires the help of revelation, not only in religious affairs
but also in many worldly affairs. He emphasized the point that
there is no contradiction between the judgement of revelation and
reason.
Discussion of such points swfre absent from the extant works
of al-Ash'ari, which has some significance. This indicates on
the one hand the rational approach of al-Maturidi in this field
compared with that of al-Ash'ari. On the other hand, this
difference of approach indicates basic differences even between
al-Katuridi' s Kitab at-Tawhid and al-Ash'ari's Luma* for instance,
which are works of the same type. It seems that while al-Ash'arl
in his huma* was concerned with one purpose (presumably to refute
Ku'tazilite doctrines) al-!\'aturidi in his Tawhid seems to be more
,
concerned with setting up a theological system and with the
arguments for its validity, also bringing into consideration
general intellectual background of his period, and the contending
views of his opponents.
Apart from these two points of difference, however, it has
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been found that in the course of their arguments, both al-
Maturidi and al-Ash'ari used Traditional proofs and rational
arguments in order to support their points of view-and to refute
those of their adversaries. As for the traditional evidences,
they both considered the Qur'an and authentic Traditions as the
only sources for religious doctrines; they introduced similar
methods for the interpretation of the Qur'an, but they differed
regarding the role of reason in this respect. Though al-Ash'ari's
commentary on the Qur'an has not survived, it appears from his
interpretation of certain verses of the Qur'an in his extant
works that the valid method for its interpretation should be
based on traditional evidences (including the Qur'an itself),
linguistic justification and the authority of i jma* . Thus, he
disapproved of any allegorical interpretation of the Qur'anic
verses based on rational justification. Al-f^aturidi adopted the
same rules and employed them in his Ta'wilat and Kitab at-Tawhid.
For him, however, only the Qur'an remains an unquestionable
authority in this respect. Thus he questions many of the Traditions
quoted in support of certain interpretations of the Qur'an, and
he expressed his disagreement with many of the early commentators.
His liking for the rational approach expresses itself into two
points: in his attitude towards the legendary tales developed
and quoted by the Qur'an-Commentators in order to explain the
stories referred to briefly in the Qur'an, and also in his
attitude towards the ambiguous verses of the Qur'an. Concerning
the first point, we have seen that al-Maturidi adopted a strict
method and clearly stated that one should stick to the limit
bounded by the Qur'an itself and authentic Traditions, and that
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there is no point in indulging in quotations from foreign sources.
In respect of the ambiguous verses of the Qur'an, al-Maturidi
stated that these verses must be interpreted according to the
self-explaining and precise (muhkam) verses; if the apparent
sense of a. verse contradicts what has been established by the
precise verses, it must be realized that the apparent sense was
not intended because, as God has repeatedly declared, there can
be no contradiction in the verses of the Qur'an.
Both al-Maturidi and al-Ash'ari used the material available
in hadith to a limited extent in the course of their arguments.
However, as has been demonstrated, al-Ash'arl seems to have given
more weight to this material especially in his Ibana, while al-
Maturidi does not seem to be keen on quoting Traditions in the
course of his theological arguments. It has also been observed
that while al-Ash'ari often used i,jma* to silence his opponents,
al-Maturidi hardly used this authority in this respect; in the
instances where al-Maturidi quoted it, it is clear that he was
only employing such a method after he had exhausted all the
arguments based on the Qur'anic reasoning and rational arguments.
Both al-Maturidi and al-Ash'ari allowed reason a place in
their theological systems, but they differed regarding its
importance and its role. Thus al-Maturidi considered reason a
precondition for the imposition of religious responsibility
(taklif). Also, for him, reason requires that man as a rational
being should acquire the knowledge of God's existence, even if
no messengers had been sent by Him for this purpose. He stated
that through his intellect, man must seek to know his Creator by
reflecting on his creation and the phenomena of creation in
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general. If man fails to attain such knowledge, he will be
eternally punished. To al-Maturldl, things and actions have
intrinsic values; they are intrinsically good or evil. Revelation
takes these values into consideration in the command and pro¬
hibitions which it reveals; and reason is capable of compre¬
hending these values and of distinguishing between right and
wrong, but it cannot be the final authority for human obligation
and religious laws. The basis of obligation and religious laws
is revelation and not reason. On these points we have seen that
al-Ash'ari held somewhat different views from those of al-
Ivlaturidi. To al-Ash'ari, reason was a means of knowing God,
but it did not make such a knowledge incumbent upon man, and it
necessitated neither belief in God nor knowledge of Kim. So man
would not be punished for not achieving such knowledge; rewards
and punishment are only connected with the sending of messengers.
Also, al-Ash'ari maintained that things do not possess intrinsic
values of good and evil, it is only religious law which makes
them good or evil. So what is commanded by revelation is good,
and what is prohibited is bad; revelation can convert previously-
declared good into bad and vice versa.
As for the rational method, both al-Katuridi and al-Ash'ari
defended Kalam (reasoned arguments) and used rational arguments
based on some form or another of the Aristotelian syllogism.
They also made use of the theological method of argument based
on the principle of the analogy of the absent to the present
(oiyas al-gha'ib 'ala-l-shahid), and involved themselves to some
extent in polemical, weakly supported arguments. Judging from
the proportion and variety of arguments used by these two scholars,
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it might be said that al-Maturidi appears to be more inclined
the use of rational methodology. The concepts he used and the
terminologies he employed, which are usually derived from
philosophical sources, confirms this statement.
PART TWO




THE ARGUMENTS OP AL-MATURIDI FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE
AND HIS ATTRIBUTES
The early Muslim theologians, especially the Mu'tazilites,
were occupied for some time with the problem of God's existence
and His attributes because Islamic conquests, which spread over
vast areas, brought the early theologians into contact with the
Hellenic culture and its concept of God, which differed consid¬
erably from that of Islam. The Sabians, the dualists, the Dah-
riyya and the followers of Greek philosophy in its Hellenic form,
(1 )
all lived within the new frontiers of the Islamic Empire. The
Ku'tazilites played an important role in meeting the challenge
(2)
presented by these groups. Their arguments and counter¬
arguments, concerning this problem, were handed down to the next
generation of theologians, who continued to develop them; so it
is not surprising to find that almost the same problems occupy
a prominent place in the works of al-Maturidi and al-Ash'ari.
1. Al-Maturidi on the Existence of God
One of al-Maturidi's arguments for the existence of God is
the well-known theological argument based on the premise that the
(1) De Lacy O'Leary, Arabic Thought and its Place in History,
chapter 1, pp.1-55. Watt, Formative Period, pp.183-186.
(2) See Intisar. p.21; an-Nazzam's arguments with the dualists,
• • •
(pp.30-31) and the Dahriyya (p.33).
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world is temporal, so it needs an originator who is God. Thus
he devoted a considerable part of his Kitab at-Tawhid in estab-
lishing that the world is temporal, and in refuting the views of
those who hold that it is eternal.
(a) His Refutation of the Eternity of the World
Al-Katuridi's treatment of this subject suggests that he
was well aware of many of the ideas concerning the eternity of
the world, current in his time, such as those of the various
groups of the Dahriyya, the dualists, etc. According to al-
Eaturidi, there are three reasons behind the confusion regarding
the origin of the world: (i) Some hold its eternity as a result
of blind imitation, (taqlld); they followed what they are used to,
and find it hard to think otherwise; to engage in argument with
such people, al-Maturidi said, is useless and no attention should
be paid to them.^^ (ii) The changing states of things, and the
linking of things with other things through cause and effect,
led some to believe that it is impossible that something should
come out of nothing; everything, they said, arises from another
(2)
thing preceding it, and that the world is eternally like this.
They argued that to ascribe an origin to the world different
from the existing things is false, since such a concept cannot be
(3)
perceived by the senses or comprehended by the intellect.
This materialistic view was held by the various groups of the
Dahriyya, who shared the doctrine of the eternity of the world.
(1) Tawhld. p.111.13-18.
(2) Ibid. , p.30,111-12. Ta'wllat. 74:36. cf. Ghazall, Eunqidh.p.19.
(3) Tawhid. pp.30, 112. cf. Ibn-Hazm, Pisal, vol.1,p.10.
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(iii) By observing the existence of good and evil, pleasures and
pains in the world, the dualists held that there must be two
originators of the world, one from whom all good things arise,
and the other who is the origin of all evils. Because one who
does good is usually commended and he who does evil is blamed,
thus it is impossible for God, who is wise and merciful, to do
O)evil or harm.
Al-Maturidi refuted the materialistic views by first refuting
the idea that nothing comes into being except from a thing; he
argued that our experience shows that things cannot be latent
(mustajin) in another thing, thus man could not possibly come into
being simply from semen, or the tree from seed alone; for the
form of man and the colours and the size of fully-grown trees
are non-existent in the semen and the seeds respectively. They
cannot arise from the food intake, since we observe that in the
case of the human body, for example, no amount of food can cause
it to exceed certain limits of growth; and while some grow fat on
food, others spend their lives eating and yet remain thin. And,
furthermore, we find that different effects may be produced by
(2)
one and the same food.
For the fact that the originator cannot be perceived by the
senses nor comprehended by the intellect, al-Maturidi argued
that this does not mean that He does not exist, since there are
many things the reality of which is imperceptible through the
senses and incomprehensible to the intellect, yet no-one denies
(1) Tawhld. pp.113, 116, 37. Ta'wllat. 74:30.
(2) Tawhid, pp.13,31-32. Pazdawi, Usui, pp.16-17.
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their existence. It is true that neither reason nor the senses
are able to grasp the real essence of God, this, however, does
not mean that He is non-existent, but it simply discloses that
the reality of God is beyond the limits of these instruments. Thus
the use of reason or the senses in this respect is unjustified,
as is the use of sight for attaining sounds, or hearing for
distinguishing between colours. So, just as it is impossible to
perceive the objects of sense perception by another organ than
that used for it, it is in the same way improbable that we should
perceive or comprehend by the sense organs or the intellect an
object which lies beyond the reach of those instruments.^^
Al-Maturidi used the word Dahriyya in a wide sense to include
those who believe in the eternity of the world, depending on the
doctrine of causation, ('illiyva); the naturalists, who believe
in the eternity of the four elements; the Ashab al~hayula, who
• •
believe in the eternity of the matter; the Ashab an-nujum, who
• •
maintain that the eternal movement of the stars is the origin of
all actions in the world; as well as the various groups of the
dualists. In his Kitab at-Tav/hid. al-Maturidi explained the
doctrine of all these groups, and meticulously refuted them.
Thus consideration of his arguments in this respect might help
in promoting our understanding of his rationalism, and the
contribution he made in the field of speculative theology.
According to al~Maturidi, those who advocate the doctrine of
causation, maintain that the world arises from the creator, yet
hold that it is eternal. They identify God with the perfect
agent or cause, and consider the world as his necessary effect.
(1) Tawhid, p.32; TaVilat 6:103; cf. Ibn-Hazm, Fisal, vol.1,p.11.
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They said that it is impossible for a cause to be without an
effect; and since the world is an effect whose cause is eternal,
it must be eternal. The creator must be existent, generous and
powerful, these attributes are eternal otherwise he would be
impotent, so the world must be eternal and that God from eternity
bestowed (afada) his generosity upon it.^^ Al-Maturidi attri-
(2)
buted these views to the Batinites, but it is obvious that
they are a summary of the contents of the first argument
introduced by Proclus concerning the eternity of the world,
which is said to have been translated into Arabic along with
(3)
another eight of his arguments by Ishaq b. Hunayn (d.268/911) ;
• •
and upon which the theory of emanation, advocated by the Muslim
(4)
philosophers, was based.
Al-Maturidi rejected the idea of the doctrine of causation
('illivva) and argued that if it is thus meant that the world was
necessarily (bi-t-tab*) made by the creator, this would be
• »
impossible. For in this case, the creator would be compelled,
and the creator's nature is such that he cannot be compelled.
Moreover, the world is originated and is made up of different
elements and he who produces a thing by nature must be dhu-naw*;
the nature of the world itself is that it is not subject to
cause and effect and it has not therefore arisen in this way,
with God as the necessary cause. If they meant, however, that
(1) Tawhid. pp.30,9-12; 112,7-13.
(2) Ibid.. pp.94-5.
(3) Badawi, al-Aflatuniyya al-Muhdatha 'ind al-'Arab. pp.34-42.
• •
(4) Al-Alousi, the Problem of Creation in Islamic Thought, pp.239-41.
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God originates (yuhdith) the world out of free choice then to
call Him cause is improper (fasid). ^ ^
The naturalists or Ashab at-taba'i', believe that the world
is a production of four elements, fire, earth, air and water.
All generation and decay, as well as the different qualities of
things, are the result of the mixing and unmixing of these four
elements. All being is simply composition and decomposition.
Some of the naturalists, however, consider only one of these four
(2) - -
elements as the principle of all existence. Al-Katuridi argued
against the naturalists by saying that: (i) These elements are
naturally determined, (matbu'). and the matbu' is constrained to
• •
do only whatever it is naturally determined to do. Moreover,
everything other than the matbu' itself can increase or retard
its effect and even render it ineffectual, so these elements
cannot be the sole cause of the world, they must be under the
(3)
control of something not compelled or restrained. (ii) The
matbu' would have no effect on other things unless those things
were naturally the recipient of that effect, as for example
things which are not liable t-o be harmed would not be harmed by
something which causes harm to other things. Since it is not for
the matbu' to make things subject to its effect,there must be an
external force which originates and combines the naturally deter¬
mined and which accepts its effect (dhu-l-tab* wal-matbu').
» •
(1) Tawhld, p.33,5-9.
(2) Tawhid, pp.112,6-13; 141-43. Instead of the word, rutuba,
• •
commonly used, al-Maturldl used the word, nuduwwa. which has
virtually the same meaning.
(3) Ibid.. pp.1 16,23-24; 117,1-2.
(4) Ibid.. p.117,3-7.
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(iii) If the dyestuff is left to stain by itself, it would pro¬
duce bad colours, so the dyes must be produced by wise and
experienced people who mix them in certain proportions to produce
perfect colours. This also applies to the elements, since by
their natures these four elements are opposed to each other, the
harmony and the order in them proves that they have been forced
to combine and have been restrained from combining by an external
force. (iv) These elements oppose each other and are mutually
discordant, and this leads naturally to separation and disinte¬
gration. Things cannot be naturally produced by such opposing
elements, so there must be an external force which represses
their mutual repulsion, prevents them from scattering, and
(2)
compels them to come together. (v) It is noticeable that
continuous movements produce heat in the subject which moves, and
complete rest produces moisture; so what seems to be more likely
is that these elements originated from the changing states of the
(3)
world, and not that the world originated from them.
As for Ashab al-hayula, they maintain that the principle of
• •
the world is prime matter, (hayula or tina)^^. which is formless
(1) Tawhld. p.117,8-14.
(2) Ibid. , p.143,3-6. The same argument has been attributed to
an-Nagzam. See Intisar. pp.41-2.
(3) Tawhld. p.145,7-10.
(4) Al-Katuridi used the hayula and tina to denote prime matter,
and he made no distinction between the two terms. The same
attitude has been adopted by al-Kindi and al-Baqillani. See
respectively, al-Kindi, Rasa'il. vol.1.p.166, note 2,
al-Baqillani, Tamhid. p.33.
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and characterless, indeterminate in quality and unlimited in
quantity; all substances and accidents as well as the change in
the world are caused by a latent power (quwwa) arising from
causes within the nature of prime matter. Al-Maturidi pointed
out the contradictions of the advocates of this doctrine in
their assertion that the prime matter is formless and character¬
less, yet accidents occur in it. Moreover, according to their
own views, the world would not be eternal because they held
that the world is produced through the change caused by the
latent power in the prime matter; as a result of that change
prime matter would no longer be existent, but would be replaced
(2)
by the world which consists of temporal qualities and substances;
According to their views, the latent power changes prime matter
by its nature, so it should not be separate from it at any time,
thus it might be asked why the latent power did not cause that
change in eternity? In other words, by producing the world at
a certain time even in eternity, implies that the latent power is
not naturally determined, but it must have some sort of free
choice. Those qualities which are said to have been originated
in prime matter, if they were latent in the ha.yula then it would
be necessary but ridiculous to say that it was characterless but
with co-occurring qualities; or if it was said that the ha.yula
was devoid of these qualities in this case they would be
produced neither by the hayula nor by the latent power, since
(1) Tawhid, p.147,4-9. Al-Maturidi attributed this doctrine
to Aristotle. See Tawhid. p.147, 12ff.
(2) Ibid.. p.148,4-12.
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both these have the same qualities and characteristics. So
there must be an outside force which brought these qualities
into existence in the first place.
Al-Maturidi argued that if this prime matter is of the
same nature as the substances of this Vr-orld, then it would be
impotent and temporal just as the world is; if it does not
belong to this world, but the world was produced by it, the
processes of its origination would be either: (i) as a result of
the occurring of qualities in the prime matter which change its
substance from that postulated characterless concepts into the
form of this world with all its defects and liability to change
and alteration. In this case, the prime matter no longer exists
and what exists instead is this world which is supposed to have
(2)
been originated by something else. (ii) Or that the world
was latent in the prime matter which brings it to actual exist¬
ence. Al-Maturidi rejected the idea of kumun, and added that
this prime matter is an ignorant power, and it is impossible for
such power to have control over the affairs of the world and
(3)
bring it into existence. If he who holds that prime matter
exists, believed that it brings the world from non-existence
into existence by his own action and bringing it into existence
(takwin) according to his free will, then there would be no
disagreement between them and the Muslims apart from the fact









As for Ashab an-nujum, who hold that eternal movements of
• •
the stars cause all the changes in the world, al-Katuridi
rejected such a view and introduced many arguments to refute
the notion of eternal movements; and to demonstrate that every
movement has a beginning and an end, and it is finite at the end
and the beginning. According to him, every movement is an end
of a movement previous to it, so it is impossible for a movement
(2)to end without having a beginning. Arguing for the views
that heaven is created and will come to end, Jahm b.Safwan is
said to have used the same argument and said that, "It is im¬
possible to conceive of movements which have no end, just as it
(3)
is impossible to conceive of movements without a beginning."
Al-Katuridx introduced another argument based on the finiteness
of objects and said, we observe that objects are different in
extent and the only possible explanation for this difference is
the fact that there is a finite quantity which when multiplied
becomes larger, that finite quantity however cannot possibly be
produced by a quantity preceding it, but it must have come into
being ex-nihilo. This proves that objects are finite in quantity
and time; the same applies to movement, therefore the first
movement must be originated in a finite time and has a beginning.
(1) Tawhid, p.65,1-4.
(2) Ibid.. p.144,2-5.
(3) Milal, vol.1, p.87.
(4) Tawhid, p.144,6-11. The text is very difficult and rather
confused; if my reading of it is correct, similarity between
al-r.'aturidi' s argument and one mentioned by al-Kindl is to
be found. See Rasa'il, vol.2, p.202 ff.
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Another argument is that if the movement which is supposed to
be circular, were made straight so that each one follows the
track of the other, the beginning of one movement entails the end
of another (as in billiards); following the assertion that they
are eternal, they would be eternally existent and non-existent
which is contradictory. So the movement must have a beginning.
Moreover, if two things are said to be moving on a straight line
and one is found to be ahead of the other, this might be explained
either in that one started before the other, or that they were
moving at different speeds; if it is assumed that they were of
equal speed, the only alternative would be that they started from
(2)different points, and this proves that movement has a beginning.
Al-Maturidi argued that the continuous movements of the stars
indicates that they are subjected to such movement by an external
force, otherwise they would have chosen an easier way to control
the world than this tiring process; and such a determinate force
cannot possibly be the origin of all these different qualities
(3)
and entities of the world. What is more likely, according to
al-Maturldi, is that the motion of the celestial spheres and the
movement of the stars were caused by the change in the terrestrial
(4)
globe and not the other way round.
The dualists hold that the wise cannot do harm or evil,
(1) Tawhid, p.144,11-15.
(2) Ibid.. p.144,15-19. Similar argument is attributed to
an-Nazzam, see Intisar. pp.33-34.
• • •
(3) Tawhid. pp.145,15-20; 146,1-3.
(4) Ibid.. p.145,10-14.
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therefore, to explain the existence of injustice and evil in
the world, they attributed good to god or light and evil to dark
ness or the devil. To refute these views, al-Maturidi said that
the dualists were led to such absurd views through misconception
and ill definition of the meaning of wisdom, and their relying
on intellect alone for understanding the wisdom in all creation.
To al-Maturldl, wisdom simply means the assigning of things to
their proper place, and giving everyone the share he deserves
without disregard or negligence. Concerning the misfortunes and
injustices of the world, al-Maturidi said that the human intelle
as a created instrument, has its shortcomings and limits, and so
many things are beyond its comprehension, and sometimes it is
misled by outside influences from conceiving the real wisdom
behind creation, not to mention that of God's action and His
works. For al-Maturidi, reason alone is unable to explain the
existence of evil or apparent hardship which occur in this world
and this refuted the whole dualist argument.In detailed
arguments, al-Maturidi discussed the views of various groups of
dualists: the Manichaens, Daysanites, Marcionites and the
•
Mazdakites, and pointed out the weakness of their arguments
regarding the causes of the mingling of light and darkness, and
(2)
how one becomes free of the other. Though it might be out of
the scope of the present study to go into details of al-Katuridi
arguments with the dualists, general observations concerning his
arguments with all those who hold the eternity of the world may
(1) Tawhid, pp.37,15-19; 113,7-18; 116,3-12.
(2) Ibid.. pp.157-176.
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not be out of place.
(i) Al-Maturidi's summary of the various sectarian views and
his arguments with his opponents disclose his indebtedness to
the Ku'tazilite thinkers and heresiographers. In relation to
the sects, al-Maturidi*s main source of information seems to be
one Muhammed b. Shabib, who has been quoted by him in many
instances. He mainly depended upon Ibn-Shabib's works for the
views of the materialistic Dahriyya, the Sceptics, the dualists
as well as the Kagians.^^ Al-Maturidi also made use of the
disputes between the Ku'tazilites and other sects, thus he quoted
some of Ibn-Shabib's arguments against the dualists and represented
(2)
them as advocating the very views which he himself held. He
(3)
also accepted his argument with Ashab al-hayula. But when he
• •
is not satisfied with the Ku'tazilite's arguments, al-Maturidi
did not hesitate to express his disapproval of them, and to
demonstrate their weaknesses. Al-Katuridi dealt similarly with
(4)
one of Ibn-Shabib's arguments with the dualists, and with his
disputation with the Sceptics which al-Maturidi described as
(5)
being nonsense and useless; he also criticized Ibn-Shabib's
method in demonstrating the origination of bodies, and described
it as being lengthy and futile.Apart from Ibn-Shablb, al-







Katuridl quoted some of Ibn-Harb's arguments with the dualists
and expressed his approval of them.^^ He mentioned also with
(2)
approval, one of an-Nazzam*s arguments with Ashab al-hayula,
• • • •
at the same time, however, he criticized his argument with the
(3)
Sumaniyya as being weak. In spite of this, however, full
realization of al-Maturidl's relation to the Ku'tazilite thought
requires more thorough investigation.
(ii) The other point which deserves consideration is al-
Maturidi's inclination to rationalism which is evident in the
form of his arguments and the vocabulary he used. In the course
of his argument, al-J.'aturidi did not use Qur'anic proofs or
argument based on revelation, but he introduced arguments based
on experience and proofs derived from general observation and
natural science as well as proofs based on dialectical method.
The vocabulary he used tends to be abstract and more philosophical,
and terms such as latent power, substance, quiddity, (ma'iyya).
generation, (tawallud). naturally determined (matbu*), universal,
and latent, (musta.jin) . are frequently used in the course of his
arguments.
(b) Al-Maturidi's Arguments for the Temporality of the World
To prove the temporality of the world, al-Maturldi uses
evidences derived from traditional accounts (akhbar) as well as
(1) Tawhid. p.169.
(2) Ibid. . p.150.
(3) Ibid. . p.152.
- 145 -
rational arguments.
Traditional Accounts: Al-Maturidi uses the term akhbar not
only in the sense of a revealed text (sam*). but also in its
wider significance of what might be called "historical evidences"
Thus, as a proof for the temporality of the world, he referred
to the Qur'anic verses which state that God is the creator of
everything,^^ that He is the originator of the heavens and of
(2) (3)
the earth, and that He is the ruler of all that is in them.
At the same time, however, al-Katuridi argued that no living
being claims to be eternal or produces evidence of his eternity,
otherwise he would be ridiculed since his origin and the process
of his development are evident. Therefore, living beings must
(4)
be generated, and this applies to inanimate objects as well.
Reasoned Arguments: Al-T.Taturidi' s rational arguments are based
on the premises well known among theologians, that substances or
bodies are never devoid of temporal qualities or characteristics
and must, therefore, be temporal. Therefore, the world (which
consists of these substances) must also be temporal. Though al-
Katuridi tackled many of the questions regarding this proposition
he did not present it in the concise and developed form as found
in later theological writings such as those of al-Baqillani and
- (5)
al-Juwayni. To demonstrate the existence of characteristics
(1) Qur'an. 39:62.
(2) Ibid.. 2:117; 6:101.
(3) Ibid.. 3:189; 5:18; 40; 120.
(4) Tawhid. p.11,10-13.
(5) See Baqillani, Tamhid, pp.22-23. Juwayni, Irshad. pp.11-12.
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or qualities (sifat) as he preferred to call thera,^^ al-Maturidl
said that movement and rest in a body, as well as its combination
and separation, endurance and annihilation, are states different
from the body itself, because we can observe that motion follows
rest, separation follows combination, and the coming into
existence of a body follows its non-existence. These states
cannot be a part of the body's own essence, for were this the case,
the body would not be capable of assuming the respective opposite
(2)
quality. This proves that these states are different from body.
The temporality of these accidents, said al-Maturidi, is well
recognized by the senses and by reason. Because two opposites
cannot be reconciled, thus succession (ta'aqub) is established
(3)
and temporality is thereby implied.
Al-Maturidi divided his rational arguments into two cate¬
gories: (i) those which are derived through the senses, (ii) and
those based on rational deduction.
The Senses: Al-Maturidi argued that our senses show to us that
substances are not self-sufficient because they depend for their
(1) Al-Maturldl used both terms and said that the term sifa is
more suitable from Islamic point of view because in the Qur'anic
verses (8:67; 9:42) 1arad is used to denote the substances of
things and not their changing states, so for these states
the word sifa is more suitable, Tawhid, pp.16-17. Prom the
• •
same verses al-Baqillani argued for the opposite and defined
the state as that which is changeable, and in these verses




existence on objects other than themselves. Substances of such
nature are temporal, because eternity (qidam) implies self-
sufficiency, since the eternal by reason of its eternity is
independent of anything else.^^ Another argument is that, our
senses inform us that substances are incapable of restoring
themselves even those with perfect qualities and that they need
(2)
an external force to restore what deteriorates in them. These
substances are also of opposing parts and contradictory natures,
so they require an external force to compel their contradictory
natures to combine, and to reconcile their opposing parts. To
al-Maturidi, substances of such nature cannot be self-sufficient
(3)
and they must be temporal. Al-Maturidi also used the argument
concerning the finiteness of objects, as a proof of the temporality
of the world and said that the world consists of parts and
objects, it is well known that these objects came into existence
from non-existence, so they are finite in time; their growth,
extension and their bulk demonstrate their finiteness. This means
that the whole world must be finite otherwise it would consist of
(4)
finite and infinite objects which is impossible.
Reason: One of al-Maturidi's rational arguments for the
temporality of the world is based on the concept of motion and
rest as temporal characteristics. He said that no body is devoid
(1) Tawhld, p.11,14-16.
(2) Ibid.. pp.11,16-18; 12,1-2.
(3) Ibid, p.12,3-4.
(4) Ibid. . p.12,5-7.
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of motion and rest which are irreconcilable, and both of them
cannot be external. Therefore one of them must be temporal,
and this entails the temporality of the other. This proves that
both motion and rest are temporal, and what is not free from
them is itself temporal, so all bodies must be temporal. More¬
over, no body is free from continuous movement or continuous
rest, or both of them alternately. These states are not due to
the essence of the body, but to an external force which subjugates
the body to such states for the benefit of other beings and any
state of such nature must be temporal. Since all the substances
of the world are subject to these states, they must be temporal.
Another argument of al-Maturidi is that concerning the
nature of the world there are three hypotheses which might be
introduced: (i) It could either be said that the world is
eternal in spite of the qualities of movement and rest, combin¬
ation and separation, goodness and evil, beauty or ugliness,
excess and lack, which it has. But these qualities have been
recognized as temporal by the senses and by reason, as stated
above. Therefore, the whole world must accordingly be temporal,
since it is not free from temporal things, and whatever is not
free from temporal things is itself temporal. So in this case
the world cannot be said to be eternal. (ii) The second
proposition is that the world is originated by a principle which
is devoid of these temporal qualities. In this case there could
be no argument regarding its origination. (iii) The third
suggestion is that the origin of the world was free from these
(1) Tawhid, pp.12,15-23; 13,1-2.
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qualities at first, but later somehow came to possess them.
Within the range of this proposition lay the views of those who
asserted the eternity of matter, those who advocated the
doctrine of latency (kumun) and generation (tawallud).^ ^
Reference has already been made to al-Maturidl*s refutation of
these views, and to his arguments that beside the fact that they
(2)
are absurd, do not entail the eternity of the world.
Prom the evident connection between causes and effects in
the perceptible world, al-Maturldi argued that just as the effect
must have a cause from which it follows, so also must the world
have a maker from whose power it has followed and received its
origin. Quoting his own words, al-Maturidi said, "We know no
writing without a writer, no division without a cause of division,
and likewise combination, rest and movement, and this must also
apply to the whole world for it is composite and yet divided.
Indeed, the remarkable thing is that the composition of the world
is more sublime, and therefore its combination or division is
more likely to have been the result of a force other than itself.
Since everything in the perceptible world which is combined or
written is more recent than its maker, likewise the whole world,
(3)
since what I have said is applicable to it."
(c) Al-fflaturidi ♦ s Arguments for the Existence of God
To prove the existence of God, al-Maturidi not only argued
(1) Tawhld, p.13,3-19.
(2) See Supra., pp.137-40.
(3) Tawhld, p.15,15-19. The same argument is used by al-
BaqillanI as a proof for the existence of God. See Tamhld. p.23.
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from the temporality of the world, but he introduced arguments
derived from the observed change in the world, as well as the
evident design and purpose in its creation.
(i) The Argument from the Temporality of the World
Having established the temporality of the world as premiss,
al-Katuridi proceeded to prove that the world being temporal must
have a creator. In this respect he used almost the same arguments
as those he used for the temporality of the world; thus al-
Katurldi argued that, "None of the objects of the perceived world
can combine or separate by itself. Nor are these objects capable
of restoring what has deteriorated in them, even when they are
in a state of perfection. So if contradictory incompatible
natures cannot combine by themselves, then there must be an
external force which compels them to combine against their natures
and this force must be God, the Knowing, the Wise".^^ This
argument of al-Maturldi is almost the same as that of an-Nazzam
• •
mentioned in al-Intisar. where he said, "I found that heat is
opposite to cold, and I found that two opposites cannot be
reconciled in one object by their natures, and since I have found
them reconciled, I know that they must have been reconciled by
another force, and that they have been compelled to join against
(2)their very natures". These striking similarities between the
two arguments disclose, as Kholeif said, the great influences
which the Mu'tazilite dispute had on later theologians.
(1) Tawhid. p.17,6-8.
(2) Intisar, p.40.
(3) Tawhid. Introduction, p.33.
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Another argument, which has already been mentioned, is that the
substances of the world are never devoid of qualities, and
qualities are always dependent on substances, thus none of these
can be self-existing or is able to produce another. Therefore,
there must be an external force which brought them into existence
Al-MaturidI introduced a new argument based on what came to
be known among later theologians as the principle of determination,
(dalil al-imkan aw at-takhsis). According to al-Maturidl, if the
• •
world were created by itself, there would be no determinate time
for its creation, nor would there be determination of attributes
or characteristics; so the fact that it is determined in time and
in qualities proves the existence of a determinant (mukhassis)
• • •
which brought it into existence at a certain time and gave it
(2)
this or that quality. Thus, in formulating this argument, al-
Maturidl seems to have preceded both al-Baqillani and al-Juwayni
(3)to whom its formulation is ascribed.
From the proposition that "a thing cannot be the cause of
itself", al-Maturidl argued that the world cannot be created by
itself, for if it were created by itself, it would either be
originated after its existence, and thus it cannot be said that
it created itself since it already existed, or it would be non¬
existent yet it created itself, which is impossible because
(4)
something non-existent cannot possibly be an agent. A more
(1) Tawhld, p.17,17-20.
(2) Ibid.. p.17,9-11.
(3) Fakhry, "The Classical Islamic Arguments for the Existence of




philosophical statement of this argument is to be found in al-
Kindi,^^ from whom al-Maturldi might possibly have derived his
argument; or perhaps they both drew from the same sources.
On the concept of the existence of evil in the world, al-
Katuridi argued that a world of such a nature could not have
possibly created itself, but must have a creator. According to
him, if the world had come into being of its own accord without
a maker, evil would not have existed, for that which comes into
being of its own accord will be satisfied only with the best of
(2)
conditions and the best of qualities for itself. None of the
philosophers or the theologians who preceded al-Maturidi used
(3)
the concept of evil as a proof for the existence of God. So
the only possible source of such argument might be in the dualists
views on evil. It seems that while the dualists took the exist¬
ence of evil in the world as an argument for the existence of
two gods, al-Maturidi used the same concepts and derived from it
his argument for origination of the world and the existence of
its maker.
(ii) The Argument from Change (dalil at-taghayyur)
Prom the phenomena of change in the world, al-Maturidi
argued for the existence of God. According to him, the world
suffers a constant change of qualities; a living being dies; what
is separate combines, children grow up, evil becomes good, thus
it is continually altering as the result of the changes which
(1) Rasa'il. pp.77-79.
(2) Tawhid. p.17.11-13. Ta'wilat. 3:186.
(3) Tawhid, Introduction, pp.34-35.
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occur in it. It is not possible for things to change by them¬
selves, if it were, the colour of a dress would change by itself
without being dyed and the ship would become what it is by
itself, and as this is not so, there must be one who know£ how
to build it, and this applies to all the changes in the world.
Though this argument is derived from the observation of con¬
tinuous change in the world and is based on rational deduction,
its conclusion was of Qur'anic inspiration since it directed the
attention of man towards thinking about his creation and the
(2)
phases of changes in the process of his life.
(iii) The Argument from Design and Purpose (Teleologjcal Argument)
Prom the evident order in the world and its being suitable
for the living beings, al-Maturidi argued for the existence of
God. According to him, everything in this world displays remark¬
able and impressive order, and also it indicates the wisdom
behind its creation. The whole world is organised in such a way
that no-one - even the wisest of men - can comprehend or grasp its
real structure. Thus the structure of every object and living
being discloses the wisdom and proves the existence of its
(3)
creator. Moreover, all the substances of the world are organ¬
ized in certain ways to serve certain ends, and for the benefit
of mankind. Everything is subject to certain patterns of move¬
ment and rest to serve certain purposes, all this points to the
existence of God who controls the affairs of the whole world.^^
(1) Tawhld. pp.18,18-21; 19,1-2.
(2) Qur'an. 23:12-14; 40:67.
(3) Tawhid. p.18,13-16; Ta'wilat. 3:183.
(4) Tawhld, p.62,10-14.
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To al-Maturidi, the regular revolution of the sun and the moon,
and the continuous interchange of days and nights resulting from
their revolution, and their following of certain patterns without
change or disproportion, proves that they have been designed in
this certain way by a supreme being who has eternal knowledge
and full control over the affairs of this world. Men are
naturally dependent on each other for their existence and
sustenance, and their affairs are arranged in such a way as to
make it impossible for each one to be self-sufficient. All this,
according to al-Maturidi, indicates that there is an external
force behind this arrangement which has full control over the
whole world and that is God, the all knowing the wise and the
(2)
powerful.
The basis of this argument is deeply rooted in the Qur'an
whose proofs for the existence of God depended mainly on reminding
man of the wonders of his creation as well as the creation of the
world. Time and again man is enjoined to think and ponder on
his creation as well as the creation of heavens, the earth and
the mountains, as well as the regular movements of the stars, the
sun and the moon. This Qur'anic method was followed up by al-
Jahiz (and possibly by other Mu'tazilites), whose work, ad-
Dala'il wal-l'tibar. is aimed at demonstrating the natural evidences
for the existence and unity of the creator, from the order visible
in the terrestrial and celestial phenomena, the perfection in
growth and instinct and adaptation to their environment of
(1 ) Ta'wilat. 10:67.
(2) Tawhld, p.62, 15-17.
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animals, vegetables and minerals.^^ Later on, Ibn-Rushd, who
criticized the other methods and arguments of the theologians,
considered the Qur'anic method as suitable for people of
(2)
distinction as well as for the masses.
2. Al-Maturidl on the Attributes of God
All the problems concerning the nature of God might claim
the support of the Qur'an. The Qur'an emphasizes the transcendence
and absolute uniqueness of God and "Like Him there is naught."
Yet it ascribes to God hands, eyes, face and states that He sits
on His throne and can be seen, which might imply His resemblance
to His creatures. Different readings of the Qur'anic verses,
and emphasis on one of these Qur'anic conceptions of God at the
expense of others, led to the appearance and development of what
is known in the terminology of Islamic theology as the doctrines
of tashbih (anthropomorphism or likening God to creatures) ta* til
(divesting God of all attributes) and tanzih (keeping God pure
against tashbih) .
In dealing with the problem of God's essence, al-Haturldi
strongly advocated the doctrine of tanzih, and tries to preserve
the conception of God from whatever might affect His absolute
(1) Gibb, "The Argument from Design, A Mu'tazilite Treatise
Attributed to al-Jahiz", in Ignace Goldziher Memorial
• • ■
Volume. part 1, pp.150-62. Quotation from p.151.
(2) Ibn-Rushd, Manahi.1 al-Adilla. p. 153.
(3) E.I. ^ ^ art. "Tashbih", R. (Strothmann). Watt, "Some Muslim
Discussion of Anthropomorphism", pp.1-10.
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perfection or might suggest resemblance between Him and His
creatures. Thus he used mystical language to describe God saying,
"He is, but is not, since He is more mysterious than the
expression "He"; the tongue is incapable of His description,
explanation explains Him not, ideas fall short behind Him, and
the intellects are bewildered by Him." So to al-Maturldi, God
transcended even the comprehension of human intellect, and he
held that an intimate essential knowledge of Him is impossible.
He preferred to interpret the Qur'anic verse, "He knows what is
before them and behind them, and they comprehend Him not in
(2)
knowledge." , according to such a conception of God, namely in
the sense that God's creatures do not have comprehensive knowledge
of Him; the knowledge about Him, which is possible, is limited
and derived from reflection on the observable signs of His creation.
Comprehensive knowledge (idrak) is only possible in respect of
things which are perceived by the senses, but comprehensive
knowledge of what is known only through reflection and deduction
(3)
is not possible.
Similarly, al-Maturidi explained the famous pseudo-hadith,
(4)"He who knows about himself knows about His Lord" in a sense
which confirmed his doctrine of tanzih. According to al-Maturidi
(1) Tawhld. p.43,10-15.
(2) Qur'an. 20:110. For different reading and interpretation of
the verse see F. Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, pp.130-34.
(3) Ta'wllat. 20:110; 39:67.
(4) For discussion about this pseudo-hadith. see Rosenthal,
op.cit., pp.137-39.
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if one knows the ti*ue nature of himself, with all its defects,
needs, liability to change ana shortcomings, one would realize
that the nature of his creator is absolutely different from that
of himself, ana that He does not resemble His creatures in any
respect. Having such conception of God in mind, al-Katurldi
dealt with the problems of the oneness of God, tashblh. the vision
of God, and whether He has locality.
(a) Al-Maturidi's Proofs for the Oneness of God
According to al-Maturidi, the concept of God's oneness
denotes not only that God is one, but also implies the negation
of any similarity between Him and His creations; so God is one
(21
in His essence as well as in His attributes and His actions.
Al-Maturidi's arguments in this respect were, however, mainly
directed against the dualists, and based on evidences derived
from general or traditional accounts, reason, and on the observ¬




As has already been mentioned, sam* is used by al-
Maturidi, not only in the sense of traditional accounts, but also
to include the evidence of historical events, common observation
as well as arguments based on these two sources. In line with
this concept of sam*. al-Maturidi introduced the following arguments
(1) Tawhid. pp.102-3.
(2) Ibid. . pp.23,8-10; 119,7-9.
(3) See Supra, pp.50-51.
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to prove and defend the oneness of God: (a) Prom the concept
of finitude, which he often used, al-Maturidi argued that, "If
God were not one, the world would not be finite, since if there
were more than one God, it would be possible for us to presume
the existence of an infinite number of gods, and if each of them
created one single thing, the world would then cease to be finite
since its creators are infinite. Also if there were more than
one god, their numbers could be multiplied incessantly, because
numbers themselves are infinite, and thus there would be no
*0)
logical reason for limiting the number to two or three etc. ...
(b) Depending on general reports and historical evidences, al-
Maturidi argued that since no god besides God claims the
divinity or introduces signs or proofs for his lordship, or sends
a messenger with compelling proofs for his deity, it must be
deduced that any assertions that there is more than one God are
an outcome of deluded imagination and wicked thought. Al-
Maturidi believed that the signs brought by the prophets demon¬
strate God's oneness since, if God had a partner, he would have
prevented the prophets from manifesting their signs, because such
a manifestation would constitute a denial of his partnership said
his divinity.^
(ii) Reasoned Arguments
Al-Maturldl*s rational arguments are basically derived from
the Qur'anic arguments for the oneness of God. Thus from the




heaven and earth would disintegrate and their good order would
be ruined, al-Maturidi argued that if there were more than one
god, the existence of the world would be impossible. Because
these gods would be in constant conflict and mutual opposition,
and if one intended to affirm certain things, the other would
oppose him; and if one of them desired the existence of something,
the other might render it non-existent. Thus if one of them
wanted the existence of the world, the other might not, so the
fact that the world exists demonstrates the oneness of its
creator.^^ This argument has been criticized by both Ibn-Rushd
and at-Taftazani on the pretext that the plurality of gods does
not necessitate the disintegration of the world, for it is
possible that these gods might come to an agreement on the
present order of the world, which is something that gods would
(2) - -
be likely to do. Al-Maturidi seems to have anticipated this
objection and he pointed out that such mutual agreement (istilah)
• • •
is a sign of weakness and impotency rather than of power, and
(3)
it is not, therefore, appropriate for the conception of God.
Moreover, if these gods were similar in all aspects of godship
and absolute perfection, there would be no distinction between
them in qualities, thus they would be only one essence. If they
were different in qualities, he in whom absolute perfection was
(4)
realized would be the only true god.
(1) Tawhld. p.20,11-15; Ta'wllat. 21:22; 3:185.
(2) Ibn-Rushd, Manahi.1 al-Adilla. p.157. cf. Taftazani, 'Aqa'id.p. 57.
(3) Tawhld, pp.20,11-15; 21,4-5.
(4) Ibid.. pp.22-23. cf. Ghazali, Iqisad. p.36.
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The Qur'anic verse (17:43) states that if there are claimants
to the throne, there will arise conflict between them; so the
existence of order in the universe indicates that its ruler must
(X
be one. Prom this verse, al-Maturidi argued that it is^common
phenomenon among the rulers of this present world that each one
tries to subdue his rival and to prevent him from executing his
plans; so if there were more than one god the same would apply
to them, and thus everyone of them would try to subdue and over¬
come the other and in this case everything in the world would be
in chaos; if one of them had succeeded in subduing the other,
then he would be the only god. The order in the world however
proves that its originator is one without rival.
Prom the Qur'anic verses (23:91; 13s16), al-Maturidi argued
that if there existed another god besides God, he would demonstrate
his power and wisdom and make his acts distinct from those of
God, and all this would entail confusion and destruction in the
world; but nothing of the sort has happened; thus it becomes
(2)
clear that there is only one God. Furthermore, al-Maturidi
introduced a dialectical argument based on the theological
argument of mutual hindrance (dalil al-tamanu'). According to
him, if there were more than one god, they would either be able
to hide their secrets from each other or they would not; or only
one of them would be able to hide his secrets, while the other
would not. If it were the first alternative, then each of them
would render the other ignorant (sincenone of them would have
(1) Tawhid, p.20,16-20; Ta'wllat. 17:43.
(2) Tawhid. pp.20,21; 21,1-3; Ta'wIlSt. 23:91; 13:16.
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knowledge of the other's doings). If it were the second alter¬
native, then both of them would be impotent and impotency
nullifies their lordship, and if it were the third alternative,
then only he who was able to hide his secrets from the other
would be God.^
(iii) The Arguments from the Precision in the Making of the World
Al-Maturidl's arguments in this respect also have a Qur'anic
basis and inspiration, and they seem to be no more than an
elaboration of his previously mentioned "rational arguments".
According to al-Maturidl, if there had been more than one god,
there would have been disharmony in their control of the world,
and disagreement between them about the calculation of heaven and
earth, the direction of the sun, moon and stars, and the calculation
of night, days and hours. Since all this proceeds in harmony,
it proves that all of creation has a wise, knowing controller
(2)
whose control is not disputed, nor his calculation opposed.
This precision is also evident in the creation of man and his
development from sperm to clot then embryo, then flesh and bones,
and completeness in his body which is made in such a way that
tasks can be efficiently performed. This precision in the making
of all things in the world is an evident proof of the oneness of
God.^"^ Prom a consideration of the natures of the created
things of the world, al-Maturldl argued for the oneness of God
and said that things by their natures are neither absolutely
(1) Tawhid, p.21,7-14.
(2) Tawhid. pp.21,15-22; 22,1-8; Ta'wilat. 10:6; 67:3; 21:22.
(3) Ta'wilat. 51:21.
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benefic ent and good, nor absolutely harmful and bad; for what
is good for someone might be bad for another and vice versa.
This proves that these things are under the control of one God
who knows their natures and those of the people, and thus
produces from one thing different aspects to suit different
people.Also the objects of the world are of opposing natures
and they are liable to separation and disintegration if they
were left alone to work according to their natures. So, their
being combined in harmony indicates that they are under the
control of one God who combined them and restrained the evil of
each one of them by His power and wisdom. If they were under the
control of more than one god, then chaos would prevail and the
(2)
world would be ruined.
(b) The Denial of Anthropomorphism
Al-Maturidi made his doctrine of tanzlh clearer by criti¬
cizing and refuting the views of those who held that God has a
"body", and by rejecting all the reports which imply tashblh,
and finally by interpreting all the verses which attribute to
God face, hands, eyes, etc. allegorically.
The term jism (body) was applied to God in two senses:
(i) The sense of physical entity, (ii) and in the meaning of
"existent", "thing" and "self-subsistent" (maw.jud, shay', qa'im
bi-nafsihl). While the former sense was a result of a naive




hands, eyes, etc., the latter meaning has philosophical conno¬
tation, and the propounder of this interpretation argued that
the existence of an entity without its being body is inconceivable
so to affirm God's existence, the term .1ism must be applied to
Him.^^ It seems that al-Maturldi was well aware of these two
interpretations, so in his refutation of the application of the
term "body" to God, he started by defining the meaning of the
term. According to him, "The term 'body' is that which has
directions, limits and three dimensions, i.e., length, breadth
and height. In this sense the term 'body' should not be applied
to God since it implies that He is finite and has location and
these are signs of temporality and createdness. Moreover, its
application in this sense entails similarity between God and
other bodies which contradicts God's Qur'anic dictum, "Like Him
there is naught.42:11)
According to al-Maturidi, reason has nothing to say in
respect of whether the term jism was applied with or without
these meanings, and only revelation can provide the answer.
According to revelation (sam*). .jism is not one of God's names,
so to ascribe it to Him is not permitted. Al-Maturidi argued
that, if it were permissible to invent names without the evidences
of the senses or revelation or of reason, it would be permissible
to say that He is a body (,1asad) or a person (shakhs). But
this is objectionable because it would then be permissible to
ascribe to Him all appellations that are commonly applied to
(1) Maqalat♦ pp.31-34. cf. Watt, Formative Period, pp.247-48.
(2) Tawhld. p.38,3-8.
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created things which would be objectionable according to revel¬
ation. For those who identify the term 'body* as a necessity
for existence, al-Maturidi said such a view might be acceptable
except that no-one uses the term 'body' as a term for existence,
since pure characteristics and attributes cannot be included in
this term, although it cannot be denied that they exist. There¬
fore, to maintain that being 'body' is the condition for a thing's
existence is wrong. So there is no justification for applying
the word 'body' to God.^^
Concerning the verses which attribute hands, face and eyes
to God, and which described Him as seated on His throne, and
coming and going, etc., al-Maturidi held that such expressions
should not be taken in their literal sense, since they contradict
the explicit verses of the Qur'an which emphasize tanzih. So it
must be believed that the prima facieSof these expressions was
never intended; and in such cases the particular verse should
either (i) be accepted as it stands without allegorical inter¬
pretation, and its true meaning should be left to the knowledge
of God, or (ii) it should be interpreted in the light of the
verses which clearly speak of tanzih. in a manner consistent with
the doctrine of tawhid and according to the normal use of
language.
Al-Maturidi introduced various allegorical interpretations
for these expressions; and said, concerning God's hand, the




because 'hand* has been ascribed to the Qur'an (41:42) and to
rain (7:57) and no-one understands it in its literal sense, thus
'hand' in relation to God might be explained in the sense of His
grace as in the verses (5:64; 18:57) or His power as in the
verse (38:45).^^ Nor do the 'eyes of God' in the verse (11:38)
literally mean eyes, but might be explained by saying that
'with our eyes' means either, (i) under God's protection and
care, or (ii) by His instructions; since without God's instruc-
(2)
tions Noah would have had no idea how to build the ark. In
sura 55 the following lines occur: "All that dwells upon the
earth is perishing yet abides the face of thy Lord majestic ?
splendid." God's face, which is mentioned here, might possibly
mean his dominion, power or lordship and indicates that God's
sovereignty and power is different in nature from that of His
creatures; so the destruction or annihilation of those creatures
(3)
does not decrease or belittle that sovereignty or power.
Similarly, the coming (ma.ii *) , which has been ascribed to God
should not be understood literally in the sense applied to bodies
and qualities, because in this sense it implies change of
locality (intiqal), therefore it must be interpreted in a sense
(4)
appropriate to God.
Though al-Maturidi gave these expressions allegorical
interpretation, it seems that he was not quite convinced that
(1) Ta'wilat. 5:64; 18:57; 38:45; 7:57.
(2) Ibid.. 11:37.
(3) Ibid.. 55:27.
(4) Tawhld, pp.53,15-16; 77,2-6. Ta'wilat. 50:16; 69:9; 2:187.
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this was the best method of treating these verses. . He expressed
this dissatisfaction in his commentary on the verse (38:75),
where he said, the theologians undertook a painful task in their
attempt to find suitable interpretation of the word 'hand' in
relation to God. Their efforts in this respect are futile, for
'hand' can be ascribed to something which has no organs or
limbs (as the Qur'an,) and no-one understands that it means a real
hand. Therefore, since it is acknowledged that God transcends
all comparisons, there is no need to seek allegorical interpre¬
tation for the word 'hand'.^^ Concerning the coming of God, al-
Maturidi said one should refrain from giving a definite meaning,
for ma.ji' if ascribed to body would give a meaning different from
that for quality and since God is neither body nor quality another
(2) -
meaning must be intended. So it seems that al-Maturidi
became more inclined to the acceptance of these verses without
allegorical interpretation, but at the same time holding fast to
the principle of tanzlh.
Closely connected with the doctrine of tanzlh. are the
concepts of God having locality, and being visible; the Mushabbiha
and similar groups found no difficulty in ascribing locality to
God and in affirming that he is visible. The Mu'tazilites, in
accordance with their doctrine of tanzih, denied that God can be
seen and that He has locality. Al-Maturidi, who emphasized the





(c) The Problem of God's Locality
Al-Maturidl, in his section on this problem, gave a summary
of the various views regarding God's locality. According to
him, (i) there are those who say that God is in a particular
place, that is on His throne, which is similar to a bed surrounded
by the angels. They quoted as support for such views, those
verses which speak of God being on His throne above the sky;
they also argued that people by their natural disposition (fitra)
raise their hands to the direction of the sky when they implore
God for mercy, and this indicates that He is on His throne above
the skies. (ii) There are those who assert that God is omni¬
present (bikulli makan) and quote, as support for their views,
the Qur'anic verses which speak of God being in heaven and on
earth; that He is nearer to man than the jugular vein, etc. They
also argue that ascribing a particular place to God entails that
He is finite and is dependent on that place, which cannot be said
of God who is dependent on nothing.(iii) There are those,
however, who deny that God has locality or that He is omnipresent,
and interpret the fact that a place is ascribed to him by saying
(2)
that He is in control and has full knowledge of all places.
These are the views of the Mu'tazilites who interpreted the
(3)
verses which mention God as sitting on His throne allegorically.
Al-Maturidl rejected and refuted these three views; he saw
no difference between the first two views since both ascribe
(1) Tawhid. pp.67,11-15; 68,1-10.
(2) Ibid.. pp.68,11-12; 75,3-6.
(3) 'Abd-al-Jabbar, Usui, pp.226-7.
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locality to God, thus he refuted them both by saying, (i) God
exists in eternity without place or places, and it is possible
for Him to endure without place or places; and He is free from
change and transitoriness. Since His being in a place or places
necessitates change and movement which are signs of occurrence
in time and temporality, it must be denied that He is in a place
or places. (ii) It is impossible to assert that God has locality
since this entails that He is in need of such a locality.
(iii) The same assertion also entails that He is part of the
world which is a sign of temporality; and thus it is inappropriate
(2)
for God. (iv) To say that God is in a place means either
that the place encompasses Him or it is bigger or smaller than
Him, and all these suggestions detract His essence and imply
(3) - - -
that He is finite. (v ) Al-Maturidi argued that the raising
of the hands upwards is not an argument for God being in that
direction, otherwise the fact that the people place their fore¬
heads on the ground or that they face East or West in prayer, must
be taken as proof of God being in this or that direction which
(4)
is as absurd as the first suggestion.
Concerning those verses which have been quoted in support
of the view that God is in place or places, al-Maturidl said that
in many self-explanatory verses, (muhkam), the similarity between




(4) Ibid.. pp.75,23; 76,1-4.
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God is beyond similarity with His creatures, and those verses
should therefore be explained in a sense appropriate to God.
So His nearness (qurb) and His being with men (ma*iyya) should
be explained in the sense that they mean His omniscience and
benevolent care for His creatures, and not His personal approach
or His accompanying of them.^^ His 'uluw and 'azama. mentioned
in the verse (42:4) should be interpreted in the same way. God
being above (fawq) mentioned in the verse (16:50), should also
be interpreted as referring to His absolute power and will, and
(2)
His omniscience.
As for those verses which refer to God sitting on His throne,
al-Maturidi said that these verses do not necessarily mean that
God is in a place, i.e. His throne, since being in a place does
not give the occupant merit or extra honour. So these verses do
(3)
not mean that God is actually sitting on His throne. After
giving various allegorical interpretations of the words: throne
and sitting ('arsh and istiwa')^^ which are mainly Mu*tazilites*
explanations of these terms, al-Maturidi shows his dissatisfaction
with such interpretations and goes on to say that, "The meaning
of this doctrine cannot possibly be comprehended by reason or
conceived by the intellect; so assuming a firm belief in the
transcendance of God, one should rely on tanzll (revelation) and
accept it without allegorical interpretation. According to al-
(1) Tawhid, pp.76-77. Ta'wilat. 2:186; 50:16.
(2) Ta'wilat. 16:50.
(3) Tawhid. p.70,12-14. Ta'wilat. 16:50.
(4) Tawhid. pp.72-74. Ta'wilat. 13:2; 20:5; 41:11.
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Maturldl, "We must believe and accept the Qur'anic verse, 'The
All Compassionate sat Himself upon the throne.' as it stands, and
refrain from attempting definite interpretation as it may have
another meaning; we should believe in whatever God meant by it."
In discussing this and similar expressions found in the Qur'an,
such as those about His visibility etc., he states that it is
necessary to deny tashbih and to believe in whatever God meant
without attempting to reach any definite interpretation.^^
To make his doctrine of tanzih more clear, al-Maturldi
introduced the following rule for explaining the relations between
God and things ascribed to Him. According to al-Maturldi, if
the things related to God are universal such as: "To Him belongs
the kingdom of heaven and earth."; "Lord of the heaven and earth";
"The Lord of all creation";"The Lord of all beings" etc., they
should be explained in a sense which reveals God's exaltation
and glorification. If these things are particulars such as: "God
is with those who are godfearing"; "The places of worship belong
to God"; "The she-camel of God"; and "The Lord of this house" etc.,
they should be explained in the sense that these particulars
have been honoured and given special preference over their kind.
The relation of the throne to God is of the latter kind and thus
should be explained in its being honoured and preferred above
(2)
other things.
(1) Tawhid. p.74,6-10. Ta'wilat. 57:4. Al-Maturidi•s views in
this respect are close to those of the balkafiyya (See Infra
Ch.IV, p.248 ff). They are also in line with the views of
his predecessors, the Hanafites. See Fiqh Akbar II.art.2. M.C.p.19
(2) Tawhid, pp.68-69; 70-71. Ta'wilat. 3:55; 7:206; 96:1; 38:75.
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(d) The Problem of God's Visibility
Though al-Maturidl denied that God is a "body" and that He
has locality, he affirmed God's visibility in the hereafter. To
him, God's visibility is possible without comprehension or qual¬
ification (bila-idrak wla-tafsir).^^ To establish the vision
of God, al-Maturidi depended mainly on scriptural proofs and
introduced the following arguments:
1. He used the verse which the Mu'tazilites used for the
denial of God's visibility, "The eyes comprehend Him not, but
He comprehends the eyes". Al-Maturidi asserted that while God
cannot be comprehended, this does mean that He cannot be seen;
so the denial of idrak still allows the possibility of God's
visibility.^
2. The utterance of Moses, "Oh my Lord show me that I may
behold Thee." is another proof for the possibility of God's
vision, for if this were impossible, Moses would have been ignorant
of God, and thus would not have been a prophet. Moreover, God
did not forbid him to ask about His visibility, nor did He
deprive him of the hope of its fulfillment, which implies its
possibility.^ ^
3. The third proof is the Qur'anic verse, "Paces, that day,
are bright, looking (nazira) to their Lord." According to al-
Maturidi, 'Looking to* cannot mean expectation (intizar) as the
Mu'tazilites assumed, for the following four reasons: (i) The
(1) Tawhld, p.77,14-15. Ta'wilgt. 75:23.
(2) Tawhld, p.77,16-18. Ta'wilat. 6:103.
(3) Tawhld. p.78,1-4.
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hereafter is a place for reward and bliss, not for expectation,
(ii) The first part of the verse "Paces that day are bright"
refers to the pleasures which the believers will be enjoying in
Paradise, therefore the only possible meaning for "looking to"
is the seeing of God. (iii) According to Arabic normal use of
language, when the word 'to' is connected with the verb 'look*
it means simply the seeing of a thing by the eyes and not
expectation. (iv) Expectation has a negative aspect which is
inconsistent with the bliss of Paradise. Moreover, the alleg¬
orical interpretation of the verse gives no assurance that it is
what God meant; so the verse must be understood in the sense of
affirming God's vision and the denial of all aspects of tashblh.^ ^
4. Another proof for the possibility of God's vision is the
verse, "To the good-doers is the reward most fair and surplus".
(Q. 10:26). The surplus has been interpreted by authentic
(2)
Traditions as meaning the vision of God.
5. In many Traditions, the prophet clearly stated that "You
shall see your Lord as you see the moon on the night when it
is full, and you shall not suffer from His visibility". These
scriptural proofs, al-Maturldl said, are strong evidences for
the possibility of God's visibility.
Though al-Maturidi depended on revelation for the proof of
God's visibility, he argued rationally against the Mu'tazilites
in their attempt to explain God's visibility as a mere intellectual
(1) Tawhid. p.79,1-13. Tajwilat, 75:23.
(2) Tawhid, p.79,15-17.
(3) Ibid.. pp.79,19; 80,1-ff.
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knowledge of God in the hereafter. To the Mu'tazilites, the
vision needs certain conditions to be realized, i.e., that the
object seen must be before the beholder, in a certain direction
and at a certain distance etc., if these conditions were applied
to God, they would entail His being a body.^^ Moreover, the
Mu'tazilites saw no difference between idrak and ru'ya, and
since God clearly stated that "the eyes attain Him not", this
(2)
means that His visibility to the eyes is impossible.
Al-KaturidI argued against the Mu'tazilites and in particular
_ / O \
al-Ka'bi, by first differentiating between comprehension
(idrak) and vision (ru'ya). To al-Maturidi, comprehension means
full grasp of a definite thing, while vision did not necessitate
comprehension. Since God is not finite His reality cannot be
comprehended, yet He can be seen. Al-Maturldl pointed out the
fact that we do see the shade, light and darkness, yet we do not
claim that we comprehend their realities before we get knowledge
of the definition of their natures (hudud). Because of this
obvious difference between idrak and ru'ya. the prophet likened
God's visibility to that of the moon in that though we see the moon,
we do not comprehend its reality or understand the limits of
(4)
its nature.
(1) 'Abd-al-Jabbar, Usui, p.233ff.
(2) Tawhid, p.82,6-9. 'Abd-al-Jabbar, op.cit.. p.248ff.
(3) Abu-l-Qasim 'Abd Allah b.Ahmad b.Muhammad al-Balkhl al-
• •
Ka'bi (d.317/929) was the leader of the Mu'tazilite school
of Baghdad at the period just before al-Maturidl. Ibn-al-
Murtada, Tabaqat al-Ku'tazila. pp.88-9.
• •
(4) Tawhid. pp.81,15-22, 82,1. Ta'wllat. 6:103.
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Al-Maturidl did not deny that there were requirements for
vision in this world, but he emphasized the point that these
requirements were not necessary in every case and for every
entity; requirements of vision differ from genus to genus, person
to person, and stage to stage, so the conditions of seeing
shadows, darkness and rays of light are not the same as those of
seeing solid material objects. To al-Maturldi, al-Ka'bl had
mistakenly considered his own essence, without taking into account
the fact that other essences do exist in this world, which are
either invisible as the angels and jinn, or are not seen by the
naked eye in spite of the fulfilling of the requirements of their
t m
visibility, such as tiny germs. So the application of these
conditions,even in the present world, would lead to the denial
of many things. The Mu'tazilites* assertion, that absent
(gha'ib) is analogous to present (shahid), is invalid as far as
the vision is concerned. Because our knowledge in the present
is limited only to what is body or accident, while in the absent
we know God who is neither body nor accident. So if vision in
the present has requirements for its realization,these conditions
might not be necessary for the vision of things in the absent.
Thus it would be quite absurd to apply the conditions of
seeing a physical object in this world to the seeing of the
"Being" which is not a body in the next world, where conditions
(21
will be totally different from those in this world.




fulfilled, for one reason or another, vision may not be realized.
So it is easily possible that vision can be realized without the
fulfillment of these conditions.^^ Al-Maturldi went on to say
that al-Ka'bi and his fellow Mu'tazilites had experiences of the
vision of bodies and qualities, and had no idea how the vision
of immaterial things occurred, therefore, they had no justification
for making the conditions for the vision of material things
(2)
necessary for seeing immaterial things. Finally, al-Maturidi
said, vision is one of the subjects related to the hereafter,
whose conditions differ from those of this world, so the conditions
applicable to the vision in this world are not necessary for the
(3)
vision in the hereafter.
If these conditions of vision stipulated by the Mu'tazilites
are not necessary for the vision of God, of what nature would
His vision be? Al-Maturldi refrained from qualifying this in any
way and said, "We only follow what the scriptures said concerning
the vision of God. Having first denied any similarities between
God and created things, we believe that vision of God is possible
without qualification, for qualities are appropriate to what has
form, while God is seen without qualities such as being standing
or sitting, leaning or hanging, connected or separated, advancing
or receding, short or tall, dark or light, moving or still,
touching or not touching, in or out. He has no quality which the






So the vision of God will occur without conditions or qual¬
ifications. This, however, does not mean that it is an intell¬
ectual knowledge of God as the Mu'tazilites hold; for such
knowledge, according to al-Maturldi, will be shared by the un-
(2)
believers and the believers in the hereafter. The unbelievers
will have no doubt about the existence of God, they will realize
this fact after the removal of the covering from their hearts
as the Qur'an said, "Thou wast heedless of this, therefore we
have now removed from thee thy covering, and so thy sight today
is piercing." (Q.50:22). In spite of this knowledge, however,
the unbelievers would be veiled from seeing God as the Qur'an
stated, "No indeed, but upon that day they (i.e. the unbelievers)
(3)
shall be veiled from their Lord". Prom this, al-Maturidi said,
it is clear that the vision of God is something more than intell¬
ectual comprehension, its nature however cannot be defined by
reason, so one should rely upon scripture for its justification,
(4)
and leave its nature for God's knowledge.
(1) Tawhld. p.85,15-19. Ta'wilat. 7:143.
(2) Tawhld. pp.80,16-21; 81,1-2. Ta'wilat. 75:23.
(3) Qur'an. 83:15. According to 'Abd-al-Jabbar, the verse
refers to the fact that the unbelievers will be veiled
from God and not from seeing Him, so it should not be
cited in this context. See Usui, p.267.
(4) Ta'wilat. 75:23.
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3. Al-Maturidi on the Essential and Active Attributes of God
Various aspects of this problem occupied the Muslim theologians
from early times and remained as central points of discussions
for quite a long time.^^ In the Qur'an, God has been described
as being knowing, powerful, living, the Provider etc., and the
Qur'an also speaks of God's knowledge and His power. On the
basis of these Qur'anic statements many questions arose: it has
been asked whether these terms ascribed to God in the Qur'an
imply the existence in God of substantive attributes, or whether
they are only expressions in human terms of the relation which
exists between God and temporal things. Another question that
came into prominence was that of the meanings which these terms
convey when applied to God and man: is it the same or not? In
other words, when we say that God is "knowing", does this expression
convey the same sense of "knowing" when related to human beings?
And if the existence of these eternal attributes has then been
established, what would be the relation between them and their
temporal effects? This question led eventually to the distinction
between the essential and the active attributes of God.
The main issue underlying all these questions is the
significance of the words of the human language when used to
denote God. Are these words capable of describing the transcendent
nature of God or not? The various views on God's attributes
ascribed to individuals and sects, in the heresiographical works
such as al-Ash'ari's Maqalat, might be understood in the light
of the above-mentioned questions. Al-Maturidl*s efforts in this
(1) E.I.^^. L. Gardet, art. "Allah", vol.1, pp.410ff.
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respect might also be viewed as an attempt to solve these
questions, with due consideration to his intellectual environ¬
ment. A general survey of his section on this problem discloses
his attempts on the one hand to affirm the transcendent nature
of God and the validity of the revelation, and on the other hand
to refute the views of the philosophers, the Batinites, the
Mu'tazilites (especially al-Ka'bi and Ibn-Shabib), the Jahmites,
and the anthropomorphists. Thus the main points which al-
Maturidi discussed can be classified as follows: (a) The
affirmation of the reality of God's attributes. (b) That this
affirmation implies no resemblance between God and His creatures,
(c) Both the essential and the active attributes of God are
eternal. The framework of al-Maturidi's treatment of the point
involved polemical arguments which were meant to refute the
opponent's arguments and to support his own point of view.
This method makes the arguments more confused and somewhat
difficult. Yet, in spite of these difficulties in the process of
analysing the views of al-Maturldl, it is possible to give a
general picture of them.
(a) The reality of the names and the attributes of God
In his dealing with the reality of the names and the
attributes of God, al-Maturldl starts by setting out the method¬
ology of his arguments. He clearly stated that, "The description
of God as knowing, powerful, living, generous and beneficient,
and calling Him by these names, is well affirmed by both revel¬
ation and reason. In another statement he said, "Predicating
(1) Tawhid. p.44,3-4.
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speech of God (kalam) has been affirmed by the proofs of revel¬
ation and reason. To substantiate his first statement, al-
Maturldl does not give particular quotations from the Qur'an
or from the Traditions to affirm the reality of God's attributes,
rather he points out the fact that the Qur'an and all the other
scriptures have ascribed certain attributes to Him and called
Him by certain names. Moreover, the prophets and all creatures
(khala'iq) applied to Him the same names and attributes. Thus,
according to al-Maturldl, "God is called by the names He applied
to Himself, and is described by the descriptions He used for
(2)
Himself.To establish the reality of God's speech, however,
al-Maturldl cites the following verses of the Qur'an: the
verse (4:164) which states that God spoke directly to Moses; and
the verse (2:75) which speaks about those (sc. the Jews) who
heard God's Word, and then tampered with it. From the verse
(2:118) "And they that know not say, Why does not God speak to
us?", al-Maturidi argued that in it God did not deny that He has
speech, but reprimanded the infidels by pointing out their
stubbornness, arrogance and their ignorance of themselves. To
these evidences based on the Qur'an, al-Maturldl added the
consensus of the Muslims (ittifaq). that God is speaking, that
He has speech in reality, yet their opinions differ regarding
_ (3)
the nature (ma'iyya) of this speech.
As for his rational arguments, al-Maturldi stated that
(1) Tawhid, p.57,10-11.
(2) Ibid.. p.44,4-5, 9.
(3) Ibid.. p.57,11-15.
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reason necessitates these attributes, then he introduced arguments
to prove God's freedom of choice (ikhtiyar). His power, will,
knowledge and speech. He spent proportionately much more
effort in establishing that God acts according to an absolute
freedom of choice; and without any compulsion or necessity. Al-
Katuridi's emphasis on this point is quite understandable
especially when we recall the effort he spends in his Kitab at-
Tawhld in refuting the doctrines of the naturalists and those
who advocate the principle of causation ('illiyya), as the
origin of the world. His arguments, in this respect, proceed
from the proposition that, since it is affirmed that God is the
originator of all things with all their different substances and
qualities, this proves that His action is not like the act of
the naturally determined, but that it results from absolute
(2)
freedom of choice. Also, the systematic order of regular
acts, without any sort of corruption (fasad) or disorder, proves
that such results are produced out of free choice on the part of
the agent (fa*il) , and that creation is truly by His action (bi-
- (3)fi'lihi haqiqatan'). We shall see, as we proceed, that al-
Maturidi considers ikhtiyar as one of the conditions for an
actual act. Another argument which proves God's freedom of
(4)
choice is that God originated many things and some He caused
(1) See Supra, pp. 132-44.
(2) Tawhld. p.44,10-11.
(3) Ibid.. 12-14.
(4) The original text reads ansha'a ghayr shay', but Kholeif
amends it to ansha'a shay'. which is grammatically incorrect.
What al-Maturidi seems to have intended to say and which
agrees with the text is that God creates many things, and
not one thing as Kholeif's amendment suggests. See p.44,15.
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to perish and some He kept in a state of change such as night
and day. This proves that He acts according to freedom of
choice; furthermore, through His acts He made good what was
corrupted, restored what had perished, and brought into exist¬
ence what had non-existence and vice-versa; such an action can
only be realized through freedom of choice, because he whose
actions are naturally determined is unable to annihilate what
is existent or to bring into existence what he destroyed.^^^
Another argument is that the world is originated out of nothing
(min la-shay'), and such an act can only be by one who has an
absolute freedom of choice, for what is naturally determined
must be necessarily producing, and it is impossible that one
who is able to originate things out of nothing can be naturally
determined or act under any compulsion. Moreover, the naturally
determined cause is normally under the control of another agent,
thus it would have no choice, which is a sign of weakness and
impermanence, and this is impossible for God the absolute
(2)
perfection.
After these arguments which have philosophical connotations,
al-Maturldi introduced another argument of a different kind,
and said that if God has no freedom of choice then there would
be no point in invoking his help or assistance, because in this
case He would be unable to fulfil our requests. So the fact
that people do invoke God's help, and that He answers some and
refuses others, proves that all things of the world run according
(1) Tawhid, p.44,15-18.
(2) Ibid. . p.45,1-5.
- 182 -
to His freedom of choice, for such things cannot be expected
from one who acts under necessity.
The affirmation of God's freedom of choice postulates the
affirmation of His omnipotence, will and knowledge. Al-Maturldl•s
arguments in this respect, are mainly based on the analogy of the
absent to the present. According to him, "since it has been
established that God has freedom of choice, He must have the
power to create, and to make His creation according to His will,
because he who has no power his actions will be discordant and
inconsistent, and he will not be able to create and destroy,
to do the thing and its opposite (yamlik ash-shay' wa-didahu)
• •
This affirms that all God's actions originated from His power
and freedom of choice, and these are the real characteristics
of the action in the present world which is the basis of our
understanding of the absent (al-ladhi huwa asl al-'ilm bi-1-
(2)gha'ib). The same principle of analogy is used to establish
the attribute of takwin; according to al-Maturidl, "We do not
find in the present one who is powerful and unobstructed, who
is prevented from performing action, nor one who has the ability
to speak yet has no speech, and the present is the evidence of
the absent (ash-shahid huwa dalil al-gha'ib), so what is true
(3)
of the present is true in relation to the absent. The rest
of al-Maturldi's arguments for takwin will be dealt with later
for they involve different aspects of his concepts of God's act
(1) Tawhld, p.45,6-9.
(2) Ibid. . 10-13.
(3) Ibid. . p.46,9-10.
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of creation.
On the same line of thought, al-Maturidl argued for God's
knowledge and pointed out that the order and perfection in the
actions of God prove that His acts were done according to His
knowledge. Also the fact that everything in the world has its
proper place and function, and that everything has what it
needs for its existence and continuation, all this bears witness
to the wisdom and knowledge of its originator. Another argument
is that God created the creatures in such a way as to prove
their temporal nature and their dependence on an originator who
is unique, so had God no power over, or knowledge of, these
creatures it would not be possible for Him to create them in such
(1)
a way.
In his Ta'wilat. al-Maturldl introduced arguments based on
the Qur'anic verses which speak of the wonders and marvels in
God's creation and of His creatures. Thus commenting on the
Qur'anic verses (16:66-69), al-Maturidi says: this verse con¬
tains the strongest proof of God's power to create things out of
nothing, and of His knowledge and control over things. It
affirms the ability of God to produce from substances something
which is different from their genus and essence, (.ilns and iawhar).
This is strikingly evident in both plant and animal species:
thus from the fruits of the palm and the grapes, different kinds
of food and intoxicating drink are made, and from animals, milk
is produced which is completely different in essence from the
grass the animals eat; and from the bees comes honey which differs
(1) Tawhld, p.45,14-21.
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in constitution from the flowers and the fruits from which the
bees gathered it. So the fact that these substances produce
something different from their original genus and essence, proves
that this process has been brought about by one who has the
knowledge and power to create things out of nothing and without
any immediate cause.Similar arguments are derived from the
Qur'anic verse (36:37) which refers to the systematic order in
the solar system, and thus indicates the knowledge and power of
(2)
its controller.
As for the rational arguments for God's speech, al-Maturldl
uses the same method of analogy of the absent to the present;
he said that every wise and powerful person who does not speak,
then his inability to speak must be due to some defect such as
impotence or some hindrance, and since God is above all sorts
of defects, He must be able to speak. In the visible world,
"non-speaking" means "to be dumb", "non-hearing and non-seeing"
mean deafness and blindness respectively. Since God is far
removed from these defects, He also deserves to be free from
being dumb, because speech is an attribute of perfection in the
(3)
present world, and it distinguished human beings from animals.
It is clear from these statements that al-Maturidi is
drawing an analogy between speech as an attribute of perfection
in the present world and in the world of absence, and that he
sees no difference between these two worlds in this respect.
(1) Ta'wilat. 16:66-69.
(2) Ibid.. 36:37.
(3) Tawhid, pp.57,16-19; 58,1-2.
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Thus he inferred that since speech is a necessary part of respect,
and that non-speaking is a sign of defect, then God the absolute
perfection must have speech. But will al-Maturidl. carry his
analogy a step further and apply it as well to the nature of
speech in both worlds? This does not seem to be the case, and
as we will see later, al-Maturidl emphasizes the difference
between the two worlds as far as the nature of speech is concerned.
As for God's will, al-Maturldi devoted a special section to
it; he pointed out that this problem is closely connected with
the question of man's acts and the relation they have with the
acts of God, so it should be treated in such a context. But
following the traditional method of the theologians, al-Maturidl
treated it in a separate section. His main concern was to
establish the reality of the "will" as a substantive eternal
attribute of God, and that it differs from God's command, His
desire and His good pleasure; and that its affirmation does not
entail the determination of man's actions.
Al-Maturidi defines God's will as the faculty which deter¬
mines the things by certain time, and particularizes them by
(2)
this or that quality. In the normal use of language, will
(mashi'a) is used in the following senses: (i) It is sometimes
used to denote the sense of wish (tamanni). which is improper
for God. (ii) Sometimes it is used in the meaning suggesting
commandment or invitation. (iii) or that one is satisfied or




appropriate to God only in matters related to good acts.
(iv) Will is also used to denote the negation of compulsion in
one's acts and that the acts run according to the will of that
who will and according to his design. This meaning of will is
in line with God's perfection, since He creates out of free
choice and does not act under compulsion or necessity.^^\
To establish the reality of God's will, al-Maturidi used
evidences from the Qur'an as well as rational arguments. He
quoted the Qur'anic verse, "Whomsoever God desires to guide,
He expands his breast to Islam; whomsoever He desires to lead
astray He makes his breast narrow, tight as if he were climbing
(2)
to heaven." This verse tells us that God wills the guidance
of some people and that He wills to lead others astray. Another
verse says, "Whomsoever God wills, He leads astray, and whomso-
(3)
ever He wills, He sets him on a straight path." This verse
distinguished between two kinds of people, to each of whom God
had decreed a certain fate. Both this verse and the verse
mentioned before it, suggest that God wills for each group of
people certain actions according to His previous knowledge of
what they are going to perform; they also prove that God's will
is neither command nor good pleasure (rida).Al-Maturldl
also quoted the Qur'anic verse (32:13) "If we had so willed, We






(5:48, 6:149). He stated that "will" in these verses cannot
possibly mean God's command or His satisfaction of something which
had already taken place, but it simply referred to the quality
through which God determines all events and happenings. He
refuted the Mu'tazilite concept of "compelling will of God"
(mashl'at oasr). According to this concept, the Mu'tazilites
hold that had God willed, He would make all people believers,
or one nation. To al-Maturldl, such an explanation of these
verses is improbable for the following reasons: (i) God has
instructed men how to attain guidance, and informed them of
the nature of His relgio'n arid how it can be fulfilled, so it is
improper to compel them after such instruction. (ii) The method
of knowing the oneness of God and the belief in Him and His
messenger is attained through intellectual effort and deduction
and not on the basis of compulsion. (iii) The act of belief is
a kind of voluntary obedience and carrying out orders, but
compulsion implies the denial of such concepts., (iv) Mam in
the state of compulsion and subjection has no actual act, and
thus his belief in this case would belong to the natural religious
disposition which he shares with all kinds of creation. So'will'
in these verses must mean more than this concept of natural
belief on man's part.^^
Al-Maturidi also quoted the verse, (11:107) "Surely thy
Lord accomplishes what He desires." He stated that in this verse
God praises Himself as that He does what He wills, so His will
(2)
must be related to all actions and happenings. The verse,
(1) Tawhid, pp.287,7-16; 288,1-10.
(2) Ibid.. p.289,3ff.
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(17:16) "And when we desire to destroy a city, We command its
men who live at ease, and they commit ungodliness therein, then
the word is realized against it, and We destroy it utterly", also
tells us that God wills in advance the destruction of certain
people or cities because of their wrongdoings, which He must
have willed also, for had He not willed their wrongdoings accord¬
ing to His knowledge, then their destruction without doing wrong
would be injustice on His part.^1^ Then al-Maturldi quoted
several Qur'anic verses to the effect that God has a will, and
(2)
refuted the Mu'tazilite interpretation of them. He also
pointed out that the Qur'anic verse (11:119) "I shall assuredly
fill Gehenna with jinn and men together", is against the Mu'taz-
ilites, because according to it, God certainly would like to
fulfil his promise stipulated there, but fulfilling of such a
promise, while the people are believing in Him, would be injustice
on his part. So it must be admitted that He wills their dis-
(3)
obedience which implies that His will encompasses all things.
Speaking about the unbelievers, God says, "God desires not to
(4)
appoint far„them a portion in the world to come." and He
addresses the believers saying that, "God desires to lighten
(5)
things for you". According to these verses, God wills for
the unbelievers something and for the believers another thing;
(1) Tawhid, p.289,13-16.





and. since it is inconceivable that He wills such fate for the
unbelievers while they are in a state of obedience, He must have
willed their disobedience of Him beforehand.^^ Also God says,
"But will you shall not, unless God wills", since, according to
this verse, they cannot will unless God wills, then it would be
impossible that if God wills, they will not, and vice versa,
otherwise it would be a sign of a lie on God's part, which is
(2)
impossible.
Then al-Maturidi introduced rational arguments to demon¬
strate the reality of God's will. He argued that reason confirms
the existence of such an attribute, because everyone of us knows
that our actions do not always occur according to our will. We
often will them to be good, pleasant and enjoyable, yet they
become bad, painful and displeasing, which proves that an external
force with a will must have influenced these acts and made them
(3)
to be in that way. Moreover, the assigning of certain acts
to man means the bringing about of some acts in God's domain
without His will, which would imply His impotence and weakness,
(4)
and one of such characteristics cannot possibly be God.
Another argument is that if God wills the act of disbelief to be
something different from what He knows it to be and from what
He tells us that it is going to be, He would be intending to
demonstrate his foolishness and his being a liar, and one of





such intention cannot be God.^^ Also, according to the rule
of wisdom, he who does a thing while willing by it another thing
or willing it to be different from what it normally is, would
be either ignorant of the outcome of his actions, or that he is
fooling around by his acts, which is inappropriate for God;
because he who intends to do something knowing that it is not
going to come about, he would be 'abith. and if his act resulted
in something completely different from his intention, he would
(2)
be ignorant of the act. Moreover, error in actions, accord¬
ing to the visible world, is of two kinds; one is that the
coming about of one's act contrary to what one intended it to be,
and the second is its coming about in a time different from
what one estimates, so if God willed a thing and it does not
come about according to His will, then His act would be wrong,
(3)
which is impossible for God. '
Al-Maturidi argued that will is a prerequisite for him who
acts freely, while he who acts under compulsion would have no
will. So if God were not willing man's act, then He would be
compelled and not free in His actions and creation. But it has
already been established that He is far from any compulsion or
(4)
to be acting under necessity.
These are all the arguments used by al-Maturidi to affirm
the attributes and names of God. It is noticeable that he
(1) Tawhld. p.292,13-15.




introduced no arguments or evidence to establish the attributes
of hearing, seeing, and actual living. An explanation of this
might be found if we look at the lists he gave of God's names
and His attributes. One of the statements he had listed is
this: "God is eternally knowing, powerful, doing, (fa'il), and
beneficient (jawad)"; the second statement is this: "God is
(2)
powerful, knowing, living, generous and beneficient"; and
the third statement contains such names as: the One, God, the
(3)
Merciful, the existing, the eternal, and the worshipped.
Prom these statements, it might be assumed that al-Maturidl does
not seem to be interested in the problem of the extension of
the vocabulary used to describe God. This might possibly explain
on the one hand the fact that his Kitab at-Tawhld contains no
exhaustive lists, neither of God's essential attributes, nor of
His active ones; and on the other hand this might account for
the absence of full treatment and arguments about such attrib¬
utes as hearing, seeing, and living. Another point which these
lists seem to suggest, is al-Maturidi's insistence on making no
distinction between the essential and the active attributes of
God, as far as their eternal aspect is concerned.
In spite of the absence of exhaustive enumeration or lists
of God's names and His attributes, al-Katuridi clearly stated
that the application of names and attributes to God must be





made to his statement that God's names must be invented only
according to revelation and the evidence of reason and the
senses.^^ In his justification of the application of the term
thing (shay') to God, he argued from reason and revelation
(2)
together. Again, to justify the necessity of ascribing
attributes to God, al-Maturldl concluded that, "These ruleB only
concern those attributes which reason and revelation postulate
to their application. As for those attributes which are neither
mentioned by revelation nor can possibly be justified by reason,
_ /o\
their application to God is indeed bold, (jura' 'azima)."
From these statements it might be concluded that al-Maturidl
allowed the application to God of all those names and attributes
which have been mentioned by revelation as well as those whose
meanings are implied and can be rationally justified. Of the
latter kind are names and attributes such as: the benificent, the
existing, the eternal and the worshipped one, which have not
been categorically stated in the Qur'an nor in Traditions, but
their meanings can certainly be deduced from these sources. In
this connection the term shay'.and its application to God, is
significant.
The denial of the application of the term thing (shay') to
God is mainly attributed to Jahm b.Safwan, who defined the term
shay' as something created andhas similar[^lnd said that "I will
not say that God is a thing, since this would be to make Him
(1) See Supra, pp.178-9.
(2) See Infra, pp.193 ff.
(3) Tawhid, p.42,20-21.
(4) Kaqalat. pp.181,2-3; 518,5-6.
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similar to other things. Al-MaturidI refuted this view and
defended the application of the term on the basis of reason and
revelation. He quoted the verse (42:11) which states that,
"There is nothing anything like Him", and said that if God were
not a thing, then the nature of things (shay'iyya) would not be
denied Him. The Qur'anic verse (6:19) "Say: what thing is
greatest in testimony? say: God is a witness between me and you",
also supports the application of this term to God, for if it
were not permitted to be applied to Him, then He would not be
(2)
included among the other things in this verse.
He argued on rational grounds that according to the normal
use of language ('urf). shay *iyya stands for the affirmation of
existence and conveys no other meaning. So when we say that God
is a thing, we simply affirm His existence and there is nothing
objectionable in this use of the term. But if the term tends to
give a different meaning to some people, then it should not be
applied to God, and the term 'existence'(histiyya) should be used
(3)
instead. Moreover, the expression'nothing'(la-shay*) is used
for the denial of an entity altogether or for showing its
insignificance; so its opposite 'thing1 must be used for affirming
the existence of an entity or for showing its significance, and
(4)
God, the absolute perfection, is worthy of such a meaning.






stand from the term 'thing', nor from the terms 'knowing' and
•powerful', the nature or the essential characteristics of the
entity, but one understands from the first term the existence of
the thing (wujud wa-histiyya), and from the other terms that
one is described by these attributes. So these terms do not
illustrate the nature of the thing. When the term jism is used,
however, it implies that the object by which it is described has
some dimension and direction, is finite and is recipient of
qualities.^ ^
As for Jahm's view that the application of this term to God
would entail similarity between God and other things, al-Maturidl
said that if the term shay' were considered as a name, it would
not entail similarity because,as will be shown below, mere agree-
(2)
ment in name would not entail similarity between things. It
might be argued, however, that the term 'thing' is not a name,
because every name has a particularity when it is mentioned, it
would disclose the nature of the object to which it is applied,
as when we say: what is the body? The answer would be that it is
that which has three dimensions. Also what is a human being? We
would reply with its well-known definition: what is liable to
live, articulate and die; and thus every substance has certain
inherent characteristics disclosed by its particular name. In
the case of the term 'thing', however, there is no such definition
of the nature of the object to which it is applied. Similarly,
the terms 'knowing' and 'powerful' do not give any definitions
(1) Tawhid. p.42,7-10.
(2) See Infra pp. 209-13.
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of the essence, or inform us of the objects to which they are
applied; they simply indicate the denial of the object's
ignorance of things, and establish its power over things, without
reference to the nature of its essence (ma'iyyat adh-dhat).^^
So there should be no objection to the application of these terms
to God since they do not suggest similarity respecting essence.
What al-Maturldl is trying to establish by these rational
arguments is that the application of the term 'thing' would not
entail resemblance between God and other things as suggested by
Jahm. What concerned us here, however, is that al-Maturldl is
using rational arguments as well as arguments derived from the
Qur'an to ascribe to God a term which is not corroborated by
revelation.
As for the meanings of the divine names and attributes, al-
Maturidi vehemently argues against their explanation in a neg¬
ative sense. He quoted Ibn-Shablb who admitted that God is
eternally knowing, hearing and seeing, yet he explained these
terms as meaning the negation of their opposites; so the eternal
quality of hearing means the negation of dumbness, and in the
(2)
same manner he explained 'knowing' and 'seeing'.
Al-MaturidI refuted such negative explanations of these
terms, and said that if the statement 'He is eternally hearing,
seeing and knowing' means that He is neither ignorant nor blind
nor dumb, then to state these meanings in the latter expressions





intended (i.e. the negation of these defects).Moreover, a
thing might be described as being not ignorant, nor dumb nor
impotent, yet this would not mean that it is powerful, knowing
hearing and seeing; if these expressions only mean the negation
of their opposites, then to express them in those negative terms
would be much nearer to the sense intended than those terms
(2)(eternally knowing etc.) which convey a useless meaning. If
only the negation of the opposites of these expressions was
meant, then it implies that we can say that He is healthy, free
from evil and disease (salim mu'afa), as connoting only the
negation of their opposites, but these latter expressions are
not allowed to be applied to God, which proves that it is not
only the negation of the opposites which is meant by God's
(3)
attributes, but also their positive aspects. Moreover,
the occurrence of actions in a systematic and well-arranged order
indicates the knowledge and power of their originator and not
only that He is neither ignorant nor impotent; for one can be
described by these negative qualities without having active
(4)
qualities at all, or having any order or system in one's action.
Furthermore, these expressions are names derived from attributes
(knowing from knowledge); if the attributes were rendered void
of meaning, these names would be nicknames (asma' alqab). and in






so, because nicknames cannot be eternal,
Al-Maturidi attributed to al-Ka'bl the view that God has no
attributes in reality (fi-l-haqjqa). but it (the attribute) is
the description given by the describer and the naming made by the
(2)
namer (wasf al-wasif wa-tasmiyat al-musammi). ' Al-Ka'bi
• •
defines the attributes as the description by saying or writing,
so God's attributes are our sayings by which we describe Him and
(3)
His sayings and writing about Himself (i.e. what He reveals).
Thus, he refuses to say that mercy (rahma) is an attribute of
God because it is not a saying of His, but His action; so He
should not be described by it, His real attribute here is His
saying 'the merciful' (rahlm).^^ Also al-Ka'bl refuses to say
that when God creates redness in a dress He gives the dress an
attribute. If redness were the attribute of the dress then it
might be said that when God created it He described the dress by
it, and the same thing might be said about movement and rest;
likewise in the case of one who describes his height, it might be
(5)
said that he describes it only by dint of his having written it.
Al-Ka'bi stated that we do not deny that it is possible to say
that redness is the attribute of the red, and that mercy is an
attribute of an act, figuratively speaking, but in reality the









the question of whether the attribute has an attribute, he
affirmed this in the sense that it might be described, but
only at the moment of describing a particular thing, and after
finishing the description of it then it ceases to be em
attribute.^ ^
Al-Maturldl rejected al-Ka'bl's definition of the
attribute and said that if attributes in reality were only the
description given by the describer, then the proposition that
creation consists of substances and qualities, would be invalid,
and al-Ka'bi's view concerning combination and separation,
movement and rest, from which substances are never free and
which proves their temporality, would also not be valid. Since
these qualities are free from the description of the describer,
this affirms that they are attributes inseparable from their
(2) -
substances. As for God's attributes, al-Maturidi had
pointed out that both the attribute (sifa) and the description
(wasf) are fulfilled when knowledge, power and action are
attributed to God, and this is a matter of common agreement.
Then Re is definitely called in reality (fi-l-haqlqa). knowing,
creator, and powerful, and there is no justification for
explaining these expressions from the point of view of wasf
(3)
only, for their true sense belongs to what is agreed upon.
What al-Maturldl is trying to say is that when we ascribe an





existence of the substantive attribute and to the verbal des¬
cription of God as knowing, so when we call Him knowing, this
should convey simultaneously that He is knowing and that He has
the attribute of knowledge, and there is no proof for limiting
its meaning to a verbal pronunciation as al-Ka'bi's view suggests.
Al-Maturldi makes his view about the reality of God's
attributes clearer in the section devoted to the classification
of God's names. He clearly stated that in the normal use of
language God's names can be classified into three categories:
(i) The first category are those names which are mainly attri¬
buted to our calling Him by them, such as the omniscient (Valim)
and omnipotent. And to this category belongs all the ninety-
nine names of God referred to in the Traditions. These names are
eternal, for God, for instance, is eternally merciful, otherwise
he would be merciful only when he bestows his mercy upon His
creations.^
(ii) The second category are those names related to God's
essence of which no knowledge is possible but through these names.
Yet God transcends all human conceptions of these names. Of this
category are names such as: Allah, the Merciful, the Existing,
(2)
the Eternal, and the Worshipped One.
(iii) The third category, which concerns us in this context,
are those names which are derived from attributes such as: knowing
and powerful (from knowledge and power); these names are not




or alteration (tabdil) in Him. If these names do not convey the
meaning understood from them in the normal use of language, then
it would be possible to call God by whatever names apply to other
people, since what one normally understands from the name is
not meant here.^^ What al-Maturldi means by this statement
seems to be that God's names which are derived from the attrib¬
utes convey the sense which these attributes convey in the normal
use of language, so 'knowing' means that He has knowledge, but
the real nature of God's knowledge is different from that of man.
It might be appropriate at this conjunction to mention al-Maturldi•s
views on God's speech where the difference between its nature
and that of man's is strongly emphasised.
We have already seen that al-Maturidi affirmed the attr-
(2)
bute of speech to God because it is an attribute of perfection.
As for the nature of God's speech, al-Maturidi rejected the
definition adopted by both the Hanbalites and the Mu'tazilites.
These two groups maintain that God's speech is of the same nature
as the speech of man, i.e., it consists of utterance and letters
and it is identical with the Qur'an. But while the Mu'tazilites
hold that God's speech, including the Qur'an, is created, the
Hanbalites hold that both God's speech and the Qur'an are
•
(3) - - -
eternal. Al-Maturidi maintained that the speech of God is an
eternal attribute which subsists in His essence and that it is
not of the genus of sound and letters. What we mean when we say
(1) Tawhld, pp.65,21; 66,1-2.
(2) See Supra, pp.184-5.
(3) Ta'wilat. 17:86.
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that God is speaking is that He has this eternal attribute.
Al-Maturidi rejected any suggestion of resemblance between God's
and man's speech. According to him, God's speech would either
be considered as similar to the speech of other creatures or it
would not, but it should be remembered that the first suggestion
would entail similarity between God and His creation. But such
similarity has been refuted by the Qur'anic verses 42:11; 13:16,
which deny any resemblance between man and God in essence and
actions; therefore, as it is established that God's essence is
different from that of other creatures, His speech must also be
different in nature from that of all other creatures.More¬
over, no-one has examined the kinds of speech of various creatures
because speech is attributed to ants, birds, and it is even said
that the mountains praise God, such speech is inexpressible in
letters and sounds, nor can human kind understand its contents.
So, since there are different kinds of speech whose nature cannot
be understood, there is no justification in considering man's
speech as the standard criteria of all speech, and thus whoever
attempts to measure God's speech by that of man is heedless
(2 )(mughaffal). This difference between God's speech and that of
man entails the denial of the temporality of the former. It
would also deny the similarity of all the characteristics of man's
(^0





As for the speech which consists of sounds and letters, it
is not the real speech of God but an expression in human terms
of his eternal speech. It is allowable for it to be called
metaphorically the speech of God; just as it is said in the
case of messages, poems and speeches that they are the sayings
of so and so metaphorically; because as a matter of fact, the
real speech of a person can never be heard, what is heard are
sounds expressing that speech. These expressions, therefore, are
not the real speech of God because they are created, and when we
read the Qur'an, for example, God is only speaking indirectly to
us.(,)
As to the question - how can the eternal speech of God be
expressed in human terms - al-Maturldl finds no difficulty in
that. According to him, it is possible for God to make us hear
His speech through something quite different from His speech as
He makes each of us hear another's speech by letters and sounds
which are not exactly that real speech, and as He makes us know
His power, knowledge and divinity (rububiyya) through His creation
(2)
which is something different from these attributes.
The true nature of the speech cannot be heard through speech
itself, but through sounds and letters, because hearing is
related only to sound and what is not of the genus of sounds and
letters cannot be heard directly but it can be heard through
sounds created by God. According to this conception of God's
speech, al-Maturldl interpreted all the verses which seem to
(1) Tawhld. pp.58,18-19; 59,1.
(2) Ibid.. p.59,3-5.
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suggest otherwise. Thus, commenting on the Qur'anic verse 4:164,
which suggests that Moses heard the speech of God, al-Maturldl
said that this does not mean that Moses heard the true nature
of God's speech, but what he heard was God's speech expressed in
sounds and letters created by God, thus he heard what is un¬
created by created means. Similarly, he interpreted the
verse 9:6 "Until he hears the word of God" as meaning that
"Until he understands the word of God", because the eternal word
(2)
of God cannot be heard but only understood.
Abu-'Udhba considered the point, as to whether God's
eternal speech can be heard or not, as one of the points on which
al-Ash'arl and al-Maturidi hold deep-rooted differences; he
ascribed to al-Maturidi a statement suggesting the possibility
of hearing what is not sound. According to Abu-'Udhba, al-
Maturldi refers in his Kitab at-Tawhid. at the opening of his
section on the attributes, to the possibility of hearing what is
beyond sound. He says, "The knowledge of sound and the secret
thought is the definition of speech in the present world". Thus,
(3)
he considered it as possible to hear what is not sound. So
far I have not been able to trace this statement in al-Maturldl*s
Kitab at-Tawhid. where Abu-'Udhba assumed that it is mentioned.
This statement, however, does not suggest what Abu-'Udhba con¬
cluded from it. What al-Maturldl clearly expressed in his Kitab
at-Tawhid. is the view that, "Whatever does not consist of sound
(1) Tawhld, p.59,7-9. Ta'wllat. 4:164.
(2) Ta'wllat. 9:6.
(3) Ar-Rawda al-Bahiyya. p.44,4-6.
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cannot be heard, though a knowledge of it might be obtained
by other means."^^ This goes in line with his view concerning
the nature of God's speech which has already been mentioned, and
it agrees with the other statements ascribed to al-Katurldi by
Abu-'Udhba himself. According to Abu-'Udhba,"al-Maturldi said
in another statement that God's speech cannot be heard in any
respect because it is impossible for anyone to hear what is not
of the genus of letters and sounds, because hearing in the
present world is related only to sound. It is impossible to say
about something which is not sound that it can be heard, thus
(2)
the hearing of what is not sound is inconceivable." ' As to
whether al-Ash'ari made any distinction between God's eternal
speech and the expressions which represent that speech, this will
be dealt with in the following chapter.
Al-MaturidI's general view on the problem of God's speech
resembles in some way the views of Ibn-Kullab, who maintained
that God's speech is an attribute or an idea (ma'na) which exists
in God's essence. It is neither letters nor sounds, neither
divisible nor can it be changed; he holds that what is uttered by
the reciter of the Qur'an is both an expression of the speech of
God and its meaning, but not the speech itself. According to him,
the utterance is created and produced by the reciter and is the
(3)
acquisition of man. The similarity between these views of
Ibn-Kullab and those of al-Maturldl is quite evident.
(1) Tawhld, p.51,5.
(2) Ar-Rawda al-Bahivva. p.44,14-19.
(3) Maqalat. pp.584-85; 601-2.
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Concerning the point as to whether the Qur'an is created or
uncreated, al-Maturidl gave no positive statement, but from his
arguments with al-Ka'bl we might be able to find out his real
stand on this most controversial problem. Al-Ka'bl, following
the general view of the Mu'tazilites, maintained that the speech
of God and the Qur'an are identical and both are created. As
an argument for such a view, he quoted the Qur'anic verse, 15:9,
which states that the Qur'an is guarded (from corruption) by
God. He also argued that the Qur'an was subject to abrogation,
and that it consists of chapters and verses, and all this
indicates that it is created and originated.^^ In his answer
to al-Ka'bi, al-Maturidl pointed out that what we call the speech
of God is a metaphorical expression denoting God's speech which
is His attribute; and of this kind is the Qur'an, and from this
point of view God is not described by the Qur'an. Thus it seems
that al-Maturidl is distinguishing between the meaning of the
Qur'an which is God's eternal attribute and the expression of
that meaning which is created; therefore as he criticized the
Mu'tazilite view, he similarly refuted the views of the Hanbal-
(2)
ites. According to him, the Hashwites made no distinction
between the Qur'an and the eternal speech of God, and they
considered them both to be eternal. At the same time, however,
they said that the same eternal Qur'an is in the Books (masahif).
• •
and in the minds of the people. This, to al-Maturldi, is an




that the Qur'an, which is the eternal attribute of God and which
is neither He nor other than He, be the very same thing that
exists in the masahif and the minds of men. The error of this
• •
group, al-Maturidi said, is that they confused God's speech and
the Qur'an, and failed to realize that the first is eternal and
subsists in God's essence, while the other, i.e., what is in
the masahif. is an expression of that eternal speech in human
0 0
terms that could be understood by men.^^
At the end of his section on God's speech, al-Maturidi made
a brief reference to the problem of abstaining from passing
judgement (waqf) concerning the createdness or uncreatedness of
the Qur'an. He gave various aspects of this problem which seem
(2)
to have developed generally at that period. His general treat¬
ment of the point, however, suggests that it no longer seems to
occupy an important place in the discussion on the Qur'an.
As for the point as to whether these divine attributes are
identical with or separate from His essence, al-Maturldl seems to
have adopted the solution already advocated by Ahl al-Ithbat and
similar theologians, that these attributes are neither God nor
are they other than Him. This statement has occurred twice in
Kitab at-Tawhid. In the course of his argument with al-Ka'bl,
al-Maturldl quoted him as saying, "What I mean by the attributes
is not to affirm an entity separate from God (ghayr), at the same
time I do not want to say that they are identical with His




confused in his thinking, al-Maturldi concluded by saying that
if he (sc. al-Ka'bi) wants the attributes to be neither He nor
other than Him, then does not he know that this is the doctrine
of Ahl al-Ithbat?^^ Again, in his treatment of the problem of
God's speech, al-Maturidl pointed out that waqf. in relation to
this problem, has two aspects one of which is that: it (sc. God's
speech) is neither God nor other than Him, and in this case it
(i.e. waqf) is abstinence based on knowledge and understanding,
and it is a right decision, and in the same way it is applied to
(2)
the knowledge and power of God. So from this last statement
it seems that al-Maturidi has advocated the solution adopted by
Ahl al-Ithbat.^
(b) The Attributes and Transcendence
We have already seen that al-Maturidi affirmed the reality
of God's attributes and names, and refuted the negative explan¬
ation of their meanings; he also emphasized the point that these
terms contain and convey the sense that is normally understood
from language. Thinking on such lines leads eventually to the
question that when we describe God and man by similar terms,
(1) Tawhld, p.55,11-16.
(2) Ibid.. p.59,10-11.
(3) The phrase Ahl al-Ithbat was used by al-Ash'ari to refer
to those who affirm the doctrine of Qadar in opposition to
the Mu'tazilites. Watt, Formative Period, pp.117-118. Al-
Maturidi, however, used the term to refer to those who affirm
God's attributes. So as Watt suggested, the phrase seems to
have been used differently at different periods. Watt, op.
cit.. p.341, note 122 and the references mentioned there.
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would this imply a similarity between God and man? Both those
who adopted the doctrine of tashblh. and those who advocated the
denial of these attributes, answered this question affirmatively.
But while the former insist on applying to God all terms and
expressions mentioned in revelation, in their human sense, the
latter emphasized the transcendence of God and went to the extent
of divesting Him of all names and attributes.
Kitab at-Tawhid reveals to us that al-"aturidl was conscious
of this problem, and well aware of those groups who emphasized
one aspect or the other for its solution. Thus he discussed the
views of these groups and introduced his own solution to the
question. The anthropomorphists (mushabbiha). al-Maturidi said,
maintain that God has similarities to His creatures in respect
of bodily characteristics such as finiteness, limitation, move¬
ment and rest. Thus they ascribed to Him the same characteristics
which can demonstrate the temporality of the world, disregarding
the fact that God transcends such conception^]^ Throughout his
Kitab at-Tawhid. al-Maturldi strongly rejected the anthropo-
morphists' view; reference has already been made to his view
concerning the expressions which suggest similarity between God
(2)
and man. Again, in his treatment of God's Oneness, al-
Maturidi emphasized the point that God's Oneness means the denial
of any similarity or resemblance between Him and His creation,
and since this concept of Unity has been established, then it
would be futile to understand the relation of creatures to God
(1) Tawhld, p.120,16-18.
(2) See Supra. pp.162-66.
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or the attributes by which He is described, in the sense under¬
stood from these concepts when applied to the creation. To
al-Maturidi, similarity between things in all aspects is impossible,
for in such a case they would be one entity, but it may be
realized in one aspect or another. So if God is said to be
similar to something else in one aspect, He would be one of the
(2)
created being because of this similarity. Prom these state¬
ments we might understand the reason behind al-Maturldi's
vigorous attack on and refutation of tashblh.
As for those who denied God's names and His attributes, al-
Maturidi said that "some people denied to God an essential
attribute by which He is described, and an essential name by
which He is to be known." They thought that affirmation of names
and attributes entails similarity, for He would then join with
others in having the same name. They said that it is inconceivable
for God to resemble in any way any of the creation and if the
names which are applied to every thing are also applied to Him,
there would then be resemblance; because of such assumption they
denied that God is a thing (shay'), knowing and powerful. They
gave the example of the assertion to Him of a place which entails
similarity and finiteness; thus to say that He is in all places
would entail the same conception, for the places have finiteness
as well, so to ascribe to Him a place or places would be the
(3)
same. After a statement, affirming the reality of God's names,
(1) Tawhid, p.23,18-20.
(2) Ibid.. p.24,14-16.
(3) Ibid. . p.93,3-9.
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al-Maturidi said, "but some people dismissed these names, because
they assumed that the attribution of a name to God would imply
resemblance between Him and whoever is called by a name (musamma)P ^
As he rejected the views of the anthropomorphists, al-
Maturidl rejected the views of those who denied God all names
and attributes. To do this, he demonstrated that, (i) Common
agreement on having names does not imply similarity between God
and man. (ii) God's divine attributes are not like men's att¬
ributes. (iii) And finally, using attributes and names is the
only possible way for human intellect to attain any knowledge
about God.
To prove the first point, al-Maturldl argued from the prop¬
osition that similarity between things is due not to their having
names but to their actual agreement in their essential character¬
istics. Thus they would be said to be similar or alike because
of their being identical or for having some resemblance in
certain qualities, and not because of their being possessed of
names and attributes. According to al-Maturldi, "The similarity
which our thoughts (awham) assume between entities or between
acts, for instance, is not based on the verbal description of
them Can qawl al-lisan) , but it is based on what we actually
know about the similarity in nature or essence between these
entities or acts. And it is on this real meaning that our
thoughts depend when applying names. Such fact, however, can
be realized or attained even though these entities have no names
by which they are known, or descriptions by which they are
(1) Tawhld, p.44,5-7.
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described. Since we firmly realized, and believe that God is
unique and does not resemble any of those to whom the name "one"
is applied, then we are under no obligation to assume that there
is a resemblance between Him and another, just because He agrees
with him in having name.
Another argument is that, agreement in names does not imply
similarity, because the name might be used sometimes to denote
the disagreement in nature or abstract quality (ma'na) between
entities. Al-Maturldi gave the example of the name "one" when
it is used to denote the prominence of a person when it is said
"he is the unique one of his time, or the unequalled one among
his people" in the sense that it denies him any similarity to
others in certain aspects. So, though the term "one" is
commonly shared by all people, it is used here to distinguish
a certain person by certain qualities. This proves that mere
agreement in names or descriptions does not necessarily entail
resemblance between entities. To al-Katurldi, if agreement in
having names entails similarity, then it would not be possible
in the present case to use the same name to denote disagreement.
In the same manner, we find the words "belief" and "disbelief"
both belong to the category of name and both are verbal utter-
(2)
ances, but their meanings are contradictory.
Al-Maturldl made the last point quite clear in another
passage which argues from the fact that under the category "name"
we find contradictory meanings which make the realization of
(1) Tawhid, p.25,3-7.
(2) Ibid. . p.41,2-8.
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similarity impossible. "To us, it is inconceivable that the
general application of name entails similarity, for we find all
opposite concepts in the present shared in having names such as
life and death, light and darkness, good and evil, belief and
disbelief, and each one of these is a "name". If their being
in common under the category "name" implies similarity (i.e. in
the real meaning), then we would not know the contradictions
indicated by these terms. This proves that these names are
expressions meant to stand for the agreement and disagreement
between the nature of the entities which can be known, even
though there are no names.
He also argued that if the attribution of names to God
implies similarity between Him and whoever is called by a name
(musamma), the denial of Him names (ta* til), would likewise
entail similarity between Him and whoever is not qualified by
(2)
a name, that is the non-existent (lays)♦
It seems that what al-Maturidi was trying to establish
were two points: on the one hand he tried to prove that mere
agreement in having names does not entail similarities between
(1) Tawhid, p.96,4-9. Kholeif amended the text by adding la and
thus it reads (which cannot be known) (la yu*lam haqiqat
dhalika), but this does not seem to be correct as far as
the argument is concerned.
(2) Ibid.. p.44,6-8. Kholeif also amended the text here by adding
(kadhalika) meaning "which is not so". But this does not fit
in the general argument, al-Maturidi is simply explaining
that the non-qualified by a name is non-existent, and that by
using the term lays. which is used in the same sense by al-
Kindi, see Rasa'il. vol.1,p.132, also notes 1-3 on the same page.
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entities, because the name itself might differ such as:- life
and death and so its meaning also differs. On the other hand,
he pointed out that even if entities have in common similar names,
("knowing" for God and for man, for example), this does not imply
a common meaning. Thus to him it seems that there is no
identification between names and meaning, names are merely used
as labels to denote a fact already known to us.
To prove the second point that God's attributes are not like
man's attributes, al-Maturidi based his argument on the fact
which has already been established, i.e., that God's nature
differs from that of man. God is one in His essence (dhat). in
the sense that He has no similarity in nature. Similarly, He is
one in His attributes in the sense that He is so exalted that
no-one can possibly share with Him in the realities of the att¬
ributes of knowledge, power, and bringing into existence (takwln),
etc. Al-Maturidi pointed out that the main distinction between
God's attributes and those of man is that the former are eternal
while the latter are originated after they were non-existent,
thus it would be impossible to assume that the originated is
similar to what is eternal.
In spite of the brevity of this statement, al-Maturidi's
thought is quite clear; he is simply pointing out that the realities
of the attributes when used for God are completely different when
they are used for man. So a name like "knowing" which is common
to God and man, conveys different meanings in both cases. Al-
Maturidi, however, did not go further to explain the essential
(1) Tawhld. p.119,6-9.
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nature of God's attributes, because the nature of God's attri¬
butes, like the nature of His essence, is beyond the grasp of
our human understanding. In a passage on the question concerning
God's 'manner' (kayfiyya). al-Maturidl said, "This question (i.e.,
asking how God is?) permits of two interpretations; first, it
might be a question of finding a similar god among the things of
the world, which is impossible, since God is unique and far
beyond any similarities. It might also be a question of what is
His quality? (i.e., what is the nature of His quality), and the
answer might be the same as the preceding one:- that His attri¬
butes have no qualification (kayf). Again this question implies
finding something similar to Him. God, however, is exalted
beyond any resemblances in nature or in any attributes.^1 ^
What might be gathered from these brief statements is that
al-Katurldi is making attempts to point out that God's attributes
are different in their realities from those of man. Thus it
would be possible to apply to God and man attributes which are
alike without being accused of tashblh. because God and man differ
in their essence and in the nature of their attributes.
To establish the third point, that the affirmation of names
and attributes is the only possible way for human intellect to
attain any knowledge about God, al-Maturldi said that there is no
way of knowing God except through evidences derived from the
present world, for it is impossible to know Him through the senses
or by the evidences of sam*♦ The present world, however, testifies
to His reality from the aspect of His attributes and not from
(1) Tawhld. p.107,12-15.
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that of His essence^]!, in the visible world there is nothing
which indicates the existence of an essence divested of all
attributes, thus it would be inconceivable to affirm the reality
(2)
of an essence without ascribing attributes to it. What al-
Maturidi is trying to establish is that any knowledge about
God is attained only through evidences derived from the present
world. In the present world no reality can said to be existing
without ascribing attributes to it, so according to such an
analogy, God must have attributes, otherwise His reality cannot
be established. Al-Maturidi made this point quite clear in
another statement where he said, "We affirm the names because it
is inconceivable to know God or to describe His essence in a
manner suitable to the nature of the godhead, other than through
this way. And also because there is no way of attaining know-
(3)
ledge of the absent except by the evidences of the present.
Al-Maturidi, however, acknowledged the shortcomings of the
human language as a means for describing the reality of God. He
pointed out that it is extremely difficult to find in human
languages words or expressions adequate to describe the transcen¬
dent reality. God, thus, cannot be known as He really is, or be
described by any fitting attributes, because all the expressions
used for His description are borrowed from our inadequate language.
In spite of this, however, we have to use these words and





intellect can understand. He made this point quite clear in
his Kitab at-Tawhld. where he said, "God has essential names by
which he is called, such as the Merciful, and essential attributes
by which He is described, such as the knowledge of things and
having power over them. But our description and naming of Him
must be taken as expressions in human terms of what we simply
conceive Him to be, within the limits of our intellect and our
language. And also because the method which we can possibly
follow in this respect is based on the deduction from what is
known in the present world (and then to be applied to God). Such
a method would certainly entail similarity in expressions
(commonly used in both worlds): but we have been granted such
allowance on the condition that we deny God all concepts under¬
stood from the present world, in order to negate any similarity
between Him and the world. If our intellectual ability considered
it possible to call Him by names different from those applied to
others, we should do so. But this does not seem possible; because
the present world is the evidence for His existence, and is the
only way which gives us knowledge about Him. Thus, from the
shahid. we derived names for God to make His essence or conception
nearer to human understanding, though in reality He is far from
having any resemblance or likeness to us. So you find that the
expressions "knowing" and "powerful" by which we call God, differ
according to different languages without implying any difference
in the reality of His knowledge or power. This proves that these
names by which we call Him are expressions (flbarat). denoting
what can be understood by man's intellect, and axe not really
God's actual names. So to avoid understanding them in an improper
- 217 -
sense, they have to be accompanied by a negative statement (i.e.
knowing not like the knowers "learned"). And thus tawhid
(uniqueness of God) would be realized by affirmation of essence
with the implication of negation (sc. of similarity), and
negation with the implication of affirmation (ithbat dhat fi-
dimn nafy wa-nafv fi dimn ithbat).
• •
Thus, to attain any knowledge about God, one is impelled
by necessity to start by using human concepts and terms which
might imply tashblh, but one has to proceed from that to the
transcendent conception of God; because the normal procedure of
knowledge, in our present world, is to take what is comprehensible
as evidence for what is incomprehensible by human intellect. As
we conceive the rewards and punishments in the hereafter by
inference from the pleasures and pains in this world, so to
establish any knowledge about God, He has to be described by
some conceptions and expressions understood to human intellect,
such as "knowing" and "powerful" etc. Because, to refrain from
using such terms would be ta* til (divesting God of any concept),
•
and to take these expressions in their literal human sense would
entail tashbih (anthropomorphism). So to avoid the last con¬
ception, these expressions have to be accompanied by negation
(2)
(knowing not like the knowers "learned").
Prom these statements, it might be inferred that al-Maturidi
realized the dangers of both tashbih and ta* til: but to him the
danger of tashbih can be avoided by emphasizing the point that
(1) Tawhid. pp.93,10-19; 94,1-3.
(2) Ibid.. p.42,14-20.
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none of the attributes and names is to be taken at its face
value, and that one should not understand them in relation to
God, in the same sense as when in relation to man. The danger
of ta*til. however, is much more serious, because it might lead
us eventually to designate God as an abstract or empty conception
devoid of all content. This might account for al-Maturldl's det¬
ailed criticism and refutation of those who advocate the
doctrine of ta* til.
Both the philosophers and the Batinites agreed in their
denial of God's names and His attributes. The philosophers main¬
tain that their affirmation entails plurality in God's essence
so they explained the attributes in terms of negation and relation
(salb wa-idafa).^^ The Batinites, however, hold that the
(1) Ghazall, Tahafut al-Falasifa. p.151ff. According to al-Ghazali
the philosophers agree exactly as do the Mu'tazilites that it
is impossible to ascribe to the First Principle knowledge,
power and will. (Ghazall, Tahafut al-Falasifa. p.158). Al-
Kindi, in his Rasa'il. clearly stated that God is transcendent
and can be qualified only by negative attributes. "He has no
matter, no form, no quality, no quantity, no relation, nor is
He qualified by any of the remaining categories (maqulat).
He has no genus, no differentia, no species ... He is, there¬
fore, absolute oneness, nothing but oneness (wahda). Every-
thing else is multiple." Al-Kindl, Rasa'il. p.160. cf. El-
Ehwany, art."al-Kindi" pp.428-9. Ibn-Sina holds a similar
view concerning God's attributes and, according to him, all
the attributes are either relational or negative. The Deity
is therefore absolutely simple. Ibn-Sina, Kitab an-Na.iat.
pp.250-51. cf. Fazlu-ar-Rahman, art. "Ibn Sina", pp.501-2.
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ascription of names and attributes to God would imply similarity
between Him and man, therefore they denied God all names and
attributes.^^
Al-Maturidi made no account of the philosophers' views, and
*
the only reference to them in this respect was made while he
was discussing the point that agreement in name does not entail
any likeness between entities. Al-Maturidi said that "those who
denied the names and attributes among the philosophers did not
advocate ta'til. and those who affirmed the attributes meant to
reject ta* til. so though both groups seem to agree in denying
ta'tll, their actual views in this respect are completely
different; likewise though names might suggest similarity, their
(2)
real meaning is different.
The passage which immediately follows this statement contains
an argument against those who denied the attributes of God. Al-
Maturidi said, "If they did not affirm (i.e. the attributes of
God), what would they say if it is said to them: whom are you
worshipping? To what (God or religion) are you inviting people?
What religion are you professing? Who ordered you as to what
you are doing and from what refrain? Who creates the higher and
the lower spheres? and who originates the first principles of
things? To answer these questions they would either use some
terms and expressions to make the reality of God understandable
to human intellect, or avoid the use of human language and




those who deny the origination of the world, and they would refute
their views concerning the "First" that is the intellect or the
preceding Principle, or the First Divine, or whatever else they
said in this connection. ^
The vocabulary used here suggests that the argument is
mainly directed against the Batinites. The absence of full
initial treatment of the philosophers* view on this point might
be explained by assuming that al-Maturidi considered their views
as identical with those of the Batinites, so the refutation of
the latter's view implies refutation of the former's. It also
might be assumed that he considered the Batinites and not the
philosophers to be the real threat to the Islamic faith by their
disruptive political activity and their energetic attempts to
(2) - -
convert people to their doctrine. Al-Maturidi's account of
the Batinite views on this problem seems to be accurate especially
if it is read in the light of the works of later writers such as
- -(
al-Ghazali. He seems to have realized the identification of the
views of the Batinites with those of the philosophers, with a
slight difference in vocabulary used by the two groups. Unlike
the philosophers, the Batinites made use of some Qur'anic terms
such as "The First and the Last", and the "Tablet and the Pen"
(4)
to serve their conception of God and their theory of Creation.
(1) Tawhid, p.25,11-15.
(2) For the activity of the Batinites in Transoxania at the time
of al-Maturidi, see E.I.8 art. "Karmatians", pp.218-223.
(3) See in particular Fada'ih al-Batiniyya. pp.38-40.
• • •
(4) Ta'wllat. 57:22. cf. al-Ghazall, op.cit..pp.38-40.
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In his Kitab at-Tawhld. al-Maturidl said that, "the Batinites
• •
explained the above mentioned names (i.e. God's names) as
referring to the First and the Second originator (mubdi*). or
the "Intellect"and the "Soul" (nafs); they maintained that the
whole world is emerging (mabruz) from the "Intellect" which gives
impetus to the soul which in turn provides the prime matter.
They also said that the "Intellect" came into being by origination
(ibda*) and this ibda* is its cause ('illatuhu); and every thing
emerges from this "Intellect". So, according to this view,
creation occurs as if from he who was naturally determined (dhu-
tab*) without him being aware of having knowledge of, or power
over it. Thus God would be,according to such views, divested of
all content (fi hadd at-ta<til), and there would be no proof
• •
for his existence, and thus belief in Him would be through blind
following (taqlld) . which is impossible."^^^
Al-Maturldi refuted the Batinite views by pointing out that
it is impossible that the "Intellect" could be originated by
one who has neither knowledge of what is going to emerge, nor
power nor will to make it emerge. Moreover, the Batinites may
be asked: is the name "Allah" God's name or is it a name of
another being. According to their view it is the name of the
"Intellect" and the "Merciful" is the name of the soul. So
though they refused to apply names to God to avoid tashblh. they
in fact made his concept consist of numerable entities, and called
him God, the merciful and the compassionate to represent these
(2)
entities. The Batinites might also be asked - what do you
(1) Tawhld, p.94,19-20; 95,1-7.
(2) Ibid.. p.95,8-10.
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mean by saying that God has no essential name nor essential
attribute? They would have no other way but to express themselves
and explain their statement, and to do so they haye to use some
terms, and thus they would have nullified their statement because
they would be bound to use some terms and expressions.^^
The Batinites assumed that God has a name derived from His
relation to created things, and it is applied to Him by others,
such as the originator (mubdi*). Al-Maturldi argued that the
name "the originator" in this case would either be applied to
Him without His actually being an originator, and in this case
it would be used in a metaphorical sense, without implying reality
of action. On the other hand, if it is said that He is really
an originator, the ibda* would be temporal and so would be His
name, but this is impossible because in this case ibda* would be
in need of another ibda* and this cannot go on ad infinitum.
Thus His origination must belong to His essence (dhat), and in
this respect He would be eternally an originator, which implies
( 2)
the necessity of affirming His essential name.,,v ' These
arguments against the Batinites disclose that al-Maturidi was
familiar with the views and doctrines of this group. This fact
is more evident in the Ta'wilat where al-Maturidi discussed the
Batinites• free usage of numbers and letters in their philoso-
(3)
phical system , and how they used the method of ta'wil regarding








(c) The Eternity of God's Attributes
All the discussions regarding the eternity of God's attri¬
butes might be considered as attempts to find a solution to the
problem of how the temporal can possibly be related to the eternal
without imputing change to the eternal or assuming the eternity
of what is temporal. To God have been ascribed attributes such
as knowledge, power, creation and giving of sustenance which have
temporal effects or associations. So if it is assumed that these
attributes are eternal, would this imply the eternity of their
objects (muta*alliqat)? Similarly, if these effects were
supposed to be temporal, would not this imply the temporality of
the attributes; otherwise how can God, for instance, be considered
to be eternally creating before the existence of the objects
created?
To solve this problem, both Hisham b.al-Hakam and Jahm b.
Safwan are said to have denied the eternity of God's attributes.
Hisham is said to have maintained that it is impossible for God
to be eternally knowing for, if He were eternally knowing, then
the object known would be eternal, because there is no eternal
knowing without the similarly eternal existence of the objects
of His knowledge.Jahm holds that God's knowledge is temporal
in the sense that it comes into being together with the objects
known, otherwise if God's knowledge of the things were eternal,
(2)
then the things themselves would be eternal. The Ku'tazilite
theologians, however, distinguished between those attributes
(1) Maqalat. pp.493-94.
(2) Ibid., pp.280; 494. Tawhid. p.103,11.
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related to the essence of God (sifat adh-dhat). and those related
to His actions (sifat fi'l); and while they agreed on the
eternity of the former, they differed regarding the definition
as well as the eternity of the latter.The Mu*tazilites, for
instance, defined the essential attributes as those whose opposites
should not be ascribed to God, nor performed by Him, such as
knowledge; the opposite of "knowledge" is "ignorance" and God
cannot be said to be ignorant nor is He able to be ignorant.
The active attributes are those whose opposites can possibly be
ascribed to God and of which can be said that He is able to
perform them, such as "will" and "speech". Of the active attri¬
butes also are all those attributes derived from His actions such
as the Beneficent one, the Creator, the Sustainer and the Just
one etc. The active attributes also include any names applied
to God and which are derived from the acts of others such as the
(2)
worshipped and the invoked one (mad'uw). While the Mu*tazilites
considered the essential attributes to be eternal, they maintained
the temporality of the active attributes. They realized that
these latter attributes are connected to temporal things, so if
they were eternal their objects must also be eternal, and this
means in a sense the acceptance of the eternity of the world.
Therefore, they denied the eternity of the active attributes and
said that God can only be a creator when He is creating things,
the attribute of creation here being a temporal attribute, for
(1) Maqalat. pp.508-9.
(2) Maqalat. pp.508,11-15; 509,1-8.
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it would otherwise entail the eternity of the things created.^
Prom al-Maturidi's treatment of this problem, it seems that
he has accepted the Mu'tazilite distinction between the essential
and the active attributes of God; yet he disagrees with them on
the definition of these two kinds of attributes, and specially
in considering speech and will as active attributes. More
important, however, is that al-Maturidi, unlike the Mu'tazilites,
maintains that all God's attributes, whether being essential or
active, are eternal; and thus to him God is eternally knowing,
powerful, providing and creating. Al-Ka'bi was a leading Mu'taz-
ilite of that period just before al-Maturidi, thus to al-Maturidl
he represents the main opponent, and thus to refute his view is,
in a way, a refutation of the whole Mu'tazilite theory concerning
God's attributes. This is why al-Maturidi devoted a considerable
effort to show the weakness of al-Ka'bi's views.
According to al-Maturidi, al-Ka'bi defined the essential
and active attributes of God as follows: (i) The active attri¬
bute is that which is subject to different circumstances such as
mercy, giving sustenance and speech, because it might be said that
God sustains someone and does not sustain another, He bestows
mercy in certain circumstances and not in others, and He spoke to
somebody and did not speak to another. The essential attributes
are not subject to such change as: power, knowledge and life,
(ii) Another definition is that: whatever is under the control of
God's power is an active attribute such as mercy and speech, and
(1) For the Mu'tazilites' different views on the point see
Maqalat. pp.186-87; 179-80; 505.
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that which cannot be said to be under His power such as His
knowledge, is an essential attribute. (iii) Al-Ka'bl gave
another definition of the attributes and said that the essential
attribute is that by which God cannot be described by its
opposite, and the active is that which He can be described by
its opposite. ^ ^
Al-MaturidI rejected these definitions of God's attributes
introduced by al-Ka'bl. To refute the first definition he
put forward the following arguments: He said that knowledge and
hearing are subject to differences between persons and circum¬
stances, yet this does not entail the denial of their being
essential attributes; it might be said that God heard the
invocation of somebody and did not hear it from another, and a
man might say, "God did not know this about me, or He knew about
me at this time and not at another time." This does not imply
that these attributes are not essential ones, so speech and
(2)
mercy cannot be said to be active because of this.
God's speech is not a sound, and what is not a sound cannot
be said to be heard, though it might be said that it is known.
This, however, does not entail change in the character of the
speech nor in God's essence, so the fact that God spoke to some¬
one and did not speak to another does not necessitate change in
(3)
the character of the speech. Moreover, it might be said to
him (i.e. to al-Ka'bl), why did you consider this as the only
(1) Tawhld, p.50.1-9.
(2) Ibid. . 15-18.
(3) Ibid.. p.51,5-8.
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distinction between the active and the essential attributes,
though you knew that the essential attributes differ in their
positive application, and that in some cases it might be said
that He knows certain things over which He cannot be said to have
power, and that He has power over things which He cannot be said
to hear and that He sees things which He cannot necessarily be
said to bestow favour upon? All these differences do not imply
that these attributes are active and originated; but He is
described by them eternally, so to al-Ka'bi - why did you not
apply this to that by which He is described? since God is far
from change and alteration and corruption which are signs of
origination and coming into existence after non-existence.^^
Al-MaturidI rejected al-Ka'bi's second definition of God's
attributes, namely that what is under God's power is not an
essential attribute and vice versa. He said that according to
al-Ka'bi's opponents (among whom were presumably al-Maturidi
himself), God cannot be described asihaving power over His own
attributes except in a metaphorical way, i.e., as referring to
the object of the attributes. So there is no justification for
(2)
saying that He has power over His speech or mercy. He argued
that according to al-Ka'bi's doctrine, God was not eternally
creator nor merciful, but then He became able to make Himself
creator and merciful. Since it is allowable to say that we
worship the creator and the merciful, and according to al-Ka'bi




God's power, thus al-Ka'bi's view would lead to the opinion that
God was able to make a worshipped being for His creatures (in
other words, another god) which is absurd, for this other god
would be originated since he is under God's power.
As for al-Ka'bi's third definition of God's attributes,
al-Maturldi said that God cannot be described by the opposite
of justice ('adl). but that al-Ka'bl does not hold that 'adl
is an essential attribute, and this proves that his criterion
for what is an essential or active attribute is weak and inacc¬
urate.^
The polemical nature of these arguments is quite evident
and often tends to misrepresent the opponent's view and blurred
the point which al-Maturidi is trying to make. Though al-Maturidi
introduces no positive criterion for distinguishing between the
active and the essential attributes, his vigorous refutation of
al-Ka'bl'8 is quite understandable, for all the definitions of
al-Ka'bl imply the temporality of the active attributes, the
notion to which al-Maturidi strongly objected.
Al-Maturidi found no difficulty in defending the eternity
of the essential attributes; he maintained that since the main
purpose of ascribing attributes to God is to establish His
transcendence and absolute perfection, we have to assert the
eternity of all His attributes. Had any of these attributes been
temporal, this would entail that God was not perfect in His
essence before the coming into being of these temporal qualities.
(1) Tawhid, p.53,3-7.
(2) Ibid. . p.51,8-9.
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Those who assumed the temporality of these attributes and hold
that God is not eternally knowing, might be asked - how was He
before the creation, had God any knowledge of His essence and
His actions or not? Also, did He know Himself as a "thing" or
not? If they said that He did not know, then He would be ignorant
until He created a knowledge by which He becomes knowing. If,
however, He knew, then would He be knowing His essence or not?
Since we assume that He knows His essence, we have to apply this
name to Him eternally.^1^ If God were not eternally knowing and
powerful, it would mean that He was ignorant and impotent, and
then became knowing and powerful, which is improper for God and
leads to the discrediting of His oneness since it implies
change in His essence. But how can knowledge, for example, be
created without power or power be created without knowledge? If
it is said that they were created by another force, then God would
(2)
be in need of that force and He would no longer be the one God.
So, to maintain the absolute perfection of God, these attributes
must be eternally ascribed to Him.
As for the active attributes, al-Maturidi considered them
to be as eternal as the essential attributes, and he made no
distinction between them as far as their eternal aspect is con¬
cerned. Thus he says, "we say that God is eternally knowing,
powerful, acting and beneficent in the sense that is rationally
justified, arid which indicates that the order in creation pro-
(3)






Maturldl says, "The description of the maker as eternally
powerful and beneficent is necessary, and to us it is also
/1 \
necessary to describe Him as eternally making (sun'). He
♦
used the term takwln to denote creation, sustenance, origination,
and all those concepts which are related to God's actions, and
defined takwin as an eternal attribute of God through which He
brings the non-existent from the state of non-existence into
existence. The term itself is derived from the Qur'anic verses,
"And when He decrees a thing, He only says to it "Be" and it
(2)
is." , where the form of the verb (kun) is mentioned. A long
time before al-Maturidl^, term takwin had been used by the
theologians in a sense identical with "creation" or "bringing from
non-existence into existence". Those theologians, however, held
widely different views regarding the issue as to whether this
term referred simply to the thing created, or whether it conveyed
a different meaning. Most of them maintained that creating or
bringing into existence (khalq or takwln) is identical with the
thing created or brought into existence. Thus when the Creator
creates a thing, there is nothing in this action but the creator
and the thing created. The idea denoted by such terms as
"creating" and "bringing into existence" is an expression of
that which takes place in the mind, and it refers to the relation
between the Creator and the thing created, and cannot be estab¬
lished as distinctly different from the thing created in the
(1) Tawhld, p.118,5.
(2) Qur'an. 2:117; 3:47.
(3) See Maoalat. pp.363,10-11 , 365,8-9.
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world of reality. Thus to those theologians there is no attri¬
bute of takwin, but the act of creation is simply achieved by
God's power and will. Even those who asserted the difference
between takwin and the mukawwan did not hold that the former is
an eternal attribute as al-Maturidl^ clld, and among this latter
group, the Karramites introduced their own theory of creation
based on the view that takwin or ihdath. as they preferred to
(2)
call it, is not eternal but is originated in God's essence.
It is in the light of these views that al-Maturidi seems
to have worked out his concept of God's creation of things based
on takwin as an eternal attribute of God. Thus he had to
establish not only the eternity of takwin against the Karramites*
assumption of its origination, but he also had to prove the very
existence of this attribute. Commenting on the Qur'anic verse,
"And when He decrees a thing, He only says to it "Be" and it
is." (Q. 2:117), al-Maturidi said that this verse refutes the
view that the creation of the thing is identical with the thing
itself; because God mentioned "decree" and a "thing" which are
different, and He mentioned "Be" as referring to the act of
creation or takwin which precedes the existence of the thing,
and "it is" as referring to the thing created (mukawwan). Al-
Maturidi argued that if these terms were identical, then God
would not have mentioned "Be" as referring to takwin and "it is"
(1) Maqalat. pp.363-66.
(2) See my unpublished M.Litt. Thesis, The History and Doctrine
of the Karramiyya Sect with Special Reference to ar-Razi's
Criticism, p.111.
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as referring to the mukawwan. This, however, does not mean that
creation occurs by God's utterance of the word "Be", but that this
expression simply refers in precise and concise terms to the
effectiveness of God's order and the fact that the act of
creation is so easy for Him. ^ ^
Al-MaturidI also argued from the point of view that the
ascription of this attribute is necessary for the establishment
of God's perfection and His transcendence because no-one disputes
that God is eternally acting; and al-Maturldl here refers to the
evidence of the analogy of the absent to the present. But some
of God's creation might be described as wicked, evil, ugly and
unfortunate. So if such a creation were directly produced from
God's essence, then He would be described by these qualities,
and would be called wicked, an evil doer, causer of ugliness and
misfortune. But to relate such descriptions to God denotes
unbelief. So it must be assumed that these actions should not
be ascribed to God's essence, but to something different: that
is to an attribute through which God causes these things to exist.
The same thing might be said about pregnancy, obedience, dis¬
obedience and acquisition; for if God were really the direct
cause of things, He would be called procreator, disbeliever,
(2)
believer and an acquirer which is improper for God. According
to al-Maturidi, he who acquires something is called an acquirer
and he who does evil is called an evil-doer etc., so if all
creation follows directly from God, then He would be called
(1) Ta'wllat. 2:117; 3:47.
(2) Tawhid, p.46,9-15.
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accordingly, moving, motionless, wicked, etc. So if God is far
from such qualities and at the same time we find Him called the
causer of death and life, the mover etc., then we have to assume
that God's action is different from its effect (i.e., His creation
is different from the created thing.)
Another argument is the fact that God does not create an
action in eternity but that He creates it at a certain time. The
non-existence of the act originally cannot be due to God's
essence, because His essence is unchangeable, and in this case
the act would never have been realized. So this must be due to
something else, that is His attribute of takwin. which brings
(2)
the action from non-existence into existence.
Against the Karramite view that takwin is originated, al-
Maturxdl strongly emphasized the eternity of this attribute. He
maintained that God is eternally creator and originator, as He
is eternally knowing and powerful, and what is originated and
created is produced at a certain time by eternal takwin. and not
by originated takwin which occurs at the time of creation and
origination as the Karramites assumed. He argued that if takwin
were originated, there would be two alternatives; it would either
be created by itself and, if this is possible, then it would be
possible for everything to be created without cause which is
absurd, or it would be created by another creation and so on,
(3)





Two main objections were raised against al-Maturidl's theory
of creation. The first is that the assumption of an eternal
attribute of takwin would entail that the mukawwan.is eternal as
well and this would lead to the eternity of the world, because
it is inconceivable for takwin. in such a concept, to exist
without its effect. The second objection is that if it is
assumed that takwin can exist without the mukawwan. this would
imply the impotence of God, for in this case He would not be able
to bring something into existence although He has the attribute
of takwin.
To answer the first objection, al-Maturidi pointed out that
there is no causative connection between God's action and its
effect or connection, i.e., between takwin and the mukawwan.
So God is eternally creating (mukawwin) before the existence
of the created thing, and to ascribe this attribute to Him, it
is not necessary that there be any actual creation, because He
has the potential power to create. According to al-Maturldl,
as God's power is not dependent on things He has power over, and
His will is not conditioned by things willed, and His knowledge
is not dependent for its existence on things known, but all these
attributes are eternal though their effects were originated,
then likewise takwin is eternal though the mukawwan is origin¬
ated.^^ Commenting on the Qur'anic verse, (1:4), al-Katuridl
said that this verse proves the possibility of describing God
as the master of something which does not exist at the moment,
that is, the day of judgement; this affirms that whatever He is
(1) Tawhld. p.47,1-5.
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described by, it belongs and is related to Himself not to these
attributes or to their effects. Therefore we say that He is
eternally creating, merciful, beneficent and hearing, though
the objects of these attributes are absent. God's action is
not preconditioned or related to a certain period in time. Thus,
as He is eternally knowing and powerful, so He is eternally
creating and originating in the sense that He has the potential
power to do all these things. Time, however, is only mentioned
when reference is made to the subject of these attributes.^^
So, according to al-Maturidi, "Basically, when a description is
ascribed to God, and He has been described by such qualities as
action, knowledge, etc., this description must be eternal. If
we mention at the same time the object of the quality ascribed
to Him, such as what is known, what is subject to His power,
what is willed and what is made to be (mukawwan), the time of
(the action of the attributes on) these things must also be
specified, so that it should not be supposed that these things
(2) - -
are eternal." Al-Maturidi argued for this view by saying
that God has been eternally described by these attributes, and
He said that He is the creator and sustainer even before the
existence of the things created and sustained; so the eternity
of these attributes must be affirmed. But if the object of these
attributes is mentioned, its time must be specified, otherwise
its eternity might be implied, or that He is unable to bring it
(3)





As for the second objection, i.e., that the assertion of
takwin without mukawwan would entail the impotence of God, al-
Maturldl said that this would be true if takwin was connected
with the bringing of its objects into existence at a definite
time and if it then fails, then God would be certainly impotent,
as He would be ignorant and devoid of free will if His knowledge
and will were connected with objects at certain times and then
failed to be realized. But in fact, takwin is connected with the
mukawwan. i.e., bringing something into existence at a certain
prescribed time, so its being non-existent before or after that
does not entail the impotence of God. It is the same thing as
when we say that God is eternally hearing, seeing, generous and
beneficent, we mean that He is described eternally by these
attributes, though what is heard, seen etc., is originated.^^
After refuting these two objections, al-Maturidi introduced
more arguments to support his view concerning takwin; he pointed
out that the affirmation of this attribute is an affirmation of
God's perfection and His absolute uniqueness, because he whose
actions are limited by time is impotent compared to he whose
actions are unlimited by time. Also he who is able to produce
things and their opposites is more powerful than he who is able
to produce only one thing, and he whose action is limited by the
confines of space (ha.y.yiz) is inferior to him whose actions can
be throughout space. Takwin is simply the absolute potential
power of God which is neither limited by space, nor finite in time,
and the affirmation of such an attribute is necessary for estab-
(1) Tawhid, p.47,19-24.
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lishing the absolute perfection (tamam) of God.^^ To al-
Maturidi , those who denied takwin were led to such a view by
mistakenly drawing a comparison between God's actions and the
actions of man. They thought that God's actions are subject
to the same conditions as man's, including the actions occurring
at a certain period of time, and they had forgotten that time is
a human concept by which distinction between the past, present
and the future is made. Thus, while the actions of man are
inconceivable without time, God's actions are not subject to
(2)
this human concept. Moreover, if we consider man's actions,
we find that in his generated actions such as shooting and
killing, there is a time gap between the act and its effect. So
in the case of an archer, when he shoots an arrow and kills
somebody, there would be a gap between the actual shooting and
the killing, yet there is no immediate connection between the
act and its effect. God's actions are not generated, but this
might be applied to them, and thus though they are eternal, their
(3)
effect may be originated.
To al-Maturidi, those who deny the existence of the eternal
attribute of takwin cannot deny that they are at the present
time in possession of the message of the prophet which was
delivered a long time ago. So they have no justification for
denying that what is originated and comes into existence at the
present, was caused by the eternal attribute of takwin and the
(1) Tawhid. p.48,1-5.
(2) Ibid. .5-8. cf. Ibn-Rushd, Manahi.i al-Adilla. Introduction, p.50.
(3) Tawhid. p.48,10-14.




AL-ASH*ARI ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD AND HIS ATTRIBUTES
1. His Arguments for God's Existence
(a) The argument based on the temporality of the world
Prom the extant works of al-Ash'ari it seems that he did not
use the argument based on the temporality of the world to prove
the existence of God, but he derived his arguments in this respect
from the observed change in the world and from the perfection in
its creation. Thus, unlike al-Maturidl, al-Ash'ari made no
attempts to prove the temporality of the world or to refute, in
detail, the views of those who asserted its eternity. Prom the
same works, however, it is quite evident that al-Ash'arl was not
only aware of the contents of that argument, but he also used
many of its concepts and terminologies in his disputations. For
instance, al-Ash'ari asserted that all visible things consist of
(1)
substances and accidents; that each body is finite and has
(2)
limit and that the atom cannot be divided ad-infinitum.
Accordingly, he refuted the views that there is no atom which can
(3)
be halved ad infinitum. He stated that it is impossible for
a quality to subsist in a quality, or for an accident to carry an
accident, nor is it possible for an accident to subsist in
(4)
itself. He also affirmed that accidents do not endure for more
(1) Luma*, p.36,14-15.
(2) Risala I, P.92,19.
(3) Ibid.. p.91,17ff.
(4) Luma', PP.55,7-9; 22,8
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than one instant, that two contradictories do not combine in
one substrate or direction or in what exists already in the
(2)
substrate. Because he is convinced beyond doubt that God is
the real agent of everything, al-Ash'arl denies the idea of
latency (kumun) and natural causality. To him bodies have no
(3)
effect on things distinct from themselves. He also rejected
(4) (5)
the eternity of bodies, and the eternity of the world, and
refused the Materialists* view concerning the eternity of move-
ment.^^ It is said that al-Ash'ari wrote several works refuting
the views of the philosophers, the materialists, the naturalists
and all those who maintained the eternity of the world, as well
(7)
as the dualists and the magians.
Prom this account it seems that there is no doubt that al-
Ash'ari was well aware of the contents of the arguments based on
the temporality of the world and all the questions involved in
it. But the question remains whether or not he employed the
argument as a proof for God's existence. The immediate followers
of al-Ash'ari depended on this particular argument rather than
(8)
the others, and some of them ascribed the same argument to
(1) Luma'. p.55,4-9. Ibana, p.28.
(2) Risala I. p.91 .7-9. Luma'. pp.8,7-9; p.60,18-19.
(3) Luma'. p.39,8-9.
(4) Ibid.. p.7,8-12.
(5) Risala I. p.91,3-14.
(6) Ibid.. pp.91,15-19; 92,1-3.
(7) Ibn-'Asakir, Tabvvin. p.128ff.
(8) Al-BaqillanI, Tamhid. pp.22-24.
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al-Ash'arl himself. Thus in his Nihavat al-Iqdam. ash-Shahrastani,
distinguished between two arguments both based on the temporality
of the world used by the theologians to establish the existence
of God. One is positive and aims to prove the temporality of
the world, the other is negative based on the refutation of its
eternity. According to ash-Shahrastani, al-Ash'arl chose the
latter method and said, "If we assume the pre-eternity of atoms
they must have been combined or separate, or neither combined
nor separate, or some combined and others separate. In short,
they are not free from the actual combination or separation, or
the possibility of separation and combination, and as their
relation to each other has changed and they cannot change their
own essence because essence is unchangeable, there must be an
external force which combines and separates them. So it follows
that whatever does not precede atoms, which are thus proved
temporal, is itself temporal.
As has already been mentioned, al-Ash'arl expressed his
disapproval of such arguments and pointed out their weaknesses
(2)
as well as the faults in their premisses. 7 We might explain
this inconsistency by supposing that al-Ash'arl might have used
this type of argument before abandoning Mu'tazilism, and these
arguments might have appeared in his works of that time, from
which ash-Shahrastani perhaps quoted; then later he would have
realized the weakness of these arguments and the seriousness of
the objections raised against their validity, and he therefore
(1) Iqdam. p.12.
(2) See Supra.Chapter II, pp.111-12.
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joined those who doubted their validity and avoided mentioning
them in those of his works which survive, but he nevertheless
made use of some of the premisses of the old arguments in the
course of his disputations.
(b) The Argument based on Change and Causation
Al-Ash'ari constructed an argument for the existence of God
based on the observed change in the visible world; since things
do not and cannot cause change, therefore, there must be an
external force causing it. He gave the example of the change
of man from one state to another and said, "The completely mature
man was originally sperm, then a clot, then embryo, then flesh
and bone and blood. Now we know very well that he did not trans¬
form himself from one state to another because at the peak of
his physical and mental perfection he is unable to produce extra
organs or hearing and sight or to create another limb for himself,
and he is even more incapable of doing that when he is weak and
imperfect. ... Man also cannot transform himself from youth to
old age and decrepitude and although he strains to rid himself
of old age and decrepitude and to restore himself to his youth¬
ful condition, he is not able to do so. All this proves that it
is not he who transforms himself through these states, but that
he has a transformer who transforms him from state to state, who
governs his every state: for his transformation from one state
ti( 1)
to another without a transformer or governor is impossible.
This principle of change and the necessity of its causation
(1) Luma*. p.6,5-16; cf. Milal, vol.1, p.94. Iqdam. p.12.
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is applied to all things of the world; thus cotton for instance
cannot change into spun thread and woven material by itself,
there must be a spinner and a weaver to cause that, change. One
who takes a pile of raw cotton, al-Ash'ari said, and waits for
it to become spun thread, then woven material, without a spinner
or a weaver, is out of his senses or ignorant. Similarly, one
who goes into a desert in which he finds no castle built, and
waits for the mud to be fired into bricks, and be piled up on
top of each other without a firer or a builder is ignorant.
As has already been mentioned, the source of this argument
(2)is basically Qur'anic; thus al-Ash'ari derived his above-
mentioned rational argument from the Qur'anic verses which speak
(3)of the stages in the creation of man, and his inability to
(4)cause any change in himself or in other things. From the
same verses, al-Ash'ari argued that man changes from one state
to another, it is a known fact that changeable things cannot be
eternal, for their change necessitates their departure from
their previous states to new ones, and in the case of their being
eternal, such change would not occur. So the occurring of
change in man and in other things implies an origination and
refutes their being eternal; and the originated things need an
(5)
originator who is God.
(1) Luma'. p.6,17-21.
(2) See Supra. Chapter III, pp.152-53.
(3) Qur'an. 23:12-14.
(4) Ibid.. 56:58-9.
(5) Risala II. p.82.
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(c) The Argument based on Design and Purpose (the Teleological
Argument
Reference has already been made to the origin of this
argument and how it was developed out of the Qur'anic arguments
for the existence of God.^^ Al-Ash'ari used the same arguments
as al-Maturidi, and said that the gradual and systematic
development in the stages of man's creation, mentioned in the
Qur'anic verses 23:12-14, discloses the existence of a wise
creator behind it, who intended these processes to be in that way;
for such systematic development cannot be the production of
chance or mere accident without prior intention or arrangement.
The extraction of clay (sulala) from which man is developed,is
liable to accept various forms, and to be produced at different
times, so its gradual development at certain times discloses the
design and purpose behind the creation of man. Moreover, design
and purpose is quite evident in the function of man's senses and
(2)
the suitability of his organs for their particular tasks.
Purpose and design is also evident in the alternation of night
and day mentioned in the verse 3:190, "Surely in the creation of
heaven and earth and in the alternation of night and day there
are signs for men possessed of mind." According to al-Ash'ari
this alternation is specifically for the benefit of mankind so
that he should work during the day and rest at night; if the
world were in complete darkness, men would not be able to do
their work or execute their affairs, if day were continuous
(1) See Supra. Chapter III, p. 154.
(2) Risala II. pp.82-3.
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they would enjoy no rest or tranquillity.^^
Prom what has been said it becomes clear that though al-
Ash'ari made use of the argument based on the temporality of
the world, the later Ash'arite arguments based on the theory of
(2) (3)
the atom, and the principle of determination are not his.
Unlike his followers, al-Ash'ari laid more emphasis on those
arguments based on the observable phenomena of changes and the
evidences of design and purpose in the world's creation, so the
criticism levelled against the Ash'arites method by such men as
(4) .
Ibn-Rushd, is not applicable to al-Ash ari, at least as far
as his extant theological works are concerned.
2. Al-Ash'ari on the Attributes of God
Unlike al-Maturidi whose main concern, as has already been
mentioned, was to deny tashbih. that is similarity between God
and His creatures, al-Ash'ari seems to have been mainly interested
in refuting the extreme views of the Mu'tazilites and their
method of ta'wll. i.e., allegorical interpretation. Thus he
strongly advocated the doctrine of bi-la-kayf. and affirmed that
God sits on His throne and is visible in the hereafter.
(1) Risala II. pp.83-4.
(2) Baqillani, Tamhid. pp.15-23. Cf. Macdonald, Development
of Muslim Theology, pp.200-203.
(3) Juwayni, Irshad. pp.16-17. cf. Iqdam. p.12.
(4) Ibn-Rushd, Manahij al-Adilla. pp.135-48.
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(a) His Arguments for Establishing God's Oneness
To prove God's oneness, al-Ash'arl used only the argument
based on mutual hindrance, (dalil at-tamanu'). to which reference
has already been made.^^ Thus al-Ash'arl argued from the
Qur'anic verse, 21:22, that if there were two gods, their gov¬
ernment and control over the world would be neither harmonious
nor consistently effective, and one or both of them would be
impotent; for if one of them willed that a man should live and
the other willed his death, one of three things would have to
ensue: either the will of both together would be accomplished,
or the will of neither would be accomplished, or the will of
only one would be accomplished. It is impossible that the will
of both together would be accomplished, for the body cannot be
simultaneously living and dead and, accordingly, the impotence
of both must be concluded, and that which is impotent can be
neither God nor eternal. And if the will of only one be accom¬
plished, impotence necessarily attaches to the one whose will is
not accomplished and the impotent can neither be God nor eternal.
So what has been said proves that the Maker of the world must
(2)be one.
This argument of al-Ash'ari is identical with that of al-
Maturidi and it was used by almost all the later theologians of
(3)different schools; It is noticeable, however, that this is the
(1) Supra, pp.160-61.
(2) Luma*. p.8,3-11. Risala II. p.84.
(3) Baqillani, Tamhid. p.25; Ghazali, Iqtisad. pp.36-38;
'Abd-al-Jabbar, Usui. pp.279-82.
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only rational argument introduced by al-Ash'arl in comparison
with the many such arguments of al-Maturidi; this might be ex¬
plained in the light of what has already been mentioned, that
al-Ash'ari's main concern was to combat the Mu'tazilite views,
therefore he paid no attention to other groups and did not need
to introduce other than this argument. Al-Maturidi•s main
concern, however, was to defend the conception of God and His
oneness, so he had to take into account the views of various
groups on such matters and had to introduce many rational argu¬
ments based on sam' in its wider significance, reason, as well
as arguments derived from the observable precision in the making
of the world.
The dalil at-tamanu* was severely criticized by Ibn-Rushd
who pointed out the weaknesses of the theologians' arguments
based on it, and that it is neither rationally convincing nor is
it in agreement with what the verse intends to convey. To him,
the theologians divided the subject into three parts for which
there is no textual basis, for the text merely stated that, were
there to be two gods, the universe would collapse in ruins at
the time of its first existence, but since it has obviously not
collapsed, there must be only one God.^^ This criticism might
be valid as far as al-Ash'ari and his Ash'arite followers are
concerned. For al-Maturldi, however, such a criticism seems to
be unjustified, because his argument based on this verse, which
(2)has already been discussed, proceeds in the same manner as
approved by Ibn-Rushd.
(1) Ibn-Rushd, Manahij al-Adilla. pp.155-59.
(2) Supra.. pp.160-61.
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(b) Al-Ash'ari and the Doctrine of bi-la-kayf
It is a well known fact that the doctrine of bi-la-kayf was
fully formulated long before al-Ash'arl's time, and even before
the time of Ibn-Hanbal with whose name the doctrine has been
connected. The balkafiyya asserted their firm belief in
those Qur'anic expressions which ascribe to God hands, eyes,
face, etc., without giving them definite interpretation, as a
reaction to the extreme views of both the Mu/tazilites who used
ta'wil or allegorical interpretation as a method of explaining
away these Qur'anic expressions, and the corporealists and
anthropomorphists who naively accepted those expressions in their
literal sense. They also emphasized God's separateness and His
uniqueness and maintained that He cannot be compared to anything
of this world.
On abandoning Mu'tazilism, al-Ash'arl sought refuge with the
balkafiyya: in his Ibana he expressed his allegiance to Ibn-
(2)
Hanbal, and advocated the doctrine of bi-la-kayf. by affirming
•
as realities all the physical attributes ascribed to God in the
Qur'an such as: eyes, hands and face etc. Thus, according to
al-Ash'ari, God has a face as He has said, "Yet still abides the
face of thy Lord, Majestic, Splendid". He has two hands (bi-la-
kayf ) as He has said, "Nay, but His hands are outspread". "That
I created with my own hands". He has eyes as He said, "Running
before our eyes". All these, however, should be accepted without
(1) Watt, "Some Muslim Discussions of Anthropomorphism", pp.1-4.
E.I.^ art. "Ahmad Ibn-Hanbal" (H. Laoust), p.275. M.C.P. 88ff.
(2) Ibana. p.9,2-3.
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qualification or definition.^^ Similarly, al-Ash'arl accepted
all the Traditions which affirmed that God descends to the
lowest heaven, and all the verses which speak of God's coming on
the day of resurrection, and His being nearer to His servants
than the jugular vein, all this without allowing for allegorical
(2)
interpretation of their meaning.
It is clear from these statements that al-Ash'arl is using
the language of Ibn-Hanbal and his followers. In the same way,
al-Ash'ari stood firm against all the Mu'tazilite attempts to
use ta'wil and substitute other meanings for those difficult
expressions in the Qur'an and the Traditions. In spite of this
similarity of language between al-Ash'arl and the Hanbalites,
they differed in their methods; and while the Hanbalites envisaged
the doctrine of bi-la-kayf as a passive acceptance of all
Qur'anic expressions, even if they seemed to imply self-contra¬
dictory conceptions, al-Ash'arl attempted to explain away the
contradictions of these expressions, not only by means of Scrip¬
tural arguments, but also by using purely rational arguments.
On this point lies the difference between the Hanbalites and al-
Ash'arl: while the latter used Kalam to defend the doctrine of
bi-la-kayf. the former condemned this method and refused to
- (3)
accept al-Ash'ari within their ranks.
The Mu'tazilites used ta'wil in the metaphorical inter¬
pretation of those difficult Qur'anic expressions such as God's
(1) Ibana. pp.9,12-14; 37-38.
(2) Ibid.. pp.11-12.
(3) Watt, "Some Muslim Discussion." pp.5-6; Formative Period p.295.
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hands, face, etc., and said that God's hand simply means His
grace (ni'ma), and pointed out that the Arabic word for hand also
has the meaning of grace.Al-Ash'ari opposed the whole method
of ta'wll and, with a similar linguistic argument, he said that
in literary or conversational usage one may not say, "I have done
thus and thus with my two hands" meaning "with my grace". Simi¬
larly, the Mu'tazilites cannot claim the support of ijma' and
analogy for such interpretation, for there is no unanimous agree¬
ment among the Muslims about such interpretation, and analogy is
not the proper method for judging in this case. So the assertion
that God's "hands" had no meaning but "grace" could not be con-
(2)
vincingly proved by analogy.
Al-Ash'ari rejected the assumption based on the analogy of
the absent to the present, that since yad in the present is
either a member or a grace, then the yad in the absent, i.e.,
God's hand must either be a member or grace; he questioned the
validity of the principle of analogy and its application for God
in all cases. To him, random application of this principle would
lead to absurd views because we do not find in the present a
living being unless it has a body consisting of flesh and blood,
and we do not find a ruler who is not human, yet we presumed that
God, who is living and who rules, transcends these conceptions.
Thus it would not be illogical to deny that the "two hands"
ascribed to God are neither grace nor members, nor like our
(3)
normal hands.




Al-Ash'ari also rejected the interpretation of God's hands
as meaning His power, and pointed out that the ayd referred to
in the verse, 51:47, is not the plural of yad. because the plural
of vad meaning grace is avadin. and according to this the
meaning of God's words (with my two hands) cannot possibly be
the same as that of His words, "And the heaven - with our hands
We have built it up." Q.51:47. Moreover, if power is meant,
then God would have two powers according to His words, "With
my two hands" Q.38:75, but the Hu'tazilites deny Him one power
not to mention two; so according to the Mu'tazilites own views,
the yadain in this verse cannot mean two powers. Another argument
is that if God meant "His two powers" by "two hands", then Adam
would have no superiority over Iblis, since all things including
Iblis are created by God's power and His will. So to show His
preference for Adam over Iblis, God stated that He created Adam
with His two hands, and this proves that the "two hands"
mentioned in the verse do not simply mean God's power.^^
Concerning the arguments that if "two hands" were ascribed
to God because it is mentioned in the verse 38:75, then equally
one hand or more than two hands should be ascribed to Him accord¬
ing to the verses 48:10 and 36:71 respectively. Al-Ash'arl
emphasized the principle, already mentioned, that the literal
meaning of the Qur'an should be accepted unless there is strong
(1) Ibana. p.39,1-14. The same arguments were used by al-
Baqillani, Tamhid, pp.258-60. Later Ash'arites, however,
adopted the principle of ta'wil and thus metaphorically
interpreted these Qur'anic verses. See Juwayni, Irshad,
p.88 ff. Ghazall, Iqtisad. pp.28-29.
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proof suggesting another meaning which should then be followed.
In the present case, he found the proof of i.jma* to be convincing:
by i.jma' the literal meaning of the verses referring to one hand
and the plural of hands, is transferred from its primary literal
meaning in order to agree with the verse which refers to God's
(2)
"two hands".
By using the same principle of exegesis, al-Ash'ari refuted
the whole Mu'tazilite attempts to establish metaphorical inter¬
pretation of the term "hand", and he stated categorically that
the prescriptions of the Qur'an should be interpreted literally
and obviously unless there is a proof suggesting otherwise.
Therefore, "two hands" must be interpreted literally and no meta¬
phorical meaning should be ascribed to them except by proofs;
for if Qur'anic interpretation were uncontrolled and unrestricted,
one might for instance maintain, without proof, that what has
universal significance in its literal interpretation is partic-
(3) -
ular and vice versa. Al-Ash'ari seems to have realised the
dangers of the metaphorical method of interpretation and the
possibility that it might eventually lead to the debasement of
the Scripture altogether. He therefore strongly opposed its
application to the Qur'an and tried to demonstrate its invalidity.
Prom what has been said, it is clear that al-Ash'arl's
method of argument concerning these disputed Qur'anic verses
proceeds from an assumption of analogy between God and His creatures,
(1) See Supra, pp.117-18.
(2) Ibana, pp.40,20-25; 41,1-4.
(3) Ibid. . p.41,5-17.
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but this assumption is not the assumption of resemblance between
God and His creatures of the anthropomorphists and the corpor-
ealists as has sometimes been assumed.So the accusation that
he was closer to these groups than to any other Muslim sect is
unjustified. It is true that he strongly defended the attrib¬
ution of hands, eyes, etc. to God, and opposed any allegorical
interpretation of these terms; at the same time, however, he
was careful not to fall into the trap of tashblh by emphasizing
the doctrine of bi-la-kayf. and by advocating the principle of
tanzih. Thus, in his Ibana, al-Ash'ari clearly stated that
God's hands are neither organs nor limbs nor power nor grace;
the Qur'anic verse is an assertion of the existence of two hands
that are not two members and not two powers and not two graces,
and are unqualified except insofar as the two hands are not like
(2)
ordinary hands.
In his Risala II. al-Ash'arl pointed out that God's coming
and descent do not imply movement or wandering about, for move¬
ment and motion are applicable to the comer who is body or sub¬
stance, but God is neither body nor substance, therefore coming
in this sense of movement does not apply to Him; as it does not
apply to fever when it is said that ,1a'at Zald al-humma (Zaid has
been attacked by fever). This does not mean that the fever came
or walked to Zaid, but it simply means that it afflicted him.
God's descent also does not imply moving about (nuqla) because
this is a bodily characteristic and, as the descent of
(1) Ibn-Rushd, Manahi.1 al-Adilla. Introduction, pp.77ff.
(2) Ibana. p.39,14-23.
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revelation (^17:105, does not imply such a concept, nor does the
descent of God.^^
Al-Ash'ari placed more emphasis on the doctrine of tanzlh
in his al-Luma* where he refuted all similarities between God
and His creatures, and opposed the application of the term "body"
to God. He argued that if God were similar to His creatures He
would be temporal like them. For, if He were similar to them,
He would have to be like them either in all respects or in some
respects. If He were like them in all respects, He would be
temporal as they are in all respects. And if He were similar to
them in some respects, He would be temporal in that respect in
which He was like them. But it is impossible for that which is
(2) -
temporal to have existed eternally. In his Risala II. al-
Ash'ari introduced the same argument and added that if God were
similar to His creatures it would either entail that He was
temporal like them, or that they were eternal; both premisses are
wrong as God does not resemble any of His creatures in any respect.
According to al-Ash'arl, the denial of similarity between God and
His creatures does not entail the negation of His existence, as
some anthropomorphists and corporealists claim: the method for
establishing God's existence is not in making comparison between
Him and His creatures, for His existence is proved through intell¬
ect and by reflection upon the signs of creation in the whole
world.
(1) Risala II. p.97
(2) Luma*. p.7,14-18. Risala I, p.92,11-18.
(3) Risala II. p.93.
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Al-Ash'arl also refuted the application of the term "body"
to God, whether in the sense of being long, deep and constructed
of parts (murakkab), or not having these qualities.^^ He
argued that the term ,1ism in the sense connoted by these anthro¬
pomorphic qualities cannot pdssibly be applied to God, because
what is composed is not one thing, but it consists at least of
two things joined together, and since the oneness of God has been
established beyond doubt, it would be false to say that He is
composed. Nor can the term jism be applied without giving it
these qualities, for it is not for us, al-Ash'arl said, to assign
names to God; and it is not permissible to apply to Him names
which He did not apply to Himself, or have not been applied by
His apostle or about whose meaning there is no consensus of the
Muslims (i.jma'). ^^
(c) The Problem of God's Locality
Al-Ash'arl formulated his views on God's locality, by
applying the doctrine of bi-la-kayf. and refuting any metaphor¬
ical interpretation of the Qur'anic verses. The section devoted
to the problem in the Ibana is more or less a reiteration of
the views and the arguments of Ibn—Hanbal and his Hanbalite
• •
- (3)
followers, such as ad-Darimi. Thus, in the manner of the
Hanbalites, al-Ash'arl affirmed the doctrine of God being seated
(1) See Supra, pp.162-3.
(2) Luma* pp.9,18-19; 10,1-8.
(3) Cf. Ibn-Hanbal ar-Radd p.323. cf. Seale Muslim Theology,
pp.117-19, Ad-Darimi, Radd. pp.8-9.
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on a throne with arguments based directly on the Qur'an and
the Traditions. He quoted many of the verses which speak of
God being seated on His throne, Q.20:5, that He is in heaven,
Q.67:16, that angels and spirits ascend to Him, Q.70:4, that
God took Jesus up to Himself Q.3:55; 4:158, etc.^^ He also
quoted different versions of the Tradition of God's nightly
descent to the lower heaven, and the Tradition which tells that
the Prophet considered the black slave girl, who said that God
is in heaven, a believer. All these evidences, al-Ash'ari said,
(2)
prove that God is sitting on His throne, which is above heavens.
Al-Ash'arl also based an argument on the fact that the
Muslims are naturally disposed to raise their hands, when they
invoke God's mercy, towards the heavens, which proves that He
is seated on His throne above the heavens; otherwise if God were
not upon the throne, they would not raise their hands towards the
throne, and they do not lower them to the earth when they pray.^"^
This argument of al-Ash'arl is almost a repetition of ad-
- (4) - -
Darimi's ; reference has already been made to al-Maturidi•8
(5)
refutation and criticism of it; it has to be mentioned,
(1) Ibana, pp.33-35. Cf. Ibn-Hanbal op.cit.. p.323. Ad-
Darimi, Radd. pp.16-17.
(2) Ibana. pp.34-35. Al-Ghazall explained these Traditions in
a way which gives conclusions different from those of al-
Ash'ari, see Iqtisad. pp.24; 26-27.
(3) Ibana. p.34,1-4.
(4) Ad-Darimi, op.cit.. p.16.
(5) See Supra, p.168
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however, that al-Ash'arl's followers who abandoned the doctrine
of bi-la-kayf. demonstrated the weakness of this argument and
showed that it does not necessarily entail that God is on the
throne above the heavens.
It is noticeable that, in his section on God's locality,
al-Ash'arl quoted some Qur'anic verses and introduced arguments
from them which have nothing to do with the problem he is dealing
with and concluded, from these irrelevant quotations and
arguments, that they prove that God is not in His creation, and
His creation is not in Him, and that He is seated upon His
throne.^ ^
Al-Ash'ari attacked the Mu*tazilites, Jahmites and the
Haruriyya for attempting metaphorical interpretation of God's
enthronement (istiwa'). He also attacked these three groups for
denying that God was seated on His throne in the literal sense,
and for asserting the doctrine of His omnipresence (bikullimakan)..
The existence of the throne itself was not questioned since this
is referred to in the Qur'an. Al-Ash'arl rejected the metaphor¬
ical interpretation of istiwa' by saying that, if istiwa' means
God's power or His having mastery (isti<la''). then there would
be no difference between the throne and the earth, since God has
mastery and power over everything including these two. So if
God's sitting (istiwa') on His throne, means His having power
over it (isti*la') , then it would have to be said that He is
seated (mustawi) on all created things, including the throne,
(1) Ghazali, Iqtisad. pp.23-24; RazI, Asas at-Taqdis. pp.153-58.
(2) Ibana. p.36,1-13.
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such as gardens, wasteland and on each separate thing, since He
has mastery and power over them. But no Muslim holds such em
absurd belief, thus it follows that istiwa'. in relation to
the throne, does not mean Sod's having mastery or power over
it which is common to all things, but it must necessarily mean
an istiwa' that belongs particularly to the throne, euid not to
all things. We find similar arguments introduced by ad-
--(2) _ _ _ _
Darimi. Al-Baqillemi, who followed al-Ash'ari in refuting
the metaphorical interpretation of istiwa'. also argued in a
(3)
similar way. Later Ash'arites, however, seem to have disagreed
with al-Ash'ari's method of interpretation, and they adopted the
metaphorical interpretation of istiwa'. as propounded by the
Mu' tazilites.
Al-Ash'arl stressed God's otherness and separateness, as
did Ibn-Hanbal, and pointed out that the doctrine of God's
omnipresence leads eventually to pantheistic conceptions and
as a corollary to it, the propounders of this doctrine would
have to admit that God is in the womb of Mary, and present in
the gardens and in the wasteland and in all despicable places,
since they hold that He is in every place. But such views are
contrary to religion and have been refuted by many Qur'anic
verses which affirm that God is separate from His creatures,
and prove that He is not in His creation and His creation not in
(1) Ibana, p.34,5-15.
(2) Ad-DarimI, op.cit.. p.14.
(3) Tamhid. p.262.
(4) Juwayni, Irshad. p.24. Ghazali, Iatlsad. p.28.
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Him, that He is seated upon His tnrone.^ Al-Ash'arl argued
that if God were not seated on His throne and were omnipotent,
He would be under the earth over which the heaven is; and if He
were under the earth and the earth above Him and the heaven above
the earth, then it would have to be said that created things are
above God; and if this is true He must be under that above which
He is and also above that under which He is, and this is impossible
(2)
and self-contradictory.
In his Luma', al-Ash'ari made no reference to the doctrine
of God's sitting on His throne; but it does not seem likely from
this that he had views on this problem different from those
mentioned in the Ibana. It is most likely that in the Ibana,
which is of Hanbalite tendencies, al-Ash'ari placed great emphasis
on the points which occupied the Hanbalites, such as the problem
of God's locality and the creation of the Qur'an, and he adopted
almost the same Hanbalite views. While in the Luma'. which is
addressed mainly to the Mu'tazilites, al-Ash'ari paid more
attention to the major points upon which he disagrees with the
Mu'tazilites. Therefore he made no reference to such minor points
as God's locality.
(d) The Problem of God's Visibility
As in all theological problems, the differences between
various contending groups over the possibility of God's visibility
arose firstly from differing interpretations of Qur'anic texts.




Thus, al-Ash'ari used his already mentioned principles of
Qur'anic exegesis to assert that it was possible to see God,
and to refute the arguments and counter-arguments of his opponents.
However, unlike al-Maturidl, who confined himself to the textual
evidences, al-Ash'arl took his arguments further and introduced
rational arguments to demonstrate the possibility of God's vision.
Traditional Evidences
1. Al-Ash'arl found one of his proofs for the possibility of
God's vision in the verses, 75:22-23, "Paces that day are bright,
looking to their Lord", which has commonly been used as a proof
for tne possibility of God's vision. The Mu'tazilites, who
denied the possibility of His literal visibility (by the eyes),
interpreted these verses metaphorically and tried to explain away
their literal meanings by saying that, "Looking to (nazira ila)"
might possibly mean "considering" or "reflecting", or "expecting"
or "looking with sympathy" or that "it refers to the believers
waiting for the reward of their Lord", and the vision of the Lord
is not implied.Al-Ash'arl rejected all these alternatives
and, basing his argument on common sense and normal use of
language, he said that "looking to" in this verse cannot possibly
mean "considering" or "reflecting" since the hereafter is not a
place for reflection and consideration. It cannot also mean
"expecting" since expectation has a negative aspect which is
inconsistent with the bliss of paradise, it is also inappropriate
from the normal use of language because where faces are mentioned,
(1) Ibana. p.13; Luma*. p.34. cf. 'Abd-al-Jabbar, Usui. pp.242-48.
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as in this verse, the normal meaning is that they are looking
at something, and not that they are expecting something. If
nazira were used in the sense of "expectation", it would not be
linked with the article "to" (ila), as mentioned in the verses
36:49; 27:35, and in one of Imru* al-Qays1 poems, in all these
examples when "expectation" is meant, "ila" is not used. Nor
can "looking to" mean "looking with sympathy" since it is not
appropriate for man to feel sympathy for God. It cannot mean
"waiting the reward of their Lord" because the reward of God is
something other than Himself, and the verse clearly states that
they are"looking to their Lord" and not towards something else.
Al-Ash'arl pointed out that it is not for us to give metaphorical
interpretation of the literal meaning of the verse without a
proof, otherwise allowing for such an interpretation would lead
others to absurd conclusions not acceptable to the advocates of
such a method (i.e. the Mu'tazilites). According to al-Ash'arl
therefore, all interpretations of these verses are unjustified
and invalid except the one that "looking to" means "the seeing
of God by eyes in the hereafter".^^
2. The second proof is the utterance of Moses, "Oh my Lord,
(2)
show me, that I may behold Thee" which implies the possibility
of the vision of God; otherwise if it were impossible, Moses
would be proved ignorant in what he sought, which is unbelievable
(3)
in a prophet.




3. The third proof is the Qur'anic verse, 7:143, in which God
has connected the realization of His vision with something
possible, that is, the staying of the mountain: "Thou shalt
not see Me, but behold the mountain - if it stays fast in its
place, then thou shalt see Me". This proves the possibility of
God's vision, otherwise He would have connected it with something
impossible. Against the Mu'tazilites'objection to this conclusion
and their assertion that God might have possibly intended by
this verse to show the impossibility of His vision, al-Ash'arl
fell back on linguistic argument and quoted one of al-Khansa's
poems in which she connected her speech with something impossible,
when she intended to show that she could not be at peace with
one who was a foe to her brother. Al-Ash'arl said that a care¬
ful consideration of the use of language of the Qur'an is
essential for an understanding of that Book's meaning; and thus
since God connected His visibility with something within His
power and possibility, we know that the visibility of God is
also possible and not absurd.
4. The fourth proof is the verse, 10:26, "To the good-doers
the reward most fair and a surplus" where the surplus (ziyada)
(2)
has been interpreted as meaning the vision of God.
5. The fifth proof is the Tradition, "You shall see your Lord
as you see the moon on the night when it is full, and you shall
not suffer from His visibility", which has been widely transmitted




vision is mentioned here without qualifications and compared to
that of the eyes, its meaning can be none other than ocular
vision. Against the Mu'tazilites' criticism of this Tradition^ \
al-Ash'ari said that the numbers of its narrators exceed the
number of those who narrate the Tradition concerning ra.jm (stoning),
the prophet's saying "No testament for an heir"; the Tradition
concerning the wiping of the sandals; and the Tradition that,
"the woman shall not be married to the same man as her paternal
or maternal aunt". So if the Mu'tazilites had accepted these
Traditions as authentic, the Tradition concerning the vision of
God has a better claim to be authentic since it has been handed
(2)
down from generation to generation.
The Mu'tazilites based their argument that God cannot be
seen either in this world or the next, on the Tradition which
states that the prophet, when asked "Have you seen your Lord?"
replied "He is light how can I see Him?". In another version
which the Mu'tazilites preferred, the prophet is reported to have
asked a question expecting a negative answer: "Is He light? How
(3)
can I see Him?" Al-Ash'ari preferred the first version and
refuted the Mu'tazilite argument that the vision of God is im¬
possible with the assertion that the prophet was merely denying
the possibility of the vision of God in this world, for eyes in
the present world cannot see light from eternity, even less God
(1) 'Abd-al-Jabbar, Usui, pp.268-270, where the text and chains
of this Tradition were criticized.
(2) Ibana. p.16,14-23.
(3) 'Abd-al-Jabbar, Usui. pp.269-270.
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Himself. So though the possibility of God's visibility in the
present world is disputed, His visibility in the hereafter has
been strongly affirmed by i.jma'. ^ ^
As we have seen, al-Ash'ari based his proofs on the Trad¬
itional evidences, that is the Qur'an and the Traditions, nor
did he merely extract quotations from these sources, but he also
looked carefully at the use of language in them, upon which he
built rational arguments. Another definable type of argument
which al-Ash'ari used was the reasoned argument.
His Reasoned Arguments
To prove the possibility of God's visibility, al-Ash'ari
introduced the following rational arguments:
1. Prom the assumption that every thing existing can be seen,
al-Ash'ari reasoned that one of the things that proves the
visibility of God is the fact that nothing exists that God can¬
not show us, and it is only the non-existent that He cannot show
us, therefore since God certainly exists, it is not impossible
(2)
that He should show us Himself. Though this argument has been
accepted by many of the later theologians, it met with severe
criticism of its validity even from the followers of al-Ash'arl
himself.
2. The second rational argument of al-Ash'arl bears a resemb¬
lance to the above mentioned one, but it is less convincing.
(1) Ibana. pp.16,23-25; 17,1-9.
(2) Ibid.. p.17,13-15.
(3) See RazI, Arba'In. pp.191-98.
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According to al-Ash'ari, "One of the proofs for the possibility
of God's visibility is the fact that God sees things and so He
must see Himself, for he who does not see himself does not see
things, and if He sees Himself, He must be able to show us
Himself.^ It is evident that the premisses of this proposition
do not necessarily lead to al-Ash'ari's conclusion, and if the
proposition is stated in a syllogistic form it would certainly
give us a conclusion different from al-Ash'ari's.
3. The third rational argument is derived from the general
belief of the Muslims that the life of Paradise is perfect bliss
and perpetual delight, accordingly al-Ash'arl maintained that
since the greatest delight is the vision of God, He will not with-
(2)
hold it from His prophets, angels and the faithful believers.
4. The core of al-Ash'ari's fourth rational argument for the
vision of God has been briefly mentioned in the Ibana, where it
is said that the vision does not affect the object seen (mar'i).
but only the seeing subject (for the vision of the seeing remains
in him); since this is so and the vision does not affect the
object seen, it does not necessitate tashbih, or essential alter¬
ation in the mar'I. therefore, it is not impossible for God to
show Himself to His faithful servants.In his Luma'. al-
Ash'arl prefaced his section on the vision of God with an expanded
version of this argument and put it in the following logical
form: That which cannot be ascribed to God and cannot be true
(1) Ibana. p.17,18-20.
(2) Ibid. . p.18,6-13. cf. Watt, Formative Period, p.308.
(3) Ibana. p.18,13-16.
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of Him is that which if allowed would entail that He is temporal,
or that He has temporal qualities, or that He resembles His
creatures, or that He is classifiable with other creatures, or
that He is unjust and oppressive, or that He would become altered
by this ascription. But the affirmation of God's being seen
entails none of these factors, therefore God's visibility is not
impossible, and if it is not impossible, it is possible to
predicate it to God.^^
*Abd-al-Jabbar, the Mu'tazilite, who is said to have written
a refutation of al-Ash'ari's Luma' 1 Criticized this argument and
said that it originated from al-Jubba'i who used it in a context
completely different from that of al-Ash'arl. According to 'Abd-
al-Jabbar, al-Jubba'I said in his book, Man Yakfur Warnan La-
Yakfur. that the affirmation of God's vision, according to the
principles of those who assert it, does not amount to unbelief,
since its affirmation does not entail the origination of God, or
a generation of a quality in Him etc. Al-Ash'arl, however,
mistakenly used this proposition as an argument for the affirm¬
ation of God's vision.It is noticeable that though al-Ash'
arl prefaced his section on vision in the Luma' with this rational
argument, he made no reference to the other rational arguments
mentioned in the Ibana, this might be due to the brevity of the
Luma'. since al-Ash'ari also omitted all Traditional and the
Qur'anic proofs except one, or perhaps left them out because he
(1) Luma'. pp.32,3-16; 33,1-6.
(2) Ibn-al-Murtada, Tabaqat al-Mu'tazila. p.113,11.
• •
(3) 'Abd-al-Jabbar, Usui, pp.275-77.
- 267 -
realized their weaknesses.
The Mu'tazilites objected to the vision of God by quoting
the Qur'anic verse, 4:153, "The people of the book will ask
thee to bring down upon them a book from heaven, and they asked
Moses for greater than that, for they said, "show us God openly".
They said that in this verse God scorned those who requested His
vision and this indicates its impossibility. As a reply to this,
al-Ash'arl said that the people of the book were not scorned for
asking the prophet to bring down a book, nor were the Isra'ilites
scorned for asking for the vision of God, but they both were
reprimanded for making the granting of their requests the pre¬
condition for belief in their prophet, although in fact neither
the bringing down of a book nor the vision of God are impossible.^^
Another Mu'tazilite argument for the denial of God's
visibility was based on the Qur'anic verse, 6:103. They asserted
that tne meaning of the last part of the verse, "but He compre¬
hends the eyes", has a universal meaning, i.e., applied to this
world and the world to come; so the first part "the eyes compre¬
hend Him not" must also be universal, since the two parts are
connected together. And this implies the impossibility of God's
( 2)
vision in this world and in the hereafter.
Al-Ash'ari refuted the Mu'tazilite understanding of this
verse and argued that if the meaning of the verse is universal,
it would necessarily follow that God could neither be comprehended
by the sight of the eyes nor by the sight of the heart, since the
(1) Ibana, p.16,5-13.
(2) Ibid.. pp.18; 19,1-6.
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meaning of basar includes the two senses. The Mu'tazilites
could not accept this for their main article of doctrine was
that God was visible to the intellect or the heart (qalb). ^
Having successfully disposed of the universalist interpretation
for this verse, al-Ash'ari put forward his own more literal
explanation. He suggested that the line of the verse, "the eyes
do not comprehend Him", might possibly mean that eyes do not Bee
God in this world or that the eyes of the infidels do not see
Him. He quoted from other verses such as 75:22-23, which clearly
affirms God's visibility, and states that since the Qur'an does
not contradict itself, "the eyes do not comprehend Him" can only
(2)
be explained in the sense of the eyes of the infidels.
Finally he distinguished between comprehension (idrak) and vision
(ru*ya) and said that the denial of the former does not necess-
(3)
arily mean the latter also is denied. '
Less easily refutable arguments against the possibility of
the vision were mentioned in the Lurna'. The authors of these
arguments had attacked in rational form al-Ash'arl's basic assumption
that the possibility of the vision did not imply tashblh or the
origination of God. They said, if God can be seen even though
He is not visible like ordinary visible things, then He may be
touched, smelled and tasted without having the qualities of the
other things which are touched, smelled and tasted. Using the
definition of these processes as stated by his colleagues, al-
(1) Ibana. p.19,7-10.
(2) Ibid.. pp.15-16; Luma*. p.35.
(3) Ibana. p.19,19-25.
- 269 -
Ash'arl pointed out the differences between vision and these
other processes, and maintained that while the realization of
the visual process does not entail origination of qualities in
the object seen, the other processes do, because they imply a
sort of physical contact between them and the subjects performing
the actions sensed. Their assertion that God could be smelled,
tasted and touched would thus imply qualities and accidents in
His essence, while His visibility would not.^^
Objection was also raised against the vision of God on the
grounds that what is seen in the present world is either substance
or accident which is limited, or adhering to something limited,
so if God is to be seen, one of these attributes must be applied
to Him, and they applied analogous conditions to the unseen
world (gha'ib). According to al-Ash'ari, this objection is not
valid, because what is visible in the present world is not seen
as a result of the qualities of substance or accidents, existence
being the only condition necessary for an object to be seen,
(2)
nor should this judgement be applied to the unseen world.
3. The Essential and Active Attributes of God
Concerning this problem, al-Ash'arl seems to have dealt with
almost the same points as al-Maturidi. They both affirmed and
defended the reality of the attributes, discussed their relation
to God's essence as well as their eternity; but al-Ash'ari's




the emphasis given to particular points.
(a) The Reality of God's Attributes
In the course of his argument against the application of
the term "body" to God, which has already been mentioned, al-
Ash'ari clearly stated his method for applying names and attributes
to God. He said, "It is not for us to assign names to God, nor
is it for us to call Him by names which He has not applied to
Himself, nor is it for us to call Him by names which the prophet
has not applied to Him, nor is it for us to call Him by names
concerning which there is no consensus among the Muslims".
In his Risala II. he says that, "They (i.e. the ancestors) agreed
that He is eternally existent, living, powerful, knowing, willing,
speaking, hearing and seeing, on the basis of the fact that He
has described and called Himself by these attributes in His book,
or they were stated by His prophet, or they can be inferred from
(2)
His actions". In another statement, and after quoting
Qur'anic verses to demonstrate God's knowledge and His power,
al-Ash'ari said that, "the fact that these attributes are based
on the argument of reason, language and consensus, does not
(3)
entail their temporality". Prom these brief statements it
might be gathered that, according to al-Ash'ari, God's attributes
could be affirmed by revelation, or by the consensus of the








Al-Ash'arl's main interest, however, was not only to establish
these names and attributes of God, but also to affirm the
existence of substantive attributes. This is the central theme
in his Luma*. Risala II and the Ibana.
In his Luma*. al-Ash'ari begins the section on the problem
by introducing an argument to prove that God is knowing, powerful,
and that He hears and sees. His argument in this respect is
essentially based on the principle of the analogy of the present
and the absent. Thus from the proposition that the works of
widsom in the present world indicate that he who performs them
is knowing (a proposition deduced from the fact that it is not
expected that birds, for instance, might be able to weave, or
that an unskilled man might execute fine points of craftsmanship),
al-Ash'arl proceeds to the sphere of God's acts and points out
that the perfection and completeness in man's creation and the
systematic organization in the cosmos prove that their maker
could not have made them without knowing their mode and essence.
If such a work could be produced by one who is not knowing, it
might be assumed that all the perfect actions of the living beings
proceed from them while they are ignorant of them, which is
absurd.^^ By using the same principle of analogy, al-Ash'arl
argued that God has power that He is living, and that He hears
and sees. He said that a living being normally hears and sees
when he is free of defects, so God, who is without defects, must
(2)be hearing and seeing. (This method of analogy has been
(1) Luma*. p.10,10-19.
(2) Ibid.. pp.10,20-21; 11,1-6.
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generally accepted by the theologians with the exception of
'Abbad b. Sulayman, who is said to have rejected it, because it
admits the taking from this world and applying it to God).^^
Then al-Ash'ari proceeds to establish the eternity of these
descriptions of God, an aspect which will be taken up and dis¬
cussed later.
Following this, al-Ash'arl argues about the main problem
upon which he was in disagreement with the Mu*tazilites, that is,
whether God has substantive attributes such as knowledge, power,
etc., or not. The Mu'tazilites did not deny God the adjectival
descriptions such as knowing, powerful, which occur in the Qur'an,
but they did not accept the eternal existence of substantive
attributes, because they said the assertion of such attributes
would entail the existence of something eternal together with
God. Thus they tried to solve the problem by either denying
these attributes altogether or by making no distinction between
them and the essence of God and that by saying for example, that
(2)
God is knowing by Himself or by knowledge which is Himself.
Al-Ash'arl rejected the Mu'tazilite views and introduced
many arguments to demonstrate the reality of God's attributes.
His arguments in this respect are also mainly based on the
principle of the analogy of the absent with the present. He
said, "As the works of wisdom in the visible prove that their
producer is knowing, they also prove that he has knowledge; simi¬




has knowledge. Every knowing being knows through knowledge that
God is a knowing agent, therefore, he knows things through a
knowledge. ^ Al-Ash'arl pointed out that the meaning of knowing
is simply that one has knowledge, and it is inconceivable to
assume knowing without the possession of knowledge and vice
(2)
versa. This, however, does not mean that the act of knowing
per se is something distinct and separable from the knower. To
al-Ash'ari, this might be true in the case of the knower whose
knowledge is created and temporal, but for God, the Eternal, His
act of knowledge would be inseparable and eternal. Because
separation (mughayara) between two things means the possibility
of each of them being separated from the other, and in the case
of God this is inapplicable, since He and His attributes are
eternal and it is inconceivable that any one of them would be
(3)
separable from the other.
The Mu'tazilites argued that the works of wisdom prove the
knowledge of the knower, because the knower is liable to accidents
such as death and ignorance, since God is not subject to such
accidents His works of wisdom do not necessarily prove the
existence of a knowledge which is distinct from His essence. Al-
Ash'ari, in reply to the above assertion of the Mu'tazilites, says
that if such an argument is valid then it might be assumed that
the works of wisdom prove that the knowing knows because he is
liable to accidents, which is incorrect. To al-Ash'arl, these
(1) Luma', p.12,4-10.
(2) Ibid.. p.12,11-17.
(3) Ibid.. pp.12,18-21; 13,1-6.
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works of wisdom prove that the knower is knowing because he has
knowledge, and that he has knowledge because he knows, they do
not, however, prove that his knowledge is separate from the knower
nor that it is an accident, because ghayriyya and huduth have
nothing to do with the definition of knowledge and he who
0)knows.
After these rational arguments, al-Ash'ari proceeds to
substantiate his argument with citations from the Qur'an. He
quoted the Qur'anic verses 4:166 and 35:11 which refer to God's
(2)
knowledge, and the verse 41:15 which refers to His power, and
he implied that if the Mu'tazilites claimed to have depended on
the Qur'an for establishing that God is knowing and powerful, they
also had to admit that He has knowledge and power according to
these verses, otherwise it might be said that they in fact
intended to deny God's attributes and all His names.
At the end of his section on the attributes, al-Ash'arl
refuted the view that God is knowing by Himself (bi-nafsihl),
which is attributed to an-Nazzam who is believed to have denied
• •
God's knowledge, power, life, hearing, seeing and the other
essential attributes of God, while also asserting that He is
continuously knowing, living, powerful, hearing and eternal by
virtue of Himself (bi-nafsihl). but not by virtue of a knowledge,
power, life, hearing, seeing and eternity, and so is his view
(3)





refuted this view by saying that if God were knowing by Himself,
then He himself would be knowledge, but it is impossible for
a knowledge to be knower or a knower to be knowledge or for God
to be an attribute, so it must be said that God is knowing by a
knowledge which cannot possibly be Himself. Al-Ash'arl also
refuted the view that God is knowing neither by Himself, nor by
a quality (ma'na) which could not be part of His essence. He
said that if such a view were correct it might be assumed that
"knowing" is not pertaining to Himself nor to a quality (ma'na)
which is not part of His essence and in this case we would affirm
neither God's Himself nor a quality which is not part of His
(2)
essence, but this is absurd and so must be the above assertion.
In his Risala II. al-Ash'ari commenced the section on the
divine attributes with two lists of adjectival descriptions used
to qualify God: "He has always been One, knowing, powerful,
willing, speaking, hearing and seeing; the most beautiful names
(3)
and the most sublime attributes are for Him." The second list
differs only at the beginning from the first: "He has always
(4) .
been existing, living ..." Later on, al-Ash ari gave another
list of the substantive attributes corresponding to these descr-
ft
iptions; God has a life, a knowledge, a power, a word, a will, a
£5)
hearing and sight." In his extensive study of this problem,
(1) Luma*. p.14,7-12.
(2) Ibid.. p.14,13-17.




Allard points out the difference between the two first lists,
and remarked that the comparison of the last list with the two
preceding lists shows that it is different again since we do not
find in it the two substantive attributes corresponding to the
descriptions Existing" (mawjiid) and "unique" (wahid)« Thus Allard
concluded that, "Al-Ash'ari does not want to give exhaustive lists
but only to enumerate the general categories of the language which
are used to describe God."^^ Allard's conclusion is quite valid
as far as the first list is concerned since al-Ash'ari listed
some of God's qualifications at random as an introduction to his
section. In the paragraph immediately following, he dealt with
the question of God's uniqueness so he did not need to repeat it
again in the second list. The absence of the substantive corres¬
ponding to the participle "existing" (maw.jud) from the third list
(2)
can be explained as Prank said, from the fact that God's
existence for al-Ash'ari is not grounded in an act of existence
that is distinct from His essence. So al-Ash'arl needs not to
mention existence as a substantive attribute.
As we can see from the third list mentioned above, al-
Ash'arl was much concerned to establish that God really has
substantive attributes corresponding to these adjectival des¬
criptions. The full text of this reads as follows: "The
ancients agreed in the assertion that God has a life by which He
is eternally living, a knowledge by which He is eternally knowing,
(1) Allard, Le Probleme des attributs divins. p.192.
(2) Prank, "The Kalam, an art of Contradiction-making or
Theological Science?" p.301.
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a power by which He is eternally powerful, word by which He is
eternally speaking, a will by which He is eternally willing,
hearing and sight by which He is eternally hearing and seeing.
They argued that if God did not have these substantive attributes,
then He could not be described by the appropriate participles
(i.e. if He has no knowledge he would not be called knowing). To
illustrate this point, al-Ash'arl said, "for he who has no action
would not be doer in reality, and he who bestows no benevolence
would not be benevolent, and he who has no speech would not be
speaking in reality, and he who has no will would not be in
reality willing." So if one is called by one of these descrip¬
tions without really having the attributes which entail them,
then he would not have these descriptions in reality and he would
be described with them in a figurative way or in a false way
(majaz aw kadhib). This is why the will to collapse when ascribed
to the wall was explained away figuratively because the wall has
no real will. He justified his argument on the grounds that
"these descriptions are derived from the most distinctive names
of these attributes, and they indicate the meaning of these
attributes (awsaf mushtaqoa min akhass aema' hadhihi s-sifat
• • • • •
wa-dalla 'alayha). If these substantive attributes were not
realized in that one who has been depicted by these descriptions,
then his depiction by them would be nicknaming or the application
of false names. Since God, however, is qualified by these
descriptions in reality, then those substantive attributes corr¬
esponding to them must be affirmed to Him, otherwise His description
(1) Risala II. p.94,10-12.
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by them would be in a figurative way as in the case of will
ascribed to the wall.^^
It is clear from these arguments that al-Ash'arl used the
principle of the analogy between God and the world in order to
establish the reality of God's attributes. Thus to him the words
of the human language retain their significance when they are
used to speak of God because of this analogy between God and
the world. These words, however, can be used in a figurative
way for man and things, but God's names and His attributes must
be taken in their proper meanings. In emphasizing this point,
al-Ash'ari said, "The descriptions of man as being willing,
dishonest, and unjust are derived from the substantive attributes
of will, theft and unjustice respectively, similarly a man's
description as being black is derived from blackness. If a
person does not have the meaning of these appellations in reality,
yet he has been depicted by them, such descriptions would be
mere nicknames; and in this case tney would convey no real
meanings; this is why the Arabs used to call their children by
such nicknames without intending to insult them. In the case of
God, however, the matter is rather different, for His names and
attributes convey real meaning, thus if His descriptions as being
living, powerful, knowing, speaking, willing, hearing and seeing
are real and are neither figurative nor nicknames, then we must
affirm to Him the substantive attributes from whose distinctive
(2)
names these descriptions were derived.
(1) Risala II. pp.94,18-19; 95,1-9.
(2) Ibid.. p.95,9-16.
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After these rational and linguistic arguments for the
establishment of the reality of God's attributes, al-Ash'ari
quoted those Qur'anic verses 4:166 and 2:255, which mention God's
knowledge, and 51:58 which mentions His power,to substantiate
his arguments.
The section of the Ibana devoted to the problem of the
attributes is mainly intended to refute those who denied the
attributes of God, therefore the main problem dealt with is the
problem of the affirmation of the reality of them. Unlike the
Luma' and the Risala II. the section of the Ibana begins by a
number of quotations from the Qur'an which prove that God has
(2)
a power and a knowledge. However, in spite of all these
quotations which are in line with the generally traditional
approach of the Ibana. al-Ash'ari used rational arguments here
against the Mu'tazilites and other groups who denied God's
attributes. His arguments in this respect are almost a repetition
in a briefer and sometimes considerably more lucid form of the
above mentioned arguments of the Luma' and the Risala II.
Al-Ash'ari attacked a group he called Jahmites (probably
means the Ku'tazilites) for their view that God has no substantive
attributes such as power, knowledge, life, etc., and said that
their ultimate aim was to deny that God is knower, powerful, etc.,
but they were restrained by fear of declaring it openly. He also
criticized the Mu'tazilites for holding a similar view and saying
that God is spoken of as knowing, powerful, seeing and hearing,
(1) Risala II. p.95,16-18.
(2) Ibana. p.41,19-23.
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without it being asserted that He has real knowledge, power,
hearing and sight. He levelled the same accusations at the
Mu'tazilites in the Maqalat with the only difference that in the
Ibana he attributed their views to the Zanadiqa, while in
- - (2)
Maqalat. he traced their views back to the philosophers. ' He
also rejected the views attributed to Abu-l-Hudhayl, the
(3) - -Mu'tazilite, that God's knowledge is God. In his Maqalat.
al-Ash'ari recorded those views in detail and accused Abu-1-
Hudhayl of borrowing them from Aristotle and of distorting their
(4)
meaning. He pointed out that such a view would lead eventually
to the negation of all the substantive attributes of God, because
Abu-l-Hudhayl affirms their existence in God, only to add that
they designate God Himself. According to al-Ash'arl, Abu-l-
Hudhayl denied the existence of the divine knowledge though he
thought he was affirming it, and this because he only affirmed
(5) —
the Creator's existence. So it seems that al-Ash'ari saw no
difference between saying that God is knowing by Himself or that
He is knowing by a knowledge which is Himself, for both views
imply the denial of the essential attributes of God. By holding
such a view, al-Ash'arl considered that Abu-l-Hudhayl, in fact, is
making God into a knowledge but when he was asked to say, 0
knowledge of God forgive me and have mercy on me (on the assumption






that knowledge is God and God is knowledge), he refused to say
this and thus he fell into contradiction. To al-Ash'arl, however
affirming a "knower" without "knowledge" or "knowledge" without
a "knower" is contradicting himself. Here, al-Ash'arl is
repeating those views which he had already expressed concerning
the strong relation between the description and the attribute
representing it.
Then he argued from the principle of ijma' to establish the
reality of the attributes; he said that he who supposes that God
is one who discourses and speaks without the medium of word,
eternal without the quality of eternity, and who commands and
prohibits without the quality of commandment and prohibition is
contradicting himself, and an apostate from the Muslim Community.
He argued against the Mu'tazilites by pointing out that they
cannot deny that God is willing by a will, for a wilier cannot
be willing except by a will, therefore the Mu'tazilites had no
justification for denying that the knower knows only by a know-
(3)
ledge, and that God has a knowledge just as He has a will.
The Mu'tazilites differentiated between God's speech and
His knowledge on the grounds that the first is particular and the
second is universal and they therefore affirmed the first and
denied the second, and they concluded that God has speech but
not knowledge. To al-Ash'arl, if such a distinction were valid





universal comparable to His being a speaker according to their
own criteria.
Then al-Ash'arl questioned the basis upon which the
Mu'tazilites attributed descriptions such as "knowing" to God,
and argued that if this basis is the Revelation, we find that
the Qur'an ascribed to God the attributes of knowledge and
power so they would have to admit these substantive attributes
of His, if the basis, however, were the signs of wisdom in the
creation of the world, the same signs prove that God has attri¬
butes, because such works come into being only by the influence
of the possessor of knowledge, just as they appear only by the
influence of a knower, likewise they come into being by the
influence of the possessor of power, just as they appear only by
(2)
the influence of a wielder of power.
Al-Ash'ari uses these two proofs (i.e. the Qur'an and the
signs in the creation of the world) to establish the reality
of God's attributes. Reference has already been made to his
numerous quotations from the Qur'an in support of his views.
He also argued that the denial of God's knowledge amounts to the
discredit of the Qur'an, because the Qur'an clearly states the
reality of His attributes. Moreover, if the verse, 6:59, "He
knows everything and not a leaf falls but He knows it" made it
true that He is "knowing" and that He knows all about all
created things, there is no reason for denying that the above
mentioned verses make it also necessarily true that God has
(1) Ibana. pp.42,23-26; 43,1-7.
(2) Ibid.. p.43,14-21.
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knowledge of created things.
As for the second proof, al-Ash'ari repeated almost the
same argument mentioned in the Luma'. he said that as acts of
wisdom are possible only on the part of a powerful knower who
is living, likewise the same acts are possible only on the part
of a possessor of knowledge, power and life; and so if their
appearance apart from a possessor of knowledge is possible, then
it would also be possible for them to come from one who is
(2)
neither knowing nor powerful nor living, which is absurd. The
basic principle underlying this argument is the analogy between
God and man.
Al-Ash'ari also confirmed the point which he had discussed
at length in his Risala II. that the language used to describe
God is non-metaphorical (haqiqa) and contains the full meaning
understood from its normal usage. He stated that, "We find that
the terminations "knower" is derived from knowledge, "powerful"
is from power, "living one" is from life, "hearing one" and
"seeing one" are from hearing and sight respectively. As for
God's names, they would either simply be derived from such pre¬
dicates, or they would be used to indicate His true nature or
they would be as nicknames, this last alternative is inappropriate
to God since He cannot be given a name which does not indicate
His nature and is not derived from a predicate describing Him.
For instance, His names knower and powerful are not proper names




predicates "knowledge" and "power" and in this case we have to
affirm these of His attributes, or they are used to indicate
His nature and in this case their meanings would not be different
from the meaning understood from the normal usage of the language.
Since the meaning of "knower" is he who has knowledge, then
every knower (including God) must be a possessor of knowledge;
or as the term "existent" means the assertion of an existence,
an existence must also be affirmed to God since He is existent.
Apart from these arguments which are to be found in al-
Ash'ari's other works, he introduced new arguments in his Ibana,
which tend to be essentially polemic. He said that God's
knowledge is mentioned in the Qur'an, so to deny it implies the
_ (2)
denial of all God's names that are mentioned in the Qur'an.
Another argument of the same kind is that God taught His prophet
all matters related to Shari'a, but God could not have taught
the prophet that of which God does not possess knowledge, there¬
fore God knows everything connected with the Shari'a. Al-Ash'arl
continued: since God's cursing of the infidels has special
significance different from that of the prophet's curse against
them, then there should be no justification for denying that in
the example of knowledge, God has knowledge different from that
of the prophet. Moreover, when we assert that He is wrathful
towards the infidels, the existence of wrath is undoubtedly
asserted; and likewise since we assert that He is pleased with




likewise, since we assert that He is living, hearing, seeing
the existence of life, hearing and sight is undoubtedly estab¬
lished.^
The theme underlying all these arguments is the principle
of the analogy between God and man, so as the prophet has know¬
ledge God also has knowledge. The principle of analogy is more
evident in those arguments of al-Ash'ari which emphasize God's
transcendence. Al-Ash'ari argued that God has knowledge of the
distinction between His friends and His enemies, otherwise He
would be less in rank than His creatures who know such a
distinction and who would then be above Him, which is impossible.
Moreover, since the creature who has knowledge is more worthy of
exalted dignity than he who does not have knowledge, so to deny
God knowledge is in fact an admittance that the creatures are
(3)
higher in rank than their creator, which is also impossible.
Furthermore, lack of knowledge implies ignorance and defects in
the present world, but God is free from all defects, so knowledge
(4)
must be attributed to Him.
As for the point as to whether these attributes are
identical with or separate from God's essence, al-Ash'arl seems
to have adopted the same type of solution as that introduced by
men like Ibn-Kullab^^ and Hisham b.al-Hakam^^ , and which was
(1) Ibana. pp.43,25-26; 44,1-7.




(6) Ibid.. pp.37-38; 494.
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also adopted by al-Maturidl. In his Luma*. he refuted the
suggestion that God's attributes are identical with His essence
as well as the suggestion that His essence is separate from His
attributes. In his Risala II. he openly advocated these views
and stated that God's attributes are neither separate from His
essence nor identical with it. They are inseparable from Him
because the mugha.yara between two things means the possibility
of each of them being separated from the other in one aspect or
another; but God's attributes cannot possibly be separated from
Him, for such separation leads eventually to His being temporal
and finally to the denial of His divinity. He would be like body,
accident and substance and these are susceptible to change.
However, the supposition that these attributes are inseparable
from God's essence does not mean that they are identical with
Himself (nafsihi) , because it is impossible for Him to be a life,
knowledge or power, otherwise He could not possibly produce
actions, because actions proceed from one who is living, powerful,
knowing and not from life, knowledge and power.
(b) The Attributes and Transcendence
From what has been said above, it becomes clear that al-
Ash'ari affirmed and defended the reality of God's attributes in
all his works. His arguments in this respect are mainly based on
the principle of the analogy between man and God. Speaking about
God in such terms might possibly lead to the suggestion of
similarity between God and man. Al-Ash'ari shows no concern for
(1) Risala II. pp.95-96.
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such a problem neither in his Luma* nor in his Ibana: it is true
that in a passage in the Luma*. al-Ash'arl affirmed the trans¬
cendence of God and refuted any suggestion of similarities
between Him and His creation, but his discussion of the point
here is not directly connected with the affirmation of names and
attributes to God.^1^ However, al-Ash'arl shows an awareness of
the problem and discussed it fully in the Risala II. where he
stated that the qualification of God by such and such attributes
and names, which are common to Him and to man, does not imply
any similarity between them. The absence of discussions of the
question of similarity from the Ibana and the Luma* and its
occurrence in the Risala II could possibly be explained from the
fact that the first two works were mainly addressed to the
Mu'tazilites among whom the question did not arise, so al-Ash'arl
finds no need to deal with it, while the Risala II is meant to
meet not only the Mu'tazilite challenge, but also that of other
groups such as the Jahmites and the Batinites for instance, to
whom the question of similarity was of great importance.
In his Risala II. al-Ash'arl clearly stated that "The early
Muslims agreed to assert that God does not look like anything in
(2)
this world." To demonstrate this commonly accepted view, al-
Ash'ari used the following argument: If we suppose that the
proposition "God is like the world" is true then we have to choose
between two propositions which are both inconceivable: either
God is like the world and therefore a created being, or the
(1) Luma*. p.7. Supra, p.254.
(2) Risala II. p.93,16.
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world is like God and therefore eternal like Him.^^ Thus, to
al-Ash'arl, the non-similarity between God and the world is
firmly established and would not be impaired by the affirmation
of names and attributes commonly used for human beings. To
demonstrate the validity of this statement, al-Ash'arl used two
stages: (i) He starts by demonstrating that the affirmation of
these names and attributes to God does not lead to the affirm¬
ation of similarity between Him and His creatures. (ii) Then
he establishes that the divine attributes are not like human
attributes.
To prove the first stage of his demonstration, al-Ash'arl
gave a brief statement to the effect that if two things are said
to be similar then their similarity cannot be asserted on the
basis of something which is not a part of either, nor on the
basis of the coincidence of names, but it must be asserted on the
(2)
basis of something belonging to their essence or nature (anfus).
So al-Ash'arl is making a distinction between essence or nature
of entities and the names and attributes with which we designate
them, and if beings or entities are different in essence, the
ascription to them of similar names and attributes does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that they are similar. Since
God and the world are different in their essences or their souls,
we can attribute similar qualities to them without being accused
(3)of tashbih. To clarify this point further, al-Ash'ari pointed
(1) Risala II. p.93,18-20.
(2) Ibid.. pp.93,23; 94,1.
(3) Ibid.. p.94,1-4.
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to the fact that both God and man have been described as existing,
such a description does not, however, entail resemblance between
them though they both share the reality of existence. If such
an agreement necessitates similarity, then blackness and white¬
ness would be similar for they are both existing, but since this
is false, it is established that ascription of similar names
such as living, knowing and powerful to man and God does not
entail similarity between them, though they both possess the
reality of these descriptions.^^
To prove the second point, al-Ash'arl pointed to the major
difference between God's attributes and those of man: that
God's attributes are eternal while man's are temporal. God
possesses these attributes from eternity while man possesses them
when God creates him along with these attributes. Al-Ash'arl
argued that if God's attributes were originated, then God would
be qualified by their opposites (did) before their coming into
• •
being, and would be no longer a Divine being, but would be like
temporal things liable to defects and praiseworthy and blame¬
worthy attributes, which is impossible for God who must be eter¬
nally qualified by the attributes of perfection.
(c) The Eternity of God's Attributes
Like al-Maturldi, al-Ash'ari accepted the Mu'tazilites'
distinction between the essential and the active attributes of
God. Following the Mu'tazilites also, he affirmed the eternity




of the essential attributes and considered the active ones to
be temporal. Yet he disagreed with them on the classification
of God's will and speech, and whether they are eternal or temporal.
To establish a proof for the eternity of God's names and
His attributes, al-Ash'arl used the principle of the negation of
the contradiction: God's attributes of essence, such as knowledge,
power, have contradictory attributes such as ignorance and impot¬
ence correlated to them, and the negation of one of them necessa¬
rily entails the affirmation of its opposite. The negation of
knowledge, for instance, entails the affirmation of its opposite
such as ignorance or doubt, so if God were not eternally knowing,
He would be eternally qualified by one of these opposites, and
in this case He would never be knowing (for what is eternal is
unchangeable), but if He were eternally ignorant He would not
have been able to produce works of wisdom.^^ The same method
can be used to prove the eternity of the other divine attributes
(2)
such as God's power and His ability to hear and to see. '
The Mu'tazilites hold that God's will and His speech are
temporal, and are closely linked with His actions, "Most of the
Mu'tazilites asserted that God's speech is His action, God has
speech that He done it (fa'al) and it is impossible for God to
(3)
have not ceased to be speaking." All the Mu'tazilites affirm
that the description of God as "willing" belongs to the class
(4)
of the attributes of acts.
(1) Luma'. p.11,8-17.




In his Luma'. al-Ash'arl devoted a special section to the
treatment of these two attributes. According to Allard, al-
Ash'ari was prompted to juxtapose these two questions by the
Qur'anic text 16:40, which he quoted at the beginning of the
section, and which refers to the two divine attributes of "will"
and "speech". ^ ^ But, Prank's explanation of al-Ash'ari's
underlying intention seems to be more detailed. "Al-Ash'arl"
Prank says, "has chosen this particular text because it conjoins
the two attributes of God's word and will in such a way as to
imply a number of notions upon which he would insist, viz., that
God's will and His word are the determinant source of the being of
all creatures; that He creates by His word what He wills, that
His word is the articulate creative ground through which God orders
(2)
and causes the being of all beings." Thus it seems that al-
Ash'ari devoted this special section of his Luma* to the discussion
of the divine attributes of will and speech in order better to
refute the Mu'tazilite views concerning them, and because of their
importance in his doctrine of creation.
In this section, al-Ash'arl, in countering the Mu'tazilite
ideas, introduced arguments based on revelation and reason to
establish the eternity of God's will and His speech, and to refute
the idea that they could be related to His actions. He quoted
the Qur'anic verse: "The only words We say to a thing, when We
will it, is that We say to it "Be" and "it is", and argued
(1) Allard, Le probleme des attribute divins. p.234.




that if God's word or the Qur'an were created, His utterance "Be"
would also be created, and it would require another creative
utterance. However, this could not go on ad infinitum, so God's
word "Be" must be eternal and uncreated, and the same thing must
apply to His will.^^ Thus, for al-Ash'arl, God's will and His
creative word which carries the will into effect cannot be
temporal.
The Mu'tazilites tried to explain God's utterance "Be" and
the concept of His will as meaning only His actual creation of
things. They hold that the phrase "We say to it "Be" and it is",
means that "We create it and it is" without God giving utterance
to anything; again, to say that God willed a thing simply means
that "He has done it". They explained the Qur'anic verse, 18:77,
which ascribes "will to collapse" to a wall in a metaphorical
sense meaning "it is about to collapse" without actually having
will. They explained the verse 16:40, which ascribes will to
God in the same way and concluded that to say that God wills a
(2)
thing means that "He does it" and nothing else.
Al-Ash'arl refuted this Mu'tazilite view by pointing out that
such a method of explanation of God's will and His utterance "Be"
would eventually lead to the denial not only of these two essential
(3)
qualities of God but also to the denial of His knowledge. To
al-Ash'ari, the Mu'tazilites' correlation of the verses 16:40 and
18:77 was wrong, because the second verse refers to an inert
(1) Luma*. p.15,3-11.
(2) Ibid.. pp.15,12-19; 16,1-9.
(3) Luma'. p.15,14-17.
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thing (wall) which truly cannot will as long as it retains its
inertness, whereas the first verse refers to God for whom it is
not impossible to will something or to speak. Moreover, if
God's willing of a thing means only that "He does it", and that
His willing the movement of a thing means that He moves it, then
it might be assumed that an inert object wills its movement in
the sense that it is moving; and in this case God would be equal
to inert things and would have no merit over that person or
(2)
object whose act takes place without him willing it.
Al-Ash'ari then introduced two rational arguments to demon¬
strate the eternity of God's speech and His will. The first
argument is based on the principle of the negation of contradictions:
speech as an essential attribute has an opposite that is silence
or various infirmities of speech (i.e. defects) and its negation
necessarily entails the affirmation of its opposite; so "had God
ever been not speaking, He would eternally be characterized by
one of the opposites of speech such as silence or some ailments;
and if the opposite of the speech is eternal, it would have been
impossible for it to cease to exist, and for the creator to speak,
and in this case the creator would have had to be not-speaking,
not-commanding and prohibiting in no way whatsoever, which is
(3)
impossible for God. To prove the proposition that one who is
not-speaking would be characterized by the contrary of speech,
al-Ash'arl made use of the principle of the analogy between the
(1) Luma*. p.16,9-16.
(2) Ibid. . pp.16,17-18; 17,1-3.
(3) Ibid. . p.17,6-13.
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absent and the present worlds, and he said, "Among us one who
is living is always such either speaking or non-speaking, and
there is sound proof that the concealed world contains any one
who is living and at the same time devoid both of speech and
of its contraries, just as there is no sound proof that any one
lives who is devoid both of knowledge and of its contraries such
as that he could be described as neither knowing nor unknowing. ^
The same method of argument is used to establish the eternity of
God's will.
The Mu'tazilites objected to al-Ash'ari's proposition that
the negation of speech and will entails the affirmation of their
opposites; they argued that if the negation of the eternity of
God's speech and His will entails the ascribing to Him of their
contraries, then it must be admitted that if He is eternally non-
acting He must be characterized by the contrary of acting, and
(2)
then he must be eternally non-acting or omitting to act (tarik).
(according to this argument al-Ash'ari must admit that God is
eternally acting otherwise He would be qualified by the contrary
of acting.)
Al-Ash'ari replied to these assertions by distinguishing
between the essential attributes such as power and speech and the
active attributes such as creating, acting etc. The former have
contrary attributes correlated to them and if God is not described
by them He would be described by their opposites; the latter,
however, have no contraries, and if they were not ascribed to God
(1) Luma'. p.17,14-19.
(2) Ibid. . p.19,1-4.
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it does not mean that He is described by their contraries. So
if God is not eternally acting it does not mean that He is
powerless because 'a.jz is not the contrary of acting but of
power. God's speech and His will are not active attributes as the
Mu'tazilites assumed but essential attributes, so the negation
of them necessitates the affirmation of their contradictories.^^
To support this argument al-Ash'ari made use of the principle
of the analogy between the concealed and the visible; he said
that "If one who is living be not-speaking and not-willing, he
must be qualified by some contrary of willing and speech; but if
he be not-acting, it is not necessary to affirm a contrary
quality which is powerless or neglecting to act, since the man's
powerlessness is not the contrary of his acting. So the denial
that God has been ever-acting does not necessitate the affirmation
of a quality of neglecting to act or a quality of powerlessness,
in the same way that the denial of His having been ever speaking
(2)
and willing necessitates the affirmation of their contraries.
On the basis of the distinction between the essential and
active attributes, al-Ash'ari refuted the Mu'tazilites* assertion
that the denial of acts such as movement, generosity and justice
necessitates the affirmation of their contradictories, such as
rest, miserliness and injustice respectively. He pointed out
that the notions of movement and rest are inappropriate to God
(3)





opposite of generosity, because generosity means something which
the generous are free to exercise or not, while miserliness is a
refutation of a claim which ought to be acknowledged, so they
are not opposites.^^^ The denial of eternal justice does not
necessitate the affirmation of powerlessness which is not opposite
of justice, nor does it necessitate the affirmation of injustice
(jawr). because injustice is not the opposite of justice. To
demonstrate this proposition, al-Ash'ari indirectly made use of
al-Jubba'i's principle of double negation concerning the point
whether it should be said that God is eternally just; al-Jubba'I
said that, "God is eternally not-just at the same time He is not
unjust (ghayr 'adil wa-la-.1a'ir)In accordance with such a
concept, al-Ash'ari held that the denial of justice does not
necessitate the affirmation of injustice, because a man may be
not-just, when no justice proceeds from him, and yet not be unjust.
So the denial of justice does not necessitate a contrary which
is injustice with the same necessity that is present in the case
of speech and will. The opposites, justice and injustice, are of
the same class and the relation between them is that of contraries
and not of contradictories. So we may deny the existence of both
terms, or we may deny one of them but we do not thereby necessarily
affirm the other one.^"^
The Mu'tazilites did not agree with al-Ash'arl's definition
(1) Luma'. p.20,13-15.
(2) Maaalat. pp.179, 187. cf. Allard, Le probleme des attribute
divins. pp.237-8.
(3) Luma'. pp.20,16-20; 21,1-8. cf. Allard, op.cit.. p.238.
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of the contradictories: that the negation of one of them necessi¬
tated the affirmation of the other. They said that this definition
is inapplicable in the case of speech where it is found that one
who has the power to speak may be devoid both of speech and its
contraries while he has the power to speak.
Al-Ash'ari did not accept such a view and responded by saying
that "One who has the power to speak, at the very moment he has
(2)
this power is speaking (mutakallim) without doubt." ' As Allard
noticed,al-Ash*ari's answer to this objection is very interesting,
since it laid the foundations of the later doctrine of the kalam an-
nafsi.. According to Allard, the active participle mutakallim
is thus taken here in a more extensive sense than its usual meaning,
it designates not a passing action, but a permanent ability.
Allard went on to say that by using the Aristotelian distinction
between act and power, we could say that, for al-Ash'arl, God is
mutakallim not only when He is really speaking, but also when His
(3)
word is potential as well. Though al-Ash'ari might have thought
on lines similar to these lines suggested by Allard, this parti¬
cular opinion concerning the kalam an-nafsi. which al-Ash'ari's
(4)
later followers attributed to him, does not seem to be his.
Al-Ash'ari's second rational argument for the eternity of
God's speech and His will is based on the principle of the
reduction to the absurd which proceeds from a demonstration of the
(1) Luma*. p.21,19-20.
(2) Ibid.. p.21,20-21.
(3) Allard, op.cit. , p.239.
(4) See for instance Iqdam. p.320.
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falsity of all the alternatives which suggest the temporality
of God's speech thus proving its eternity. According to al-Ash'arl,
God's speech must either be eternal or temporal, the second
alternative allows for three suggestions: (i) that God produces
it in Himself, (ii) or it is self-subsistent, (iii) or He produces
it in another substrate. All these three alternatives are
impossible: God cannot produce it (i.e. speech) in Himself,
because He is not a substrate or a recipient of temporal things
or accidents (this is contrary to the Karramites view which allows
God to be a substrate of temporal things). Al-Ash'ari refuted
this view because, to him, the proof of the origination of
substance and body is that they take on temporal accidents, so
if God were to be a substrate of originated things, He would
Himself be originated which is inadmissible; also He cannot pro¬
duce self-subsistent speech because speech is an attribute, and
an attribute cannot subsist in itself. As for the third assertion
held by the Mu'tazilites, that God produces His speech in another
object, al-Ash'arl introduced the following rational arguments:
If He (God) were to produce it (speech) in another body, the body
in which the speech subsisted would necessarily acquire some of
the most distinctive qualities of the speech, a name for itself
and a name for the whole to which the substrate of the speech
belongs. So if the most distinctive quality of the speech were
its being "speech" that body would have to be speaking (mutakallim):
and if its most distinctive quality were its being "command",
that body would have to be "commanding" ... so since another
cannot speak by God's speech ..., God cannot produce speech in
another in such a way that He himself would be speaking thereby.
(1) Luma*. p.22,5-17.
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In spite of the difficulty of al-Ash'ari's argument it
seems that he is trying on the one hand to emphasize the close
connection between the speaker (mutakallim), and the speech
(kalam); to him it is only he from whom speech proceeds who can
be called speaker. And on the other hand he pointed out that the
description mutakallim is derived from the substantive attribute
kalam.^ ^
The Mu'tazilites objected to al-Ash'ari's view that if God
created speech in another body this body could be characterized
as speaking God's speech rather than that it was purely the
channel for the speech of God. They argued that when God produces
an act in another subject such as sending down a favour, a bounty,
a benefit or "daily bread", the other subject would not be called
mun'im or mutafaddil. but God alone would be the doer, generous,
• •
bountiful and sustaining. Similarly in the case of God's speech,
He would be speaking by the speech which He creates in another
subject.
Al-Ash'ari replied by pointing out the fault in the Mu'tazilites'
comparison of God's speech to those of His actions, since God's
speech is one of His essential attributes such as His knowledge
and His power, and the Mu'tazilites would certainly not ever
suggest that God's power and knowledge could ever be created in
(3) -
another subject. Moreover, al-Ash'ari asserted that when God
sends down His favour to another body, the body would be character-
(1) Allard, op.cit. . pp.240-42.
(2) Luma'. pp.22,18-19; 23,1.
(3) Ibid.. 1-3,8-18.
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ized with the most distinctive qualities of these actions, and if
these qualities could be essential qualities, i.e., power and
knowledge, the other subject would be "knowing" and "powerful".
Similarly, when God creates speech in another subject, that other
subject would be qualified by the most distinctive qualities of
the speech that is "speaking".^
In his Ibana. al-Ash'arl devoted a special section to affirm
the uncreatedne8s of the Qur'an. In his extensive study of this
section, W.M. Watt discussed the closeness of al-Ash'ari's thought
(2)
to that of the Hanbalites and the Traditionalists. ' Al-Ash'ari's
main interest was to establish the eternity of the Qur'an and to
disprove the view that it is created. To demonstrate this, he
made use of both traditional and rational arguments. As we will
see later his arguments, on the whole, are partly a repetition,
yet in a refined form of some of the Hanbalites* and Tradition-
alists* arguments, and partly a brief version of some of the
arguments he used in his Luma' and Rlsala II.
As for the traditionalists arguments which he used, al-
- (3)Ash'ari following Ibn-Hanbal, emphasized the distinction
between God's creation and His command referred to in the Qur'an,
7:54; and in accordance with this verse he identified God's
command with His word (speech), and he argued that according to
the clear meaning of the verse, God's command is distinct from
the general creation which implies its uncreatedness. His
(1) Luma' p.23,3-8.
(2) Watt, "Early Discussions about the Qur'an" M.W. vol.40 (1950)
pp.99ff.
(3) Ibn-Hanbal, Radd, p.317.
• '
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opponents maintained that the distinction in thi6 verse did not
imply the exclusion of the command from the general creation.
They quoted the Qur'anic verse, 2:98, which referred to the
angels in general and mentioned at the same time Gabriel and
Michael in particular, and no-one is led to understand that these
two are therefore different from the rest of the angels; so if
this verse and the verse dealing with God's command are essentially
the same, then the command would be a part of the creation, just
as Michael and Gabriel are angels. Al-Ash'ari replied to the
Mu'tazilite objection by saying that, "Ae give particular meaning
to the Qur'an by reason of i jma' and proof. In explanation of
this point, he emphasized that the nature of the two verses are
different, but he did not make that difference quite clear as
Ibn-Hanbal did. Also following Ibn-Hanbal, al-Ash'arl explained
• •
the Qur'anic verse, "The command is God's first and last" as
(21
meaning that His command is eternal and everlasting. This
argument of al-Ash'ari is absent from the Luma'. but there is a
reference to it in Risala II. and this indicates the polemic
nature of these two works compared to the Luma'.
Another proof of al-Ash'ari for the uncreatedness of the
Qur'an is the Qur'anic verse 16:40, which describes God as creating
(3)
something by saying to it "Be" and it is. ' Reference has
. (4)
already been made to this argument in the Luma ; the lbana
(1) Ibana. pp.20-21.
(2) Ibid. . p.21. Ibn-Hanbal, Radd.p.317.
• "
(3) Ibana. p.21.
(4) See Supra, pp. 291-93.
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repeats the main points almost exactly. The origin of the
argument, however, is essentially Hanbalite, and already Yusuf
b.Yahya al-Buwaitl (d.232) used it in his disputation before the
• •
court of the mihna.^^
Al-Ash'ari also introduced another argument which had pre¬
viously been used by the traditionalist ad-Darimi (d.282). This
argument is based on the Qur'anic verse 18:109, which states that
God's word never ceases. Al-Ash'ari argued that he whose speech
(2)
ceases becomes silent, which is impossible for God.
Besides these arguments based on Qur'anic verses, al-Ash'arl
quoted several traditions which assert the uncreatedness of the
Our' an, he also gave a list of some traditionalist theologians
such as: Ibn-Hanbal, WakI', Ibn-al-Mubarak and Hammad b.Sulayman,
• •
(3)
who were of the same opinion. This section is a prototype of
the Hanbalite way of thinking, and its contents can easily be
traced in the traditionalist works such as that of ad-Dariml.
His rational arguments are mainly aimed at the refutation of
the Mu'tazilite view that God's speech is created and that His
speech to Moses was created in a bush. Al-Ash'arl pointed to
the strong relationship which exists between the speech and the
speaker, he made it clear that one cannot speak with speech
created in smother subject. We have already seen al-Ash'ari's
.(4)
explanation of this point in his Luma . In the Ibana, however,
(1) Patton, Ahmed Ibn-Hanbal and the Mihna. pp.119-20.
• • •
(2) Ibana. p.22. Ad-Dariml, Radd, p.73.
(3) Ibana, pp.28-31.
(4) See Supra, pp. 297-99.
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he did not use the sophisticated arguments of the Luma'. but he
utilized an argument already used by Muhammad b.Aslam,^1^ that if
the word of God were created in a bush, then it would be the
"bush", or creating thing which said to Moses nI am God" and
(2)
that, of course, is blasphemy. He refers to two accounts in
which a poisoned joint of meat said to the prophet, "eat me not,
for I am poisoned", and a wolf is said to have spoken so elo¬
quently to an unbeliever that he became a Muslim. Al-Ash'arl
argued that in both these two cases, the words spoken are created
by God, yet they are not His words nor His speech; so what He
creates He does not speak. On the assumption that the speech
here is created, there is no essential difference between these
cases and that of the bush of Moses and, therefore, on the same
assumption there is no reason to assert that the speech from
the "bush" is God's speech and not that of the bush. We know,
however, that the speech is not the speech of the bush, and
consequently the assumption that it is created is to be
rejected.
Opponents of al-Ash'ari tried to differentiate between the
two cases of the speaking wolf and the speaking joint of meat
and the case of the "bush" by pointing out that the bush is
inanimate which could not be speaking. Al-Ash'ari refuted this
by saying that if it is impossible for an inanimate thing to be
a speaker, then it is also impossible for it to be a recipient
(1) Patton, op.cit. , pp.36-41.
(2) Ibana, p.22.
(3) Ibid. . pp.25-6. cf. Watt, "Early Discussions about the
Qur' an," p. 100.
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of speech. Furthermore, the Mu'tazilites' assertion that
it is impossible for an inanimate thing to be a speaker is un¬
tenable, since there is a Qur'anic verse which ascribed this
(2)
quality of speaking to the heavens and the earth, Q.41:11.
Another argument of al-Ash'ari for the eternity of God's
speech is that based on a comparison between God's will and His
speech, both of which he considered eternal attributes which
cannot be created in another subject. He said, "Just as God
cannot create His will in a creature so He cannot create His
words in a created thing. If God were to creaate His will in a
created thing, then it would be the created thing which was
willing, and that is impossible. Likewise it is impossible for
God to create His word in a creature, for then it would be the
creature who was speaking, and the speech of God would have become
(3)
the speech of the created thing."
In all these arguments, al-Ash'arl is emphasizing the point
that speech is the expression of the personality of an intelligent
(4)
being, therefore it has a strong connection with its speaker.
In accordance with this conception of speech, al-Ash'ari used
the Qur'anic verse, 42:51, which emphasizes a distinction between
the prophet to whom God speaks directly through revelation, and
the ordinary man to wnom God's words are transmitted by the
prophet; he argued that if God's word was created, this distinction
(1) Ibana, p.26. cf. Watt, op.cit.. p.100.
(2) Ibana. p.26. cf. Watt, op.cit.. pp.100-101.
(3) Ibana. pp.22-23.
(4) Watt, op.cit.. p.101.
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would disappear, and thus the prophet Moses would be of lower
rank than most ordinary men, since this allegedly created word
comes to him from a bush, while for the ordinary men it comes
from the prophet.
Al-Ash'arl'introduced another argument based on the principle
of the negation of the contradictory which he widely used in the
Luma*. he argued that if God's speech were created, then God
would not be "speaking" or "saying" and in this case He would be
eternally characterized by the opposite of speech such as
(2)
silence and deficiency which is inadmissible. In this
argument al-Ash'ari drew a comparison between God's speech and
His knowledge which reminds us of Ibn-Hanbal's notion that the
Qur'an is equal or inseparable from the knowledge of God, so if
this knowledge is uncreated, then the Qur'an also must be un-
(3)
created.
He also introduced arguments based on an assumed connection
between the name and the reality it designates; and since the
names of God are in the Qur'an and are uncreated, the Qur'an
itself cannot be created. Al-Ash'ari said, "Another proof is
God's statement, 'Say; He is God alone, God the eternal; He
begetteth not, and He is not Begotten, and there is none like
unto Him", (^112:1-4, then how can the Qur'an be created, when
God's name is in the Qur'an. This confirms that God's names are
created, and if His names are created, His oneness would be
(1) Ibana. pp.24-25.
(2) Ibid.. p.22.
(3) Patton, op.cit.. p.90.
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created and likewise His knowledge and power. In another
argument he said, "That which proves that the opinion of the
Jahmites is wrong and that the Qur'an is God's word and is
uncreated, is that God's names are part of the Qur'an, and God
said, "Praise the name of thy Lord, the most high, who has
created and balanced" Q.87:1-2, and the statement, "the name ..."
cannot be created, just as "the Majesty of our Lord" cannot be
created; for God has said in 72:3 "May the Majesty of our Lord
be exalted", and just as His Majesty cannot be created, so His
(2)
word cannot be created." Commenting on the Qur'anic verse,
38:78, al-Ash'arl declared that, "If God's speech is created and
all creatures were to vanish, it has to be admitted that if God
made all things vanish, the curse on Satan would disappear, and
(3)
Satan would not be cursed."
(4)
In spite of the naivety of these arguments, they are,
however, as Allard noticed, in accordance with al-Ash'ari's doctrine
of the attributes, since they underline the strong relationship
between the name and the reality it designates. In the first two
texts the nouns which designate God and His attributes should be
considered eternal as is God and all His attributes. In the last
text, the connection between the formulation of God's curse against
(5)




(4) Watt, "Early Discussion about the Qur'an," p.101.
(5) Allard, Le probleme des attributs divins. pp.282-3.
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are not original, they had already been used by Ibn-Hanbal in
his defence of the uncreatedness of the Qur'an.
Another argument of al-Ash'arl is based on the comparison
of God's eternal will, in respect of moral distinction, with
His word. He said that God eternally wills that His friends and
His enemies be separated, if His will in this respect were not
eternal, He would be imperfect, but there is no fundamental
(2)
difference between His word and His will.
At the end of this section, al-Ash'ari dealt briefly with
two points, the first of which is concerned with the refutation
of the view of those who reserved judgement on the question of
the createdness or uncreatedness of the Qur'an, because there is
no statement supporting either point of view in the Qur'an or the
Traditions of the prophet, nor is there consensus on this matter
(3)
among the Muslim community. Al-Ash'ari rejected such a view
and pointed out that there is likewise nothing about suspending
judgement in the Qur'an or the Traditions or consensus of the
community; on the contrary, it is possible to derive proofs from
(4)
the Qur'an that the word of God is not created.
The other point with which al-Ash'arl dealt is that concerning
whether or not the utterance (lafz) of the Qur'an is created or
uncreated. Using quotations from the Qur'an, al-Ash'ari affirmed
that the Qur'an is written on the preserved tablet (in heaven)
(5)
and that it can be remembered, recited and heard, but he






refused to admit that it can be uttered. "Because", al-Ash'arl
said, "one may not say that the Qur'an is an uttered word, for
when an Arab says lafaztu al-luoma min fami (I have uttered the
morsel from my mouth) his meaning is "I have cast it forth" and
the word of God cannot be said to be cast forth (in this way)
but only to be read, recited, written and memorized.So, to
al-Ash'ari, the word "uttered" is not an appropriate word to be
used for the Qur'an, and considered that those who used this
term only wanted to assert the createdness of the Qur'an, but
(2)
they dared not openly profess such a view. As W.M. Watt
rightly remarked, this point of al-Ash'ari is very weak, for
many who hold firmly that the Qur'an was uncreated were ready to
say that man "uttered" it, and that his utterance of it is
(3)
created. Reference has already been made to the weakness of
. _ (4)
al-Ash ari's linguistic argument upon which he depends here.
Thus, al-Ash'ari even went beyond Ibn-Hanbal in attempting
to deny the validity of the common theological phrase, lafz al-
Qur'an. because of its inappropriateness to an uncreated entity
such as the Qur'an. He clearly stated "It may not be said that
a part of the Qur'an is created because the Qur'an in its
(5)
entirety is uncreated." Such a statement makes it very
difficult to accept as al-Ash'ari's, some of the views attributed
(1) Ibana. p.32.
(2) Ibid.. p.32.
(3) Watt, op.cit.. p.102.
(4) See supra. Chapter II, p.119-20.
(5) Ibana. p.32.
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to him by his followers.
Conclusion to Chapters III and IV
Prom the general account of the views of al-Maturidi and al-
Ash'ari on tawhid. which has been given in the last two chapters,
it might be said that though they both have agreed on many theo¬
logical doctrines and adopted similar solutions, there is still
genuine disagreement between them, especially in those matters
related to their methodology and their treatment of the subjects.
Thus in dealing with the problem of God's existence, we have
noticed that al-Maturidi spent considerable efforts discussing
the views of the materialists, Dahriyya, the dualists and similar
groups who denied God's existence or asserted the eternity of
the world. In the course of his arguments, he adopted the same
rational method gf his adversaries and his disputations are
dominated by such concepts and terminologies as: causation,
emanation, prime matter, and similar philosophical terms. However,
discussions of such nature are completely absent from the extant
works of al-Ash'arl. It is true that some lost works dealing with
such matters were attributed to al-Ash'arl, but it is doubtful
whether al-Ash'arl had treated these questions with the same
intensity shown by al-Maturidi. The absence of any reference to
these points in al-Ash'ari's Luma*. which might be expected to be
of the same nature as al-Maturidi•s Tawhid. supports such a doubt.
As far as the arguments for God's existence are concerned,
both al-Ash'ari and al-Maturidi used similar arguments based on
the observable change in the world and the purpose in its design.
They were fully aware of the argument based on the temporality of
- 310 -
the world; but while al-Ash'ari seems to doubt its validity, al-
Maturidi adopted the argument and produced various versions of
it. Moreover, he introduced an argument based on the existence
of evil in the world as a proof for the existence of God which
is unique in the field of Islamic theology.
Concerning the oneness of God, both al-Maturidi and al-
Ash'ari used the argument based on the concept of mutual hindrance
(dalil at-tamanu*) to prove this doctrine. From their treatment
of the point, it seems that al-Maturidi was more concerned to
establish and prove God's oneness; therefore he introduced
arguments based on sam' in its wider significance as well as
various rational arguments. In the course of his arguments, al-
Maturidi used some philosophical conceptions such as: the infinity
of space and time to prove his point of view, and his treatment
of the subject in general discloses rational tendencies. This
might be due to the fact that al-Maturidi was mainly directing his
arguments to such rationally minded groups as the dualists, so he
had to employ their own method and logic of arguments.
Both al-Maturidi and al-Ash'ari advocated the transcendence
of God and refuted all arguments for anthropomorphism and cor¬
poreality, and emphasized that only revealed names should be
applied to God. However, they differed regarding the expressions
of the Qur'an which ascribed hands, eyes, face, etc., to God.
While al-Ash'ari affirmed these expressions and attacked all
attempts to state the precise manner of their existence on the
basis of the doctrine of bi-la-kavf. he also refuted any meta¬
phorical interpretation of them. Al-Maturidi, however, asserted
that these expressions should not be interpreted literally and
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he suggested that their literal sense was never intended. They
therefore might either be interpreted metaphorically in the
light of the verses of tanzih, or their meaning.should be left
to the knowledge of God. Al-Maturldi did not adopt a clearly
definable method of argument, for while he introduced various
metaphorical interpretations for these expressions, he also
openly expressed his dissatisfaction with them and showed his
inclination to leaving their meanings to the knowledge of God.
As for the doctrine of God's sitting on His throne, al-
Ash'ari consistently applied the doctrine of bi-la-kayf. and
refrained from metaphorical interpretation of these verses,
asserting this doctrine in its literal sense as expressed in the
Qur'an, and he rejected any allegorical interpretation of the
word sitting (istiwa') and throne ('arsh). Al-Maturldi, however,
though not convinced by the Mu'tazilites'metaphorical interpre¬
tation of these terms, did not affirm this doctrine and tried to
prove that God has no need of a place or places; he introduced
a general principle for explaining the relation, expressed in the
Qur'an, between God and created things (including the throne).
He concluded by stating that these verses, which speak of God's
sitting on His throne, must be accepted without giving them any
precise or definite interpretation.
Regarding God's visibility, al-Ash'ari and al-Maturidl
affirmed that God could be seen in the hereafter, and based
arguments to justify the possibility of the vision on similar
Qur'anic verses. But while al-Maturidi confined himself to the
Scriptural proofs, al-Ash'arl introduced rational arguments.
One of the basic differences between al-Maturidl and al-Ash'ari
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is that concerning the essential and active attributes of God.
Thus, while al-Maturldl considered all God's attributes to be
eternal,^ al-Ash'arl indirectly implied the temporality of
the active attributes. Connected with this point are their
theories of God's act of creation, al-Maturldi maintained that
God creates things through the eternal attribute of takwln. al-
Ash'arl held that creation occurs through God's eternal will and
His word "Be". They also differ regarding the speech of God,
al-Katuridi clearly distinguished between the eternal speech of
God which is His attribute and the expressions in human language
of that speech, and he considered the former to be eternal and
the latter as created. Al-Ash'arl's views on the point seem to
suggest that, to him, God's speech and the expressions which
are identical with it are both eternal and uncreated.
Both al-Maturidi and al-Ash'arl asserted that the attri¬
bution of names and qualities to God, which are commonly used for
man, does not entail similarity between man and God, they both
pointed out that mere agreement in names does not entail simi¬
larity and that God's and man's qualities are essentially different.
In spite of this, however, al-Maturidi seems to be more concerned
with this problem than al-Ash'arl and, as a matter of fact, we
find no reference to this problem in al-Ash'ari's major work
al-luma'. Al-Maturidi was not only anxious to refute the
Mushabbiha, but he was more concerned to refute the Batinites
and the Philosophers who took the excuse of the possibility of
(1) This is a Hanafi position; cf. Fiqh Akbar II, article 2,
M .C . p.188.
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such a similarity and denied God's attributes altogether.
Moreover, al-Maturidi acknowledges the shortcoming of human
language as a means for describing the reality of God, but he
emphasized that the using of this language is the only feasible
method of knowing anything about God, so it must be used with
caution guarding from the danger of tashblh.
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CHAPTER V
AL MATURlDI ON THE DOCTRINE OF QADAR
Introduction
The doctrine of Qadar was for a long time one of the most
controversial problems in the history of Islamic thought.
Basically it aimed at harmonizing God's omnipotence and His
absolute will with man's responsibility and freedom of action.
The basis of this controversy is based on the Qur'an itself,
where we find that some verses laid great emphasis on the
absolute "power" and "will" of God and attribute to Him the
creation, as well as the full control over the created world
including man and his action. Other verses, however, describe
man as a competent agent who acts freely, and can be held account¬
able and rewarded and punished for his acts. The Qur'anic
statements concerning this problem of the conflict between God's
omnipotence and man's freedom and responsibility, seem to
adopt a middle between these two aspects.
Political motivations were behind many of the schools of
though which sprang up in the Muslim community in the second
and third centuries A.H., and which produced widely variant
interpretations of the Qur'anic texts. At one extreme were the
Jabrites or the predeterminists who denied man any real freedom,
while the Qadarites at the other extreme asserted that man is
free and has responsibility. The moderates between these two
(1) Watt, Formative Period, pp.90-94.
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extremes remained faithful to the middle course of the Qur'an.^1^
The Jabrites supported their opinion with those Qur'anic
verses which emphasize the absoluteness of the will of God, and
they ignored those verses which refer to human freedom and respon¬
sibility. Similarly, the Qadarites based their views narrowly
on those verses which refer to man's responsibility and freedom
of actions while they overlooked those which speak of the
absolute power and will of God.
The Qadarites* assertions were superseded and absorbed into
the doctrines of the Mu'tazilite school. The Mu'tazilites made
use of the philosophical material available at that time and they
were thus able to introduce new ideas concerning this problem.
They raised many new questions relating to God's justice and
man's responsibility. They discussed the nature of man's power
in detail and attempted to find some means by which they could
avoid to attribute evil to God.
In response to this extreme Mu'tazilite view, the group
( 21
called Ahl al-Ithbat (i.e. who affirm the doctrine of Qadar)
emerged. Using the same concepts and jargon of the Mu'tazilites,
the Ahl al-Ithbat attempted to harmonize man's freedom of action
with the effective power of God, while preserving limited freedom
of action to man.
Thus the intellectual scene before the appearance of al-
Maturidi and al-Ash'ari was dominated by conflicting doctrines of
these two groups. The influence of these two scholars on their
(1) For the significance of the terms "Jabrites" and "Qadarites"
and the sects named after them, see Ibid.,pp.116-118.
(2) For the implications of this term Ahl al-Ithbat, see
Ibid.. pp.117-118, also p.341, note 122.
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intellectual background, concerning this problem, will occupy
the following two chapters.
From Kitab at-Tawhld and Ta'wilat al-Qur'an it seems that
al-Maturidi dealt with almost all the questions on Qadar discussed
by the Mu'tazilites and Ahl al-Ithbat, covering such points as:
the nature of man's actions, the doctrine of God's justice and
similar relating matters. He also refuted the Mu'tazilite views,
especially al-Ka'bi•s,and made use of many of the solutions to
the problem introduced by Ahl al-Ithbat.
1. The Analysis of Man's Actions
To formulate his views on the problem of man's actions, al-
Maturidi started by explaining and refuting the views of both
the Jabrites and the Mu'tazilites. According to him, the Jabrites
have denied man any real action, they maintained that actions
are only ascribed to man in a figurative sense, but in reality
they belong to God.^1^ They argued that in various Qur'anic
verses these actions, which are said to be man's, were attributed
to God. It has also been clearly stated that God is the creator
of all things. This must be understood in its real sense,
because God is the real agent and the most powerful, and any
figurative interpretation of this statement would imply the
(2)
diminishing of that power. Moreover, many of those actions
which are apparently attributed to man such as: causing death
and life, being short or tall, moving and resting, causing things
(1) Tawhld, p.225,2-3.
(2) Ibid. . p.225,4-6.
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to combine or to separate, no doubt belong in reality to God
and are under His power. To answer the question why God then
punishes man for these actions if they are not his, the Jabrites
simply said that the whole creation and command belong to God,
so it is to Him to do whatever He likes as any owner has the
(2)
unrestricted right to do whatever he wants in his domain.
They hold that the attribution of real actions to man would imply
resemblance between man's actions and God's, a notion which has
been refuted by the Qur'an, 13:16. Also, if creation in the
sense of bringing something from non-existence into existence
were attributed to man, he would then deserve to be called "creator"
(3)
which no one can admit it to him.
Al-Maturldi attributed these views to the group whom he
called Ahl al-Jabr. The term Jabr and its derivatives Mujbira
and Jabriyya were mentioned about six times in Kitab at-Tawhld.
By examining the instances where the term mentioned is used,
it is hoped that it will be possible to shed light on some of
the problems regarding the origin and the significance of its
usage in the field of Islamic theology. Before discussing this
point it is worth mentioning that W. Montgomery Watt has already
traced the origin and followed the development of the term up to
the time of al-Ash'ari. He doubted the existence of a sect called
Jabriyya, and pointed out that Jabriyya and Mujbira were nicknames





who must have included not only the pure and moderate Jabriyya
of ash-Shahrastanl's classification, but also those who held the
doctrine of acquisition. As a result of a later development,
the advocates of acquisition disassociated themselves from the
Jabriyya, and claimed to be holding a mediatory position between
the Qadarites and the Jabrites, thus the term "jabr" became
heretical.^ ^
Al-Maturidl's usage of the term .ja.br confirms in many ways
the conclusions of Watt and gives evidence to his final findings.
In one of his statements al-Maturidi said, "The Qadarites who
were nicknamed by i'tizal attributed the name Jabr to us though
we have acquitted ourselves of it in saying and conviction (*aqd
wa-qawl). They are lying in applying this name to us as they
lied in calling us Qadariyya. ... They applied the name Jabr to
us because we denied that the power for the action is prior to
(2) - -
the action." In another statement al-Maturidi said, "The
(3)Mu'tazilites called the Husayniyya, Mujbira because the
Husayniyya maintained that man has power only for the action
that he is doing. He has no power for its opposite neither at
(4)
the time of the action nor before that time." These two
statements clearly consolidate the conclusion that the terms Jabr
and Mujbira were nicknames given by the Mu'tazilites to their
(1) Watt, Formative Period, p.118.
(2) Tawhid, p.320,14-16.
(3) Followers of al-Husayn an-Najjar, Maqalat. p.283,2-3. They




opponents who were the middle of the road Sunnites.^^ The last
statement of al-Maturidi very well fits al-Khayyat's identification
of the Mujbira as those who, in opposition to Ahu-l-Hudhail,
maintained that a man has power over a single act only, and not
(2)
over both unbelief and faith.
In one of his statements, al-Maturidi defines the Jabriyya
by saying that "The Jabriyya, who are known to us, get this name
from Jabr; they denied man any power for his action, attributing
all actions to God, without asserting to man any action in
(3)
reality." It is clear that such definition very well fits
the first group of the Jabrites in ash-Shahrastani's classification
(i.e. the pure Jabrites). In two other statements, however, al-
Maturidi attributed similar views to the Murji'ites. He said
that "The Murji'ites attributed (ar ,1a'). the actions of man to
God and did not attribute them to man, while the Qadarites affirmed
these actions to man in the sense that he creates them, and denied
(4)
God any control over them." In another similar statement he
said, "The Murji'ites attributed the reality of man's actions to
God and the Qadarites denied God any control over them, attributing
(5) - - -
their control to man." Though al-Maturidi is identifying the
Murji'ites views with the Jabrites', this does not mean that he
is accusing all the Murji'ites of holding the doctrine of Jabr.
(1) Watt, op.cit.. p.118.
(2) Intisar, pp.17-18.
(3) Tawhid, pp.319,18-19; 320,1.
(4) Ibid.. pp.228,21; 229,1-3. Ta'wilat. 2:32-34.
(5) Tawhid. p.318,13-15.
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For in other places of Kitab at-Tawhid he analysed the concept
of irja' , which is mainly connected with faith, and implied
that even Abu-Hanifa, who is definitely not a Jabrite in al-
Maturidi's view, seems to have sympathy with some of the
Murji'ite doctrines in this respect. So what might be inferred
from these statements is that the Jabrites represent,to al-
Maturidi, a group among the Murji'ites, and such classification
is quite applicable to men like Jahm b. Safwan who is believed to
_ (2)
be a Jabrite, yet was considered as a Murji'ite by al-Ash'ari.
Other statements of al-Maturidl suggest that he has antici¬
pated al-Baghdadi and later theologians in emphasizing the point
that his doctrine is a mean or a middle path between Jabr and
Qadar. Following a criticism of both the Qadarites and the
Jabrites, al-Katuridi said that, "Justice is the mean between
(3)
them" , (i.e. the Jabrites and the Qadarites.) In another state-
(4)
ment he said that, "justice is to harmonize both of these views"
(i.e. Jabr and Qadar).
In contrast to the deterministic view of the Jabrites, al-
Maturldl said, the Mu'tazilites went to the other extreme by
affirming real action to man, and denying God any interference
or influential power over these actions. They based their views
(1) Tawhld. pp.381-85.
(2) Maqalat. pp.132, 279-280. For the Jahm's views and his role
in the History of the Development of Islamic thought, see




on the fact that in many Qur'anic verses man has been considered
a responsible agent, and according to such a conception certain
commands and prohibitions were addressed to him, and promised
reward and punishment according to his performance. They inter¬
preted those verses which emphasize the role of God in man's
actions in metaphorical sense. They said that these actions of
men were attributed to God possibly because of the fact that he
is the source of the motives behind them, that is to say, He is
their instigator, because he commands man to do what is good
and abandon him when he commits evil. Alternatively, it might
be said that these acts were attributed to God figuratively on
the ground that He is the origin of the judgement (mihna) based
on them, though not their real agent. Just as has been attributed
to the Qur'an that it increases the believers in faith, others
in abomination, 9:124-5, and the warning increases the unbelievers
in aversion 35:42, all being in a figurative sense.
Al-Maturidi rejected the views of both the determinists
and the Mu'tazilites, and tried to find a solution to this problem
by emphasizing the point that God's justice and His wisdom make
it necessary that certain actions must be attributed to man. At
the same time he did not go with the Mu'tazilites in denying God
any role in man's actions. On the contrary, al-Maturldi strongly
defended the absolute power of God and His will which influence
and embrace all man's actions.
Thus against the Jabrite views al-Maturidi devoted a special
section in which he attempted to establish the reality of man's
(1) Tawhid, p.227,13-19.
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actions. His arguments in this respect are mainly based on the
premisses that man is a responsible agent who has been created
for judgement (mihna). and has been provided with the means by
which he can distinguish between things thus being able to carry
out his responsibility. Therefore, he must have real action and
must have some freedom to perform these actions.To establish
this proposition, al-Maturldi argued from both reason and
revelation. He said that in many Qur'anic verses man has been
commanded to do certain works or to refrain from others, 41:40;
22:77. Other verses such as 2:167; 56:24; 99:7-8, promised him
reward or punishment for his actions. In all these verses what
men do is called their actions, and men were given the name of
(2) - -
the doers of their works. Al-Maturidi argued that the attri¬
bution of these actions to God in certain verses would not deny
such a fact. Such attribution can possibly be explained as that
these actions belong to both man and God, yet from a different
aspect. They belong to God in the sense that He created them and
brought them into existence, and belong to man in the sense that
- - - - (3)
he acquired and did them (*ala ma kasabuha wa-fa*aluha).
As for the rational arguments, al-ffiaturidi said that it is
a fact that God has given certain commandments and prohibitions
to man, and it is impossible that to whomever these commandments
and prohibitions were given, would have no real actions. If
such an assimption is possible, then the door would be open for
(1) Tawhid, pp.221-24.
(2) Ibid.. pp.225,17-20; 226,1-3.
(3) Ibid.. p.226,3-5.
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considering as many absurd things as possible. Man's actions
have certain characteristics such as: obedience, disobedience,
sin, being objectionable, etc., and man has been described as
being commanded and prohibited, compensated and rewarded. It is
rationally repulsive (qablh) to attribute these aspects of man's
(2)
actions to God, so from these aspects they must be man's.
Moreover, God has promised rewards and punishment for those who
obey and disobey Him respectively. If these actions (i.e. obey
and disobey) belong to Him, then He would be the one who is
rewarded and punished which is inappropriate. If the reward and
punishment belong to man in reality, then his submission to
commandments and prohibitions must also be truly his. Also,
God has attributed certain characteristics to those who obey
and disobey His commandments, therefore, if these actions really
belong to Him, these characteristics would be applied to Him
(3)
which is admissible neither to reason nor to revelation.
Another argument is that everyone knows from his own experience
that he is free to choose (mukhtar) regarding his actions, and
that he is doer and acquirer (fa'il kasib). and such a fact can-
(A)
not be denied, thus refuting the Jabrite deterministic views.
Though al-Maturidl strongly refuted the Jabrite views, he






associated himself with those who seem to have taken a middle
road between Jabr and Qadar, and tried to harmonize both these
views. According to al-Maturidi, "Some people attributed actions
to man from those aspects according to which they become obedient
and disobedient, and attributed these actions to God in the
sense that He creates them. To these people, one act has
different aspects, being related to God from certain aspects and
to man from others. Thus it belongs to God from the aspect of
creation (khalq), and to man from the aspect of acquisition (kasb).
They argued from the fact that there is a difference between the
reality of the action of man and God. God's action, in reality,
is His act of creation and origination, while one understands
the action of man only in the sense that he did it and acquired
it (fa'ala wa-kasaba).^^ Though al-Maturidi attributed these
views to no particular groups, he clearly showed his favour to
them. Thus he emphasized the point that the right thing to be
done in order to solve this problem, is to harmonize the extreme
views of both the Jabrites and the Mu'tazilites. By doing this,
we would also be able to harmonise the verse 6:102, which states
that God is the creator of all things, the verse 6:17 which
emphasizes His absolute power, ,and those verses 41:46; 4:83
(2)
which refer to His Justice and unmerited grace.
To support such a view, al-Maturidi introduced various
rational arguments to the effect that man has neither knowledge
nor capability to do all the things related to his actions, and




have an influential role in all man's acts. He said that, "The
proof of the necessity of holding such an opinion ... is the
existence of states in the actions of man which their imaginations
cannot conceive nor their reasons understand, and other states
which they can understand and which their reasons can imagine.
Thus it is clear that the actions of the first group axe not theirs,
while the actions of the second group are theirs. The first
group consists of such actions as imagining how things came from
non-existence into being, and the time, place and limits in
relation to the actions. The second consists of such actions
as movement and rest according to what is forbidden and what is
commended. It is clear that those actions of men which belong
to the first group are not theirs, and those which belong to
the second group are theirs.
Another argument is that man's actions are of the nature of
good and bad. Man, however, has no knowledge of how and why
they become so, which proves that these actions in such states
do not belong to him. It is also found that these actions cause
harm, pains and hardship to man, though he intended to gain joy
and pleasure from them, which proves that these actions from this
(2)
aspect do not belong to man. The underlying strength of these
two arguments is that if it is assumed that somebody is able to
create a thing without having knowledge of it as it is or without
willing it to be such, anything in the world might have come





Al-MaturidI argued that it is a well established conviction
that there is no creator but God and no Lord but He. If we assume
that the creation of man's actions and their bringing into exist¬
ence ... is caused by man, man in this case would deserve the
title of "creator" which implies the existence of another creator
besides God which is inadmissible.^^
This argument seems to imply that the Mu'tazilites made no
difference between the act of creation when attributed to main
and God. In another statement he levelled this accusation openly
against them, and said that, "the meaning of God's act is His
origination of things (ibda*) and the bringing of the thing into
being. The Mu'tazilites gave the same sense to man's act. Further¬
more, they attributed to man a power for acquisition, while
denying God such a power. Thus, according to their view, man
would have more influential power than God since his power would
be related to creation and acquisition and that of God is related
only to creation. In this case man would be free to choose,
while God would not, which is inadmissible to reason and to reve-
i +- (2)lation.
Al-Maturldi also argued that if God has no power over man's
action, his power would be defective as the power of man. Also,
if some actions escape God's power, no one would trust His
(3)





of every thing, because He creates them all. If it is assumed
that man is the creator of his actions, then God's kingdom
would be defective. It is clear that the implication of these
arguments is that God's power is so overwhelming that nothing
could escape it, and any suggestion which implies man's independ¬
ence of this power would imply defect and weakness in God's
sovereignty.
Al-Maturidi substantiated these rational arguments by quoting
various Qur'anic verses and argued from them to the effect that
man's actions were created by God. He quoted the verses, 67:13-14,
"Be secret in your speech, or proclaim it, He knows the thoughts
within the breast. Shall He .not know, who created? And He is
the All-subtle, the All-aware", and said that if God were not the
creator of what is hidden and proclaimed, He would not claim
(2) - -
knowledge of it. Here again al-Maturidi is taking the detailed
knowledge of an object as the necessary condition for any claim
to creation. He also quoted the verses, 10:22 and 34:18, which
declare that it is God who enables man to travel and it is He
who appointed certain measures in their journeys. The verses
30:21-23 state that love and mercy between husband and wife, as
well as the sleep of man and his seeking after God's bounty, are
among His signs. It is impossible that such signs could be
(3)
produced by another agent but God. Also the verses 57:27;
58:22; 16:80; and 5:13 clearly speak of the influence of God's
(1) Tawhid, pp.232,20-21; 233,1-3.
(2) Ibid.. p.254,13-17.
(3) Ibid.. pp.254,17-20; 255,1-2.
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power over man's actions. On the whole, al-Maturldl said, God
says that, "He accomplishes what He desires", and certainly many
of man's actions are included among those which He wills. God
also promises that He does what He wills, and rebuked those who
wanted to be praised for what they did not do: all this affirms
that all actions belong to Him.^^
Al-Maturidi concluded his arguments by pointing out that
were it not for the fact that man is held responsible and has
been addressed by certain commandments and prohibitions, reason
would not have considered it as conceivable that any thing can
be out of the range of God's power, or that any actions could be
(2)
ascribed to other agents.
2. Al-Katuridi's Conception of Kasb
Prom what has been said, it becomes clear that al-Maturidl
is trying to hold the balance or mediating position between the
Jabrites and the Mu'tazilites. Thus he asserted that God is
the creator of all things including man's actions. At the same
time, however, he pointed out that God created in man the power
of choice and acquisition to distinguish and choose between
different things. Because of this freedom of choice man is
accountable for his actions and is a responsible agent.
Al-Katuridi used the terms Kasb (acquisition) and choice
(ikhtiyar). and their derivatives, as referring to the part




development of these terms up to the time of al-Ash'arl, have been
fully studied by W. Montgomery Watt, who discloses that the term
kasb. which is associated with al-Ash'ari and his school, played a
significant role among the theologians of Ahl al-Ithbat a long time
before al-Ash'ari. Watt also points out that the term choice
(ikhtiyar) could be rightly associated with Hisham b.al-Hakam, who
preferred it to the term kasb.^ ^ Having in mind that the school
- - (2)
connected with al-Maturidi seems to prefer the term choice, it
might be interesting to examine the use of these terms by al-Maturidi
himself and try to disclose the significance he ascribed to them.
The term kasb and its derivatives occurred in both Kitab at-
Tawhid and Ta'wilat. It occurs in Kitab at-Tawhid about six times.
• •
In two of these instances kasb was referred to in connection with
the Mu'tazilites• views. According to al-Maturidi, "The meaning
of God's act is the origination and bringing of things into exist¬
ence, the Mu'tazilites gave the same meaning to the action of
(3)
man. Moreover, they ascribed to man a power for acquisition."
In another statement al-Maturidi said that, "According to the
Mu'tazilite doctrine, a man has power over his action from a
certain aspect which is kasb, and God has power over it from
another aspect which is origination (ijad); God has no power over
that aspect which belongs to man, and man has no power over that
(4)of God." It is not clear from these two statements whether
al-Maturidi is using the Mu'tazilites own words or he is simply
(1) Watt, "The Origin of the Islamic Doctrine of Acquisition"





using his own terms to describe the Mu'tazilite view. The
latter assumption seems to be more likely since the Mu'tazilites
had no affection for using this term. In al-Maturldi's other
statements where kasb and ikhtiyar were used, we notice that the
term kasb is sometimes used as an equivalent to ikhtiyar. and
sometimes ikhtiyar is used to describe kasb. In both cases,
however, kasb stands for the part played by man in his actions
as parallel to the role of God. Thus in an argument against
the Jabrites, al-Maturidl said that, "Everyone knows from his
own experience that he is free to choose (mukhtar), and that he
is a doer and an acquirer (fa'il. kasib).^^ It is clear that
the terms "doer", "acquirer" and "free to choose" are synonymous
in this context. In another statement, while defending his view
that man's action has two aspects, one of which belongs to God
and the other to man, al-Maturidi concluded his argument by
saying that, "Thus it is established that the action belongs to
man from the aspect of acquisition (kasb), and to God from the
(2)
aspect of creation." Immediately following this statement,
he repeated that God's actions in reality is His creation, and
it is understood only in the meaning of origination, while man's
action is understood only in the sense of his doing and aquisition
(3)
of it (fi'luhu wa-kasbuhu). Here again, kasb and fi'l from
man represent man's contribution to his action as opposed to the





that the attribution of man's actions to God would entail man's
compulsion, al-Maturldl said that, "everyone knows from his
experience that he is free to choose (mukhtar)." He then pro¬
ceeded to say that, "the act of man is compulsion (idtirar) in
• •
respect of creation, and man has no part in it, from this aspect.
Prom the aspect of acquisition, however, it is his choice
(ikhtiyar). ... the fact that the act is created by God does
not deprive man of his choice because the power for the act has
already been created. This power is the basis for his being free
to choose and not compelled^^ In this statement kasb and
ikhtiyar were used conjointly to describe the activity of man in
relation to his action, but kasb stands in contrast to creation
from God, while ikhtiyar is opposite to idtirar. One might
• •
notice a similarity between this statement and a statement attri¬
buted to Hisham b.al-Hakam. According to al-Ash'ari, "Hisham
b.al-Hakam held that human actions are created by God. Ja'far
b.Harb relates that Hisham b.al-Hakam said that the acts of a
• •
man are his choice (ikhtiyar lahu) in one respect, and compulsion
(idtirar) in another; his choice in that he wills them (arada)
• •
and acquires them (iktasaba), and compulsion in that they do not
come from him save when there arises the cause which incites
(2)them.J
It is clear that al-Maturidi is using conceptions and
terminologies similar to those used by Hisham b.al-Hakam, which
(1) Tawhld. p.239,8-18.
(2) Maqalat, pp.40-41, cf. Watt, "The Origin of the Islamic
Doctrine of Acquisition", p.238. Formative Period, p.193.
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might suggest that al-Maturidi is building his views or, in a
sense, he is developing the basic ideas of Hisham. It has to be
said, however, that while Hisham made no use of the term kasb.
al-Maturidi seems to have given this term some significance.
In the Ta'wilat. the derivatives of the term kasb such as:
iktisab, aksab and yaktasib. were mentioned several times, only
in the sense of acquiring, gaining, earning money, or collecting
wealth.^^ The only instance, as far as I could find, where the
term is used in its technical sense, is in al-Maturldi's
commentary on the verse 67:14. He said that in spite of their
disagreement, all people agreed that the natural compulsory
actions of man are created by God, but they hold different views
regarding those acts which are by man's acquisition (kasb al-'abd).
Some people, namely Ahl al-Huda, asserted their creation by God,
while others denied this. It is clear that kasb here is used in
its technical sense. Al-Maturidi then proceeded and gave a very
interesting statement to the effect that even in his acquired
actions, man is restricted by certain limits. For instance, he
can only use his hand in the work which is linked to the nature
of the hand, and if he tried to see or hear with it, he would
not be able to do so. He only has the power to use his hand in
holding, giving and taking because the hand is naturally pre¬
pared for such a task. This is applicable to all other senses,
a fact which discloses that God's creative power has influence
(2)
on whatever man performs.
(1) See for instance, 16:40; 42:12; 43:32; 65:7.
(2) Ta'wilat. 67:14.
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These are the only instances where kasb is used, which I
have been able to trace in Kitab at-Tawhid and the Ta'wilat.
Prom these statements it might be assumed that al-Maturldl does
not seem to be interested in the terminology, but his main
concern seems to be about ideas, namely to establish man's choice
in his actions as well as his responsibility, and to affirm, at
the same time, God's power and will in those acts. Both
"acquisition" and "choice" were used by al-Maturldl to stand for
the part played by man in his actions, yet one feels that kasb
has a wider sense which includes choice (ikhtiyar), intention
(hirs), inclination (mayl) and preference (ithar), as well as
• •
the power provided according to these mental actions. Thus kasb
seems to represent the whole operation which begins from man's
intention and choice, culminating in the power to perform the
act. Choice has a great significance in this operation because,
on one hand, power is provided according to man's choice: "power
in stable men occurred consecutively according to their intention,
choice and inclination."^1^ On the other hand, man's salvation
and eternal damnation depended on his choice. According to al-
Maturidi, "God has created man knowing that he will disobey and
be hostile to Him. However, He provides him with the power to
choose and to have performances, which lead him either to des¬
truction or salvation. If he chooses what would save him, he
would attain salvation, and if he chooses what will destroy him,
he would be in eternal damnation. Therefore man's fate is based
(2)
on his own choice." Thus, it is on the basis of this intention
(1) Tawhld, pp.266,15-17; 270,8-11.
(2) Ta'wilat. 15:32-40.
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or choice that man is held responsible and is rewarded and
punished for his actions.
3. The Nature of Man's Power
Choice and intention are the first steps, but to bring an
action into being, man needs power (qudra or istita'a). What is
the nature of this power? Is it the adequacy of means or the
physical fitness to perform the act or does it mean something else,
and to what extent is man free to use this power? In other words,
is he free to use it for more than one act, or for the act and
its opposite, or is it only related to one act? All these questions,
and similar points, were widely discussed by the Mu'tazilites and
their opponents.
The Mu'tazilites who advocated the freedom of man in his
actions, differed regarding the nature of man's power whether it
meant soundness and freedom from defects, or whether it was an
accident which was something other than physical fitness.In
consistence with their general doctrine, the Mu'tazilites held
that power is before and over the act and its opposite, yet it
does not make the act necessary, and ultimately they denied that
(2)
God imposes on man something for which he is not able. Among
the opponents of the Mu'tazilites, an-Najjar defined "power" in
the sense of help ('awn) from God, which originated at the time
of the act, not before it, and that every single act has its
(3)
own power. While to Hisham b.al-Hakam, an act presupposed
(1) See Maqalat. p.229,11-16.
(2) Ibid. . p.230,12-14.
(3) Ibid.. p.283,6-9.
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five elements: (i) soundness, (ii) freedom of condition,
(iii) adequate space of time, (iv) instruments, and (v) the
cause; but the essential element, the one which necessitates
the act, is what he calls the cause (sabab), which apparently
exists at the time (hal) of the act.^^
Prom Kitab at-Tawhid. it seems that al-Maturidi had dis-
cussed all these points, taking into consideration the solutions
of the Mu'tazilites and their opponents, as well as his pre¬
decessors, the Hanafite theologians. Thus, in his discussions
about the nature of man's power, al-Maturidi begins by disting¬
uishing between two kinds of powers: one is primary power
related to physical fitness and material means; the other is a
power which is connected with bringing the action into being.
He says, "in our opinion what is called power is of two kinds:
one is the adequacy of means and soundness of organs, and precedes
the actions; in its essence, it is not brought about for the
sake of the actions, although the actions cannot be performed
without it. Such a power is a blessing from God which He
generously bestows on whomsoever He pleases. ... The second is
concept (ma'na), the definition of which can only be reached by
saying that it exists only for the action, and it may only exist
when an action happens by means of it, and then it exists
(2)
contemporaneously with this action."
Then al-Maturidi quoted some verses where "power" in the
first sense is mentioned. He quoted the verse, 58:4, which
(1) Maqalat. pp.42-43. Watt, Formative Period, p.235.
(2) Tawhld, p.256,8-17.
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suggests an alternative for those who are unable to fast two
successive months as atonement for committing zihar (to say to
his wife: be as my mother's back) to feed sixty poor persons.
He also quoted the verse, 9:42, which tells of the hypocrites
who tried to find an excuse for not going to war with the prophet,
claiming that they had no ability (i.e. no adequate means). By
analysing these two verses, al-Maturidi tried to show that
"power", in these cases, only means the adequacy of means and
soundness. It also conveys the same meaning in such verses as
4:25 and 3:97. He pointed out that it is a matter of agree¬
ment that without this kind of power no duty would be imposed on
man, and if he is deprived of such power, man would not be blamed
for not performing an act, nor would he be asked to perform it.
Therefore, such verses as 2:286 and 2:233»which state that God
does not charge a soul save to its capacity, must be interpreted
as referring to this kind of power. Thus it would be impossible
to ask a man to perform an act which he has no means for, or
which he has no power to perform, such as: to command the blind
man "see", or to command a man who has no hand: "stretch your
hands".^ ^
As for the second kind of power, al-Maturidi referred to the
verses 11:20; 18:67,75 and 82, where according to him, though
the power in the sense of condition (ahwal) (i.e. adequacy of
means) has been realized, it is stated that man has no power of
the second kind, (i.e. the power for the action) because the
(1) Tawhid, p.257,1-18.
(2) Ibid.. p.258,1-9.
actions are not in existence. He then said that imposition
of duty on man could be made without the realization of this
kind of power. To establish this statement, al-Maturldl argued
from both reason and revelation. As for the sam*. he referred to
the above-mentioned verses where power is denied, yet men were
in sound condition, and in spite of this lack of power, have been
commanded, prohibited, and blamed for their actions. What might
explain tnis point yet better, al-Maturidi said, is the verse
3:97, "It is the duty of all men towards God to come to the
House of a pilgrim, if he is able to make his way there." It is
clear that this can be done only by means of provisions and a
mount (zad wa-rahila). This is the primary power, but if it
(i.e. pilgrimage) were not incumbent without the realization of
the power for the action, then no-one would be bound to perform
it, because the power for the act is contemporaneous with the
action itself. Therefore, if the pilgrimage were not incumbent
until it was realized, and it was not realized before the
accomplishment of the journey, then one might find an excuse for
staying away and not performing ha.1.1. The case is similar for
•
all other religious duties such as: jihad, fasting, prayer and
zakat. which proves that the imposition of these duties is not
based on the realization of the power for the action, but on the
realization of the power which is related to condition (i.e. the
adequacy of means). If man is lacking the means for performing
these duties, they would not be incumbent on him in the first
place. However, sometimes these means might be realized, such
as in the case of zakat. where one might have enough money, yet
(1) Tawhid. p.258,10-14. Ta'wilat. 11:20.
- 338 -
one would not pay it for some reason or another. Thus, to
al-Maturldi, there are two kinds of powers: one is prior to
the actions and consists of adequacy of means and soundness of
organs; and the imposition of any religious duties is conditional
upon the realization of this kind of power. The other kind of
power, however, is realized contemporaneously with the actions
and religious duties might be imposed regardless of its real¬
ization. It is on the concept of this latter power that al-
Maturidi is in real disagreement with the Mu'tazilites.
The Mu'tazilites maintained that man's power must be before
the action, in order to choose, otherwise he would be compelled
(2)
in his action. They thought that it is inconsistent to hold
that power is contemporaneous with the action and, at the same
time, that man is a free agent.
Though al-Maturidi agreed to some extent with the Mu'tazilites
in ascribing to man some freedom in his actions, he viewed this
problem from different angles, and argued to the effect that the
assertion of a power before the act would imply man's independence
of God, which is morally dangerous and religiously wrong. He
charged the Mu'tazilites of supporting in a way the dualists in
their assertion of two gods, because the Mu'tazilites' view
(3)
virtually gave man a role similar to that of God. He argued
that all people sometimes express the view that they cannot do a
certain thing because they are busy doing another thing or the
(1) Tawhld, p.259,1-5. Ta'wilat. 2:286.
(2) Maqalat. p.230,12-13.
(3) Tawhld, pp.259,21-3; 260,1-12.
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work: is burdensome. They all know, however, that they possess
the power in the sense of condition and adequacy of means (asbab
wa-ahwal), which proves the existence of a power contemporaneous
with the act.^^ Another argument is that power is an accident
which does not endure, i.e. it must be in continuous change,
and as the act cannot be realized by prior causes which are not
present at the time of its existence, similarly it cannot be
(2)
said that the power for its realization is prior to it. The
power also is for the sake of the action: if it precedes it
and inability occurs, which is quite possible, then the power
would be for the sake of an action that man is not able to
(3)
perform, which is a contradiction and wrong.
Al-MaturldJ then based an argument on the moral danger
which the Mu*tazilites• view would imply. He said that if the
power for the action is for the sake of future actions, then by
such power man would be in no need of God in all his actions,
which clearly defies the Qur' anic statement that all people are
(4)




(4) Ibid.. p.261,4-6. The same argument is to be found in
Wasiyya of Abu-Hanifa, art.15, where it is said: For if it
• •
(power) originated before the act, man when wanting anything
would not want Allah, and this is in opposition to what the
scripture says, "And Allah is He who is rich, whereas you
are poor", M.C.p. 128.
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is there a definition which explains its nature other than the
fact that it exists contemporaneously with the action. However,
the act is not existent beforehand, but exists by this power,
which proves that the act at the time of its existence discloses
simultaneously the reality of power. He argued that there
is a strong connection between the power and its action, so the
absence of any of them implies the absence of the other. Thus
we find no powerful person who is not acting at all, nor do we
find an impotent person who is acting, so the existence of power
with the absence of the action, cannot be assumed. Similarly,
one cannot assume the existence of impotence along with the
(2)
action. It is also noticeable that causes in the present
(shShid) are connected with their effects - beating with pain,
enjoyment with joy etc. Similarly, the relation between the
power and the act is of the same kind, so we should not assume
(3)
the existence of choice without the power to choose.
The Qadarites (i.e. the Mu'tazilites) used the Qur'anic
verse 7:145 as an argument that power precedes the action, since
Moses was ordered to take God's message by his pre-existent
power. The commentators explained "power" in the verse as
meaning adequacy of means or soundness of organs. The Mu'tazilites,
therefore, should not consider this verse as an argument to their
favour. In disagreement with the commentators, al-Maturidi





the Mu'tazilites have no proof that it is prior to the action.
In the same manner, he refuted the Mu'tazilite arguments from
the verses 27:39 and 28:26.^^
Related to these discussions is the point as to whether
the power is sufficient only for one act or it is appropriate
for the act and its opposite. According to al-Maturidi, the
theologians hold different views regarding this point. Some of
them, including Abu-Hanifa himself, hold that one power is
sufficient for two actions, of disbelief and belief. The same
view is also held by the Mu'tazilites, and it is due to such a
(2)
view, they assumed that power precedes the action. To al-
Maturidi, there are two bases for holding such a view: one is
that the relation of power to its action is like the relation of
the cause to its effect. If the instrument of speech, for
instance, is appropriate for saying truth and its opposite lies,
then power should also be appropriate for the act and its
opposite. If the power is not useful for the two possibilities,
then a man would have no power to perform the opposite of what
he had performed, but since he is commanded to do and prohibited
not to do that opposite, the power must be for the act and its
opposite. The commandments and prohibitions would therefore be
addressed to man according to his ability and power (wus' wa-
(3)quwwa). The other basis is that anything found to be approp¬
riate for a thing and not for its opposite, what it performs
(1) Tawhid. p.319,3-15. cf. Ta'wilat. 2:63.
(2) Tawhid, p.263,3-6.
(3) Ibid. . p.263,7-10.
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would be a result of natural disposition (tab*) and not of
choice (ikhtiyar). So if a power is not appropriate for them
(i.e. the two alternatives), then what it performs would be a
result of tab* and not of ikhtiyar.^
Other theologians, including an-Najjar, hold that one power
is not sufficient for the performance of two acts. They main¬
tained that the power for obedience is not the power for disobed¬
ience, the power of obedience is succour and guidance (tawfiq.
i awn) and the power of disobedience is abandonment and leaving
- (2)
one to choose for oneself (khidhlan. tark). They argued from
the fact that everyone asKs God to help and protect him, and to
save him from abandonment and deviation. Unless there is a power
given to each kind of these acts, there would be no differences
(3)
between those who ask and those who did not. Moreover, no-one
can claim that the unbeliever is given succour to believe, or
he is protected from unbelief, as the believer is helped and pro¬
tected, which proves that there is a different power for each
(4)
act of belief and disbelief. Furthermore, the power does not
endure for two minutes so that two actions could be performed by
it, and at the same time, the two opposite actions are contrary
to each other. They cannot be performed at one time, which proves
(5)
that a power is only for one of them.
(1) Tawhid, p.263,11-13.
(2) Ibid.. p.263,14-16.




Immediately following these arguments, there is a passage
which is quite puzzling. One expects it to be a continuation of
an-Najjar's argument, but its contents are rather confused, and
do not seem to support an-Najjar's view. After some amendment
in the texts, it seems to be al-Maturidi's own argument. If my
reading of the texts is correct, the argument seems to imply
that the power for the action cannot be but based on choice. It
is not like fire and ice whose burning and cooling respectively,
are produced out of natural disposition and compulsion, power
thus being for two possibilities and alternatives.^^
Then al-Maturidi took up some of al-Ka'bl's views regarding
the problem of whether God does impose duties on a man though
he is not able to perform (takllf ma la-vutao'). Reference has
already been made to al-Maturidi's view that such imposition of
duty is not possible if the power meant is the primary power,
but it is quite possible in the absence of the power for the
(2} -
action. To al-Ka'bi and, as a matter of fact, to all the
Mu1tazilites, such imposition of duty is not possible and it is
(3) -
against God's justice. ' Thus al-Ka'bi said that, "it is self
evident that the imposition of what man has no power to perform
is rationally repulsive." Al-Maturidi did not accept this state¬
ment and pointed out that this is the judge of reason which under¬





strength)^ \ but for the other kind of power, that is the
"facilitating power", the matter is not so. Rather, God has
imposed on the associate of Moses a duty of which He knows that
(2)
he would not be able to perform (verses 18:67,75,82). He
pointed out that it is true that the imposition of duty on one
who has been deprived of capability (taqa) is wrong, according to
reason, but it is quite right to impose duties on a person who
deliberately wasted his power. Imposition of duties would other¬
wise be only on him who is certainly going to obey, but this is
not the stipulation of judgement (mihna).Al-Maturidl went on
to say that, "to us the power, in a healthy and sound man, occurs
successively according to his intention and his inclination.
However, in the case where it has not been given to man, the
only reason for that would be his negligence, that he preferred
alternative action, and that he chose an action which drove him
(4)
away from the first alternative.
4. The Relation of God to Human Actions
So far we have seen that al-Maturidi is trying, on the one
hand to affirm man's freedom of choice and acquisition in his
action, and on the other hand, to emphasize the point that these
actions of man are created, willed and, moreover, predetermined
(1) In fact the Mu'tazilites hold the same view as far as the





by God. He clearly pointed out that the fact that God creates,
wills and decrees these actions does not in any way deprive man
of his choice.
The Mu'tazilites who find it difficult to hold such a
balance, maintained that this reconciliatory view is untenable.
They thought that man's freedom of actions and his responsibility
cannot possibly be reconciled with the notion that his actions
are created, willed and decreed by God, without belittling man's
role in his actions, or impairing the conception of God's justice.
They argued that in many Qur'anic verses man has been commanded
to do and prohibited not to do certain things. If these actions
do not belong to him, but to God, then God would be the commanded
and the prohibited, which is absurd.
Al-Maturidi, who uses the same verses against the Jabrites,
did not accept the Mu'tazilites' inference and pointed out the
difference between the "creation" of an act and "its doing". In
these verses, man is not commanded to create or not to create the
action, but only to do or not to do it. Therefore, there would
be no justification for the Mu'tazilites to equate the command
(2)
and prohibition to do or not to do an act, with its creation.
According to al-Maturidl, the Mu'tazilites' denial of these
actions to God might possibly be based on one of three assumptions:
either that these actions cannot possibly be created by God, or
that there is no proof for such a view, or that such a view would
entail the denial of man's free choice and affirm his compulsion,
(1) Tawhid, p.227,9-12.
(2) Ibid.. pp.236,20-21; 237,1-6.
j
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which contradict his being responsible for his actions.
He proceeded to demonstrate the falsity of these assumptions.
He pointed out that the first assumption is based on the propositions
that God's actions are similar to man's, that one action cannot
possibly be done by two agents, otherwise a co-operation between
man and God necessarily follows. To show the weakness of these
propositions, al-Maturidi said that God's act is different from
that of man, for God's act is simply his creation while man's
— (2)
act is his doing a thing (maf'uluhu). Moreover, unlike God's
action, man's act is limited and finite, therefore he cannot
exercise any influence on another man's action, neither is he
able to create his own action, nor can he perform an action out-
with its limited space. Therefore, any attempt to measure God's
(3)
action against man's is wrong. Al-Maturidi sees no impossi¬
bility in finding two agents sharing one action. He pointed to
the examples of two persons who are holding a rope, or moving
something, or carrying some load. Although the contribution of
these agents might differ according to the differences in their
strength, nevertheless, the act is actually belonging to them
(4)both. This is similar in the case of man's act and God's,
i.e, man's action is of different aspects and could be attributed
to man from some aspects and to God from others. As for the
proposition that the attribution of man's action to God and man
(1) Tawhld, p.237,22-23.
(2) Ibid. . p.238,1-3.
(3) Ibid.. p.238,8-16.
(4) Ibid. . p.238,3-7.
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entails co-operation between them, al-Ka'bi maintained that it is
impossible that an act could belong, in reality, to man and at
the same time be created by God. To him, such a notion would
entail co-operation (shirka) between God and man, because it is
impossible that each one of them would do some part of the action.
Al-Maturidi did not accept al-Ka'bi's assertion, and said that the
attribution of an act to God and man does not necessarily entail
co-operation between them because of the different aspects of
the act. He argued that according to the Mu'tazilites own view,
an act might be possessed by God and man without implying co¬
operation between them. Similarly, we find that actions such
as: feeding, clothing and providing with daily bread, are attri¬
buted to God and man and no-one assumes that such an attribution
implies co-operation between God and man.
If it is assumed that there are no proofs to support the
view that God creates man's actions, al-Maturidi said that refer¬
ence has already been made to these proofs and need not repeat
(2)
them in this context.
As for the assumption that the attribution of these actions
to God would entail the compulsion of man, al-Maturidi said that
such a notion is absurd because it is quite evident that everyone
knows from his own experience that he is free to choose (mukhtar).
... If it is said that the denial of compulsion implies that
there would be no outside force which has control over man's act,




compulsion (idtirar); from this respect man has no role in it,
• •
and would not be called by it, but from the respect tnat man
acquires the act, it is his choice. (ikhtiyar). ^ ^
Al-Ka'bl, following the general view of the Mu'tazilites,
introduced various objections to the effect that man's actions
cannot possibly be attributed to both man and God. He argued
that one act cannot possibly be performed by two agents, just as
it is not possible that one "saying" is pronounced by two persons,
or one report is told by two reporters. Al-Maturldi replied by
pointing out the weakness of al-Ka'bi's argument in comparing
"act" to "saying" ana "report", since the latter actions can
possibly be performed by more than one agent. It might be said
that this is the saying of a group of people, that is, the saying
of so and so, and in the case of the worthy transmitted tradition,
we find that one report is attributed to a large number of
reporters. According to this analogy, al-Ka*bi must admit that
(2)
one act might possibly be performed by more than one agent.
Then al-Ka*bi objected to the view that an act is attributed
to man as its doer and to God as its creator, by pointing out
that in the case of an act of disobedience (ma* siya), God should
be blamed for creating the act since there is no justification in
(3)
blaming the doer of the ma* siya and not its creator. Al-
Maturidl replied by emphasizing the point that the action has





originated object, and its being an accident. The moral judge¬
ment for its performance is not related to all these aspects,
but it is only related to certain aspects, otherwise it might be
assumed that a man would be blamed for performing good action,
such as belief. In the case of disobedience, God is connected
with the act from the aspect that He creates it, thus should not
be blamed from this respect, while man is to be blamed because
he performs the act of disobedience. Moreover, God's act in
this respect is wisdom, because He judges the act of disobedience
to be in reality ugly, foolish, unjust and blameworthy. Prom
this aspect His act is true and wise, while from the aspect of
man the same act is foolish and unjust, and from this aspect it
is ugliness and disobedience.^^
Al-Ka'bi introduced another argument to the effect that God
is not the creator of the evil actions of man. He said, it is
true that to God has been attributed the creation of all things
including man's actions, and certainly there is no glorification
in attributing to Him the evil actions of man, such as: the curse
of God, disbelief in Him, and killing his prophets. Moreover,
He denounced disbelief and warned of punishment for it, therefore,
it cannot be His action. Thus these evil deeds of man should
(2)
not be included in God's creation.
Al-Maturidi replied by emphasizing that the exclusion of any
actions from God's influence is more dangerous than attributing
to Him the creation of evil acts, because such a notion would
(1) Tawhid, pp.242,18-22; 243,1-2.
(2) Ibid.. p.243,19-22.
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eventually lead to the diminishing of God's lordship. He argued
that though it has been established that God is the Lord of
everything, the God of everything, and the creator of everything,
this should not be said of evil, dirt and impurities in particular.^^
As for God's will, we have already seen that the Mu'tazilites
maintained that God's will means only his actual creation. Al-
Ka'bi, however, added that will simply means that God is not forced
or compelled in His actions. He identifies God's will of man's
actions with His commandment of them and His being pleased with
their performance. This might possibly account for the fact that
his arguments, which were recorded by al-Maturidi, are mainly
intended to demonstrate that God does not will evil or the wicked
actions of man, otherwise He would be wicked and an evil doer.
To substantiate this notion, al-Ka'bi argued from both reason
and revelation. He quoted tne verse, "God desires ease for you,
(2)
and desires not hardship for you." as a proof that God does not
(3)
will disbelief, because it is the most difficult of all things.
Al-Maturidi rejected al-Ka'bi's inference and pointed out that
this verse has nothing to do with faith or disbelief, but it simply
refers to the allowance which is given to the Muslim not to fast
if he is sick or on a journey. If it is assumed, however, that
the verse speaks about faith and disbelief, it is of no support
of al-Ka'bi's view, since it would be referring to those who
believed in God, and thus they got what God wills for them, which




is ease and not hardship.
Al-Ka'bi also quoted the verse, "God desires not wrong for
(2)
His servants". He said that since God does not will injustice,
so it could not be said that He wills the actions of man and then
punishes him for these acts. Al-Katuridi replied by saying that
we do agree that God does not will injustice, but there is a
difference between "willing injustice" and "willing an unjust
action to be injustice". He who wills the hatred of another per¬
son to be an enmity, and his doing injustice to be repulsive and
abominable, would not be willing injustice to them, but would
be willing them just. Al-Maturidi argued that God said, "We
have not created heaven and earth, ana that between them, for
(3)
vanity" , and said in another verse, "falsehood (batil), comes
(4)not to it from before it nor from behind it." so God called
it (i.e. some of His creation) falsehood, but this does not mean
that He created it in falsehood. Similarly, His will that the
act of disbelief is false and unjust from the believers, does not
(5)
mean that He wills injustice for His servants. It is clear
that al-Maturidi*s argument in this respect is along the line of
those arguments wnich were first explored by men like Burghuth.
They all point to the fact that the relation of God to what He





(5) Tawhid, p.298,5-10. Ta'wilat. 41:46.
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and that consequently God is not necessarily to be described by
the terms applicable to a human agent. Al-Maturidi pointed
out that sometimes something might be willed not for its own
sake but for the sake of the benefit of another, such as in the
case of the son of Adam who wished his brother to kill him,
"Even if you try to kill me, I am not going to kill you, for
fear of God, I will that you should take the blame and be an
inmate in Hell." Q.5:28-9, which establishes the fact that one
might will an act which is disobedience, though not intending
to commit disobedience. This explains that the will of an act
which is disobedience in relation to its doer, is not like the
willing of disobedience. Similarly, when God wills the act of
the unbeliever to be an act of disobedience from him,or that
his act is of insult and disgust, is not like willing insult and
(2)
disobedience.
Prom the verse 6:148, "The idolaters will say, Had God
willed, we would not have been idolaters, nor our fathers", al-
Ka'bi argued that disbelief is not willed by God, because in
this verse God denied the claim of the infidels that He wills
their unbelief. Al-Katuridi did not accept al-Ka'bi*s inter¬
pretation of the verse and introduced the following alternatives:
he said that the verse might be explained in that it means that
these infidels claimed that God commands them to be unbelievers.
Therefore God denied them such a claim, as he denied the claim of
those who said that God commands us to do indecency, 7:28. This
(1) Watt, Free Will, p.144.
(2) Tawhld. pp.298,16-19; 299,1-5.
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also includes the Jews who falsified the scripture, claiming
that it is from God, 3:78. Other possible explanation is that
those infidels when they were warned of God's punishment
which was postponed, thought that the prophet was lying, and
that God was pleased with their doing, otherwise He would have
immediately punished them. The verse might also be explained
that it refers to the lack of seriousness in the claim of the
infidels, who were only joking and making fun of the belief that
everything occurs according to God's will. This verse does not,
therefore, support al-Ka'bi's argument.
Al-Ka'bi's rational arguments are based on two assumptions:
one is built on an alleged analogy between "willing a thing" and
"the commandment to do it". The second assumption is derived
from an assumed attachment between "willing" a thing and "being
pleased with its doing". Thus, depending on the first assumption,
al-Xa'bi said, "If it is assumed that the commanding of dis¬
obedience is repulsive, why should its willing of them not be
(2)
repulsive too.
Al-Maturidi saw no association between "will" and "command",
thus he introduced several arguments to show the differences
between tnem: he pointed out the essential contradiction which
exists between disobedience and command, making it impossible to
command an act of disobedience, because in this case it would be
obedience and thus disobedience would lose its significance. Such




Moreover, every doer realizes that he wills his acts, and it is
impossible to say that he commands himself to do an act, which
establishes the essential difference between these two concepts.
Also, we say that God wills his actions and it is impossible to
assume that he is commanded to do them, which proves that "will"
and "command" are different. Furthermore, God wills the death
of the prophets, the honest people, and the survival of His
enemies and the evil doers, who may well live in luxury, but He
does not command this, on the contrary He commanded us to invoke
the destruction of the latter and the survival of the former.
The advantage of command is that it discloses the distinction
and loftiness of the commander since he subdues the other and
demonstrates his merits and bounty upon which he deserves to be
honoured, while will only implies tne free choice ana the denial
of his compulsion. Therefore, there is an essential difference
between these two concepts. To clarify this point, al-Katuridi
referred to the incident of Abraham and his son, wnere God commanded
Abraham to slaughter his son, then He substituted the boy for a
ram, Q.37:102ff. It is not possible that God willed that the boy
should be killed then He prevented the killing by this ransom,
because such an act implies a change of mind (buda*) on the part
of God, wnich is a sign of ignorance. Thus, the fact must be
that the command was for something that God did not really will.^^
Al-Maturidi also saw no association between God's "will" and
His "approval". He said that in the Qur'an we find ample proofs
for the distinction between "approval" and "will": that His
(1) Tawhld, p.304,4-21. Ta'wllat. 4:26.
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approval is only related to good deeds, while His will is
connected with all actions. For God's approval it says, "Yet
He approves not unthankfulness in His servants", Q.39:7, and
"God loves not corruption" Q.2:205. "God loves those who repent"
Q.2;222. and "God loves not the aggressors", Q.2:195; while for
His will it says, "Whomsoever God wills, He leads astray, and
whomsoever He wills, He sets him on a straight path" Q.6:38.
Thus these Qur'anic verses make it clear that God's will is
related to all actions, while His "approval" and His "good
pleasure" must he particularised to good actions only. "Will",
therefore, is different from "approval". The principle is that
"pleasure" and "displeasure" are two concepts related to man's
actions, while"will" has no such relation because there is nothing
(ma'na) in the actions of men which necessitate "will", unless
it is meant to indicate wishful thinking (tamanni) or approval.
Moreover, in the visible world, a man might do what he does not
approve of or like, but it is impossible to be really acting
without having will.^^
Another aspect of God's relation to man's actions is that
He decrees and predetermines them. Since it is established that
God creates man's actions according to His will, it follows that
these actions come into being according to God's decree and made
(2)
as they are according to His predetermination. The terms
Qada'and Qadar have been used in various senses, not all of them
appropriate to God. Therefore, al-Maturidi began his section on
(1) Tawhid. pp.296,22; 297,1-11.
(2) Ibid. . p.305.
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this problem by enlisting the different usages of the terms in
the Qur'an, and explaining which of them might rightly be attri¬
buted to God.
According to al-Maturldl, Qada' in its real meaning is the
judging of a thing and deciding it as it should be fixed.
However, it is sometimes used in the sense of creating things as
they should really be, according to God's knowledge and His
wisdom, as in the verse 41:12. According to this meaning,
Qada' might be attributed to God and said that He decrees man's
actions, i.e. He creates them.^^ The terms is also used some¬
times in the sense of judging (hukm), as in the verses 20:72;
•
3:47. In this sense it is also related to man's actions. Thus
it might be said that God judges that so and so does such and
such at a certain time, so acting accordingly and doing the
certain action at the prescribed time. Such judgement, however,
is meted according to God's prior knowledge of what is going to
be and according to this expected action, will also judge whether
(2)
a man should be punished, or rewarded, blamed or praised.
Qada' is also used in the sense of "to inform" as in the verse,
17:4, and there is no objection for attributing Qada' in this
sense to God. It is also used in the sense of commanding (amr)
as in the verses 17:23; 33:36. In this sense Qada' is attributed
to God only in the case of good actions (khayrat). Sometimes it
might be used in the sense of finishing or completing an action




be attributed to God because it implies that He is occupied
doing or finishing something. Yet it might be used figuratively
to indicate that He has completed His creation.^^
Qadar, however, is of two aspects: one is the measure (hadd)
according to which the thing is made, that is the formation of
everything as it is whether good or evil, beautiful or ugly, wise
or foolish. This is what is meant by the verse 54:49, "Surely
We have created everything in measure". The second meaning is
that the determination of a thing by a certain time or place, be
it true or false, deserves punishment or reward. Qadar, in both
senses, is connected with man's actions. From the first aspect
it is becoming good and ugly in a way that is not conceived or
measured by human intellect. The second aspect is that they
cannot determine the action by certain time or place, which in
(2)
both cases must be by God's determination.
Thus Qada' and Qadar, according to al-Maturidi, are related
to man's actions from those aspects upon which man has no control.
Therefore, no-one should use them as an excuse for his wrongdoings
or sins. To clarify this point al-Maturidi said that Qada' ,
Qadar, creation and will of man's actions, are no excuse for him
for the following reasons:
1. God decrees and creates (certain actions of man) according
to His prior knowledge that such actions will be chosen and
preferred by man. According to God's will, creation and decree,
man attained the actions which he preferred. Therefore, he should
(1) Tawhid, pp.306,12-18; 307,1.
(2) Ibid. . p.307,3-14.
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not argue on the basis of Qada' and Qadar, since these actions
are the best stimulus to him.^^ What al-Maturidl seems to be
driving at, is that these processes do not compel man, or force
him to do this or that action, because these actions are orient¬
ated to agree with man's choice which is already known to God.
2. Al-Maturidi openly stated that Qada' and Qadar and will do
not force man or compel him to do his action, but as a matter of
fact he would still have done the same action, if there were no
such processes. Moreover, man has been provided with the power
to do the opposite of these actions, which proves that these
processes did not compel him, nor turn him away from the reality
of the act. Everyone, al-Maturidi said, knows from his own
experience that he has choice, preference, that he is acting
according to these feelings and is able not to do the act. So
there is a difference between the creation of man's actions and
the creation of substances, accidents, and the times and places
of the actions. Kan has freedom of choice and a role to play in
(2)
his actions, but not in these processes.
3. A third reason is that no-one feels while he is performing
an act that he is incited by God's will or His decree, so any
argument, or basing an excuse on these processes, is false,
otherwise he could find excuses in so many things which are not
related or have no influence on his actions. Al-Maturidi
concluded that, "the fundamental fact is that everyone knows from
(1) Tawhid. p.309-1-5. Ta'wilat. 33:36.
(2) Tawhid. p.309,6-12. Ta'wilat. 42:46.
(3) Tawhid, p.309,13-16.ff.
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his own experience that he is doer, and has power over his
action, that he prefers this particular action and chose it from
among other actions, that so much so, if he were prevented from
performing it, he would be distressed, and no-one can deny such
a fact. At the same time, however, one finds that his actions
do not always occur according to his estimation and his intention
of them to be of certain qualities and at a certain place and
time. This proves that his actions from these later aspects do
not belong to him, so whoever tried to attribute the acts from
these aspects or deny them to man from the preceding ones, is
self-willed and obstinate^^
Though the Mu'tazilites did not deny the doctrine of Qadar,
they did not accept the notion that man's actions, and in
particular the evil ones, are predetermined by God. Thus, al-
Ka'bi, as a leading member of the sect, maintained that God does
not decree unbelief, ana argued that unbelief is imperfection and
falsehood, while what God decrees is true and right. He quoted
the tradition in which God says, "he who does not approve of My
decree and is not patient with the misfortune with which I
afflicted him, should look for a god other than Me." He said
that since no-one approved of disbelief, it should not be included
(2)
in what God decrees. He explained the verse, 54:49, in the
same sense, as that which is measured or decreed is that which is




(2) Ibid.. pp.307,16-18; 308,1-2.
(3) Ibid.. p.308,15-16.
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Al-Maturidi rebuked al-Ka'bi for his failure to understand
the simple principle of Kalam (i.e. the rational method of
argument) , and pointed out that the judgement of what is false
is false, and what is imperfect is imperfect, is just and right.
The judgement that the act of benevolence, as benevolence, is not
false or imperfect, so God's judgement that disbelief is false is
not false.The Tradition which al-Ka'bi quoted, fully supports
this statement and should be understood in the sense that the
approval (rida*) of what God decrees in relation to kufr. is to
know that unbelief is dwindling (mudmahill). is ugly, and that it
• •
is evil, corrupt and leads to the destruction and punishment of
him who holds it. Whoever does not approve of such a fact is an
unbeliever, and in this sense the meaning of the report applies
to him. The act of unbelief and evil is the action of man, and
(2) - - -
it is impossible to say that it is God's decree. Al-Maturidi
pointed out that this Tradition is concerned with illness and
misfortune, and according to the Mu'tazilite doctrine such acts
are not decreed to one who commits no sin unless God gives him
indemnity ('iwad). thus, in a way, they are not approving of
God's decree till they are given indemnity, and thus this
(3)
Tradition fully fits them.
Al-Maturidi made it quite clear that there is a difference
between the decreeing of the existence of evil and sin, the pre¬





the decreeing, creation and predetermination of them are the
work of God, their committing is the work of man, by means of
his capacity, choice and intention. He pointed out that what is
attributed to God is either being his command, or indicates
reverence of Him. In the attribution of sin, neither of these
would be realized. "Strictly speaking," al-Maturidi said, "even
though God is the Lord of everything, the God of everything, and
the creator of everything, and everything is His, this is not
said of dungs, impurities, and the devil. ... Thus to say that
unbelief and sins exist by reason of God's decree, predetermination,
and will is reprehensible ... similarly people do not say: 0
creator of impurities and dirt, and other such expressions, even
though He is in fact the creator of everything. The reason for
this is that it is permissible to attribute to God everything
which constitutes glorification, gratitude, the mention of His
blessings or commands; anything other than this should not be
attributed to Him, even if in fact it is created by Him."^^
Related to these discussions is the problem of whether or
not God bestows certain favours to some people and withholds it
from others. In the Qur'an many verses indicate that God bestows
His guidance on some people and leads others astray, that He
supports some and abandons others. The Mu'tazilites tried to
explain such verses in a manner to suit their principle of "justice".
Thus, they said that the expression, "God led men astray" does
not mean that He leads them into unbelief or causes them not to
believe. According to al-Ash'ari, "Many of the Mu'tazilites
(1) Tawhid, p.312,5-21. Ta'wilat 27:88.
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explained that "lead astray" (adalla), when attributed to God
•
in the Qur'an, means, "He judges them to be astray or erring
or He said that about them that they are erring, and called
them so."^^ Similar views were attributed to the Mu'tazilites
by al-Maturidi who said that, "The Qadarites (probably he means
the Mu'tazilites) explained the concepts of leading astray
(adalla), causing to deviate (izagha)and turning away their
hearts (saraf) in the sense that God tried and abandoned men
(mihna wa-takhlivva) in their doing evil actions, and He helped
them and commanded them to do good deeds. They also explained
(2)
"leading astray" in the sense that God calls them "strayers".
Though al-Maturidi emphasized the doctrine of God's justice,
he made similar emphasis on God's favour; and pointed out that
all actions of God are based on His justice and favour. Thus he
rejected the Mu*tazilites' interpretation of these concepts. He
refuted the explanation of idlal in the sense of calling them
astray, by referring to the fact that anyone who calls another
"strayer" would not be said he led him astray. Moreover, there
is no merit or wisdom attributed to God, when He calls someone
by this term. Al-Maturidi pointed out that God is described by
His action, which means His creation of everything in the manner
appropriate to it. In His action, God is either doing justice or
bestowing favour, therefore, his actions are never free from one
of these concepts, which refutes the Mu'tazilite denial of God's
favour.^
(1) Maqalat. pp.261-62.
(2) Tawhld. p.313,5-7, 15.
(3) Ibid.. p.313,7-13, 16-17, 19-20.
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Al-Ka'bi, following the Mu'tazilite general view, explained
the verse 6:125, "Whomsoever God desires to guide, He expands
his breast to Islam; whomsoever He desires to lead, astray, He
makes his breast narrow tight as if he were climbing to heaven",
as referring to the period which follows belief and disbelief,
asserting that God's will did not precede, or cause either of
them. To al-Ka'bi, the verse means that God gives him, who obeys,
some of His favour (lata'if), calls him by honourable names, and
awards him the best, in order to strengthen his desire to obey
Him more. Reference to this sense has been made in the verses:
"but those who are guided aright, them He increases in guidance",^^^
(2)
and the verse, "and thereby He leads none astray save the ungodly".
According to al-Ka'bi, guidance and leading astray is not possible
beforehand, without one deserving God's enmity or friendship,
for two reasons: One is that God has no favour and He is not
compliant. Secondly, he who discriminates between his servants
according to the mode of his circumstances would have no right
to blame them for their actions, since they in fact have no choice
( 3)
or full freedom in their actions.
Al-Maturidi did not accept al-Ka'bi's explanation of this
verse, and pointed out his fault in interpreting the verse as
referring to the state of man before he commits himself to faith
or unbelief. He said that the verse clearly states that "whom¬
soever God desires to guide, He expands his breast to Islam", thus
(1) Qur'an. 47:17.
(2) Ibid. . 2:26.
(3) Tawhld, pp.300,14-19; 301,1-2.
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he becomes muslim when God expands his breast to it, and not
that he expands his breast after he becomes a muslim. It
might be asked whether the acts of faith and disbelief are
accompanied or not with the expansion of the breast and its
tightening up respectively, or whether they are of the same
condition in respect of expansion and tightening up of the breast.
It cannot be said that they are of the same condition, so it
must be admitted that God has a favour which He bestows on one
who becomes faithful and withholds it from another who becomes
(2)
an unbeliever. It might also be asked of him (i.e. al-Ka'bi)
whether that which has been increased after faith, helps and
facilitates in respect of religion or not. Al-Ka'bi has to
answer affirmatively and has to admit, according to his own
doctrine of the "best", that God bestows something which is best
(3)for man in respect of religion.
In his Ta'wilat, al-Maturidi widely discussed these concepts,
and took every opportunity to refute the Mu'tazilite view. He
emphasized the point that God bestows guidance to some people and
withholds it from others without impairing his justice, as the
Mu'tazilites thought. For such a favour is connected with God's
prior knowledge of what man is going to choose and how he is going
to perform his actions. Thus, commenting on the verse 5:41,
"Those are they whose hearts God desires not to purify", al-








hearts to he purified. He knew prior that they would choose, what
they had chosen, and willed it, therefore he wrote what he had
already known that they would will and choose. The verse, there¬
fore, refutes the Mu'tazilites' assertion that God does not will
the purification of the hearts of some people.Also the
verse 12:33, which states that Joseph invoked God's help and His
protection from the cunning of the women, proves to al-Maturidi
that God has a favour which He did not bestow on Joseph. Had
He bestowed it on him, then the women's wicked deeds would have
been turned from Joseph. The verse refutes the Mu'tazilites
assertion that God has given everyone power to perform obedience
(2)
and to refrain from evil.
The Mu'tazilites explained guidance (huda) in the sense of
making something clear (bayan), saying that in this sense God
gives guidance to all mankind and those who forfeit it do so
willingly. Al-Katuridi did not accept this view, and argued
from the verse 28:56, "You guide not whom you like, but God
guides whom He wills", that if "guidance" is only an explanation,
the prophet would have certainly explained to them, this proves
that there is a guidance other than explanation, which is bestowed
on man, and which would make him a believer. "Guidance" in this
sense of succour (tawfiq), protection ('isma) and right direction
(sadad), is beyond the control of the prophet and only God can
(3)





whomsoever He wills, thou canst not make these in their tombs
to hear", proves that God has favour and something which He does
not bestow on them. Had He done so, they would all have been
guided and become believers.
Many verses, al-Maturidi said, refute the Mu'tazilites'
claim, and confirm that God gives guidance to some people and He
leads others astray. Thus the verse, 2:26, "Thereby He leads
many astray, and thereby He guides many, and thereby He leads
none astray save the ungodly", clearly states that by striking a
similitude, God intends to guide some people, and to lead others
astray, but all this is based on His prior knowledge of what they
(2)
are going to choose and prefer.
The Mu'tazilites interpreted the terms khatm and tab',
(sealing and imprinting in relation to the heart), which occur in
the Qur'an, in a manner consistent with their general view that
they imply no prior prevention of man from belief or getting
(3) - _
guidance. According to al-Maturidi, the Mu'tazilites inter¬
preted the verse 2:7, "God has set a seal on their hearts and on
their hearing, and on their eyes is a covering", in the sense
that God makes a sign on their hearts showing that they are not
going to believe, similar to the sign of the title of a book or
a message. Al-Maturldi did not accept this understanding of the
verse and said that khatm means that God creates the darkness of





Therefore, God sets seal on their hearts when they abandon
pondering and reflection, sets seals on their hearing when they
refrain from listening to the truth, and covers their eyes when
they stop looking at themselves and the world around them, in
order to infer that they are temporal and He who creates them
is eternal.^
5. The Actions of God
The Mu'tazilite doctrine of "justice" led them to believe
that God's actions are destined for a certain purposes that is
what is best for man in his religion. According to ash-Shahrastani,
"The Mu'tazilites unanimously declare that the wise can only do
what is best and good, and that His wisdom keeps in view what is
(2)
best for His servants."
In both Kitab at-Tawhid and the Ta'wilat. al-Maturldl shows
his disapproval of the Mu'tazilite doctrine of the "best", dis¬
closing the weakness of their arguments for such a view, and how
their whole concept is related to the dualists. He said that,
"some people assumed that whoever acts without intending to
benefit others by his actions is not wise, and whoever acts
without aiming by his actions towards a certain purpose is
fooling around (*abith)." They hold that it is not possible that
God would do harm to anyone without deserving such a harm, con¬
sidering it as obligatory to God to do what is best for others
in matters concerning religion, and do for them whatever is good
(1) Ta*wilat. 2:7.
(2) Kilal, vol.1, p.45.
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in the outcome. Thus they limited God's actions, in the sense
that they must be intended either to cause benefit for others,
or protect them from harm. They measured God's acts to those
of the wise men in that His actions must be in agreement with
the principle of wisdom. They conceded, however, that God
differs from the wise men among men, in that His doing or not
doing an action would neither elevate nor debase Him, His actions
neither bring Him benefit nor defend Him against harm. The
wisdom in His actions is basically that they cause benefits and
protect others from harm, otherwise they would just be useless
( 1 )('abath). The Mu'tazilites gave different explanations to
the apparent existence of harm in the world. Some denied its
existence altogether, and others held that it exists but God
must indemnify those who have been afflicted in order that His
(2)
acts be in accordance with wisdom.
Al-Maturidi agreed with the Mu'tazilites that God's actions
cannot be against the principle of wisdom, but he did not
accept their view regarding the definition of wisdom and its
relation to observable good and evil in the world. He defines
wisdom as placing a thing in its proper place, which is contrary
(3)
to foolishness. He said that he who knows God very well,
that He is self-sufficient, all powerful and that to Him belong
creation and command, would necessarily know that His acts








Himself, all-sufficient and all-knowing. What leads one to act
against wisdom is either ignorance or being in need. Both of
these concepts are inappropriate for God. Thus we know that His
actions cannot possibly be against wisdom. To al-Maturidl,
injustice and foolishness are repulsive, while justice and wisdom
are good in general (fi-1-jumla), but when it comes to particular
things, we find that they are relative concepts. One thing
might be wisdom, foolishness, justice and injustice according to
its difference circumstances. Since, in general, wisdom and
justice are good and injustice and foolishness are bad, we must
affirm that all God's actions are according to wisdom, justice
or unmerited grace (fadl) and beneficence (ihsan), because He is
• •
the most beneficent, self-sufficient and all-knowing, and it
would be inappropriate to ascribe injustice or foolishness to him
(2)
who has such characteristics.
Since things in relation to justice and injustice, foolish¬
ness or wisdom, differ according to the differences of circum¬
stances, it is quite possible that their real nature might be
concealed from reason. Therefore, it would be very difficult
for human reason to judge God's actions or His law as being wise
or foolish, just or unjust. This discloses the falsity of both
the dualists and the Mu'tazilites in their attempts to subjugate
(3)God's actions to the criterion laid down by human intellect.
Reason, to al-Maturidi, is a created instrument, which has its
(1) Tawhld. p.216,16-20.
(2) Ibid. . p.217,13-21.
(3) Ibid.. pp.217,21-23; 218,1-9.
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shortcomings and limitations. Its judgements are largely influenced
by its own circumstances, so it might be afflicted by something
which prevents it from distinguishing between wisdom and fool¬
ishness. Therefore, we must assume that wisdom exists in all
God's actions whether we are able to conceive it by our intellect
or not.^^ Moreover, an act is foolish in the visible world if
it involves trespassing on another's property, or disobeying a
(2)
commander: both cases are not applicable to God. According
to al-Maturidi, the ascription of injustice and foolishness and
similar concepts to anyone would be wrong in two cases: (i) If
these concepts are repulsive according to the judgement of
intuition and reason, so that whenever one thinks about them, one
realizes their repulsive nature and discovers that they are very
abhorrent. Concepts of such a nature are different from those
which natural disposition, (tab*). judges as repulsive, such as
slaying of animals, which is not so bad after one becomes used to
it. What is thought as repulsive among God's actions is not of
the nature of the first kind, otherwise no-one can trust His
promise or fear His threat, nor hope for His grace, or feel secure
(3) - - -from his deeds. What al-Maturidi seems to be trying to
establish is, that what seems to us as repulsive among God's
actions is not intrinsically so, but their unacceptable nature
is due to misunderstanding on our part. If we thought carefully
about them we might discover the goodness in them. (ii) The other
(1) Tawhid. p.116,9-12.
(2) Ibid.. p.218,10-13.
(3) Ibid., pp.218,20-23; 219,4-7.
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case is that if one is induced to such actions as a result of
need or ignorance, from which God is free.^^
Al-Maturldi criticized the Mu'tazilite methodology, which
is based on judging God's actions according to the actions of
the wise men. He said that since God possesses the qualities of
essential knowledge, power, might and life, none of which wise
men possess, there is no justification in comparing His actions
to the actions of the wise men. Moreover, there is none of the
wise men, in the present, who is not liable to foolishness,
similarly the self-sufficient and powerful among them is liable
to possess the opposite of these qualities. In fact the wise men
were possessors of these opposite qualities, then they were given
self-sufficiency and power. However, they do not possess these
qualities in their absolute natures, but in the limited sense,
according to their experience and previous learning. In judging
a certain case they have to depend on their stored knowledge
and previous experience. Thus, for a man, regardless of his
wisdom, to claim judgement on God's actions would be presumptious.
This can be explained further by the fact that every wise man
knows that he is ignorant of so many things, that he is incapable
and in need regarding various matters; he also knows very well
his foolishness in respect of so many things. A man of such
characteristics would be foolish and ignorant to indulge in
(2)
judgement on God's actions.
In his Ta'wilat, al-Maturidi widely discussed the Mu'tazilite
(1) Tawhld, pp.219,23; 200, 1 ff.
(2) Ibid.. p.220,5-15.
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doctrine of the "best", and made reference in many verses to the
weakness of their arguments.
Two questions were closely connected with the doctrine of
the "best": one is concerned with the cause behind God's
creation of the world, and the other is how the existence of
evil in the world could be explained and be harmonized with God's
wisdom. To the first question, al-Waturldl devoted a special
section in Kitab at-Tawhid. where he introduced different
(2)
answers of various groups. What interests us here are the
answers introduced by some of the Hu'tazilites and that intro¬
duced by an-Najjar. According to al-Haturidl, some of the
Mu'tazilites answer this question saying that God considered
such a creation as the best, so He did it, and He is not subject
to question regarding His doing the best.^^ Al-KaturidI
questioned the validity of this answer, saying that if the
Mu'tazilites meant by the "best", the wisdom, then their view
would be similar to the view of those who hold that God's actions
cannot be against wisdom. If they meant something else by the
term aslah. they have to explain their view more precisely. They
• •
should, however, be ashamed of using such a term (i.e. the best)
for God. The Mu'tazilite view of the "best" implies that God
would have no alternative but to do what He has done, and accord¬
ing to this He would not be bestowing any favours in His actions,
which is an extremely blameworthy attribute. Al-Maturidi argued




that if it is not open to God to do better than what He has done,
then He would be taking advantage of His creations, thus being
in need of it, which is impossible for God.^^
An-Najjar answers this question by saying that God created
the world for many reasons, some of the world is created as
signs and proofs, admonition or warning, grace and mercy,
nourishment and sustenance. Some objects have been created to
be under the control of other objects, or to be fortune or mis¬
fortune for them. To an-Najjar therefore, all creation is
according to God's wisdom which is the placing of everything in
its proper place.
Al-Maturldi openly showed his approval of what an-Najjar
said in this respect, saying that, besides what an-Najjar has
sufficiently explained, it might be added that the reason behind
the creation is the fulfillment of God's commandments and His
prohibitions, and the realization of attraction and intimidation
(targhib wa-tarhib). To explain this point, al-Maturldl said
that God created His creature and provided him with all the means
of attaining knowledge, ,and bestowed on him many favours and
graces. Therefore, it is most likely that man should be account¬
able for his actions, thus would be punished and rewarded accord¬
ing to his conformity with God's commandments and prohibitions.
Thus, to al-Maturidi, the main purpose behind the creation is the
(3)
kulfa or mihna, that is, the judgement of man in the hereafter.




As for the second question, that is the existence of evil
in the world, al-Maturldl said that there is a wisdom behind the
creation of evil things such as: snakes and harmful substances,
though our intellect might not be capable enough to grasp the
divine wisdom in that, or fail to know the nature of the wisdom
in them. He pointed out that these evil things should be con¬
sidered in relation to the good ones, in order to attain
reasonable explanation for their creation. Then he introduced
the following explanations for the creation of evil. He said
that evil things might have been created along with the good
things in order to demonstrate the kind of rewards for obedience
and punishment for disobedience, because human beings are
created with a natural propensity for finding purpose in their
actions. To satisfy such a nature, an example from the present
is made to indicate the nature of the things man has been prom¬
ised, thus it would become easier for him to realize the outcome
of his works. Another explanation is that these evil things
were created to be a tangible example for man, and to teach him
how to be careful in dealing with his enemies, and warn him from
committing bad deeds. Kan can attain such knowledge through his
intellect, but not all people are able to do so, therefore,
these evils are created to warn those who are intellectually
incapable of distinguishing between what benefits them and what
(2)
causes them harm. It might also be said that things were
created in such a contradictory nature, of good and evil, to prove
(1) Tawhid, p.108,15-20.
(2) Ibid.. pp.108,22-23; 109,1 ff.
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the existence of their controller who is all-knowing and one,
and to demonstrate His wisdom in combining them in such a way.^^
Another explanation for the creation of evil things is that they
have been created in order to humiliate the tyrants and kings,
and to disclose their weaknesses, so that they would not dare to
(2) - -
boast of their strength and power. Finally, al-Maturidi said,
every element which seems to be harmful contains some benefits
which man might or might not be able to comprehend. If we take,
for example, fire we find that it burns, but at the same time it
is very useful for other purposes such as cooking. Similarly,
we find water can be a source of life or death for all creatures;
poisonous stuff has some medical benefits for curing certain
diseases. So every element does have some benefits and contains
harms, so much so, that to say that some substances are absolutely
(3)









AL-ASH'ARI ON THE DOCTRINE OF QADAR
In the Luma' . Risala II and the Ibana. al-Ash'ari dealt
with different aspects of the problem of Qadar. He also expressed
some of his views regarding this problem in his descriptive work,
the Kaqalat. As we have already noted, these works seem to
differ in the emphasis they place on roughly similar views.
1. The Analysis of Man's Actions
In the Luma'. al-Ash'ari introduced the section on Qadar
with an argument based on some Qur'anic verses to the effect that
man's actions were created by God. He quoted the verses 37:96,
"God created you and what you do", and the verse, "As a recom¬
pense for that they have been doing".Here al-Ash'ari pointed
out that, as the reward in the latter verse is given for an action,
the creation in the first verse must be related also to the action,
and thus the verse establishes that the actions of man are created
by God.^2^
The Mu'tazilites, who refuted such a doctrine, referred to
the verse, 37:95, preceding the above mentioned verse 37:96, which
reads, "Do you worship what you carve?" They argued that this
verse refers to the idols of the pagan Arabs. So the verse
following it, 37:96, must also refer to them, and thus it proves
(1) Qur'an. 32:17; 46:14.
(2) Luma'. p.37,3-6. In the Ibana al-Ash'ari quoted these verses,
but he did not introduce this detailed discussion. See
Ibana. p.68.
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that ta'malun refers only to the idols, not to men's acts. Al-
Ash'ari refuted this argument by stating that they really carved
the idols, but did not make the wood, so ta'malun cannot refer
to idols.In the same way, the Mu'tazilites quoted the
verse, 7:117, "It forthwith swallowed up their lying invention",
which refers to the story of Moses whose staff turned into a
serpent and swallowed the serpents which the Magicians had "invented"
from their staffs. What they invented, the Mu'tazilites argued,
was not the act of invention (ifk), but its result, that is,
they made what seemed to be serpents; likewise, "what you do"
in the verse 37:96 did not, for the Mu'tazilites, mean "your
actions" but the idols.
Al-Ash'ari rejected this Mu'tazilite conclusion. While
admitting the truth of the assertion that what they "deceptively
invented" refers to the likeness of the serpents, he maintained
that, in the case of the idolaters, they did not really make the
wood. He, moreover, pointed out that it is not valid to compare
such verses in this way, otherwise it might be argued that if
what they "deceptively invented" was not the action of deception
(but its result), then "as recompense for that they have been
doing" does not mean a recompense for their actions (but only
for their results). With this demonstration of the fruitlessness
of such a manner of arguments in this case, al-Ash'ari showed
that a comparison between the Qur'anic words, "What they deceivingly
invented" and "God creates you and what you make" to be inappro¬
priate . ^ ^
(1) Luma'. p.37,7-11.
(2) Ibid.. pp.37,12-17; 38,1-8.
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Then al-Ash'ari introduced rational arguments to support
his view that man's actions are created by God. One of his
arguments to this effect is based on the proposition that an
act cannot be said to be created by somebody unless he has full
knowledge of it as it is, and that he wills it to be such. Prom
what we observe in man's actions, al-Ash'ari said, we find that
he has neither full knowledge of them nor do they come about
according to his will. The unbelievers, for example, exert them¬
selves to justify their convictions (which are bad and false),
but they fail in this, and their convictions become contrary to
their intention. Thus they cannot be the creator of their acts
of disbelief. The creator of such an act must be another being
who intentionally produces it as unbelief (which is bad and
false), and that is God, who is the creator of all man's actions
whether innate or compulsory, or acquired.
Another argument demonstrating divine creation of all man's
actions follows: it states that it is established beyond doubt
that compulsory acts are created by God, but there is no reason
to differentiate between these acts and the acquired ones, since
both types of action are temporal and in need of time and place.
So, as the compulsory acts are created by God, the acquired
(2)
actions must also be created by Him.
To the objection that if the two actions are so similar,
then they must be both compulsory or acquired actions, al-Ash'ari's
answer seems to suggest that in spite of this similarity between
(1) Luma*, pp.38-39. Ibana, p.69,2-6.
(2) Luma*. p.41,1-7.
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them, in that they are both created by God, there is difference
between them in their relation to man. He pointed out that in
the case of compulsory acts a man finds himself constrained,
compelled and forced in his actions, as in the case of one who
is shaking from palsy or shivering from fever. Every one, al-
Ash'ari said, realized that one who goes and comes, and approaches
and retires, is quite different from one who shakes from palsy
or shivers from fever; and every one knows very well how to
distinguish between the two states in himself and in others by
a necessary knowledge which leaves no room for doubt. It is
upon this very differentiation between the acquired and compulsory
actions that al-Ash'ari seems to have formulated his conception
of kasb (acquisition).
2. His Conception of Kasb and Man's Power
In the Luma' and the Kaqalat. al-Ash'arl defines kasb in
the same terms: "The true meaning of acquisition is that the
(2)
thing proceeds from its acquirer by virtue of a created power"
"The truth in my view is that the meaning of acquisition (iktisab)
is that the thing occurs by means of an originated power, that it
(3)
is an acquisition of the person through whose power it occurs."
Thus al-Ash'ari differentiates between the acquired actions of
man and his compulsory actions by means of this originated power,
yet they are both created by God as are all things. In this




sense, man does not create his actions, rather he acquires them.
He himself chooses to acquire the action, and at this moment God
creates a power for him to do so. Thus the action is in fact
created by God through this power originated in the man, which
is a necessary condition for the action to exist. Thus man has
no positive role in his acquired actions apart from his being
conscious of them. It is God alone who creates or even acquires
these actions, for He is the only true efficient agent of all
acts and events.Al-Ash'arl carefully distinguished between
"acquiring" and "doing" and refrained from using the latter term
for man's action, because this would be to dispense with the
true agent, that is God, who is essential as the originator of
the act. While the act can exist without its acquirer, God
cannot cause man to acquire, because acquisition occurs through
a temporal power which is impossible for God, yet the agent of
kasb is not man but God, because man cannot actually be true agent
(2)
of anything, not even for his acquisition. Thus it seems that
al-Ash'ari assigned a rather passive role to the muktasib (that
is man).
Al-Ash'ari*s views on kasb have been strengthened by his
emphasis on the point that man does not have the power to perform
the action before he performs it, and that this power is specific
for the act and not effective for its opposite. Against an-
- - (3)
Nazzam's and al-Aswari's definition of power, al-Ash'ari
• •
(1) Luma'. p.39,10-14. cf. Ghoraba, "Al-Ashferi's Theory of
Acquisition* I.Q.2 (1955), pp.3-8.
(2) Luma'. pp.39,15-20; 40,1-17.
(3) Maqalat. pp.229,3-4.
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stated that man is capable of acting by virtue of a power which
is distinct from him, because man sometimes performs an action
and sometimes is impotent, just as he knows at one time and does
not know at another, and now moves and again does not move.^^
Then he proceeds to establish that such a power does not precede
the action, but it exists simultaneously with the realization
of the act. To prove this point, al-Ash'ari argued that the act
must either be simultaneous with the realization of the power
or that it must follow it. If the act comes into existence after
the power, and if it is established that power does not endure,
it would be necessary to postulate that the act comes into exist¬
ence by means of a non-existing power, and if this is possible,
then it would also be possible to assume that burning results
from a non-existing fire, and cutting from a non-existing sword,
and the cutting could be done by a non-existing limb, but since
all these are impossible, it must be established that these acts
(2)
exist simultaneously with the power.
Since man's power exists simultaneously with the act, it
logically follows that such a power exists only in relation to one
act and that its effect does not extend to the act and its
opposite. To establish this point, al-Ash'ari clearly stated
that the existence of the originated power is preconditioned by
(1) Luma/_, p.54,3-9.
(2) Ibid. , pp.54,10-20; 55,1-3. One might understand from the
examples given by al-Ash'ari in this respect, that the
relations of man's power to his action is to a greater
extent similar to the relation of these causes to their
effects.
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the simultaneous existence of its object (maqdur).^ ^ In order
to elaborate this point, he drew a contrast between God's power
and man's. He pointed out that God's power transcends all beings,
and can have no temporal relation to the existence of its object,
so that its realization does not necessitate the simultaneous
existence of its object. Man's power is strongly connected with
the realization of its object and can exist only in an immediate
and simultaneous temporal correlation to its object. Thus it
would be impossible to assume that it is related to more than
(2)
one act since this would mean that they were all in existence.
He denies the possibility that one power can be related to more
than one object, and said that the power is not only for that
which exists simultaneously in time with it, but also for what
exists with it in its locus (mahal). So if it were a power for
•
more than one effect, these effects would have to exist simul¬
taneously with it, which would entail the simultaneous existence
of contradictory effects in one locality, and this would mean
that one of them would be an effect which does not exist with
(3)
its immediate cause, which is impossible.
Then al-Ash'ari argued from another aspect, to the effect
that man's power for action is simultaneous with the act. He said
that he for whom God does not create a power cannot acquire
anything. Hence, since he cannot acquire the act if there is
no capacity, it is certain that the acquisition exists only
(1) Luma'. p.55,10-11.
(2) Ibid.. pp.55,12-18; 56,1-5.
(3) Ibid. . p.56,6-16.
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because the capacity exists. Equally, this is an affirmation
that the capacity exists with the act and for the act.^^
Then al-Ash<ari proceeds to explain the nature of man's
power. It has already been mentioned that some of the Mu'tazi-
lites maintained that power consists of the strength and physical
well-being of the body and with the non-existence of this power,
(2) -
there would be no action. To al-Ash'ari, however, power is
pertaining to something more than the physical organs. In many
instances, he differentiated between ability in the sense of
means and physical strength, and ability of the body (badan)
(3)
whose existence entails the existence of its object.
On the basis of such a conception of power, al-Ash'ari
rejected the assumption that the non-existence of limbs (jariha)
entails an inability to acquire (kasb). He pointed out that it
is true that the non-existence of jariha leads to the non-
existence of power which results in the non-existence of acqui¬
sition (iktisab). So, acquisition becomes impossible, not
because of the absence of limbs, but because of the non-existence
of the power, which is the immediate ground for the acquisition
of the act. Al-Ash'ari argued that since the limbs can exist
together with impotence, and since when power is inexistent there
is no acquisition, that the acquisition does not take place
(4)
because of the non-existence of the capacity and the limbs.
(1) Luma'. p.56,17-20.
(2) See supra. Chapter V, p. 334.
(3) Luma'. pp.62,15-16; 63,4-5; 9-10.
(4) Ibid.. p.57,1-7.
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To the assumption that the non-existence of life entails
the non-existence of acquisition, which necessitates the admission
that the non-existence of limbs entails the non-existence of
acquisition as well, al-Ash'ari replied that these cases are
not the same, because with the non-existence of life there would
be no power. Hence the acquisition becomes non-existence as a
result of the non-existence of life. For life might exist acco¬
mpanied by impotence and in this case man would not be muktasib.
Similarly, to the proposition that the non-existence of knowledge
of the act entails the non-existence of the act, al-Ash'ari
replied that the realization or non-realization of the act depends
on the existence or non-existence of power, and not on the exist¬
ence or non-existence of knowledge. Such a knowledge, however,
might be realized without the necessary realization of the action,
whereas the realization of power is necessarily accompanied by
simultaneous realization of the action.He stated that there
are two preconditions for the possibility of the realization of
any action; that there should be an absence of any internal or
external constraint or impediment to the freedom of action, and
that the physical organism (binya) should be suitable to be the
(2)
locality of both the power and the act resulting from it.
Then al-Ash'ari proceeds to substantiate these rational
I
arguments with quotations from the Qur'an as proofs for the theses
that the power for the act and its realization exist simultan¬
eously. To this end, he quoted the verses 18:67, 11:20 and
(1) Luma*. p.57,8-18.
(2) Ibid.. pp.57,19; 58,1-5.
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18:101. Commenting on al-Ash'ari's method in dealing with
this problem, R.M. Prank remarked that al-Ash'ari had deliberately-
left those quotations to the end of his treatment of the point,
because he was well aware of their weaknesses as a support for
(2)
his thesis, in that they all involve negative statements. It
is clear that the form of these verses is negative, but at the
same time it must be remembered that such an arrangement of
evidences and proofs is the normal procedures adopted by al-
Ash'ari throughout the Luma'. The best example of this might be
found in his treatment of the problems of God's visibility and
the affirmation of God's attributes.
Then al-Ash'ari dealt with the problem of whether it is
possible for God to impose upon man duties which he is not able
to perform. He said that the above-mentioned verses, 18:67,
11:20 and 18:101, fully confirmed such a doctrine. Those people
referred to in the verses 11:20 and 18:101, neither accepted the
truth nor listened to it, though they have been commended to,
because they were unable to do so; their inability to do so,
however, was not as a result of *a,jz (absolute incapability), but
(3)
as a result of their refusing to accept or listen.
Al-Ash'ari's views on this point were based on his concep¬
tions of the terms qudra. 'a,jz and tark. It has already been seen
that qudra not only means physical soundness, but also means what
(1) Luma'. p.58,6-11.
(2) R.M. Frank, "The Structure of Created Causality according
to al-Ash'ari." S.I. vol.25-26 (1966-67), p.62.
(3) Luma'. p.58, 12-16.
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he designated as the power of the "body", which is for the act
and with which the act simultaneously exists. The non-existence
of power has two aspects: absolute incapability ('ajz) and
omitting to perform the act (tark). He considered ' a j z as an
opposite of power and defined it as the absolute incapability to
perform the act nor its opposite; the imposition of duties with
such an incapability is inconceivable; tark, however, is to leave
an action unperformed, and to wilfully perform the opposite;
imposition of duties under such circumstances is quite possible.
According to such conceptions, al-Ash'ari answered the
question of whether the unbeliever is able to believe, by saying
no. By performing the act of unbelief he has been occupied in
performing a contrary belief. When he is asked to believe,
nothing outwith his capability is imposed on him, because he is
not in a state of * ajz, but he has simply left the performance
of the act of belief. In the case of 'ajz. he would not be able
(2)
to perform the act of unbelief itself.
Al-Ash'ari's opponents argued that if 'ajz has two objects,
namely the action and its contrary,then by analogy, human power
also has these two objects.^ Al-Ash'ari rejected this, stating
that if it were so then one would have to argue that divine help
('awn) for a thing is equalled by divine help for its contrary.
Moreover, 'ajz entails the simultaneous non-existence of two or
more mutually contrary objects, none of which man acquires. If
(1) Luma'. p.20,1-3.
(2) Ibid.. pp.58,17-18; 59,1-5.
(3) Ibid.. p.59,6-7.
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human power were analogous to it, it would entail the simult¬
aneous existence of contraries, all of which man would acquire,
which is absurd (because the object of power is co-existent with
the power, and the objects of impotence are concomitant with
impotence). ^ ^
He made his views on this point quite clear by stating that
where there was 'ajz in the form of limblessness in man (*adam
al-jariha), God would not impose anything on him, because that
command would necessarily presuppose the possibility of its
acceptance or rejection. Similarly, in the case of 'ajz which
is an absolute incapability, neither the action nor its contrary
(2)
can be realized.
Al-Ash'ari then distinguished between the non-existence of
power (in the sense of means, jariha etc.) and the non-existence
of all power which is equivalent to *ajz, and while God can
command in the first instance, He cannot in the second. He
compared that situation with the case of the presupposition of
knowledge, and he said that if the command where ability is absent
entails the possibility of the command where all ability is
absent, then the command with the lack of certain knowledge (that
is the knowledge of God and the knowledge that He is commanding),
would entail that God might command a man devoid of all knowledge.
What al-Ash'ari was trying to say, as M. Schwarz remarked, is
that God cannot make an injunction upon one who had no knowledge
(1) Luma*. p.59,7-18.
(2) Ibid.. pp.59,19-20; 60,1-3.
(3) Ibid.. p.60,3-5.
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at all, He would not command one who has no power at all to do
a certain act, but this does not exclude the command in the case
of the absence of particular power, or in the case of the absence
of certain knowledge.
In agreement with these definitions, al-Ash'ari pointed out
that the man who has no wealth should be exempted from paying
Zakat because he has no means of performing this duty. So the
non-existence of the means is equivalent to * a.j z or 'adam al-
(2)
Jariha. In another argument he confirmed his definition of
qudra as that which comes into existence simultaneously with the
realization of the act. Al-Ash'ari dealt with an argument against
this definition which was expressed in the question of whether a
man when he divorces his wife, or manumits his slave, can be said
to be capable of divorcing his wife, who at the moment of the
divorce is not his wife, or manumitting the slave who at the
moment of his manumission is not his slave. In replying to this
tortuous argument, al-Ash'ari simply expressed his view more
emphatically and said that such a man is capable of so doing
(3)
because the power in both cases is co-existent with the act.
After explaining his view regarding the nature of man's
power, al-Ash'ari proceeds to deal with a number of Qur'anic
verses, some of which the Mu'tazilites had used to substantiate
their doctrine that power precedes the action, and that God may
(1) Schwarz, M. Theodecy in the Early Scholastic Theology of




not impose a duty on one who has no power to perform it. Al-
Ash'ari's main intention, in quoting these verses, was to demon¬
strate that these verses do not prove what the Mu'tazilites had
used them to prove. He also quoted other verses to support his
own views and doctrines.
The Mu'tazilites used the verse, 2:184, "And for those who
are able to fast a redemption by feeding a poor man", as a proof
for their view that the power precedes the act, on the basis
that the verse refers to the capability of fasting at the time
when the subject is not actually fasting, and that it states
that those who are able to fast may nevertheless adopt another
alternative, that is feeding a poor man. Al-Ash'ari did not
accept the Mu'tazilites' interpretation of the verse. He said
that the verse might be referring to those who are not able to
fast, yet they are able to feed a poor man, and proposed for them
the alternative to offer a ransom if they are going to fast. He
did not consider the Mu'tazilites• interpretation of this verse
to be totally wrong, but rather that the principle upon which
they based their interpretation was inadmissible. He pointed out
that the Mu'tazilites' interpretation is based on the view that
the objective pronominal suffix it (hu) refers to a previously
mentioned antecedent, that is the fast. The weakness of this is
that it depends on grammatical arguments, while al-Ash'ari's
explanation is based on traditional authorities; and, to him,
the grammatical arguments cannot take precedence over the evid¬
ences of the companions of the prophet and those generations
immediately after them. He added, however, that many grammarians
do allow that the suffix "it" does not always refer to an ante-
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cedent already mentioned. He also quoted some Qur'anic verses
where the Mu'tazilites seem to interpret the pronominal suffix
as referring to a word that does not precede it.^
The Mu'tazilites also quoted the verse, 27:39, "I will
bring it to you before you rise from your place; I have strength
for it and I am trusty" in which a Jinn is claiming he has the
power to bring the throne of the Queen of Sheba to Solomon.
They argued that had the demon lied in his claim, then God would
not let such a lie be transmitted without exposing its falsity.
They therefore claimed that the verse shows that the power pre-
(2)
cedes the act.
Al-Ash'ari did not accept the principles upon which the
Mu'tazilites based their interpretation of the verse, nor the
conclusion they derived from it. In his interpretation, the
demon must have meant either "I will bring it to you if I can"
(3)
or "if God wills", otherwise Solomon would have refuted him.
Following these arguments, al-Ash'ari introduced four Qur'anic
verses, 18:97; 12:42; 18:23-24 and 10:88, to support his analysis
and to confirm his view that nothing could possibly take place
without God's will.
He next referred to the Qur'anic verse, 28:26, which al-
Jubba'i took as a proof for the doctrine that the power precedes
the act. He claimed that since the daughter of Shu'ayb declared





that Moses was strong enough for the work which her father
required, it implies that capacity is prior to the action. Al-
Ash'ari pointed out that his master was mistaken in his under¬
standing of the verse and in his conclusion, because the girl
simply intended to refer to the strength of Moses and his
trustworthiness which she had already witnessed, and she did not
mean that he was strong enough for further work as al-Jubba'i
understood. To prove this point, al-Ash'ari related the story
which tells that the father accepted his daughter's statement
regarding Moses' strength, but he indignantly asked her how she
knew that he was trustworthy, and she had to explain this by
referring to his chaste behaviour towards her on their way home.
Thus, al-Ash'ari proved the contrary of al-Jubba'I's conclusion,
and demonstrated again that capacity is simultaneous with the
(1 )
realization of the act.
Then al-Ash'ari referred to the case of the man who is in a
state of prayer, we know that he is capable of such an act only
when we see him praying, even though we do not know the exact
(2)
moment at which the power is realized in him.
The Mu'tazilites quoted the verse, 3:97, as a proof for
their doctrine that man is not commanded to do an act which he
has no power to perform. Al-Ash'ari replied by saying that
"capability" mentioned in this verse means "having adequate
property to furnish oneself with provisions and a riding camel
(zad wa-rahila)" and not "the capability of the body" which comes
(1) Luma'. pp.66,17-18; 67,1-13.
(2) Ibid.. p.67,14-17.
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about simultaneously with its object (maqdur).^ ^ The Mu'taz-
ilites quoted the verse, 9:42, which states that the hypocrites
did not come to aid the prophet in his struggle against the
infidels, although they had the capacity for it. Al-Ash'ari
rejected this argument by pointing out that the commentators and
transmitters of Traditions interpreted "capacity" here in the
sense of"wealth and mounts" and not in the sense of the "capa¬
bility of the body", and thus while taklif is possible where the
latter is not yet existent, it is impossible where the former is
absent.
They also understood the verse, 64:16, "Fear God in so far
as you are able", in the sense that man must have power before
the imposition of duties upon him, otherwise the "fearing of God"
would not have been conditioned on the realization of capability.
Al-Ash'ari replied that the meaning of the verse is that they
are obliged to fear Him when they are able to do so, but also
that they are obliged to fear Him when they are incapable of
fearing Him (but not when they are incapable of both, i.e., in
(3) —
the case of ' aj z. So, al-Ash'ari is basing his argument here
upon his previously mentioned distinction between tark and ' a j z.
and also on the fact that the imposition of duties is impossible
in the case of *ajz, but it is not in the case of tark (omitting
to act). Another possible interpretation of the verse is that:






al-Ash'arl interpreted the verse, 58:4, which the Mu'tazilites
used as an argument in this context, on the basis of the analogy
between power and 'ajz: with the absence of power there would be
no imposition of a commandment such as fasting in this verse.
Al-Ash'ari insisted on his distinction between 'ajz and tark and
pointed out that in the case of 'a.jz. as in this verse, there
would be no imposition of command/^ Likewise, he interpreted
the verse 65:7, in the sense that God only enjoins the spending
of what has been given, so that it also refers to ability in the
(2)
sense of means and provision.
Then al-Ash'ari interpreted the verse, 2:286, "God imposes
no obligation upon a soul save according to its capacity", in a
sense which supported his general doctrine that God cannot impose
duties in the case of tark (omitting to do), but cannot burden a
man in the case of * ajz. He said that God does not burden the
soul because of evil thoughts as long as they are not carried out
and a disobedient act committed. He maintained that God's command¬
ments are not unbearable for man and that they are not impotent
to fulfil them (although they may lack the power to fulfil them).
Finally he attributed to some of his colleagues the view that
this verse means that God does not impose on man anything unlaw¬
ful.
In his Risala II. al-Ash'ari dealt with some questions








with in the Luma*, but the methodology used in the two works
is quite different. His views in the Risala II merely stated in
the form of a creed, but there is some discussion regarding
taklif ma la-yutaq. as will be seen later. He stated that, "they
(i.e. the ancestors) unanimously agreed that the power to believe
is different from the power of unbelief, because the power to
believe provides guidance and direction, while the power to
disbelieve gives misguidance and abandonment ... the powers of
men differ according to the differences of their actions. He
also states that there is only one power for every action and
thus man is unable to carry out two actions with one power, in
the same way as he is unable to know two things with one piece
of information. Every action has its own power which exists at
the time of its existence. It is only with this power that
man's actions can exist; if it is possible for these actions to
exist without this power, then the action would dispense with
(2)
the power, which is impossible.
As for the nature of man's power, al-Ash'ari stated that
man's power is of two kinds: one kind is the soundness of the
body and the perfection of its instruments, and the other is the
power without which the action would not be realized. He
affirmed this last kind of power by saying that, "to acquire an
action (kasb) man needs a special power which differs from the
power not to do the action, and also from the action itself and
from the physical strength with which it is done." Though
(1) Risala II. p.100,17-20.
(2) Ibid.. p.101,20-23.
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al-Ash'ari used the term kasb in its technical sense, he intro¬
duced no definition of it in this work. According to this
conception of man's power, which is identical with his view of
the problem in Luma'. al-Ash'ari proceeds to discuss the point
of whether it is possible for God to impose upon man duties which
he is not able to perform. Here he repeated the same view as
he had already expressed in the Luma'. which is based on his
conception of 'anz and tark. He drew a comparison between power
and knowledge, and pointed out that the imposition of duty with
the absence of power, in the sense of the well-being of the body
and the perfection of the instrument, is as impossible as it is
where there is no soundness of reason, and when there is no
existence of the powers of understanding (sihhat al-'aql wa-alat
• • •
at-tamiyyiz). He argued that, although a special knowledge was
required to know every particular thing, the imposition of
action was impossible in the absence of all forms of knowledge.
For, in such a case, one would no longer be in a state of sanity,
and thus no longer responsible. Yet, it is not impossible for
God to ask a man to believe in spite of His knowledge and pre¬
determination that this man is not going to believe, since he is
physically fit and possesses the necessary instrument for per¬
forming such an action, and he is neither impotent nor is
hindered from making the act of belief. In this case he would
be unable to perform the act of belief simply because he is
reluctant to do it and has occupied himself with performing its
opposite which he prefers to perform. So if he happened to hate
unbelief and wished to be a believer, he would have been able
to do so. Al-Ash'ari clearly stated that there is a difference
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between this case and the case of the absence of all powers
.jami* al-qudar) , because the absence of all powers means
impotence and corruption of the body and its instruments without
which no action is possible. In this case imposition of duty is
impossible as in the case of the absence of all kinds of knowledge
(*adam ,1ami* al-*ulum) . ^ ^
The Ibana also confirms al-Ash'ari's views regarding the
nature of man's power expressed in Luma* and Risala II. The
Ibana made no reference to kasb in its technical sense, yet it
clearly states the differences of man's power. It also states
that the power to believe is not the same as the power not to
(2)
believe. It strongly refutes the Ku*tazilites• assumption
that the power is both for the thing and its opposite, and states
that man's power to believe is a gift (ni'ma). favour (fadl), and
the grace of God and so is a form of direction and guidance
(tafwid wa-tasdid). The power to believe is a favour from God
and not a right of man which He may withhold.
Al-Ash'ari quoted the same verses of the Qur'an, 11:20;
18:101 and 68:42, which he quoted in Luma*. and which established
that God can impose on man what he is not able to do, but he made
no distinction between the ability in the sense of physical
soundness, and the ability which exists simultaneously with the
act.<4>
(1) Risala II. pp.102,1-21; cf.p.101,7-19.
(2) Ibana, p.53,16-19.
(3) Ibid. . p.53,20-25.
(4) Ibid.. p.55,18-25.
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3. The Relation of God to Human Actions
In an argument against the Mu'tazilite conception of
"justice", al-Ash'arl emphasized the point that God wills, creates
and decrees all the created things of the world including man's
actions. In his Luma'. he devoted a special section to the
demonstration of the fact that God's will embraces all temporal
things. He argued that since God's will is one of His essential
attributes, it must, as all the other essential attributes,
embrace everything which can truly be willed.Then al-Ash'ari
proceeds to expound the view that if something which God had not
willed were to exist, this would imply that He is weak and
impotent. Starting from the premise that all temporal actions
are created by God, al-Ash'ari reasoned that if something were to
exist without His will, He would be averse to it, and then He
would refuse (ya'ba) its existence. This would necessitate the
conclusion that sins exist whether God wills them or not, even
if He refuses them. This is the one who is weak and compelled
(2)
against his will, which is inappropriate to God.
Some of al-Ash'ari's adversaries did not accept this con¬
clusion and they refuted it by taking as an example a case of a
king who is insulted by a blind cripple, yet this does not necess¬
arily mean that he is weak. Thus, in the case of God, if man does
what God has not willed, His omnipotence is not affected or
impaired by such an insignificant action. Al-Ash'ari answers




entail weakness on the part of the king if he were insulted by
the cripple and if the insult took place in spite of the king's
will.^1^
By citing examples from normal life, al-Ash'ari said that
among us men, he whose will is realized is more powerful than
he whose will is not. Therefore, we must ascribe to God who is
(2)
powerful above all, a universal and an effectual will. The
Mu'tazilites refuted such an analogy between God's and man's
will. They asserted that if God's will is not fulfilled, it
does not mean that He is weak or impotent, because although man
may disbelieve in Him and disobey Him in spite of His will, He
is yet able to force them to believe in Him and obey Him had He
so wished. Al-Ash'ari did not accept the Mu'tazilite argument
and pointed out that according to the Mu'tazilites' own view, a
forced belief does not merit reward, and that God willed man to
believe voluntarily so as to deserve reward. Thus, if He forced
them, they would neither be of the obedient ones nor would they
be rewarded. So, as the existence of what He does not will would
necessitate weakness on His part, He would also be weak if He
forced them to believe, since His will would be fulfilled by a
(3)
means not in accordance with the normal exercise of His will.
Al-Ash'ari added that since the Qadarites believe that man is
free to believe or not to believe, they are bound to hold that,
in this case, God would not be able to perform the grace (lutf)
(1) Luma'. p.26,1-7.
(2) Ibid. . p.26,8-10.
(3) Ibid.. p.27,5-12.
- 399 -
through which the disbelievers would have inevitably been
believers. Moreover, if man could perform an act unwilled
by God, entailing no weakness in Him because He could have
forced man to do it, then God could Himself perform an act
without willing it, because in both cases He is the universal
creator of all actions. If this is false, however, and if the
existence of an unwilled act of God necessitates His weakness,
(2)
then the same must be true regarding the acts of His creatures.
The Mu'tazilites argued that, if it is not weakness on the
part of God when what He commands is not done, why should it be
considered as weakness when His will is not done? Al-Ash'ari
replied by saying that, if God's own actions come to be without
His command and this is not a sign of weakness, it is similarly
not a sign of weakness when actions of others come about without
His command. Furthermore, the existence of man's forbidden
action is not a sign of weakness in God, since He willed them to
exist.
The Mu'tazilites did not accept al-Ash'ari's conception of
the universal will of God. Thus they refuted his view that He
wills disbelief and disobedience by pointing out that whoever
wills evil is necessarily evil himself, and he who wills folly
is foolish. Since it is impossible for God to be foolish, it is
impossible for God to will folly and evil. Al-Ash'ari, in
rejecting this Mu'tazilite argument, stressed the difference
(1) Luma'. p.27,13-15.
(2) Ibid.. pp.27,17-18; 28,1-4.
(3) Ibid.. p.31,15-19.
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between man and God in this respect. He denied that God is
foolish when He wills folly. A man, for instance, who is opposed
to fornication is foolish if he does not prevent his man-servants
and his maid-servants from fornicating with one another, although
he could prevent them; but God who does not prevent His servants
from fornicating with one another is not therefore foolish.
Again, a man who resolves to obey God is thereby obedient, but
if God wills obedience on others He is not thereby obedient, just
as He is not foolish when He wills folly, although when men do so
they are foolish.
Then al-Ash'ari quoted several verses of the Qur'an, 76:30;
10:99; 32:13; 6:112 and 2:253, to the effect that God's will
embraces all created things. The Mu'tazilites argued that the
verse, 2:253, means "if God had wished He could have prevented
the fighting, so it is a proof of His universal power but not
His universal will." Al-Ash'ari did not accept this and said
that it means, "if God had not willed the fighting to take place
(2)
it would not have taken place."
He also discussed some of the verses which the Mu*tazilites
quoted to support their arguments that God does not will evil.
The verse, 51:56, states that God's purpose in creating men was
only that they should serve Him and be rewarded and, thus,
according to the Mu'tazilites, He did not will the disbelief and
disobedience of the disbelievers. Al-Ash'ari said in reply that




in the Qur'an, 7:179, He said that He has created many for Hell,
and the general principle is that the Qur'an does not contradict
itself. The Mu'tazilites also quoted verses 40:31 and 3:108
to support their view that God does not will wrong or evil. Al-
Ash'ari considered that these verses merely mean that He does
not will to wrong them, although He has willed that they should
(2)
wrong one another. Concerning the verse, 6:148, which the
Mu'tazilites quoted as a proof that unbelief is not willed by
God, al-Ash'ari said that the unbelievers in this verse were
just making jokes and were not serious in their views, and God
(3)
here demonstrates their lying. The verse, 2:185, is also
quoted by the Mu'tazilites to support their contention that God
does not will unbelief, because He does not wrong His creatures;
nor does He impose on them what they are not capable of doing,
and then make them responsible for their disobedience. Al-
Ash'ari, like al-Maturidi, rejected the Mu'tazilite interpretation
of the verse, and pointed out that the verse simply refers to
the fact that God allows the Muslims not to fast while they are
(4)
travelling or ill.
Reference has already been made to the Mu'tazilite conception
(5)of the equivalence of God' s"will' and His "command". Like al-
Maturidi, al-Ash'ari did not accept this, and he argued that if
(1) Luma'. pp.67,19; 68,1-6.
(2) Ibid.. pp.68,17; 69,1-2.
(3) Ibid. . p.69,3-8.
(4) Ibid.. p.69,9-11.
(5) See Chapter V, supra, p.353.
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it is assumed that God's will regarding man's actions is His
command, it would follow that when He does not command an action
He is displeased with it, and hence that He is displeased with
the actions of children and insane people. Since God is dis¬
pleased with the disbelievers only, it follows that the suppo¬
sition that His will is His command is wrong.^ Furthermore, if
His command and His will were the same, He would be displeased
with whatever He did not command. If so, there would be no
status of allowed actions (mubah), but everything would be either
an act of obedience or disobedience (i.e. commanded or forbidden).
He also does not agree with al-Jubba'i's view that the fact that
(2)
God has not willed something entails His displeasure with it.
The Mu'tazilites held that man creates evil rather than
God. They quoted some Qur'anic verse to substantiate their views
and introduced some arguments to support their doctrine. Al-
Ash'ari affirmed that God creates all things, whether evil or
good, and strongly rejected this doctrine of the Mu'tazilites,
and tried to show the weakness of their arguments and how they
had misinterpreted the Qur'anic verses to serve their own ends.
The Mu'tazilites quoted the Qur'anic verse, 3:78, in which
the Jews are blamed for tampering with their Scripture by falsi¬
fying and distorting some of its passages. They said that the
verse indicates that an evil action, such as the falsification of
the Scripture, is not from God. Al-Ash'ari rejected this inter¬
pretation and said that the verse means that they had distorted
(1) Luma'. p.29,7-12.
(2) Ibid.. pp.29,16-19; 30,1-5.
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the description of the prophet, while the passage, "it is not
from God" means that the passages which they falsified were not
revealed by God.^^ They quoted the verse, 67:3, to the same
effect. 3y analysing the whole context, al-Ash'ari demonstrated
that this verse refers to the harmony in creation of the seven
heavens, so it provides no proof for the Mu'tazilites' assumption
(2)
that the evil actions and disbelief were not created by God.
The Mu'tazilites also argued that the verse, 32:7 implies that
God creates only the good things. To al-Ash'ari, however, the
verse suggests that God is proficient in creating, and it simply
(3)
declares that He knows how to create things. They also quoted
the verse, 38:27, to support their doctrine that God has created
nothing evil. They understood the verse to mean that "We have
created nothing false in heaven, in earth, or between them".
To al-Ash'ari, however, the verse must be understood in conjunction
with that which follows, so what God meant to say, according to
al-Ash'ari, is that He did not create the world in vain; God's
purpose in creating the world was to be able to reward in the
hereafter those who have obeyed Him, and to punish those who have
disobeyed Him. The verse is intended to refute the lies of the
idolaters, and their assertions that there would be neither
resurrection nor reward and punishment in the hereafter. Following
this, al-Ash'ari gave an alternative explanation of the meaning








creation is false or vain, since what is vain is only a part of
it. Alternatively, it may mean that God did not create what is
vain or evil when He created heaven and earth, for He created it
later/1 *
The Mu'tazilites tried to find support for their doctrine,
that God does not create the unbelief of the unbelievers, in the
verse 9:3. Al-Ash'ari rejects this and points out that the verse
refers to the treaty that was made between the prophet Muhammad
and the non-believers, and declares that the prophet is not
bound by such agreements. Moreover, the Qur'an explicitly states,
"quit of the polytheists", not "quit of their polytheism", and if
these two statements were the same, then the statement, "patron
(2)
of the believers" would mean that God had created their belief.
Apart from these arguments, which are based on the inter¬
pretation of some Qur'anic verses, the Ku'tazilites introduced
the following twisted arguments. They asked their opponents,
including al-Ash'ari, who is good, the one who is good, or the
one from whom good proceeds? If the answer had been that the
one from whom good comes is better than the one who is good,
then their opponents had to admit that a similar argument would
prove that God is worse than evil. Al-Ash'ari carefully avoided
this pitfall by saying that if good came from a person through
the bestowal of favour, then this person is better than the good
itself. Thus the person from whom evil proceeds is worse than
the evil, if he is unjust to men through it, but God is not
(1) Luma', p.49,1-15.
(2) Luma*. pp.51,5-18; 52,1-3.
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unjust, rather by creating the injustice of men, he is being just.^1^
Thus, in al-Ash'arl's view, evil comes from God in the sense
that He creates it, but this evil is manifested through the actions
(2)
of another (that is man), and not through the action of Himself.
Al-Ash'ari stated that his solution to this problem was different
from that of his colleague, who stated in general terms that it
was possible to attribute everything to God, but that it was not
possible to attribute specific things, such as a wife and child,
( 3)
to Him.
In order to justify their doctrine of the divine justice,
the Mu'tazilites denied that God decreed evil or disobedience
because otherwise He would be responsible for the existence of
evil in the world. Al-Ash'ari did not accept this Mu'tazilite
view and pointed out that Qada' and Qadar had various meanings;
they could mean creation, determination, report or command. Thus
it would be possible to say that God decrees evil in the sense of
creating, or reporting it, but not in the sense of commanding
(amr) it.^ So one has to distinguish between these different
meanings. It must also be borne in mind that the word "decreed"
is sometimes used to refer to God's decision and announcement of
this decision, and sometimes to refer to the content of the






to confuse these two meanings and asked if the decree of God was
right? Al-Ash'ari replied that, the decree in the first sense
is absolutely right, but that in the second sense, some of it
is right and some of it is wrong. For instance, obedience is
right and unbelief is wrong. To avoid this trap, some of his
colleagues refrained from saying that Qada' is wrong at all,
they merely stated that unbelief and disobedience were wrong
without connecting them in any way with Qada'.^^
With regard to the question of whether one should be content
with God's determination of disbelief, al-Ash'ari also distin¬
guished between the general approval of God's decree, and the
approval of specific case of the unbelief of an unbeliever. He
said that one should be content with God's decree in the general
sense but that one should not approve of the decree in the second
sense, i.e. the disbelief of a particular person. He attributed
this view to some of his colleagues, and pointed out that other
conservative colleagues refrained from indulging in such a
distinction and expressed their approval of God's decree what-
(2)
ever might be under consideration.
The differences between al-Ash'arl and the Ku'tazilites on
the principle of justice seem to be a result of their different
conception of "good" and "evil". The Mu'tazilites defined "good"
as that which is beneficent and useful to man in achieving reward
in the hereafter, and evil as that which leads to chastisement
and punishment. Thus God cannot decree, create or will evil to
(1) Luma*, pp.45,16-18; 46,3-5.
(2) Ibid.. pp.46,14-19; 47,1-5.
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man because it would be contrary to justice. Al-Ash'ari,
however, defined "good" and "evil" as that which God declares to
be evil and that which he declares to be good. He is free to act
as He pleases, and good and evil are exclusively decided by the
(2)
divine commandment and prohibitions.
Thus to answer the long disputed question of whether God
could inflict pain on an infant in the hereafter without impairing
His justice, al-Ash'ari affirmed that God is free to do so and
would be just in doing it. He is just in inflicting punishment
on an infant for a future sin, in subordinating some beings to
others, in being gracious to some and not to others, and in
creating men knowing that they will disbelief, similarly it would
not be evil on His part to create beings who were perpetually
punished. Nor would it be evil on His part to punish the
believers and to introduce the unbelievers into heaven. This
will not occur because God said that He would punish the dis-
(3)
believers, and it is impossible that He should lie. So to al-
Ash'ari, all God's actions are just and good whatever they may
be, because He is free to do as He pleases. He is the supreme
and has absolute power; something is evil on our part because in
doing it we transgress the limits and bounds set for us, but God
is subject to no-one, and bound by no commands, so nothing on
(4)
His part can be evil.
(1) Tawhid. pp.215; 218,5-6.




The Mu'tazilites challenged al-Ash'ari's view that nothing
is evil until God declares it to be so, by asking whether such a
view suggests that lying would not be evil if God had not declared
it to be so. Al-Ash'ari's answers affirmed this, and stated that
if God declared lying to be good it would be so, and that if He
commanded us to lie, no-one would have the right to question
such an order.
The Mu'tazilites argued that if it was possible for God to
command us to lie, then it was possible to consider that He would
lie. Al-Ash'ari strongly rejected this inference and stated that
it is impossible for God to lie, just as it is impossible for
Him to be ignorant. The fact that it was possible for Him to
command us to lie does not entail that it would be possible that
He should lie. Similarly, He commanded us to worship Him, but
(2)
this does not mean that it is possible for Him to worship. He
strongly defended the validity of this comparison in the face of
(3)
the Mu'tazilite's attempts to challenge it.
The Risala II agrees with the Luma' as far as the doctrine
of God's justice is concerned. It contains almost all the
/
principles which have been discussed in Luma'. but in brief, pre¬
cise statements. It emphasizes that God's will is absolute and
is not subject to human conception of justice. Thus God guides
whomsoever He wills and leads astray whomsoever He wills. His
actions are not subject to certain causes or destined for certain
(1) Luma'. p.71,18-19.
(2) Ibid. , pp.71,20; 72,1-4.
(3) Ibid.. pp.72-74.
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purposes. He is the possessor who is neither possessed nor sub¬
ject to commandments and prohibitions, and thus He does whatever
He wills. It also deals with the doctrine of Qadar, but in
a more traditional manner. Thus it states that God has predeter¬
mined all the actions, terms and sustenances of His creatures,
and that He has written down in the preserved tablet all that is
going to happen to them until the day of resurrection. Al-Ash'ari
(2)
quoted the verses, 54:52-53; 54:48-49, to support this doctrine.
He also stated that God had divided men into two groups, one of
which He creates for paradise and another for Hell. To support
this view, he quoted the verses, 7:179; 21:101, and referred to
(3)
some Traditions, the texts of which are mentioned in the Ibana.
He also emphasizes that God is the sole creator of all temporal
(4)
beings; He is not in any way subject to human conceptions of
justice and measures of injustice, because He is free to do as
He pleases. Therefore, He is just in all His actions and decrees,
whether they please or harm man. He is just in asking men to
obey His orders though He knew that they would not do so. He is
also just in creating some of them with the knowledge that they
are going to reject His commands, and even in giving them the
power to disbelieve: similarly, He is just in postponing the
term of the believers to a time when they become disbelievers and
apostates and to punish them for this, even though He knew that
(1) Risala II. p.98,19-24.
(2) Ibid.. pp.99,7-11; 102-103.
(3) Ibid.. p.99,12-20. cf. Ibana, pp.65-7.
(4) Risala II. p.100,11-16.
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this would happen. God is not unjust in doing this because He
has absolute power.He has the power to create all people for
Paradise out of His grace, since He has no need for their worship.
Similarly, He has the power to create them all for Hell, and is
just in doing so, because the power to create and to command is
(2)
His and no-one is able to question His actions.
In the Risala II, al-Ash'ari referred to the conceptions of
guidance (huda) and leading astray (idlal). He affirmed that
God bestows His favour on some men by guiding, directing them
towards the true path, endearing belief to them, opening their
hearts to it and by making unbelief ungodliness and detestable to
(3)
them, 6:125; 49:7. Contrary to the view of an-Nazzam, he
• •
(4)
affirmed that God's favours are infinite. He also stated that
the granting of favours is not incumbent upon Him so He does so
out of His grace. At the same time He grants no favour to other
(5)
men but leads them astray, Q.6:125; 7:155. It is not incumbent
upon Him to equate His favours between men and He is free to give
them to some and to withhold them from others, as is stated in
the verses, 5:54; 5:41.^^
Like the Luma( and the Risala II. the Ibana dealt with almost
all the questions related to the conceptions of divine justice.




(5) Risala II. p.103,9-14.
(6) Ibid, p.103,21-23.
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Many of the huma*'s arguments and the refutation of the Mu'tazi-
lite views are to be found in the Ibana. Moreover, the Ibana
contains new interesting rational arguments as well as a section
putting forward traditional views in support of Qadar, and it
discusses in detail the conceptions of guidance (huda). leading
astray (dalal) and other subjects which are not discussed in the
Luma*.
In the Ibana, al-Ash'ari also emphasized his view that God's
will embraces all things, and that nothing could possibly take
place without it.^1^ He pointed out that the Mu'tazilites view
that God does not will disbelief and disobedience, entails the
refutation of the view unanimously agreed upon, that everything
(2)
exists according to God's will. It would also imply that
Iblis, who presumably wills evil, is of higher rank than God
since, according to their view, evil in the world has prevailed
(3)
over good. Al-Ash'ari also argued that the denial of the
universality of God's will would imply the weakness of His power.
He repeated the argument of the Luma', where he equates the
"unwilling" of a thing with disapproval of it (kurh) and its pro¬
hibition. He argued that if acts of disobedience exist without
God's will, it means that they would exist whether He wished or
forbade them, which is a sign of weakness. He added that if men
do something about which God is angry (ghadib). they will arouse





something of which God disapproved and with which He is dis¬
pleased, they would certainly thereby have defeated and over¬
powered Him.^^ The lbana also repeated the Luma*'s arguments
that the existence of anything unwilled by God would imply His
(2)
weakness and His inadequacy to put into effect what He wills.
He introduced the same arguments of the Luma*. against the
Mu'tazilite view that God does not will the wicked acts of men
otherwise He would be wicked, i.e., by saying that a foolish act
(3)
is not necessarily committed by a fool. In the Ibana, al-
Ash'ari tried to show that in certain cases even men are not
foolish when they will folly. He quoted the verses, 3:28-29,
in which one son of Adam says to the other, "If you stretch out
your hand to kill me, I am not going to stretch out my hand to
kill you ... I will that you should have the guilt of my sin and
your sin, and that you so become an inmate of Hell". He pointed
out that though the first brother willed his brother's act of
murder, which is folly, but was not foolish because of it. So,
if God wills the folly of men, it would not necessarily follow
that He is foolish. Similarly, in the verse, 12:33, Joseph wills
his enemy to imprison him which is a sin on their part, but he
is not in any sense sinful because of that. Prom this, al-
Ash'ari concluded that the fact that God wills the folly of men
(4)
does not imply that He is foolish.
(1) Ibana. pp.47,24-5; 48,1-3.
(2) Ibid.. pp.49-50.
(3) Ibid.. p.50.
(4) Ibid.. pp.49,21-6; 50,1-8.
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He also repeated the same argument concerning the divine
punishment of children, expressed in the Luma*. He said that
since God afflicts children in this world with illnesses like
leprosy, and He is just in doing this, He must also be just in
chastising them in the Hereafter. Taking the Mu'tazilite assump¬
tion that children are made to suffer in this world as a warning
to their parents, al-Ash'arl said it might be said that if the
torture of the children is just in this world because of this,
it is also just for God to chastise them in the Hereafter in
order to enrage or distress their fathers. A Tradition tells us
that, on the day of resurrection, God will kindle a fire for the
children (of the infidels) and He will say to them, "jump into
it". Those who jump will be allowed to enter paradise and those
who refuse will be sent to Hell.^^ It is appropriate at this
point to mention that in the section of the Maqalat, on the
sunnite creed, al-Ash'ari said, concerning this problem, "the
question of children is at God's disposal, if He wills, He will
chastise them, and if He wills, He will do with them whatever He
wishes.'^ ^
In the Ibana, al-Ash'ari introduced a passage similar to
that of the Luma* to justify his view that God may will folly
without being foolish, and said, "One of us is foolish when he
wishes folly, only because this has been forbidden to him, and
because he is subject to the law of Him who is above him, who




foolish since he commits what has been forbidden to him. God,
however, is not subject to any law. There is no-one above Him to
prescribe rules for Him. Nor is there anyone above Him to
permit, forbid, command or rebuke Him, therefore it is not
necessary that He should be considered foolish when He wills
this (i.e. folly) to exist as evil.^^
Unlike the Luma*, the Ibana deals in detail with the concept
of "guidance", "leading astray" and "sealing up men's hearts".
Its arguments in this respect are mainly directed against the
Mu'tazilites, who explained these concepts in a manner to suit
their principle of justice. Thus, against the Mu'tazilite view
that God has given guidance to everybody, al-Ash'ari quoted the
verse, 2:6, which speaks about those whose hearts God seals up,
and the verse 6:125, which states that "VThomsoever God desires
to guide, He expands his breast to Islam; whomsoever He desires
to lead astray, He makes his breast narrow tight as if he were
climbing to heaven." He said, it is clear that those whose hearts
God has sealed up cannot be the same whom He has guided and
expanded their breast to Islam; otherwise belief and disbelief,
which are contraries, would have existed together in the heart,
which is impossible. Similarly, "guidance" and "leading astray"
cannot exist together. This proves that God has not guided the
unbelievers towards belief, as the Mu'tazilites assumed. Al-
Ash'ari found a good illustration of God's absolute freedom to
guide men or lead them astray in the verse, 10:89, which tells





The Mu'tazilites held that abandonment (khidhlan). in
relation to God, does not mean that He leads men astray, because
He has given guidance to everyone. Al-Ash'ari argued that if
God had directed the unbelievers, He would have rendered them
immune to disbelief, but we cannot say so since they are still
disbelievers. If the Mu'tazilites define "abandonment" in the
sense of leaving men free to disbelieve, they would equally have
to say that God abandons the believers, leaving them free to
disbelieve too, which is heresy. Thus the Mu'tazilites have no
alternative but to admit that God abandons the unbelievers to
their disbelief which He creates in them, and to give up their
(2)
doctrine of Qadar.
The Mu'tazilites maintained that the term adalla does not
mean that God leads men into unbelief or causes them to disbelieve,
but it might be explained in the sense that God judged them to
be of those who err or that He called them so. Al-Ash'ari argued
that leading disbelievers astray cannot possibly be explained as
leading them away from nothing, otherwise guidance of the believers
would be towards nothing which is absurd. Since no-one can argue
that the disbelievers were led astray from disbelief because they
are disbelievers, the Mu'tazilites must admit that leading astray
(3)
is meant to be from belief. Alternative Mu'tazilite explanations
. - (4)
of the term "adalla" have been strongly refuted by al-Ash ari.
(1) Ibana, pp.57,18-26; 58,1-4.
(2) Ibid. . p.60,4-13.
(3) Ibid.. p.62,5-10.
(4) Ibid. , pp.62ff. Supra. Chapter II, pp.116-17.
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The Mu'tazilites also explained the term "guidance" in the
sense of God's elucidation (bayan) of religious truth, which is
a favour He bestows on everybody. Al-Ash'ari did not accept
this Mu'tazilite view. He quoted the Qur'anic verse, 2:26,
"Thereby He leads many astray, and thereby He guides many", and
argued that surely the verse does not mean that He leads all
people astray, otherwise He would have said so. Therefore, the
Mu'tazilites cannot assert that "thereby He guides many" means
that God guides all mankind, so He only guides some of them.^^
The Mu'tazilites quoted the verse, 41:17, which states that God
guides the tribes of Thamud, although they were infidels. This
proves that guidance is not limited to the believers. Al-Ash'ari
rejected this Mu'tazilite explanation by offering two possible
alternatives. One is that the tribe of Thamud comprised two
groups, one of which was faithful and God-guided, while the other
contained unbelievers, who preferred blindness. Al-Ash'ari was
working from the assumption that the Qur'an does not contradict
itself, so that if in one place it states that it does not guide
the unbelievers, and in another place that it guides Thamud, we
know that it was there referring to the believers of Thamud, to
the exclusion of the unbelievers among them. According to this
interpretation, the word "they" in the verse does not refer to
the same group, which is the object of "We have guided". Rather
it refers to another group, that is, the infidels. For al-
Ash'ari, this explanation is grammatically in conformity with the
_ ♦
language of the Qur'an, since in the verses, 8:33-34, the word
(1) Ibana, p.61,15-20.
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hum (they) is repeated consecutively, but in its second occurrence
it refers to another group of people. Al-Ash'ari's other possible
alternative, is that God was referring to some of the Tharaud who
were believers, and it was then that God guided them. Then they
apostasised and preferred blindness and disbelief.
In the same manner, al-Ash'ari refuted the Mu'tazilite
assertion that the Qur'an was revealed to guide all people. He
quoted the verses 2:1-2 which state that the Qur'an is a guidance
for those who fear God, and the verse 41:44, which states that it
is a blindness for the infidels, which clearly refutes the Ku'taz-
(2)
ilite assumption that it is guidance for all people. He also
refuted their interpretation of the verse, 2:185, "The month of
Ramadan in which the Qur'an was sent down as guidance to men",
which the Mu'tazilites took as a proof that the Qur'an is a
guidance for all men whether they are infidels or believers. To
al-Ash'ari, this verse has a particular, not a general signification,
because God has explained in another verse that He guides who
fear Him and He tells us that He does not guide the infidels,
since the Qur'an does not contradict itself, it follows that God's
words "guidance for men" refers only to the faithful and not to
the infidels.
The Mu'tazilites drew an analogy between "guidance" and
"warning", to the effect that both these concepts are universal.
Thus they concluded that God's guidance is not restricted to the
(1) Ibana. pp.64,19-26; 65,1-12. cf. Schwarz, op.cit.. pp.443-45.
(2) Ibana, p.61,2-7.
(3) Ibid.. pp.63,25-6; 64,1-3.
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unbelievers. They pointed out that God says to the prophet, "you
only warn him who follows the remembrance", Q.36:11, "You are
only the warner of him who fears it" (^79:45, (i.e. the hour or
the day of resurrection), yet the prophet did not warn only the
followers of the remembrance and the fearers of the hour, but
also those who neither followed nor feared; likewise when the
verse 2:1, refers to the Qur'an as "a guidance to those who fear
God", this must mean that it is guidance to everybody. Al-Ash'ari
did not accept this view and argued that there are other verses
such as: 2:6; 26:214; 41:13, which prove that the prophet was
told to warn the infidels too, therefore the Mu'tazilites have
no justification in drawing analogy between "warning" and "guid¬
ance". The Qur'an tells us in some verses that the prophet warns
the infidels, just as it tells in other verses that he warns
those who fear and follow the remembrance. So it follows that
God warns both the faithful and the infidels. As for guidance,
however, God tells us that the Qur'an is a guidance to those who
fear God and blindness to the infidels, and that He does not
guide the infidels, it follows that the Qur'an is guidance vouch¬
safed to the faithful and not to the infidels.
In another passage, al-Ash'ari pointed out that the summons
to believe in God and to obey Him is addressed to all mankind,
but guidance is related to those whom God has chosen to be
believers. If guidance were for all, both those who accept it
and those who reject it, as the Mu'tazilites maintain, then one
could argue that the devil's summons "leads astray" both those
(1) Ibana. p.64,4-18.
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who accept it and those who reject it. On the other hand, if
it is maintained that the devil's summons leads astray the
unbelievers only, why should not God's summons to belief be a
guidance for the believers only.^^ The verse, 10:25, "And God
summons to the abode of peace, and He guides whomsoever He wills
to a straight path", shows that the summons to believe and
worship is universal (* amm) to all mankind, but guidance is
restricted to the believers only. Al-Ash'ari took the following
verses as proof that God does not guide the unbelievers, just as
He does not lead the believers astray, 18:17; 3:86; 2:266; 26:56;
32:13.
The Mu'tazilites denied the view that God bestows His
favour (fadl) only on the believers. Al-Ash'ari, who held this
view, quoted the verses: 4:84; 24:21; 37:55 and 37:56-7, in support
of it, and he argued that the favour referred to in these verses
must be bestowed on the believers only. Had it been bestowed
also on the unbelievers, God could not have sent these statements
down. Al-Ash'ari took a Qur'anic verse, "If it had not been for
the grace (fadl) of God and His mercy you would have followed
Satan except a few of you," to show that from the beginning God
bestows on the believers such favours as He does not bestow on the
(3)
disbelievers. Moreover, al-Ash'ari said, God strengthened the
prophet in his confrontation with the infidels, and gave support
to Joseph to resist the seduction of the Pharaoh's wife, and the
(1) Ibana, p.6l,9-14.
(2) Ibid., p.63,1-12. cf. Schwarz, op.cit., p.443.
(3) Ibana. pp.52,19; 53,1-8.
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Mu'tazilites cannot assume that God gave the infidels similar
strengthening (tathbit). for if so, they would have been
believers.
The Ku'tazilites hold various views regarding the matter of
whether God is able to bestow lutf (grace) on the unbelievers as
a result of which they would have all turned believers. Al-
Ash'ari ascribed such power to God and quoted the verses, 42:27
and 43:33, to support his ascription. He pointed out that the
Mu'tazilites cannot deny that God has the power to give the be¬
lievers grace which were he to give it to them, they would
certainly all believe, just as He has the power to do to them a
thing of such a character as a result of which they would all
(2)
disbelieve. He argued against the Mu'tazilite statements to
the effect that God has not the power of directions (tawfiq) of the
unbelievers towards belief. He said, if the Mu'tazilites affirmed
this statement, they would assert thereby God's impotence. Were
they to admit that God has such a power, then they would abandon
(3)their misguided doctrine and adopt the truth.
(1) Ibana, p.58,11-18. cf. Schwarz, op.cit., pp.441-42.
(2) Ibana, p.52,12-18.
(3) Ibid.. pp.53,26; 54,1-3.
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CONCLUSION TO CHAPTERS V AND VI
To conclude these two chapters, it might be said that although
it is believed that al-Maturidi and al-Ash'ari were both trying
to hold an intermediate position between the Mu'tazilites and the
Jabrites by using the term kasb. it is obvious that their concep¬
tions of this term and the conclusions they reached, are quite
different. Thus it has been shown that al-Maturidi laid great
emphasis on man's freedom of choice and freedom of acquisition,
and pointed out the fact that though God decrees, creates and wills
man's action, this does not deprive man of this freedom of choice.
He made it quite clear that though man's actions are created and
decreed by God, they belong to him, because they are a result of
his own choice and have been acquired by him without any com¬
pulsion. Al-Ash'ari, however, does not seems to be in favour of
the idea of man's freedom of choice. Instead, he emphasized
God's omnipotence and power, and stated that all man's actions
fall under the power of God. He held that man has power and will,
but in his view they have no effect or influence at all on his
actions, which are always determined by God. He even went to
the extent of disallowing the ascription of acquisition in reality
to man. This is why al-Ash'ari was considered in certain circles
as a Jabrite, and also explains why he made no criticism or ref¬
erence to the Jabrite views, while al-Maturidi considered them to
be no less dangerous than those of the Mu'tazilites.
Concerning the nature of man's power, they both distinguished
between the primary or physical power and the completed power
which exists simultaneously with the act. Al-Ash'ari, in
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consistence with his rather deterministic view, held that the
power is only for one act and not for its opposite, while al-
Maturidl maintained that in order to establish man's freedom of
choice and God's justice, man's power must be for the act and
its opposite. However, he gave no solution to the problem of
how this power can be for the act and its opposite and at the
same time be simultaneous with the act.
Their conception of guidance, leading astray and tab', were
mainly directed against the Mu'tazilites. Yet, while al-Ash'ari
only insisted on stating the absolute power of God, al-Maturidl
tried to find a rational justification. He said that God gives
guidance to man or leads him astray, according to His prior
knowledge that man is going to choose and prefer this course of
action and adopt certain situations, therefore he creates and
decrees for him what he is going to choose.
- 423 -
CHAPTER VII
AL-KATURIDi ON THE DOCTRINE OF IKAN
Introduction
The question of iman and the ensuing discussions may be
considered as the basis of all theological thinking among early
Muslims. The term iman has been mentioned many times in the
(2)
Qur'an, but no specific definition of it is given. Similarly,
the Traditions do not give exact definition of iman but enumerate
(3)
its objects.
The rise of the Kharijites in the period which followed the
assassination of the third Caliph 'Uthman (d.36/656) gave the
questions "who is a mu'min?" and later "What is iman?" a new
importance. Motivated by their "puritanical" concept of the
Muslim community, the Kharijites began to question everyone's
faith and to draw a sharp demarcation between those who fully
believed and practised religion, and those, who though believers,
committed some sins. Only the first were considered to be
members of the community by the Kharijites, the second group was
depicted by them as infidels devoid of faith. They conceived
the Muslim community to be one whose membership was restricted
(4)
to those who reached certain standards of moral attainment.
(1) Izutsu, The Concept of Belief in Islamic Theology, p.11.
(2) Qur'an. 49:7; 49:14; 49:17; 30:56; 58:22 and 59:9-10.
(3) Wensinck, A Handbook of Early Muhammadan Tradition, pp.69-70.
(4) Maqalat. pp.86ff. Watt, "The Concept of iman in Islamic
Theology", Per Islam, vol.43 (1967), also Watt, Formative
Period. p.35.
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Therefore, they strongly emphasised the importance of work as a
condition which qualified a person for membership of the
community. As a result, the Kharijites came to believe that
there can be no iman without work, and that whoever commits a
grave sin is Kafir, excluded from the community and will perish
for ever in Hell.
These Kharijite views were later adopted to some extent by
the Mu1tazilites, who held the doctrine that the sinner is
neither a Kafir nor a mu'min. but in an intermediate position
(2 )(manzila bayn al-manzilatavn). In spite of the slightly
different views held by various groups of the Mu'tazilites re-
- - (3)
garding the definition of Iman, they have in common, identi¬
fied Iman and works whether supererogatory or obligatory; or iman
(4)
and the avoidance of grave sin.
The so-called Murji'ites, however, held views opposite to
those of the Kharijites and the Mu'tazilites with regard to the
definition of iman and the destiny of the sinners. From the
— (51
views of the twelve Murji'ite sub-sects mentioned by al-Ash'ari,
it appears that all the Murji'ites agreed on the point of exclu¬
ding works from the definition of iman. In contrast to the
(1) Watt, "The Concept of Iman in Islamic Theology", pp.1-2,
(si - - -
Ml. C . p.47. E.I. art. "Kharijites" p.248. Maqalat, p.124.
(2) Maqalat, pp.269-70.
(3) Maqalat, pp.266-69. Razi, Tafsir. vol.1, p.164. Tahanawi,
Kashshaf. vol.1, p.95.




Kharijites' views that whoever committed a grave sin is a Kafir,
the Murji'ites asserted that such a decision could not be taken
by man but must be left to the judgement of God on the last day.
In their definition of Iman, the Murji'ites gave precedence to
knowledge^ ^ but at the same time they attached considerable
importance to the verbal acknowledgement or confession by the
tongue and totally omitted work. Moreover, iman was considered
to be an entity of its own; grave sin could not impair it, nor
could good works increase it. All these views were based on the
Mur ji'ites* conception of the Muslim community and were aimed at
avoiding the exclusion of a man from the community because he
(2)
had sinned.
The controversies existing between the Murji'ites on one
hand and the Kharijites, Mu'tazilites on the other, led to the
investigation of various aspects of this problem. The literature
accumulated from these controversies was fully assimilated by
al-Maturidi and al-Ash'ari, whose theoretical contribution in
this respect will occupy the following two chapters.
Al-Maturidi's views on the problem of Iman was in line with
the views of his predecessors the Hanafites, and disagreed with
that of the Kharijites, the Mu'tazilites, and to some extent
with that of the Traditionists. He discussed the destiny of the
grave sinners, the concept of Iman, its relation to Islam and
similar points which were the theme of theoretical argumentations.
He made considerable effort to refute the views of the Kharijites
(1) K.C. p.132.
(2) Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, p.34.
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and the Mu*tazilites, in particular al-Ka'bi.
1. The Grave Sinner and His Fate
All the disputations about Iman seem to have started from
this point, to which al-Katuridi devoted a large proportion of
his work to discuss. He recorded the views and arguments of the
Kharijites, the Mu'tazilites and those of al-Hasan al-Basri in
• •
this respect; then he demonstrated their weaknesses and following
his predecessors, the Hanafites, he openly indicated his support
for the views attributed to the Kurji'ites, that the grave sinner
is a believer or should be treated so, and that he will not be
(1)
punished eternally in Hell.
1. In spite of his advocation of these views, which will be
shown later, al-Katuridi did not associate himself with the
Kurji'ites; possibly because he was fully aware of some of
the heretical views attributed to the so-called Kurji'ites.
Al-Maturidi himself, identified some of the Murji'ite doc¬
trines with those of the Jabrites, in that they attributed
all man's actions to God, and deprived man of any role in
them. It is because of this view the Murji'ites were cursed
along with the Qadarites in the pseudo-Tradition which was
attributed to the prophet, for both being extremists.
(Tawhid. pp.229,1-3; 318). It has to be mentioned, however,
that al-Maturidi seems to have doubted the authenticity of
this Tradition (Tawhid. p.384,11 ff.)
Al-Maturidi, however, must have been aware of the fact
that Abu-Hanifa himself had been considered as a Murji'ite
(Maqalat. pp.138-9). This explains why al-Maturidi devoted a
/special
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special section of his Kitab at-Tawhid to the definition of the
term ir.ja*. and why the Murji'ites were called by. such a name.
He stated that from a linguistic point of view, it is agreeable
that ir,ja' means postponing or putting off. This sense is used
in the verses 7:111 and 9:106. Different sects, however, used
the term with different meanings: for instance, the Hashwites
said that the Kurji'ites were known by this name because they
postponed works to Iman, and did not include them in its defini¬
tions. To al-Maturidi, this Hashwite usage of the term was con-
trary to the normal use of language and it is rationally
untenable. (Tawhid, pp.381,13-18; 382,1-16).
The Mu'tazilites defined the Murji'ites as those who post¬
poned making decision about the grave sinner, and refrained from
deciding whether he was condemned to Hell or not. To al-Katuridl,
this sense of the word ir,ja' was true, and Abu-Hanifa answered
the question of the origin of irja'. in accordance with this def¬
inition, by saying that the origin of irja' goes back to the
angels, in that when God said to them, "Inform Me of the names of
these, if ye are truthful" (2:31)- Having no knowledge of these
names, the angels entrusted their knowledge to God. This is also
true in the case of the grave sinners. Since they have performed
so many good things, it is unlikely that they would be eternally in
Hell. Thus their fate should be left to the decision of God, who
might forgive them according to His mercy, or He might punish them
according to His justice (Tawhid. pp.382-383. Ta'wilat, 2:23).
Al-Katuridi said that some people (presumably he means the
Kharijites) described the Murji'ites as those who postponed making
/decision
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decision about 'Ali and his opponents. To al-Maturidi, postponement
of decision in this respect is commendable if it means refraining
from indulgence in the whole matter, but if it implies criticism
of 'Ali or blaming him, then it would be wrong. Then al-Maturidi
emphasised the merits of 'Ali and quoted a Tradition in which the
prophet is believed to have said that, "If the Muslims appointed
Abu-Bakr as a Caliph, they will find him weak in his physical
strength but strong in his belief (din), if they appointed 'Umar,
they will find him strong in both his religion and his body, but
if they appointed 'Ali, he will prove to be the best guide and would
lead them to the path of guidance." Furthermore, al-Katuridi said,
'Umar chose 'Ali as a member of the committee set up to elect the
Caliph after his assassination, and many of the companions con¬
sidered appointing him as a Caliph. All this demonstrates 'Ali's
merits and indicates the ignorance of whoever tries to criticise
or blame him. (Tawhid. p.384,1-18). This emphasis of the merits
of 'Ali seems to be directed against the Kharijites, who criticised
both the Caliphs 'Uthman and 'Ali and considered them both as
sinners.
From this account, it might be concluded that according to al-
Maturidi there were two groups who were called Murji'ites: those
who held heretical doctrine regarding Qadar and advocated deter¬
minism, but there were also the Murji'ites who were called so
because they postponed decision regarding the grave sinner, and
refrained from indulgence in making judgement regarding the
affairs of the caliphates of 'Uthman and 'Ali.
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With reference to the Kharijites, al-Maturidi said that
some people did not differentiate between grave and minor sins and
considered that they both removed the one who commits them from
Iman. To support such a view, they quoted the verses, 4:14 and
33:36, where the sinner was regarded as disobedient and promised
eternal punishment in HellP^They called such a man as an unbel¬
iever (kafir) and introduced the following two arguments:— They- -
said that the verse, 99:8 establishes that the sinner is punished
for even small sins, while the verse 34:17 tells that it is only
the unbelievers who are to be punished, and the verses, 92:15-16
state that fire is only for the wretched who lie and turn away
from belief. Prom these verses, the Kharijites concluded that
the sinner is an unbeliever and will be punished eternally in
(2) - -
Hell. They also argued that the real meaning of Iman is that
one should not disobey God, so he who disobeys Him is not ful¬
filling the conditions of Iman and thereby deserves the name
(3)
kafir, because by performing these acts of disobedience, he is
in fact following and obeying the devil's commands, and is, in a
sense, worshipping the devil, and he who worships the devil is
(4)
an unbeliever.
The Kharijites also quoted the verses, 12:87 and 15:56, which
promised the sinner that punishment which applies only to the
unbelievers. The sinner is disobeying the law of God and so,
(1) Tawhld, p.323,16-19.
(2) Ibid.. p.324,6-11.
(3) Ibid.. pp.324,13-14; 325,1-2.
(4) Ibid.. p.325,3-5.
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according to the verse, 5:44, he must be an unbeliever. More¬
over, he has been designated by the names evil-doer (fasiq),
disobedient (fajir) , and unjust (zalim) , all of which are the
characteristics of the unbeliever. Furthermore, God has divided
people into two categories, believers and unbelievers, with
regard to this life and the life to come, and has called the
evil doer kafir, thus the sinner who is promised punishment in
Hell must be called KafirP ^ Some of the Kharijites, however, called
(2)
the grave sinner polytheist (mushrik) and not Kafir.
There are also those who called the grave sinner a hypocrite
(munafiq). This view was attributed to al-Hasan al-Basri (21/642 -
• •
(3) - - -
110/728). According to al-Maturidi, the holdersof these views
based their judgement in this respect on the fact that the
sinner's actual conduct does not agree with his verbal confession
of Iman. They quoted the verses, 29:11 and 1-2, to justify the
application of such a name. They also referred to the prophet's
Tradition: there are three traits of character which make anyone
having them a downright hypocrite. When he speaks, he lies;
when he makes a compact with someone, he betrays the agreement, and
when he is trusted, he violates the trust. All these character¬
istics, they said, are to be found in those who commit grave
(1) Tawhid, pp.329,19-20; 330,1-12.
(2) Ibid.. p.325,6-7.
(3) Watt, Formative Period, pp.80-81. E.I.^^ art. "Hasan al-
Basri" (H. Ritter) vol.iii, pp.247-48.
(4) Tawhid. p.331,12-18.
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Al-Maturidi gave greater attention to the views of the
Mu'tazilites on this subject. He recorded their views and then
proceeded to refute their arguments. According to.him, the Mu'¬
tazilites held that the grave sinner should be called neither
believer nor unbeliever, because such a man has been given bad
names such as fasiq. and Iman is one of the good names, and so
it should not be applied to him, and that unlike the believer,
who will be rewarded, the sinner is threatened with punishment.
Nor should he be called Kafir, because this name has not been
used to describe him. Therefore, the grave sinner must be des¬
ignated by the name, which everyone has agreed belongs to him:
that is he should be called wicked, unjust and sinner (fasiq.
fajir> zalim).^ ^
Al-teaturldi refuted the views of both the Kharijites and the
Mu'tazilites. To him, the grave sinner should not be called
Kafir or mushrik for the following reasons: God has commanded
the prophet to ask God's forgiveness for his sins and for those
of the believers. At the same time, however, the prophet has
been forbidden to ask forgiveness for the unbelievers (9:113)
and the hypocrites (63:6). This proves that those for whom for¬
giveness was asked, were believers. Such a forgiveness, however,
would not be asked for if those believers had committed sins, and
those sins had been forgiven. This establishes that, contrary to
the view of the Kharijites, a man is not rendered a non-believer
by his sins. It also establishes that there are certain sins
(2)which require repentance in order to be forgiven.
(1) Tawhid. pp.331,19-21; 332,1-5.
(2) Ibid. . pp.325,17-18; 326,1-14.
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In the verses, 24:31 and 66:8, God calls the sinners believers,
and commands them to repent in order to attain His forgiveness.
As well as refuting the Kharijites' assertion that grave sinners
are unbelievers and polytheists,^^ this also refutes the Mu'-
tazilites' view that they are not believers. If the term Kafir
is used in this respect, it must be understood in a metaphorical
(2)
sense as meaning one being unthankful to God (Kufr ni'ma).
Also the verses, 99:7; 4:110; 8:38; 25:70, clearly state that God
rewards man for whatever good he might have done. These verses
also indicate that through repentance He forgives man's sins.
Thus they refute the views of both the Kharijites and the Mu'taz-
(3)
ilites in this respect. The fact that the prophets and the
friends of Allah commit small sins must refute the Kharijite
notion that these sins lead to unbelief, otherwise the prophets
and the awliya' would be unbelievers which is inconceivable.
Similarly, the fact that the prophets and the friends of God
asked for God's forgiveness for their mistakes, proves that the
(4)
small sins are forgiveable if grave sins were avoided. He
pointed out that the Kharijite view that small sins lead to dis¬
belief and eternal punishment implies the denial of God's mercy,
(5)
His forgiveness and His generosity.




(2) Ibid. , p.327,4-8.
(3) Ibid., P.327,9-15.
(4) Ibid., p.228,3-14.
(5) Ibid. . p.228, 15ff.
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position. He said that the Mu'tazilites should be asked: is
the grave sinner not called believer or unbeliever because he
deserves neither of these terms, or because he deserves one of
them but it cannot be specified. If they assumed that he
deserves neither of these terms, they should be asked whether he
performs all the constituents of Iman or some of them, or if he
performs nothing. If they said that he performs all of them,
they should be asked why they are depriving him of the name
mu'min. If they said he performs some of them, then they should
call him kafir because God says such a man is truly kafir (Q. 4:
150-51). If they said he performs nothing, then he most likely
deserves to be called kafir. By this argument, al-Maturidi
showed that the Mu'tazilites had no justification for their doc¬
trine of the intermediate position.He added that God has
divided people into two categories, believers and unbelievers;
by suggesting a third category, the Mu'tazilites had simply
deviated from God's prescribed ordinances. Also, Iman is removed
from a man through his being an unbeliever and not through the
possibility of him being so, thus by holding such a doctrine the
Mu'tazilites had also defied the unanimous agreement of the
Muslim community (ijrna'), which stated that a man is either an
(2)
unbeliever or a believer.
Al-Maturidi openly defended the Murji'ite view which opposed
those of the Mu'tazilites, the Kharijites, as well as those of
al-Hasan al-Basri. He said that though these groups had different
(1) Tawhid, p.336,5-15.
(2) Ibid., pp.336,15-21; 337,1-4.
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views regarding the grave sinner, they all held that the threat
of punishment (wa*id) was not directed at the believers, but
only at those sinners who committed sins which removed them from
Iman. The Kurji'ites agreed that the sins which remove the
sinner from Iman deserve the declared punishment; but they post¬
poned a decision concerning the grave sinner. They said that
he should not be considered as an unbeliever nor should he be
eternally condemned to Hell.^^
Al-Katuridi took great pains to defend the views that grave
sin does not deprive the sinner of his belief. He pointed out
that the Qur'an, i.jma* . and the normal use of language, established
that Iman is assent (tasdiq). According to this concept of Iman,
all the judicial decisions of the Qur'an were laid down and
become binding on the members of the Muslim community. A person
who commits grave sins does not loose his status as a member of
(2)
the Muslim community, nor is he deprived of his belief.
In many verses the term believer is applied to the grave
sinner , along with a warning of a punishment for his sins. The
verse 61:2, states that God hates those who say something which
they are not actually doing. These people were termed believers,
even though God's hate of them must have been for serious reasons.
Those parties who were fighting each other were called believers
in the verse, 49:9, in spite of the fact that they were erring
against each other and that the other believers were ordered to




in the case of one who kills another, considers that both the
killer and his victim are believers, and considers the application
of God's judgement in this case as an alleviation and mercy from
Him. If this sin were to remove man from Iman, such term would
not be applied to him. Al-Maturidi analysed the verses, 8:72
and 4:97 in the same way and concluded that grave sins do not
deprive a man of his belief.The verses 66:8 and 24:31, tell
that those who commit sins which are forgivable by repentance
are believers, and this supports the view of those who hold that
the committing of grave sins do not remove a man from the state
(2)
of belief.
Iman is the necessary basis by which God enjoins religious
obligations and acts of worship. Since those who commit evil
deeds (af'al al-fisq) participate in the performance of these
actions, it has to be admitted that their grave sins do not
- - (3)
deprive them of Iman.
Al-Katuridi then referred to the doctrine of intercession
as a proof of his view that the grave sinner is a believer. He
pointed out that the intercession, whose validity has been estab¬
lished by the Qur'an and Traditions, must be for those sins which
entail God's wrath and punishment. It cannot be for small sins,
because these sins entail no punishment, nor can it be for the
act of unbelief since such an act is not pardoned. Therefore,





the prophet and those with whom God is pleased (ahl ar-rida').
He refuted the Mu'tazilite interpretation of the intercession as
that it only increases the rewards of the believers and did not
forgive grave sinners. He said that some of the Mu'tazilites
explained intercession in two ways: They said that intercession
was either man asking God for elevation or lasting rewards, or
it was man asking God for forgiveness and quoted the verses
40:7-9 and 21:28 to support their views. Al-Maturidi pointed out
that intercession in the first sense is inconceivable for two
reasons: one is that it implies ignorance on the part of God
which is impossible. Secondly, all man's actions are recorded
and this is quite adequate for deciding his fate. Intercession
in the sense of asking forgiveness is only possible if it is for
grave sins. The acts of obedience entail rewards and not punish¬
ment, and asking forgiveness for them is unsightly, because it
implies asking God not to be unjust or foolish.
Al-Maturidi said that a very sound proof of this was the
fact that generation after generation of the Muslim community
took it for granted that prayers should be performed over the
body of every one of the people of the qibla (member of the comm-
•+ ^ (2)unity).
Al-Maturidi then refuted the Mu'tazilite view that the grave
sinner is not a kafir, though he should have no hope in God's
mercy. To al-Maturidi, such a view is contradictory, since the
verse 12:87 connects despair of God's mercy with unbelief, and so
(1) Tawhid. pp.366,5-18; 367,1-9.
(2) Ibid.. p.334,10-12.
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he who affirms one must affirm the other. The grave sinner is
not Kafir because the normal use of the word suggests denying
of God, and because he is a believer he hopes for God's forgiveness
and fears His punishment and therefore not denying God (mukadhdhib).
To consider him as to be denied God's mercy (ya'is) is mis¬
leading and shows an ignorance about God. Moreover, Kufr in
reality is a term used for covering up (sitr), or concealing;
the grave sinner does not conceal God's grace, nor does he deny
His right (haqq). So it would be wrong to call him a Kafir.
Similarly, Iman, according to the normal use of language and
Scripture, means assent and it is known that the sinner denies
nothing of God, which proves that he is a believer.^^
Before committing sins, a man is designated as mu'min by
the Qur'an (2:136, 2:285 and 4:94), by the Traditions, which
define the constituents of Iman, and by the consensus of the
Muslim community. The act of disobediences and the committing
of evil deeds do not remove him from Iman, because these concepts
are not contrary to the concepts of iman. Disobedience (fisq)
is a deviation of a command which might be a guidance, obligation
or a conviction. Likewise, injustice simply means the placing
of a thing in its improper place, while disobedience refers only
to disagreement. So whoever regards these as conveying similar
meanings, with the intention of removing Iman from he who
commits them, is doing an injustice to himself, and is in obvious
disagreement with the definitions made by God and the prophet
of these concepts.
(1) Tawhld, p.334,13-21.
(2) Ibid., pp.342,17-20; 243,1-11.
- 437 -
Al-Maturidi stated that the differences between the Kharijites
and Mu'tazilites on one hand and the Murji'ites on the other hand,
is based on their differing views as to whether the verses which
promise reward and those which threaten punishment are general
or particular. They cannot both be general since a contradiction
would ensue, in the case of a man who did good actions and at
the same time committed some sins. The Kharijites and the Mu'¬
tazilites held that the verses which threatened punishment must
be general in order to achieve admonition and warning, while the
Murji'ites maintained that the verses which promise reward should
be general in order to ascertain God's characteristics of mercy,
forgiveness and granting pardons.
Al-Maturidi introduced rational arguments to prove that
committing grave sins does not lead a man to eternal punishment
in hell. His arguments in this respect are based on the differ¬
ence in nature between unbelief and grave sin. He said that when
the grave sinner commits a sin, he is in a state of fear of God's
punishment, is terrified of His hatred, and hoping for His mercy
and generosity. All these states are acts of obedience and
certainly outweigh the grave sin he committed as a result of
desire, compulsion or anger. Thus, it would be contrary to
reason to deprive such a man of the benefits of His good deeds
and make him suffer eternal punishment, since this would be con¬
trary to God's generosity and bounty. The unbelievers and poly-
theists, however, have nothing which might be called good deeds,
since they have no belief in God and deny His commandments and
(1) Tawhid, p.342,5-8.
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prohibitions. Thus they would have no hope, therefore, per¬
petual punishment of them would not be contrary to God's generosity
and His beneficence.^"^
Another argument is that God promised that he who commits
sins would be punished in accordance with his sin, but for
unbelief was prescribed as punishment the abode forever in Hell.
If grave sins were to be awarded the same punishment, it would
be an excessive punishment, which is an injustice and, therefore,
(2)
inappropriate to God. The penalties (hudud) in this life are
prescribed as atonement for sins: if it were not so, and sins were
punished by eternal hell, this punishment would be greater than
(3)
the punishment for Kufr, wnich is impossible. Furthermore,
al-Maturidi said, unbelief is a doctrine which one adheres to
(yu* qad), and doctrines are normally upheld permanently, and so
its rewards and punishment must be permanent. The grave sins,
however, are only mistakes committed at certain times, when one,
for instance, is overcome by desires, so its punishment must only
(4)
be for a short time. Moreover, unbelief is ugly in itself
(bi-dhatihi). and cannot be otherwise, so its punishment should
be permanent and without forgiveness. While all other sins
might possibly become lawful, so its punishment must be temporal
(5)







between the nature of sins and unbelief, and the intention and
attitude of the grave sinner and the unbeliever, indicate that
their punishments cannot be the same, and thus it must be con¬
cluded that grave sins would not be punished eternally in Hell.^^
Al-Maturidi devoted a large proportion of his treatment of
the problem of Iman, to the refutation of al-Ka'bi's view re-
(2)
garding this problem. Prom this section it is clear that
most of al-Ka'bi's arguments are based on quotations of the
Qur'an, which he interpreted himself, and from which he drew
his own conclusions. He also contended the interpretation given
to certain verses by the opponents of the Mu'tazilites. Al-
Maturidi meticulously followed al-Ka'bi's arguments and tried to
demonstrate their weaknesses. Reference has already been made
to some of al-Ka'bi's views and his arguments, and it is needless
to mention his views in detail since they are more or less the
same as those of the general Mu'tazilite movement. There is one
point, however, which is worth mentioning and that is that in
the course of his argument, al-Maturidi made reference to a
certain book of al-Ka'bi from which he said he is quoting his
(3)
views on this problem. It is quite possible that this book
is al-Ka'bi's missing work called Wa'id al-Pussaq. Al-Maturidi
also mentioned that he devoted a special work refuting al-Ka'bi's
arguments based on his interpretation of the Qur'an. This book





Fussaq. Thus it seems that Kitab at-Tawhid has reserved most,
if not all, the material of al-Ka'bi's book and that of his own
book which is a refutation of that of al-Ka'bi.
2. Al-Katuridi's Conception of Iman
Different definitions of iman followed as a result of the
various opinions regarding the destiny of the sinners. In
accordance with their views, the Kharijites and the Mu'tazilites
gave great importance to the acts of obedience, good works in
their conception of iman [ ^ 2hi le the Murji'ites laid strong emphasis
on the importance of knowledge and verbal acknowledgement or con¬
fession by the tongue. They regarded work of secondary import¬
ance in order to establish their view that iman is unaffected by
(2)
sins, even grave sins. Individual thinkers in the Murji'ite
movement held different views regarding the emphasis to be laid
on knowledge or verbal confession, in their conception of iman.
Abu-Hanifa's view, which foretold the opinions of his school
and of the Maturidltes later on, seems to have asserted the impor¬
tance of both knowledge or assent, and verbal confession. Accord¬
ing to al-Ash'ari, Abu-Hanifa held that, "iman was the Knowledge
of God together with the acknowledgement of Him and the knowledge
of the messenger (Muhammad) and the acknowledgement of the reve-
lation he brought, and this was to be in general and without
(3)
interpretation." Both the Wasiyya and the Fiqh Akbar II
(1) Maqalat, p.266 ff.
(2) Ibid.. p.132 ff.
(3) Ibid.. p.138,12-14.
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attributed to him the view that Iman consisted of confession
with the tongue and assent with the heart. It is noticeable
- - - (2)
that Abu-Eanifa also excluded work from the definition of Iman.
Al-Maturidi' s treatment of this problem represents more or
less the general views of the Hanafites-Kurji'ites, in that it
excludes works from the definition of Iman. Nevertheless, he
advocated the definition of Iman as assent rather than knowledge,
and in contrast to the extreme views of the Karramites he mini¬
mised the importance of verbal confession. Criticism of the
Karramite view dominates all of al-Maturidi's section on the
definition of Iman. He began this section by saying that, "some
people claimed that Iman is confession by the tongue (iqrar)
(3)
alone, and that there is nothing in the heart." Refuting
such a view, he emphasized the point that Iman is assent by the
heart, thus the most appropriate place for it, according to both
reason and revelation, is the heart (i.e. not the tongue).
He then proceeds to prove his point by numerous quotations from
the Qur'an, to the effect that Iman is not only a verbal con¬
fession. He referred to the verses 5:41 and 49:14, which res¬
pectively deny the claim of the hypocrites and of the bedouins
(5)
to be believers, even though they made verbal confession. Also
(1) Aasiyya. art.1. M.C. p.125. Fiqh Akbar II. art.18.
M.C. p.194.





the verses 60:10, 9:56 and 4:56 and 4:25 imply that only God
knows whether one is a believer or not, which must prove that
iman is the work of the heart. Moreover, whilst God promises
a reward to the believers, he says that the hypocrites would be
in the lower part of hell. If verbal confession is belief,
then they would have been promised reward and not eternal punish¬
ment. Besides, God considers their act of belief as mere
deception (2:9), so whoever assumes that this verbal confession
is true belief would be making a severe mistake and disclosing
his ignorance of God. Furthermore, God tells us that the hypo¬
crites are unbelievers, 63:6, 9:54, and states that they are
liars (63:1) which makes it clear that verbal confession, with
the denial of the heart is an act of lying, so that whoever
considers the hypocrites' confession as Iman, is giving them a
(2)
contradictory name which is wrong. In the verse 16:106, God
does not consider those who under compulsion confessed unbelief,
as unbelievers, which proves that the heart is the locus of
- - (3)
Iman.
The Karramites quoted the Tradition, "I have been ordered to
fight people until they say there is no god but Allah", to
support their view that Iman is verbal confession only. To al-
Maturidi, however, this Tradition does not prove that verbal
confession only is true Iman, nor that iman is not assent by the








an expression of iman. Judgement, as to whether one is a believer
or unbeliever, would be passed in accordance with this verbal
confession, since there is no other way of testing one's Iman.
The normal procedures of passing judgement on a thing is con¬
sideration of the outward aspects, although its reality might be
different. We distinguish between the believers and the unbel¬
ievers according to certain information gained through our
association with them, which differ from the concepts of belief
and disbelief. Similarly, we judge one to be a believer, or not,
according to his verbal confession which is also different from
the concepts of belief and unbelief. Therefore, if someone was
to be compelled to express unbelief, he would not be Kafir, since
in his heart he is mu'min. Likewise, those who express their
belief in verbal form only would be considered as mu'min and
would be treated so regarding all matters related to religious
duties and observations. This does not mean that Iman is verbal
confession only, otherwise those who only confess verbally would
not be deprived of forgiveness and the rewards for ImanP^
Al-Katuridi argued that in the verses, 9:123, 9:36 and 9:5,
fighting is declared against the unbelievers and the polytheists
for verbally confessing these convictions. However, this does
not deny that the place of unbelief and polytheism is the heart.
Thus it is not unlikely that the prophets were ordered to fight
people until they verbally confessed their belief, though the
place of Iman is the heart. The wording of the quoted Tradition
supports this point and indicates that the repetition of the
(1) Tawhid, p.376,1-18.
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shahada (verbal confession) is only the reason for not fighting
the infidels, and not the reality of Iman.^^
Then al-Maturidi introduced rational arguments to the effect
that iman is assent by the heart only. Ke said that iman is a
religion, and religions and all doctrines (nadhahib) are based on
(2)
a conviction which is attained by the heart. Also Iman,
according to the normal use of language, is an assent and the
essence of this reality, which is not liable to compulsion and
enforcement, is the conviction of the heart over which no-one can
have power. According to al-Maturidi, a man might not have a
tongue to express himself, yet no-one would deny him his religion,
or his belief in God and His prophet, which establishes that
(3)
belief is only by the assent of the heart. Furthermore, reason
is a pre-requisite for imposing the duty to believe on man, and
the proofs leading to iman are based on reflection and specul¬
ation which are the acts of the man, therefore iman must be the
same, that is to say, it must be the act of the heart (i.e. mind);
(4)
for the tongue is only an instrument used like any other
(5)
instrument for speech and the giving of reports. Another proof
is that God says, "There is no compulsion in religion", yet some¬
times one might be forced to express disbelief, whicn proves that
(1) Tawhid. p.377,1-8.
(2) Ibid. . p.377,10-11 .
(3) Ibid.. p.377,11-14.




the essence of iraan is in the heart. In many verses the
Muslims were called believers, and although they are not giving
a verbal confession at that time, there is no doubt of their
belief. This establishes that the essence of iman, according to
which they were called believers, was present in them at the
time they were addressed and the only possible place for such
(2)
a conviction is the heart.
Some of the Ku'tazilites, particularly al-Ka'bi, held that
the totality of acts of obedience are part of Iman, and quoted
the verse 3:85 to support such a view. In order to refute this,
al-Maturidi tried to disclose the weaknesses of the argument
derived from the above-mentioned verse. He said that it is true
that acts of worship would not be accepted from someone who per¬
forms them without believing in Islam. This, however, does not
mean that these acts constitute a fundamental element of the
concept of iraan. It only implies that iman is a name for an act
of worship, and that it is a condition for the acceptance of all
other acts of obedience. However, this does not mean that these
acts are iman, since connection with something does not necess-
(3) - - -
arily imply being a part of it. Al-Maturidi quoted the verses,
61:2; 61:4; 9:38; 4:75 and 57:16, where the believers are
reprimanded for committing acts of disobedience and are not
deprived of the name believers, which proves that actions do not
- - (4)




(4) Ibid., pp.378,17-18; 279,1-12.
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Certain people held that only knowledge took place in the
heart of a believer,and to refute this al-Maturidi pointed
out that in Arabic language, iman means assent (tasdiq). and
drew attention to the fact that the concept of Iman stands in
opposition to the concept of kufr. while knowledge is the
opposite of ignorance. So if Iman is to be equated with know¬
ledge, kufr would have to be equated with ignorance. In reality,
kufr does not mean ignorance, but giving the lie (takdhib), or
covering up the truth (taghtiya) , and a kafir is a man who denies
the truth of something. For this reason a man who does not know
the truth is never called a mukadhdhib, but simply an ignorant
(.iahil). This proves that in reality Iman is not knowledge.
This does not mean, however, that knowledge has nothing to do
with assent. A causal relation exists between these two concepts,
so knowledge is a cause of assent, just as ignorance is often a
cause of takdhib. According to al-Uaturidi, "iman with the
heart is strictly speaking not knowledge, but knowledge can
induce assent, just as ignorance, in many cases, can induce the
(2)
attribute of "giving the lie". It is not right to describe
everybody who does not know something as a mukadhdhib. nor is it
possible to describe everybody who knows something as an assenter
to it. iman is often called knowledge because knowledge fre¬
quently causes assent, just as ignorance often causes denial.
This, obviously, does not mean that "knowledge" is really iman
(1) This view was attributed to Jahm Ibn-Safwan and some groups
among the Murji'ites, see Kaqalat, pp.132 ff.
(2) Tawhid, p.380,1-10. Ta'wilat. 5:41.
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itself.^1^
According to such a conception of assent and knowledge,
one might say, "I believe in all the messengers", but not "I
have knowledge by heart of them all." The Qur'anic verse 16:106,
"whoso disbelieve in God after having believed in Him, except
those who are forced thereto, their hearts being happily content
with Iman, but who so is happy with kufr, upon them will be
wrath from God", can be explained similarly. If only knowledge
were in the heart, kufr would be unable to remove and eliminate
it. Therefore, the condition mentioned here (of their hearts
being happily content with Iman) would be completely pointless.
In fact, it frequently happens that a man, in order to protect
himself from wrongfully suffering treatment, adopts something
which is quite different to what he knows to be the truth. He
does so only for self-protection. In such a case "the happy
contentment of the heart" is his condition (i.e. is the evidence
that he will keeps his Iman intact.)
Thus, according to al-Maturidi, knowledge might be the
cause of Iman, but it is not its essence. Iman is assent and
is such that the man who has it feels in himself a profound con-
(2)
tentment (tuma'niyna) arising from this unshakable conviction.
3. The Creation of Iman
The question of whether Iman is created or not was hotly
debated by the theologians, and later considered as one of the
(1) Tawhid. p.380,11-17.
(2) Ibid., pp.380,18-21; 281,1.
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genuine disagreements between the Ash'arites and the Maturidites.
It is even said that the Maturidite school was divided on this
question. It will be shown later that the whole dispute seems
to have resulted from the confusion regarding what is meant by
Iman. Those who considered Iman to be uncreated, linked the
question with the problem of the creation of the Qur'an, while
those who considered it to be created were merely concerned with
Iman as a human phenomenon.
Al-Katuridi , who held the latter view, devoted a special
section to this question, and pointed out that his main opponents
in this respect (who held that Iman is uncreated) were some of
(2)
the Hashwites. In opposing them he argued that, as a concept,
Iman must either be a known or an unknown object. If it were
unknown, it would be pointless to say that it is created or un¬
created. According to him, the only thing which is unknown is
creation in general which God did not give us a lead (dalil) to.
Iman, however, cannot be an unknown concept because man has been
ordered to perform it, religious obligations and laws are based
on its realization, it has been considered as the basis of res¬
ponsibility and judgement (mihna), and the Muslims unanimously
testify to its creation. All of which points that Iman is a
(3)
known concept.
He pointed out that Iman must be a human phenomenon because
it is a man who is commanded to perform it and who is promised
a reward for its performance and threatended with punishment for
its negligence. Also, the Qur'an states this connection between
man and his Iman, and designates he who performs it as a mu'min.




(2) The word "Hashwiyya, Hashawiyya or Ahl al-Hashw" is a con-
• • •
temptuous term used by different groups to repudiate their
opponents. But it is mainly used in reference to a certain
group among the Ahl al-Hadith, who accepted the anthropo¬
morphic expressions mentioned in the Traditions, in their
(2)
literal sense. (E.I. art. "Hashwiyya" vol.iii,p.269.
A.S. Halkin, art. "The Hashwiyya" JAOS 54 (1934) pp.1-28).
Al-Katuridi used the term Hashwiyya several times in
his Kitab at-Tawhid. He attributed to al-Ka'bi the views
that the Hashwiyya were those who supported the Umayyad
rulers in their political attitude, and blindly adhered to
the doctrine of predetermination. (Tawhid. p.318,3-7). Al-
Maturidi admitted that these views belong to a certain group
among the Hashwites. (Ibid, p.318,19-20).
To al-Maturidi, however, the main views of the Hashwites
were concerned with the problem of Iman. In this respect
they hold some views which are different from those of the
Hanafites. Thus they maintained that Iman is uncreated.
•
(Tawhid, pp.385-88), that the acts of obediences are con-
stituent parts of Iman (Ibid, pp.331,5-7; 378,7. Ta'wilat.
60:1). They also advocated the doctrine of the conditional
profession of Iman (istithna') Tawhid, p.382,4-15.
(3) Tawhid. pp.385,12-21; 386,1-3.
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Finally, al-Maturidi pointed out that it is man who testifies to
the oneness of God, and believes in His messengers, which proves
that Iman is the action of man. Therefore, Iman cannot be un¬
created, for it is impossible for it to exist before the existence
mnn O)ot an.
According to al-Maturidi, the creation of something is known
either by revelation or by reason, both of which testify to the
creation of Iman. With regard to revelation, the Qur'an clearly
stated that God is the creator of all things, and since in the
view of al-Maturidi, every thing apart from God is created, Iman
must also be created. To support this he refers to specific
verses, 37:96, where Iman is included in what one does, and to
67:13-14, where Iman is considered as something either proclaimed
or hidden, and to 25:59, in which Iman is included within the
(2)
things that rest between the heaven and earth.
Al-Maturidi said that rational evidences could easily be
found by looking for all the symptoms of creation within Iman;
since Iman occurs in the believers and what has thus occurred is
(3)
logically created. Another argument is that Iman is a method
of conduct which one follows, a religion which one believes in,
a doctrine which one chooses, and a creed which one adheres to.
Therefore, since these concepts are created, it must also be
(4) - -
created. Al-Maturidi then quoted some Traditions to support
(1) Tawhid, p.386,3-19.
(2) Ibid.. pp.386,20-23; 387,1-7.




his theory on the creation of Iman.
4. The Conditional Profession of Iman (istithna')
The problem of istithna'. namely saying, "I am a believer
if God wills", was one of the disputed questions among the
Hanafites-Maturidites on one hand, and the Hanbalites-Ash'arites*
•
on the other hand. Basing their view on the conception of Iman
as something determined by God, the Hanbalites-Ash'arites
affirmed the necessity of this conditional phrase, because they
said, though a man might be sincere in his belief, there might
(2)
be imperfection in his assent,of which he is not aware. The
Hanafites, who rejected such an istithna'. drew a positive line
•
between Iman and kufr. This found expression in Abu-Hanifa's
statement that the believer is really a believer and the unbe¬
liever is really an unbeliever, therefore, it is pointless as
well as illogical for a believer to express any doubt in his
belief.
Al-!'aturidi emphasized this Hanafite view and laid down
arguments to support it. He said that it is a fundamental
necessity to openly declare the certainty of our belief, without
introducing any exceptions, because to raise doubts about any
conception (ma* na), which is a necessary requisite for the
(1) Tawhid. p.387,15-18.




(3) Abu-Hanifa, V.'asiyya in the Rasa'il as-Sab'a fi-l-'Aqa'id
• •
p.77. cf. Izutsu, op.cit. pp.194-5. Watt, Formative
Period. pp.138-39.
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accomplishment of Iman, invalidates it, and raises doubts about
our Iman itself. He argued that in ordinary social life, the
istithna' would invalidate testimony, contracts, promises, etc.,
- - (2)
and so it would do the same to Iman. Again, istithna' is
normally used in cases of doubts and suspicions. The believer,
however, should have no doubt in his belief 49:15), it is
(3)
only the hypocrites who are subject to such doubts. Moreover,
Iman is one of the graces and bounties which God has bestowed
upon man.
Al-Maturidi argued that he who professes "exception" about
his belief, would either be sincere and have acknowledged God's
favour, or he would have openly denied such a favour. In the
latter case, istithna' is pointless since it only increases man's
state of doubt and suspicion, while in the first case it indicates
man's denial of God's favour and that he covers up such a favour
(4)
which is also wrong. The istithna' is usually uttered when
one is embarrassed (when asked to do something) but this embarr¬
assment would not be applicable because, if one did not believe
(5)
in God, one would be reckoned with and punished.
Those who affirmed the necessity of istithna' pointed out
that, by uttering this conditional phrase, they did not necess¬
arily mean that they doubted their assent. This is because God
(1) Tawhid. p.388.12-14.
(2) Ibid., p.388,17-18.
(3) Ibid.. p.389,15-17. Ta'wilat. 1:5.
(4) Tawhid, pp.389,15-17; 390,1-6.
(5) Ibid. . p.390,8-11 .
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mentioned the istithna' in the Qur'an and did not imply anything
doubtful in connection with it. God said, "You shall enter the
secure sacred mosque if God wills", Q.48;27. Muhammed did enter
the sacred mosque, and that was certain, although the istithna'
was mentioned by God.^^ In reply to such a suggestion, al-
Maturidi says, this argument is not sound because God mentioned
the words "may be", "perhaps" and "would it be", when He meant
to speak about things with certainty. Furthermore, God may have
taught the prophet to say the istithna' when he was making a
promise. God said: "Do not say of anything, 'I will do it
tomorrow' without adding, 'if God wills, I will do it'." The same
(2)
thing is meant in the case of "You shall enter".
5. The Relation between Iman and Islam
Attempts to state the relationship between Islam and Iman
go back to the time of the prophet and are to be found in the
Traditions in which the constructions of Iman and Islam are laid
down. Later on, theoretical formulation of these concepts were
developed, thus raising the question of whether these terms are
identical, or whether they are relevant to certain aspects of
belief. Controversies over this question were accentuated by the
fact that the Qur'an seems to have used these terms interchange¬
ably, and it certainly gives no ground for the view that Iraan is
either higher or lower than Islam. In the last section of Kitab
at-Tawhid. which is devoted to the discussion of this problem,
(1) Tawhid, p.391,3-7.
(2) Ibid., pp.391,8-19; 392,1-3.
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al-Maturidi tried to refute the views of those who attempted
to make certain distinctions between these two concepts and
concluded that they are identical.^^
According to al-Maturidi, those who defined Iman in a way
which included all acts of obedience, distinguished between Islam
and Iman on the basis of the Qur'anic verse, "The nomads say
amanna (we have believed). Say: you have not believed, but say,
aslamna (we have professed Islam), seeing that Iman has not yet
entered your hearts", Q.49:14. To them, this verse suggested
that Iman is on a higher level than Islam, thus God permits the
nomads to tell of their Islam but not of their Iman, since they
had not yet fulfilled the condition of Iman. They also referred
to the Tradition in which the prophet defined Iman to consist of
belief in God, His angels, His book, His messengers, the final
resurrection and that all Qadar, whether good or bad, is from
God, and in which he defined Islam as serving God without
associating anything with Him, performing the ordered salat.
paying over the obligatory zakat, fasting Ramadan, and visiting
the House of God for pilgrimage. They argued that there must be
(1) Al-Maturidi's views in this respect are in line with those
of his predecessors, the Hanafite theologians. In the Piqh
Akbar II. art.18, it is stated that from the language point
of view, there is a difference between Iman and Islam as
*
Iman means al-iqrar wal-tasdiq. and Islam means al-inqiyad
wal-taslim. But one is not possible without the other,
i.e., Iman without Islam, and Islam without Iman. The
two words are synonymous. M,C■ p.194.
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a difference between the two since both the Qur'an and the
Traditions distinguished between them.^^ A similar argument,
based on the Qur'an and the Traditions, was used by some of
those who defined Iman as assent and held that Islam is a term
(2)
which stands for all pious acts (qurab).
In al-Maturidi' s view, although the terms Islam and Iman
are linguistically different, they are similar in their meanings,
because they convey the same religious concepts. Thus Iman is
a term used to refer to the belief based on the intellect and
the Traditions, that God is one, to Him belong the command and
creation, and that He has no associate in this respect. Islam,
however, means the entire submission of one's self and all one's
affairs to God; this is fulfilled through humble veneration and
devoted worship. So the outcome of Islam and Iman is the same,
(3)
though each one represents different aspects.
Some people said that Islam is submission to God and resig¬
nation to His will and they interpreted accordingly the verse,
49:14, which was mentioned previously.
Al-Maturidi agreed that Islam means submission to God, but
he did not believe that this verse referred to this kind of sub¬
mission: the fact that this verse simply tells of the bedouins'
surrender to the believers, and not to God, is shown in the verses,
59:13, "you arouse greater fear in their hearts than God", and
"they think every cry is against them", 63:4, Islam which is the




result of fear of man is not the true Islam. In reality, Islam
is voluntary submission and resignation to God, and thus it is
synonymous with Iman. The bedouins were denied this sense of
Islam.
He went on to say that, if the reality of Iman and Islam is
such, it would be wrong for anyone to assume the existence of one
of them in the true sense without the existence of the other
(2)
(lays). They are considered as one concept although they
have different names, because of their close relationship, in the
same way that the terms, human being, man, and someone, which are
used in differing expressions, refer to one entity, a human being.
Thus, Islam and Iman are similar in their real essence, and the
existence of one of them necessarily entails the existence of
the other. ^
Moreover, it is unlikely that anyone would comply with the
essentials of Islam without being, at the same time, a believer
(muslim) and without being a mu'min. This proves that, in their
essence, Iman and Islam are one and that they can be applied
interchangeably, for religions differ according to difference
of convictions and not because of differences in their ritual
works. Thus, with the existence of belief, one might be called
by any of these two terms. God says, "The Religion with Allah
(1) Tawhid, p.395,5-14.
(2) The text should be read, wa-l-akhar lays (the other is not
in existence) thus the amendment of Kholeif of the text




is the surrender (to His will and guidance)" and, "And he who
seeketh as religion other than the surrender (to Allah) it will
not be accepted from him and he will be a loser in the hereafter.
Therefore, the believer in the real sense would either be in
possession of Islam, which is the religion of God or possessing
some of it, or be seeking something other than God's religion.
He would only be called a muslim in the first case, this argument
(3)
proves that Islam is the complete form of religion.
As for the Tradition which has been quoted as proof for the
differentiation between Islam and iman, al-Maturidi said that
there is another version of this Tradition. This version was
related on the authority of Ibn-'Umar and according to it, the
prophet is said to have been asked about iman and the codes of
Islam, and not about the concept of Islam, as the other version
states.^ ^
Then al-Maturidi introduced an argument based on the Qur'an,
and rational evidences, to the effect that the terms Islam and
iman are identical. He referred to the verses, 2:136; 10:84;
49:17 and 51:35-6, where the two terms were used interchangeably.
He also quoted two versions of a Tradition in which the terms
were used interchangeably.^^ He argued that there is no
(1) Qur'an. 3:19.
(2) Ibid. . 3:85.
(3) Tawhid. p.396,1-14.




contradiction in calling the Muslim a mu'min and vice versa.
Also, all Muslim schools agreed that if a man is removed from
Islam, he is also removed from Iman and vice versa, and in the
hereafter, the abode of the Muslims would be the same as that of
the mu'min. All of which proves that these two terms are
identical.^^^ He pointed out that neither of these terms
applied any judgement in relation to this world or to the world
to come, which was not applied by the other, which proves that
(2)





AL-ASH*ART ON THE DOCTRINE OP IMAN
From his extant works, al-Ash'ari does not appear to have
been as concerned with this problem as al-Maturidi was, and he
therefore introduced no systematic treatment and gave no detailed
account of the various aspects of this problem. However,
references to certain aspects of the problem are to be found in
his writings. His main concern in his Luma* seems to be the
refutation of the Mu'tazilites doctrine of the intermediate
position; while the Risala II and the Ibana mentioned briefly
some of the views which are of Hanbalite or traditionalist
origin.
1. The Fate of the Grave Sinner
It has already been mentioned that the Mu'tazilites
consider the sinner as neither a believer nor an unbeliever, but
as being in an intermediate position, and that unless he repented
he would be punished eternally in Hell.^^ In opposing this
Mu'tazilite view, al-Ash'ari emphasised the point that sin does
not remove the sinner from his belief and that, therefore, he
would not be eternally punished in Hell. In his Luma', he
clearly stated that a man may be a believer with respect to his
Iman but that, at the same time, he may be a sinner, so that by
committing a sin a man is not removed from his state of belief,
as the Mu'tazilites claimed. He pointed out that the names
(1) See Supra, p.431.
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believer and sinner belong to a man because of certain acts
performed by him, and since they are not contradictory terms,
they can both exist in one man. Prom a linguistic point of view,
a man is qualified by his action, for instance, if he strikes he
would be called a striker. Similarly, the man who commits a sin
and at the same time professes his belief, must be called a
believer and a sinner.^^ To consider him as neither a believer
nor an unbeliever, as the Ku'tazilites did, would imply that he
possessed neither of these concepts, which is impossible; this
obviously demonstrates the falsity of the Ku'tazilite doctrine of
the intermediate position. Moreover, this Mu'tazilite doctrine is
contrary to the unanimous agreement of the Muslim community,
which divided the disobedient ones into two categories: believer,
in the case of committing grave sins, and unbelievers, in the
(2)
case of commiting the sin of polytheism.
Al-Ash'ari expressed the same view in his Risala II. where
he stated that no sin but kufr could remove a man from his Iman.
He argued that the sinners, among the Muslims, were called
believers, and were under the jurisdiction of the laws and ord¬
inances of Islam. This is demonstrated by the verse, 5:6, which
orders the believers to perform ritual ablutions when they intend
to pray, and by the verse, 62:9 which commands them to attend
the Friday prayers. If sins remove man from his state of belief,
then the sinner would not be asked to perform the ritual ablution




committed no sins and there are no indications that the verse is
only directed for the obedients and not for the disobedients.^^
- - (2)
Similar views were also stated in the creeds of the Kaqalat.
and the Ibana, where it is said that, "It is our opinion that we
ought not to declare a single one of the people of the qibla as
infidels for the committing of a sin, such as fornication or
theft or the drinking of wine, as the Kharijites believe, being
of the opinion that such people are infidels; but rather we believe
that he who commits any of these mortal sins, such as fornication
or theft or the like, presumptuously declaring it to be lawful
(mustahill) and does not acknowledge that it is forbidden, is an
infidel.^
The Mu'tazilites maintained that, as had already been
mentioned, unless the sinner repents, he will be punished for ever
in Hell. They based their views on those Qur'anic verses which
threatened the sinners with the punishment of fire. Al-Ash'ari,
who disagreed with the Ku'tazilites on this point, tried to refute
their arguments in his Luma'. and to show that reading of these
Qur'anic verses, which their arguments depended on, did not
necessarily lead to their views.
According to al-Ash'ari, the I,Iu' tazilites quoted the verses
82:14; 4:30 and 4:10, which threatened the profligates, those who
act unjustly and wrongfully, and those who wrongfully consume the
wealth of orphans, with the punishment of fire. They argued that




these verses are of a universal nature to prove that whoever
commits such a crime would be punished in Hell.^^ Al-Ash'ari
contended the basic Mu'tazilite assumption of the.universality of
the threat in these verses, and stated that there is no proof
for such a claim. He pointed out that the word "whomsoever"
in the verse, 4:30, "But whomsoever does that in transgression
and wrongfully", might be applying to all those who do that, or
to some of them, because in the Arabic language the word man
(whomsoever) is used in both senses, therefore it cannot be
affirmed that it has a universal or a particular application
(2)
without solid proof. Similarly, it is not possible to be cer¬
tain if the verses, 82:14 and 4:10, refer to "some" or to "all"
(3)
without proof. Then al-Ash'ari quoted two verses of Arabic
poetry and several phrases, where words might be of a universal
or a particular meaning, and concluded that since such expressions
sometimes occur universally and sometimes particularly, it is not
possible to assert either of these concepts without some sort of
(4)
positive indication. If the punishment of whoever committed
one of these sins is to be concluded from these verses, then it
must also be concluded from the ostensible meaning of the verse,
27:89, that every one who professed God's unity would be in
heaven, and from the verse, 3:169, that whoever is killed while




(4) Ibid., pp.77,18; 78,1-8
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sins except unbelief and polytheism would be forgiven by God.
He concluded that one has no more right to say that the verses
which threaten are universal, and that the others, such as those
just mentioned, are particular, than one who reverses the state¬
ment and says that the threatening verses are particular and the
others are universal.
Moreover, if one had to conclude from the ostensible meanings
of the verses that every profligate man and everyone who wrong¬
fully consumes the wealth of an orphan will be condemned to Hell,
then one could conclude from the verses, 67:8-9, that only the
unbelievers enter fire, and from the verses, 92:14-16, that who¬
ever enters it is impious and belies, and from the verse 5:47,
that only the polytheists refrain from judging according to what
God has sent down. Al-Ash'ari concluded that, "since these verses
do not compel one to conclude that only the unbelievers enter the
fire, the previously cited verses do not compel one to conclude
that those who committed these sins will be condemned to the
fire.<2>
According to al-Ash'ari, the verse, 4:30, which the Mu'taz-
ilites quoted to prove their view that every sinner will be in
Hell, might be interpreted as meaning those who committed sin
whilst declaring it licit (mustahill) , or possibly as meaning
everyone who commits grave sins. Similarly, the other threat-
(3)
emng verses have these two alternative interpretations. By
demonstrating the weaknesses of the Mu'tazilites arguments,




al-Ash'arl is trying to say that although the grave sinner will
be punished in the fire for his sin, he will ultimately come
forth and enter paradise. He expressed this opinion in his
Risala II. where he stated that the fathers (salaf) unanimously
agreed that God will bring out of fire the person in whose heart
there is something of Iman, after he is punished for his sin.^^
This would be achieved through the intercession of the prophet
(2)(shafa'a) which has already been referred to.
Al-Ash'ari made no reference to the doctrine of the shafa'a
in his Luma*, but he did mention it in both the Ibana and the
Risala II. In his creed of the Ibana, he said, "We believe that
God, through the intercession of Muhammad, God's apostle, will
bring forth people from hell after they have been burned to ashes,
in accordance with what we are told in the Traditions which are
(3)
attributed to the authority of God's apostle." In his Risala II.
he specified that intercession is for those Muslims who have
(4) < -
committed grave sins. Al-Ash ari thus tried to refute the
Mu'tazilite views on this problem. The Mu'tazilites maintained
that intercession is only for the believers and interpreted it in
the sense that it gives them more of God's bounty and beneficence.
To him, intercession could not possibly be for such believers,
because it would be useless since those believers had already been
promised rewards and bounty and it did not require intercession
(1) Risala II. p.106,7.
(2) See Supra. p.434-5.
(3) Ibana. p.11,3-4.
(4) Risala II. p.106,8-10, also Maqalat. p.293,10-11.
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for this to be realized. He concluded that, "the intercession
in question is only for those who deserve punishment, in order
that their punishment may be removed from them, and for those to
whom He has not promised a thing in order that He may bestow it
upon them, and so, since there is a preceeding promise of
bestowal for the believers, there is no reason why intercession
should be for them.^"^
2. Al-Ash'ari's Conception of Iman
As T. Izutsu rightly remarked, al-Ash'ari does not seem to
be greatly interested in discussing the problem of the essential
- - (2)
conceptual constitutions of Iman. Thus he touched only
slightly on this problem in his surviving works, and gave no
satisfactory information concerning his own views. Yet his
followers, the later Ash'arltes, attributed to him different
doctrines and thus further confused his whole treatment of the
subj ect.
In his Luma* , al-Ash'ari defines Iman as assent (tasdiq)
or belief in God. He based this definition on linguistic grounds,
saying that the Qur'an is revealed in the Arabic language, so
the terms it uses must be understood in the sense given by this
language. According to al-Ash'ari, "In the Arabic language,
Iman means tasdiq. It is used in this sense in the Qur'anic
verse, 12:17, "But you do not have faith in us, though we are
truthful", meaning that you do not believe us (bi-musaddiq).
(1) Ibana. p.69,8-22.
(2) Izutsu, op.cit. , p.147.
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Also in the normal use of the language it is said, "so and so
has faith in the punishment of the grave and intercession",
meaning that he believes in them (yusaddiq). Accordingly, Iman
must mean tasdiq.^ ^ ^ Al-Ash'ari mentioned neither "saying" nor
"work" as part of Iman. In the Ibana, this definition of Iman
was reversed. Here, al-Ash'ari does not mention tasdiq, but said
(2)
that "we believe that faith consists of words and deeds". Does
this mean that al-Ash'ari held two different concepts of Iman or
that he is only laying emphasis on one aspect in each one of his
Works? By defining Iman in terms of words and deeds in the
Ibana. al-Ash'ari does not seem to have meant to indicate that
tasdiq is insignificant, but simply to emphasize the importance
of works and confession in the Hanbalite fashion. Thus, in order
to represent the Hanbalite view, al-Ash'ari laid more emphasis on
these terms, as if he was suggesting that tasdiq is so important
and essential that it should not require to be mentioned expli¬
citly. The importance of tasdiq is shown in al-Ash'ari's Luma'
where only tasdiq is mentioned and strongly argued for.
However, these brief statements of al-Ash'ari are insufficient
to give us a clear picture of his thoughts on Iman. Therefore,
by considering the views attributed to him by his followers, a
better understanding might be obtained. Al-Baghdadi, the Ash'arite
theologian and heresiographer, tells us that al-Ash'ari said
that: Iman is tasdiq to God and to His messengers, but that




Kufr, in his view, is nothing other than "giving the lie"
(takdhib).^ ^ This view agrees with the Luma*'s definition of
Iman as tasdiq, and adds that in al-Ash'ari's conception, know¬
ledge is the very basis of tasdiq. Ash-Shahrastani's statement
that al-Ash'ari sometimes defines it (i.e. tasdiq) as the know-
ledge of the Divinity, pre-existence and attributes of the creator,
and sometimes he defined it in the sense of a mental speech
(qawl fi-nafs). which contained the knowledge of God. When this
mental speech is uttered, it becomes confession with the tongue.
This verbal confession is also called tasdiq. The performance
of the fundamental duties is also a kind of tasdiq in the sense
that it is an outward indication of tasdiq, just as the verbal




Prom these opinions, ash-Shahrastani drew the conclusion
that, in al-Ash'ari's view, the idea subsisting in the heart is
the root of which "verbal confession" and "work" are only outward
indications. In his Milal, ash-Shahrastani attributed to al-
Ash'ari the view that Iman is assent by the heart. Confession
by the tongue and works are only its branches. So if a person
asserted by his heart and believed in the oneness of God, His
messengers and the messages they brought down from Him, he would
be a mu'min, and if he died instantly without confessing or
(3)
performing an act, he would be saved.
(1) Baghdadi, Usui. p.248,14-16.
(2) Iqdam, p.472.
(3) Milal. vol.1, p.101.
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Al-Ash'ari, following the Hanbalite conception of Iman,
declares that Iman is subject to increases and decreases; it
increases through the acts of obedience and decreases through
the acts of disobedience. However, this decreasing of Iman
neither implies doubt about what a Muslim believes in, nor ignor¬
ance of it, since otherwise it would be unbelief. By decrease is
meant decreasing in understanding and full information on the
man's part. Prom this respect, Iman is of various degrees, and
differs from one person to another, just as our acts of obedience
differ from those performed by a prophet, although we all are
performing similar obligations.^^ As far as the relationship
between Islam and Iman is concerned, al-Ash'ari declared that
Islam is more general than Iman, and that not every Islam is
Iman. Thus the application of the term Islam is wider and could
in fact be applied to anyone who calls himself a Muslim, whereas
- - (2)
Iman is limited in its application.
3. The Creation of Iman
In his creed of the Kaqalat. al-Ash'ari stated that the
Sunnites refrained from judging whether Iman was created or un-
(3") - -
created. Yet a short treatise entitled Mas'ala fi-l-Iman is
said to have been devoted by al-Ash'ari to the discussion of
this problem. This treatise is believed to have been an answer
to the question of whether or not Iman is created, and intended




to give the views of the Sunnite theologians regarding this
question.
In his reply to these questions, al-Ash'ari held that iman
is uncreated and explained the differences occurring among his
colleagues regarding this problem. He pointed out that some of
the speculative theologians (ahl an-nazar) among his colleagues
maintained that iman is created. These include men such as:
Harith al-Kuhasibi, Ja'far b.Harb, *Abd Allah b.Kullab and 'Abd
• • •
al-'Aziz al-Makki. They based their views on a rather simple
argument that, by carefully observing the existing things, they
found that everything was created except God and His attributes,
iman, which is obviously a human property and a human act, cannot
be an attribute of God, and therefore it must be among the
"created things".
Ahmad b.Hanbal and other Traditionalists hold the opposite
• •
- - (2)
view, and maintained that Iman is uncreated. Al-Ash'ari
openly declared his favouring of this view and expressed his
adherence to it, and even tried to find rational basis and logical
arguments for its justification. In doing this, he began by con¬
sidering the exact meaning of the word "created" which, to him,
means what has come into being after having been non-existent.
He pointed out that creation, in this sense, cannot possibly be
applied to Iman because, if we are to say that Iman is created,
that would imply that iman had been non-existent before it was
created. This would imply that before iman was created, there was
(1) Al-Ash'ari, Kitab al-iman. p.139,13-17.
(2) Ibid.. p.138,17-18.
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a state in which there was neither Iman nor tawhid (i.e. acknow¬
ledgment of God's oneness). In reality, however, according to
al-Ash'ari, there was never a state in which there was no Iman
and tawhid, neither before nor after the creation of Iman.^^
It is obvious that here al-Ash'ari is referring to Iman,
not as a human phenomenon, but as a cosmic event and an abstract
concept which is not related to any individual being. He made
this quite clear in his answer to the objection that such a
conception of Iman would imply that Iman might exist without
(2)
there being a believer. He affirmed this, and went even
further and connected Iman with God Himself. He said that in
this concept, Iman is identical with tasdiq and tawhid (confession
• •
of the oneness of God). So, as tawhid needs muwahhid. Iman calls
• • •
for a mu *min. Before the creation of mankind, God had declared
His oneness, glorified Himself, and testified His truthfulness
(musaddiq) . This means that Iman, which is tawhid and tasdiq,
• • •
is eternal and uncreated. Support for such a view is to be
found in the Qur'an, where God says, "Verily I am God, there is
(3)
no god but I" (which is nothing other than tawhid), and declares
Himself to be truthful (which is nothing other than tasdiq). So
even if there was no man to practise tawhid and tasdiq, these
• •
concepts would exist. That is to say that Iman existed before
(4) .
the creation of man. Al-Ash ari said that all this suggested
(1) Al-Ash'ari, Kitab al-Iman. pp.138,20-24; 139,1-5.
(2) Ibid., p.139,5-7.
(3) Qur'an, 20:14.
(4) Al-Ash'ari, Kitab al-Iman. p.139,7-17.
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that when Iman was used in an abstract sense and was not connected
with something created, it was one of the Divine attributes of
God and thus it was uncreated. He quoted the verse, "He is
allah; there is no god but He. He is the supreme Lord, the All-
Holy, the All-Peaceable (mu'min)" Q.59:23, where God called Him¬
self a mu'min and included this among the names which He applied
to Himself, to prove that Iman is an uncreated concept.
"It is quite evident", as T. Izutsu remarked, "that in this
argument, al-Ash'ari is only paying attention to the outer form
of the word mu'min, because the meaning of the word when related
to man in normal use of language refers to one who believes.
Whilst in the verse quoted by al-Ash'ari, it is related to God
and conveys quite a different meaning, although derived from the
same root. Here it means one who makes somebody feel safe, "one
who sets the mind of somebody at rest", one who ensures and
(2)
safeguards."
Al-Ash'ari criticized the speculative theologians among his
colleagues for using false reasoning, and for deriving the wrong
conclusion from this view of the creation of Iman: They have
examined all the created beings, the conditions and properties
of which they have observed, and they have found them all to be
created. Furthermore, they have ascertained that Iman is one of
the attributes peculiar to the creatures, and from this they have
concluded that iman is created. This is certainly a mistaken
conclusion, based on their failure to understand that iman is
(1) Al-Ash'ari, Kitab al-Iman. p.139.17-24.
(2) Izutsu, op.cit.. p.208-9.
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essentially related to God. It is similar to all God's attr¬
ibutes shared by man and God, such as: knowledge and speech, in
that when they are related to God, they would be neither created
0)
nor temporal.
According to this identification between iman and God's
essential attributes, al-Ash'ari refuted the objection that the
assertion of the uncreatedness of Iman would entail the existence
of eternals besides God. He pointed out that as this is not
applicable in the case of God's essential attributes, such as
speech and knowledge, it would not be valid in the case of
Iman.^
Finally, al-Ash'ari stated the reasons which led him to
emphasise the uncreatedness of tawhid, i.e. iman. He pointed
out that the assertion of its creation leads eventually to the
assumption of the creation of the Qur'an. He explained this
by saying that in the Qur'an, God has declared His unity by
saying, "verily I am God; there is no god but I". If it were
possible to say that tawhid is created, then it would be possible
to assume that these words of the Qur'an by which God had
declared His oneness are also created, and this inevitably entails
that the Qur'an is created, which is downright kufr. Thus it has
(3)
to be established that tawhid is neither created nor temporal.




CONCLUSION TO CHAPTERS VII AND VIII
From the above-mentioned account of the views of al-Maturidi
and al-Ash'ari on the problem of iman, it might be concluded that
al-Ash'ari does not seem to be concerned as al-Maturidi, with
this problem. This is quite evident from the elaborate analysis
and discussions of al-Maturidi, compared with the brief state¬
ments and references found in al-Ash'ari's works.
Both al-Maturidi and al-Ash'ari tackled the problem of the
destiny, of the grave sinner, and hold almost similar views that
the grave sinner is a believer and thus should not be punished
eternally in Hell. However, what al-Ash'ari seems to be concerned
with is the refutation of the Mu'tazilite doctrine of the inter¬
mediate position (al-manzila bayn al-manzilatavn). While al-
Maturidi had in mind this doctrine of the Mu'tazilites as well
as the doctrines of other sects and individuals such as the
Kharijites and al-Hasan al-Basri. Al-Maturidi elaborately argued
• •
from both revelation and reason to establish his point of view
and to refute those of his adversaries.
Concerning the conception of Iman, al-Maturidi defines iman
as assent by the heart (tasdio bil-qalb). Al-Ash'ari, however,
had the same definition in his Luma'. while in the Ibana he
followed the Hanbalites and thus defined iman as words and works.
And while al-Ash'ari's brief statement indicates his uninterest
in this problem, al-Maturidi•s treatment of the point showed his
concern to refute the views of the Karramites that iman is
verbal confession, as well as the view that iman is only knowledge.
He also rejected the inclusion of works into the definition of Iman.
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The problem of istithna' is absent from al-Ash'ari's work,
while al-Katuridi adopted the Hanafite views in opposition to
the Hanbalites. Thus he emphasized the point that such istithna'
is a kind of doubt and it is pointless and illogical for a
believer to express any doubt in his belief.
Regarding the relation between Iman and Islam, it is found
that the only statement of al-Ash'ari in this respect, that
- _ _ _
Islam is general than Iman, is of a Hanbalite origin. Al-Maturidi,
A •
however, quoted many Qur'anic verses and argued to support the
Hanafite view that Iman and Islam are identical terms and convey
the same conceptions. This is in spite of their differences from
a linguistic point of view.
Al-Maturidi and al-Ash'ari also differ regarding the point
whether iman is created or it is uncreated. Arguing from the
fact that iman is man's action, al-Maturidi concluded that it is
created. Al-Ash'ari, however, thought of Iman as an abstract
concept which is related to God from eternity, therefore, he
held that it is uncreated.
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